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exploded in early 2002. As a new, full-of-energy, attorney, I had the chance of bringing 
many lawsuits on behalf of people who experienced what the Administration was doing 
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back salaries and pensions, etc.— as truly draconian. As a young adjunct law professor, 
teaching constitutional law, I was afforded the opportunity to reflect upon the legal and 
moral aspects of the economic emergency regime. Memories came rushing back from my 
early years in high school, when then-President Menem had decreed a compulsory swap 
of bank deposits for long-term bonds. Countless other situations where, as a child, I had 
heard people complaining for what I now interpreted as potential violations of property 
rights acquired a new significance. I was mesmerized by the complex, ambiguous 
character of the situation: on the one hand, it was clear that the Government had to do 
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 This dissertation addresses the topic of the constitutional protection of property 
rights in the context of economic emergencies, especially —although not exclusively— in 
cases of financial crises. In so doing, it brings together several different strands that 
seldom appear side-by-side in the constitutional theory literature: emergency powers, 
property theory (especially, takings-related notions), constitutional interpretation, legal 
and institutional history, public choice, and theories of justice. It also resorts to recent 
empirical work on the legitimacy of courts and relies on insights from the fields of 
economics and behavioral economics to shed light on some of the more disquieting 
questions posed by the phenomenon of economic emergency. Throughout this journey, I 
will try to convince the reader that many of our most common assumptions regarding 
the role of courts in socio-economic matters and the place of property rights in the 
constitutional space, among others, deserve a profound revision. Conventional wisdom 
will be frequently put to question. While this work uses Argentina‘s history as a case 
study, it certainly aspires to offer quite a few insights that may contribute to the broader, 









Property, in one way or another, has been around for a long time. Perhaps in the very 
beginning of human life, as there was only mild scarcity of most resources, worries about 
property may have been of lesser intensity. But it must have not been long1 before 
relationships between persons made it necessary to implement a system of rules 
governing access to and control of material resources.2 Ever since, property has 
generated heated controversies, bloody disputes, and attempts at justification of one or 
another proposed conception of property. Its allocative character, whether or not one 
considers it to be a distinctive feature of property rights,3 makes it an especially 
contentious right. Exclusion seems to be a central feature of any system of private 
property,4 which sets the stage for the battle of the ―have-nots‖ against the ―haves‖.5 At a 
                                                 
1 As early as Genesis 13:5-13, the Bible shows the problem of distribution of resources and the entitlements 
to them. Albeit in an amicable way, Abram and Lot decide to part ways and take each a different piece of 
land, in order to avoid any contention.  Then, in Job 1:10-20, the Accuser takes as a given that Job would be 
very sensitive to any advance over his property. 
 
2 Jeremy Waldron, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 31-32 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988. I will 
be using here the distinction between concept and conception suggested by John Rawls, and applied to the 
topic of property by Waldron.  
 
3 See, e.g., Laura Underkuffler, ―Property: A Special Right‖, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1033, 1038 (1996) 
(arguing that ―the institution of property is different [from the institutions that embody other rights]. 
Property involves allocation…the giving to one person necessarily denies or takes from another‖); Gregory 
S. Alexander, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY 5 (Chicago-London, 
The University of Chicago Press, 2006) (acknowledging the allocative feature of property rights as a cause 
for debate around them, but denying that this feature is unique to property: other rights may also have 
allocative effects, though they are not understood as a core function of such rights). 
 
4 See, e.g., J.E. Penner, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 103 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), Jim 
Harris, ―Is Property a Human Right?‖, in Janet MacLean (editor), PROPERTY AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 67 (Oxford-Portland, Hart Publishing, 1999); Douglass C. North, STRUCTURE AND 
CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 21(New York-London, W.W. Norton & Company, 1981). 
 
5 Of course, this does not mean that such social ―battles‖ exist only because of private property nor that 
were the current property arrangement replaced for another based on a different conception of property, 
there would be no confrontation. As Alan Ryan points out, once it‘s admitted that men may have an 
interest in domination for other than material reasons and that they can satisfy their material interests 
without actually owning anything, it seems clear that the division between ―haves‖ and ―have-nots‖ is one 
possible stage for confrontation, but not the only one. Still, the distinction is significant, because what you 
own, how much you own, and what you can do with it makes a lot of difference to your well-being and 
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minimum, the dispute may involve the exchange of passionate arguments for both sides 
and the demand for justification of possessions; at a maximum, the dialectical battle may 
turn into actual contests of physical force.  
Rivers of ink have run, trying to supply the definitive argument for one or another 
position.6 Property has been idolized7 and demonized in similar proportions.8 Some have 
                                                                                                                                            
security. See Alan Ryan, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 188, 192 (Oxford-New York, Basil 
Blackwell, 1984). 
 
6 The literature on the topic is very extensive, indeed. For a brief, but thoughtful, analysis of the different 
arguments offered for and against private property, see generally Lawrence C. Becker, PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS (Boston, London, Melbourne & Henley, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1977). See also Peter G. Stillman, ―Property, Freedom, and Individuality in Hegel‘s and Marx‘s 
Political Thought‖, in J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 130-167 
(New York University Press, New York, 1980) (comparing Hegel‘s and Marx thoughts on property, and 
the role property plays in each of these systems of political thought: while for Hegel private property is 
essentially linked to individuality and development of the self, for Marx capitalist private property is 
nothing but the suppression of individuality). 
 
7 See, e.g., J. Roland Pennock, ―Thoughts on the Right to Private Property‖, in J. Roland Pennock & John 
W. Chapman, above n. 6, at 173-182 (arguing that the justification of the institution of private property 
does not seem a difficult task, on both deontological and utilitarian grounds, and that property is one of 
the ―Great Rights‖, playing a prominent and valuable role in modern societies); John W. Chapman, 
―Justice, Freedom, and Property‖, in J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, above n. 6, at 298-299 
(arguing that ―comparative history strongly suggests, if not outright demonstrates, that private property is 
crucial to formation of just and open societies‖); J.E. Penner, above n. 4, at 206 (arguing that the legitimacy 
of property rights per se is ―nigh indisputable, for the practice of property protects a liberty, i.e. exclusively 
to determine the use of things, that has proved marvelously productive in contributing to the good life of 
many‖, despite the important issue of property‘s distribution); Richard Pipes, PROPERTY AND 
FREEDOM  286-287 (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1999) (―Property is an indispensable ingredient of 
both prosperity and freedom. The close relationship between property and prosperity is demonstrated by 
the course of history [...] The historical evidence indicates that property can coexist with arbitrary and even 
oppressive political power, whereas democracy cannot do without it‖). 
 
8 See, e.g., Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, WHAT IS PROPERTY? OR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT AND OF GOVERNMENT 262 (New York, Dover, 1970) (electronic version 
available at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-
new2?id=ProProp.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&par
t=all; last visited 01/04/2013) (attempting to show the ―perfect identity‖ of property and robbery); Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, ―Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality Among Men‖, in Victor 
Gouretvich (ed.), ROUSSEAU: THE DISCOURSES AND OTHER EARLY POLITICAL WRITINGS 
171 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997) (arguing that ―competence and rivalry on the one 
hand, conflicts of interest on the other, and always the hidden desire to profit at another‘s expense; all 
these evils are the first effect of property, and the inseparable train of nascent inequality‖); Richard E. 
Flathman, ―On the Alleged Impossibility of an Unqualified Disjustificatory Theory of Property Rights‖, in 
J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, above n. 6, at 221-222 (arguing that property rights are, prima 
facie, doubly objectionable and doubly dangerous, and that there are good reasons for the persistent strain 
of anti-property thoughts); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, ―The Morality of Property‖, 48 Wm. & 
Mary L Rev. 1849 (2007) (pointing to a tradition, which would be stronger in academic circles than in 
popular thought, that associates property with immorality). 
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thought it to be a pre-social, natural right expressing the rights of persons which are prior 
to the state and the law; some have regarded it as a social, positive right created 
instrumentally by the community to secure other goals.9 It has been pointed out as the 
cause of the ―First Economic Revolution‖,10 and the efficiency of its structure as a 
determinant of economic growth or, alternatively, stagnation.11 From the other side of 
the fence, some have argued that this sort of association between the property rights 
characteristic of capitalist economies and their prosperity is nothing but a sign of 
institutional fetishism12 —or, at least, a very contestable assertion—,13 and that private 
property is a bulwark of inequality.14  
                                                 
9 Joshua Getzler, ―Theories of Property and Economic Development‖, 26 J. Interdiscip. Hist. 639, 641 
(1996) (arguing that theories of property within the Western philosophical tradition can be divided roughly 
along these lines). 
 
10 Douglass C. North, above n. 4, at 63-64, 74 (fn. 3), 89. 
 
11 Id., at 17, 148. Also see Angus Maddison, GROWTH AND INTERACTION IN THE WORLD 
ECONOMY: THE ROOTS OF MODERNITY 19 (Washington D.C., The AEI Press, 2005) (arguing that 
non-discretional systems of protection of property rights play a role in the explanation of the accumulation 
of wealth in Western economies); David A. Leblang, ―Property Rights, Democracy, and Economic 
Growth‖, 49 Polit. Res. Q. 5, 21 (1996) (arguing that empirical evidence shows that nations that protect 
property rights grow faster than those that do not). 
 
12 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 7 (London-New 
York, Verso, 1996) (arguing that institutional fetishism is the belief that abstract institutional conceptions, 
like the market economy, and a free civil society, have a single natural and necessary institutional 
expression). Id., at 24 ( ―The more ideologically reactionary and aggressive forms of political economy have 
identified a particular system of market institutions and of private law as the natural and necessary form of 
the market economy […] The property regime is the quintessence of this evolutionary achievement‖) 
 
13 Alan Ryan, above n. 5 , at 178. 
 
14 See, e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, ―American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of Private Property‖, in Jon 
Elster & Rune Slagstad (editors), CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 256 (Cambridge-New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 1993) (arguing that in the American tradition property has been tied to 
inequality and, thus, despite some serious strategic problems, one could see the alleged disintegration of 
property and decline of the concept with some satisfaction, hoping to give the values once associated with 
property a primacy now unencumbered by the inegalitarian tradition). Id., at 260 (arguing that inequality 
has been at the center of the traditional understanding of the relationship between property and liberty and 
that the protection of property requires the protection of inequality). Id., at 271 (considering that property 
has been a pernicious force in the American constitutional tradition). 
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Moreover, the discussion over property rights does not end with the eventual 
settlement of disputes about its institutional worth. It seems that even if we were in 
complete agreement regarding the value of organizing the access to, and control of, 
material resources under a system of private property and we had convinced ourselves of 
the moral worth of such conception, we would still have reasons to feel moral anxiety.15 
Any distribution of resources that we may deem just is highly unlikely to remain stable, 
unless we are of a favorable disposition towards a permanently intervening state, 
something whose moral attractiveness is quite disputable, indeed.16 Such instability 
wouldn‘t be a problem, if we could only manage to guarantee that all exchanges made 
after a just state of affairs is achieved were themselves free, voluntary, and just.17 
Presumably, we could also consider just the state of affairs arisen from an initially just 
situation through just steps. But, as Gerald Cohen has poignantly argued, it is far from 
clear that just exchanges can transmit justice to their results.18 Justice doesn‘t seem to be 
movable from an initial state-of-affairs ―A‖ to an end-state ―B‖, via just transactions, in 
the same way a couch can be moved from house ―A‖ to house ―B‖, using a rental truck.  
Anxiety can only rise if we make a mistake in the selection of our system of property 
entitlements, so that it is not just. For whatever we may think of the justice of the 
original entitlements, those entitlements become integrated in people‘s lives in morally 
significant ways,19 thus acquiring ―a moral life of their own‖ and becoming ―morally 
                                                 
15 Emily Sherwin, ―Three Reasons Why Even Good Property Rights Cause Moral Anxiety‖, 48 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1927, 1934 (2007). 
 
16 Robert Nozick, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 161-162 (New York, Basic Books, 1974). 
 
17 Id., at 151. 
 
18 Gerald A. Cohen, ―Robert Nozick and Wilt Chamberlain: How Patterns Preserve Liberty‖, 11 Erkenntnis 
5, 9 (1977). 
 
19 Emily Sherwin, above n. 15, at 1939. 
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wrong to interfere with them, even though it would not have been morally wrong to set 
up the system of property on a different basis altogether‖.20 In effect, property seems to 
exhibit a peculiarly resilient quality, thanks to which justificatory judgments about the 
institution itself and judgments about the conduct or character of individuals constrained 
by the institution appear somewhat dissonant or independent from each other to a 
greater degree than what happens with other legal institutions.21 Someone who steals is 
generally regarded as dishonest, and his action is considered morally wrong, despite the 
fact that existing property entitlements may not be adequately justified. Attempts to 
change a system of property radically are profoundly disruptive and, thus, injustices made 
in its establishment are not easily correctible.22 
                                                                                                                                            
 
20 Jeremy Waldron, ―The Normative Resiliency of Property‖, in Janet MacLean (editor), above n. 4, at 186. 
 
21 Id., at 176-177.   
 
22 A good example is the situation of property rights in South Africa. It is almost impossible to imagine any 
theory of justice that could support the distributive situation the country was after almost a whole century 
under the regime of apartheid. However, when the new constitution was negotiated, the solution to a 
wholly unjustified system of property wasn‘t starting from scratch. On the contrary, Section 25 of the 
South African Constitution is committed to land reform and to the correction of past injustices, but it still 
provides for equitable compensation in case of expropriation. If property didn‘t exhibit the normative 
resiliency identified by Waldron, what would be the reason for requiring compensation in cases of land 
reform? It would be enough to invoke the necessity of land reform to justify the taking of land without any 
compensation whatsoever. Presumably, those who hold land in sufficient extension for it to be useful for 
general reform purposes have benefited from the apartheid regime, in one way or another. Even if they did 
not commit any morally unjustified act themselves nor supported the regime, they might have benefited 
from their ancestors‘ injustice. They might have inherited wealth acquired in unjustified ways. Then, why 
not simply establish that, being morally unjust the system of entitlements in place, expropriation aiming to 
establish a just system should be carried out with no compensation at all? Putting aside the obvious 
practical response that points to the political power property owners held during the negotiation of the 
new constitution, one could reply that compensation is required because otherwise the system to be 
established in the name of justice would itself be unjust. Presumably, current holders are entitled to 
something in the new regime. Otherwise, it would mean just the substitution of one kind of oppression for 
another. But such reply just will not do: compensation is not conceptually required by the new, justice-
oriented system; much less a compensation mechanism that takes into account a number of factors that 
may return a close-to-market-value result. The new system, in order to avoid charges of injustice, would 
have to redistribute something to the current holders, in accordance with its own internal distributive 
principle, but not necessarily anything near market value, nor anything that deserves the name of 
―compensation‖. The very use of the word ―compensation‖ conveys the idea that there is something 
deserving of protection in the current entitlements, however unjust the property regime —considered on 
the whole— may be.  
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These, among many other points, have generated extensive debate on whether 
property rights are adequate candidates for constitutional protection. It is often argued 
that there is an inevitable tension between constitutional property and democracy.23 
Indeed, that is the very same charge sometimes made against any kind of right whose 
content is ultimately determined by unelected judges who enjoy the institutional ability of 
allegedly trumping the will of elected majorities, bar the exceptional case of constitutional 
reform.24 But for a number of reasons, the most important of which seems to be the 
essentially contestable character of judgments regarding the justice or injustice of 
economic and social regulations,25 the tension appears to be particularly acute in the case 
of property rights.  
It is clear, thus, that simply assuming the justice and moral worth of the stability of 
the status quo, in today‘s complex societies, just won‘t do to end the debate. Even 
staunch defenders of minimal state intervention acknowledge the need of correcting 
market failures,26 and those of a less suspicious predisposition towards state‘s activities 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, above n. 3, at 30-34. 
 
24 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, ―The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review‖, 115 Yale L. J. 1346 (2006). 
 
25 John Rawls, above n. 4, at 174-175 (Cambridge, Belknap-Harvard, 2003) (arguing that frequently the best 
we can say about a rule dealing with social or economic issues is that is not clearly unjust); Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting, ―I do not stop to consider whether any particular view of 
this economic question presents the sounder theory [...] It is enough for the determination of this case, and 
it is enough for this court to know, that the question is one about which there is room for debate and for 
an honest difference of opinion‖, 198 U.S. 45, 72), (Holmes, J., dissenting, ―a Constitution is not intended 
to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to 
the state or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our 
finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our 
judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution‖, 198 U.S. 
45, 75-76).  
 
26 See, e.g., George L. Priest, ―Poverty, Inequality, and Economic Growth‖, SELA paper 1999 7  (arguing 
that many political decisions do enhance societal value, in particular, those that create a legal and 
institutional structure that channel market exchanges so that they are uniformly value-enhancing) (available 
at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Priest_poverty_inequality_and_economic_growth_simple_prin
ciples.pdf; last visited 02/08/2013). There is Spanish translation: ―Pobreza, inequidad y crecimiento 
economico. Principios basicos‖, SELA 1999, Revista Juridica de la Universidad de Palermo 157 (2000); George 
L. Priest, ―Economic Rights, Personal Rights, and Other Constraints on Majoritarian Outcomes‖, SELA 
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will argue that a stronger intervention is needed in order to achieve distributive justice.27 
The complexities of modern capitalist economies often prompt the need for one or 
another degree of collective action in the management of economic affairs. But, as Bruce 
Ackerman has pointed out, ―just because state intervention sometimes improves upon 
the invisible hand, it does not mean that activism is without its own moral difficulties.‖28 
Potential instability and crude contests over the control of resources is one difficulty that 
quickly comes to mind. The possibility of abuses against those who have less political 
power, in the occasion of such contest, is another.29 How much flexibility, or rigidity, 
should be allowed for the re-allocation of entitlements is, ultimately, the question lurking 
                                                                                                                                            
paper 2001 17 (arguing that we can confidently predict that, beyond the basic structure of property, 
contract, tort, and antitrust law, the greater the extent of majority regulation or control, the lower the total 
societal value enhancement will be) (available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Priest_Economic_Rights_Personal_Rights_and_Other_Constr
aints_on_Majoritarian_Outcomes.pdf; last visited 02/10/2013). There is a Spanish translation: ―Derechos 
económicos, derechos personales, y otras restricciones sobre los resultados de las mayorías‖, in Roberto 
Saba (ed.), SELA 2001 LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (Buenos Aires, Editores del Puerto, 
2003).  
 
27 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 375 (Cambridge-London, The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 2011) (―[...] your liberty includes the right to use property that is rightfully 
yours, except in ways your government can rightfully restrict [...] The structure and level of taxation in 
force may invade liberty if it is unjust —if it does not show equal concern and respect for all. Taxation in 
many countries now is unjust, but because it takes too little, not too much. It does not deprive people of 
what is rightfully theirs; on the contrary, it fails to provide the means of granting them what it is rightfully 
theirs‖); Frank I. Michelman, ―Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property‖, 72 Iowa 
L. Rev. 1319, 1319-1321 (1987) (distinguishing between a ―possessive‖ and a ―distributive‖ conception of 
constitutional property and arguing that ―we primarily understand property in its constitutional sense as an 
antiredistributive principle, opposed to governmental interventions into the extant regime of holdings for 
the sake of distributive ends  […] the distributive side of this normative constitutional idea of property has, 
from the beginning, been recessive in the discourse of American lawyers and judges […] That the 
consequences are in some measure unfortunate may not be very controversial […] [the] legal recovery of 
the full constitutional idea of property requires some relaxation of the distinction between law and politics, 
some visionary rapprochement of the two. We would have to accept some greater degree of politicization of 
our ideal understanding of adjudication, and particularly of constitutional adjudication, than we have yet 
learned to find comfortable‖; emphasis in the original). 
 
28 Bruce A. Ackerman, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 2 (New Haven-London, 
Yale University Press, 1977).  
 
29 An argument of this kind may have played an important role in the endorsement, by oppressed sectors, 
of the inclusion of a property clause in the South African Constitution. See Andre J. Van Der Walt, ―The 
Constitutional Property Clause: Striking a Balance Between Guarantee and Limitation‖, in Janet MacLean 
(editor), above n. 4, at 112. 
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in the shadows of any system of private property. Constitutional protection of property 
rights, at least in societies where the power of judicial review is recognized, has a direct 
impact on all these issues and, thus, the decision whether to include a property clause 
among constitutional provisions is a consequential one.30 
Emergency powers are also an old legal-political institution. The idea that there exist 
circumstances in which rules can‘t be observed, either because compliance is materially 
impossible or because it would lead to consequences that are deemed unacceptable, has 
been around for a long time. Expressions such as state of exception, state of emergency, 
constitutional dictatorship, constitutional necessity, among others, have been coined to 
conceptualize the issue. Perhaps the most frequently cited institution regarding the 
problem of exception and extraordinary powers is the Roman dictatorship.31 Closer in 
time, common law countries acknowledge a tradition of ―martial law‖, as a model for 
dealing with emergencies, and France has developed its own ―state-of-siege‖ model. 
Many other countries follow one or another tradition, and sometimes mix elements of 
the different traditions, in search of a workable formula. One thing is clear, though: the 
issue of emergency, although for a long time relegated to the shadows of scholarly 
concern and under-theorized, is omnipresent throughout the world and is rightly 
deserving of the attention it has received lately.  
                                                 
30 See Kenneth R. Minogue, ―The Concept of Property and Its Significance‖, in J. Roland Pennock & John 
W. Chapman, above n. 6, at 21 (arguing that the concern with property and the constitution goes back as 
far as Solon and Lycurgus). 
 
31 See, e.g., John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, ―The Law of Exception: A Typology of Emergency 
Powers‖, 2 Int’l J. Const. L. 210 (2004); Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISES: 
EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 17-26 (New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). But see Giorgio Agamben, STATE OF EXCEPTION 47-48 (Chicago-London, The 
University of Chicago Press, 2005) (arguing that it is a mistake to equate state of exception with 
dictatorship, and that it is this mistake that has prevented writers as Schmitt and Rossiter from resolving 
the aporias of the state of exception; instead the state of exception would acknowledge its origin in the 




Many countries, small and large, powerful and weak, developed and in development, 
have had one or another encounter with the idea of emergency powers. Such experiential 
reality seems to be a prima facie good reason to explain the tendency of contemporary 
constitutional regimes to provide for emergency institutions in some way.32 After 9/11, 
there has been a sudden renaissance of interest in emergency powers. But, clearly, the 
problem has been there since long ago, and citizens of nations more accustomed to 
dealing with crises have always kept a worried eye on the exercise of exceptional powers.  
John Locke sowed the seeds of theorization of discretionary powers with his 
elaboration on the executive‘s prerogative:  
―[…] the good of society requires that several things should be left to the discretion 
of him that has the executive power. For the legislators not being able to foresee and 
provide by laws all that may be useful to the community, the executor of the laws, 
having the power in his hands, has by the common law of nature a right to make use 
of it for the good of society […] it is fit that the law themselves should in some case 
give way to the executive power […] This power to act according to discretion for 
the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it 
[…] is called prerogative‖33 
 
Later on, Carl Schmitt built a sharp critique of liberalism around the idea of 
exception, in which he thought lay an inherent contradiction of the liberal system itself,34 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, above n. 31, at 37; Venelin I. Ganev, ―Emergency Powers 
and the New East Constitutions‖, 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 585 (1997) (analyzing the emergency provisions of 
eight East-European constitutions, which represent all regions of the former communist empire); Gabriel 
L. Negretto & José Antonio Aguilar-Rivera, ―Liberalism and Emergency Powers in Latin America: 
Reflections on Carl Schmitt and the Theory of Constitutional Dictatorship‖, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1797 (2000) 
(arguing that the abuse of emergency powers in Latin American countries is due to the lack of an adequate 
theoretical framework in the original constitutions which, absent a valid model, led to the incorporation of 
flawed emergency provisions later). 
 
33 John Locke, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION 74 (Dover Thrift Editions, Mineola/New York, 2002). 
 
34 See also Rune Slagstad, ―Liberal constitutionalism and its critics‖, in Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad 
(editors), DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 101 (Cambridge-New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) (―Schmitt unites themes drawn from both conservative and radical critiques of the 
ideology of constitutionalism. He asserts a discrepancy between idea and reality, and, turning reality against 
idea, finally rejects the concepts of the liberal Rechstaat and the parliamentary legislative state as outdated 
bourgeois ideology. His alternative is absolute state power […]‖)  
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and threw a large shadow over all attempts to regulate emergency powers. Liberal 
constitutionalism, according to Schmitt, aspires to subject political power to a system of 
norms, but it is a futile enterprise that depersonalizes the political, and moreover, hides 
the true reality of its goals. The essence of the political is, according to Schmitt, decision, 
not normativity. Since all liberal constitutional systems are built upon a founding decision 
that, in turn, does not depend on ―normativities‖, liberal constitutionalism does nothing 
but perpetuate the same kind of dictatorial act it aims to prevent.35  
For a long time, the idea of emergency powers was closely related to situations 
dominated by violence and in which the survival of the community itself, or at least that 
of many of its members, was at stake. Civil wars, rebellions, attempted invasions, and 
more traditional interstate wars have played a prominent role in the development of 
emergency institutions from Republican Rome on. Emergency powers were usually 
called on to deal with alleged ―existential threats‖ to the state,36 which couldn‘t be 
managed with the use of the resources the legal order provided. This situation is, 
ultimately, at the root of Schmitt‘s critique: the fundamental ―normativity‖ championed 
by liberal constitutionalism is ineffective for resolving truly life-threatening political 
conflicts,37 and thus, to preserve the very same functional political system that is an 
unacknowledged, but nonetheless fundamental, assumption of a liberal constitution.38 
Therefore, an unrestrained decision-maker is needed.  
                                                 
35 William E. Scheuerman, ―Carl Schmitt‘s Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism‖, 58 Rev. Polit. 299, 309 
(1996). 
 
36 Bruce A. Ackerman, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK 21 (Yale University Press, New Haven-London, 
2006). 
 
37 William E. Scheuerman, above n. 35, at 306. 
 
38 Id., at 305.  
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But, for a number of reasons, the ―existential threat‖ that is at base of Schmitt‘s 
construction has somehow lost part of its actual, although nothing of its rhetorical, 
preeminence in emergency theories, and the justification for a powerful center of 
discretionary decision has moved beyond the survival of the political community.39 
Alternatively, the grounds for considering a crisis as an ―existential threat‖ have 
expanded notoriously, to encompass cases well beyond violent dangers. In any case, 
there is a clear tendency towards an increasing concentration of discretionary powers in 
the executive branch. 
The compression of time and space generated by technological progress in 
transportation and communications has also affected traditional assumptions of liberal 
constitutionalism, particularly those concerning the relationship between the executive 
and the legislative branches. As William Scheuerman has said   
―[s]ince Locke the ideal of the rule of law has typically entailed a preference for 
legislation that is not only supposed to be prospective or future-oriented in 
character, but relatively stable as well […] Unfortunately, this core attribute of liberal 
jurisprudence probably presupposes a relatively static social and economic setting 
characterized by little pressure to update legal rules‖40  
 
The essentially dynamic character of contemporary economic and social life puts 
pressure on legal rules to be brought up to date. This pressure has often been conceived 
of as an emergency situation in itself. The Executive branch, allegedly best equipped to 
take swift and knowledgeable action, has been keen on taking a central role in the 
legislative process, taking for itself functions that traditional separation of powers 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., William E. Scheuerman, ―Emergency Powers‖, 2 Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 257, 274 (2006) 
(arguing that ―many and perhaps most crisis or emergency situations constitute serious threats, but by no 
means entail the prospect of the physical elimination of the political community‖); Bruce Ackerman, ―The 
Emergency Constitution‖, 113 Yale L. J. 1029, 1039 (2004) (arguing that terrorist attacks do not trigger the 
―existential rationale‖ for emergency powers); Owen M. Fiss, ―The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of 
Law‖, 26 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 235, 256 (2006) (arguing that what is at stake in the so-called ―War on 
Terror‖ is not whether the U.S. will survive, but the terms of the survival). 
 
40 William E. Scheuerman, ―Liberal Democracy and the Empire of Speed‖, 34 Polity 41, 54 (2001).  
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arguments reserved to the legislature. This tendency has been reinforced by the 
increasing interdependency of domestic and foreign affairs, with the latter having an 
ever-growing impact on the former, and the executives absorbing more legislative 
functions as a consequence of the process.41 
Emergency powers, along with its close relative, the idea of executive lawmaking, 
pose a whole range of significant questions for a political system. Some of them are 
exclusive to its function as a justification of discretionary powers, and some are indeed 
shared with cases where discretion is justified on other grounds but where the legal 
effects are similar. Addressing the issues raised is quite important, if nothing else, because 
―the voluntary creation of a permanent state of emergency (though perhaps not declared 
in the technical sense) has become one of the essential practices of contemporary 
states‖.42 
Constitutional property and the theory of emergency powers are, then, two major 
issues of contemporary law.43 What happens when they collide?  
Argentina is an interesting case to undertake the experiment and explore the 
remnants after a violent encounter of constitutional property and emergency powers. It 
has a written Constitution, heavily influenced by the U.S. Constitution,44 that declares 
                                                 
41 Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, above n. 31, at 209. 
 
42 Giorgio Agamben, above n. 31, at 2. 
 
43 But see Thomas C. Grey, ―The Disintegration of Property‖, in J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, 
bove n. 6, at 74-75 (arguing that the concept and the institution of property have disintegrated and are no 
longer a crucial or coherent category in our conceptual scheme). 
 
44 Jose Benjamin Gorostiaga, one of the drafters of the 1853 Constitution, said that the Constitution ―was 
cast in the mold of the U.S. Constitution‖. See Emilio Ravignani (editor), 4 ASAMBLEAS 
CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS 468 (Buenos Aires, Casa Jacobo Peuser, 1937). 
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itself ―the supreme law of the land‖45 and considers property as inviolable.46 Other 
provisions guarantee that every inhabitant of the country is entitled to ―make use and 
dispose of their property‖, in accordance with the laws that regulate the exercise of said 
rights,47 laws that ―shall not alter‖ the rights to be regulated.48 
At the same time, Argentina‘s recent history is rich in examples of profound 
economic crises that reverberate very strongly in the political realm. During the last 80 
years, the usual governmental tool to deal with such crises has been the doctrine of 
economic emergency, which has justified repeated State interventions in economic rights 
—property, according to Argentina‘s Supreme Court constitutional understanding of the 
concept—.49 The Supreme Court, strongly influenced by U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                 
45 Article 31, Constitution of the Argentine Nation (―This Constitution, the laws of the Nation enacted by 
Congress in pursuance thereof, and treaties with foreign powers are the supreme law of the land; and the 
authorities of province are bound thereby, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary included in the 
provincial laws or constitutions, except for the province of Buenos Aires, the treaties ratified after the Pact 
of November 11, 1859‖). 
 
46 Article 17, Constitution of the Argentine Nation (―Property is inviolable, and no inhabitant of the 
Nation can be deprived of it except by virtue of a judgment based on law. Expropriation for reasons of 
public interest must be authorized by law and previously compensated. Only Congress levies the taxes 
mentioned in Article 4. No personal service can be requested except by virtue of law or sentence based on 
law. Every author or inventor is the exclusive owner of his work, invention, or discovery for the term 
granted by law. The confiscation of property is hereby abolished forever from the Argentine Criminal 
Code. No armed body may make requisitions nor demand assistance of any kind‖) 
 
47 Article 14, Constitution of the Argentine Nation (―All the inhabitants of the Nation are entitled to the 
following rights, in accordance with the laws that regulate their exercise, namely: to work and perform any 
lawful industry; to navigate and trade; to petition the authorities; to enter, remain in, travel through, and 
leave the Argentine territory; to publish their ideas through the press without previous censorship; to make 
use and dispose of their property; to associate for useful purposes; to profess freely their religion; to teach 
and to learn‖). 
 
48 Article 28, Constitution of the Argentine Nation (―The principles, guarantees, and rights recognized in 
the preceding articles shall not be altered by laws that regulate their exercise‖). 
 
49 CSJN, Bourdieu, Pedro Emilio c. Municipalidad de la Capital, 145 Fallos 307 (1925). The Court defined 
property in its constitutional sense as ―every worthy interest that a man may possess, other than himself, 
his life and his liberty‖. Although the decision is quite old, its conceptualization of constitutional property 
has stood. See, e.g., 311 Fallos 2034 (1988), (Belluscio, Petracchi, JJ., dissenting); 312 Fallos 343 (1989), 
(Petracchi, Bacque, JJ., concurring); 326 Fallos 417 (2003), (Fayt, J., concurring); 327 Fallos 4495 (2004), 
(Fayt, J., dissenting); 331 Fallos 2006 (2008) (majority opinion). 
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jurisprudence, has traditionally upheld almost every emergency measure taken under the 
flag of economic emergency. 
A sample of relatively recent cases may help depict the idea. In 1990 a long process 
of uncontrolled inflation concluded in the compulsory exchange of bank deposits for 
long-term national bonds.50 Consolidation of public debts in long-term national bonds 
was also ordered.51 A few years before, during the mid-80‘s, a policy of ―compulsory 
saving,‖ was put in force by the administration.52  
The repetition of crises, the continuous use of the emergency powers doctrine to deal 
with them, and the Court‘s largely ultra-deferential attitude influenced constitutional 
politics, and in 1994, among many other amendments, the Constitution incorporated two 
new weapons to the governmental arsenal available to deal with emergencies: legislative 
delegation53 and executive decrees by reasons of necessity and urgency.54 Despite the 
                                                 
50 The constitutionality of the measure was assessed in the notorious Peralta case, 313 Fallos 1513 (1990).  
 
51 Law 23.982. The regime was, basically, reenacted in 2000 through Law 25.344. The scheme was generally 
upheld —316 Fallos 3176 (1993); 318 Fallos 1887 (1995)—, with exceptional rulings of unconstitutionality 
—e.g., the provision according to which the State could pay the compensation for a taking in long-term 
national bonds, struck down in 318 Fallos 415 (1995); the provision by which redresses owed by the State 
to physically-harmed individuals could be paid with such bonds, invalidated in 318 Fallos 1593 (1995); or 
the provision that allowed the State to pay the elderly their judicially-recognized social security credits with 
bonds, declared unconstitutional in 316 Fallos 779 (1993)—.   
 
52 The regime forced individuals to deposit money in bank accounts belonging to the State, under the 
promise of restitution after 60 months with an interest. Such scheme was upheld in the Horvath, —318 
Fallos 676 (1995)— and Indo —318 Fallos  785 (1995)— cases. 
 
53 Article 76 provides that ―The legislative powers shall not be delegated to the Executive Power except for 
issues concerning administration and public emergency, with a specified term for their exercise and 
according to the delegating conditions established by Congress […]‖ 
 
54 Article 99, incise 3, in its relevant part, provides that ―[…] The Executive Power shall in no event issue 
provisions of legislative nature, in which case they shall be absolutely and irreparably null and void. Only 
when due to exceptional circumstances the ordinary procedures foreseen by this Constitution for the 
enactment of laws are impossible to be followed, and when rules are not referred to criminal issues, 
taxation, electoral matters, or the system of political parties, he shall issue decrees on grounds of necessity 
and urgency, which shall be decided by a general agreement of ministers who shall countersign them 
together with the Chief of the Ministerial Cabinet‖ 
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Convention‘s stated intention of regulating the exercise of presidential powers and 
ameliorating hyper-presidential tendencies in our system, the amendments didn‘t seem to 
change the situation for the better:55 in the late 1990‘s and early 2000‘s economic 
disruptions hit Argentina yet once again, and property rights suffered another heavy 
blow, as public employees‘ salaries and retirement benefits suffered numerous cutbacks 
justified on economic emergency grounds,56 banks deposits were ―frozen‖57 and, after a 
decade-long policy of ―pegging‖ the peso to the U.S. dollar, obligations nominated in 
foreign currency were converted to national currency at an arbitrary rate that did not 
reflect the free market value of the currencies originally promised.58 Needless to say, the 
disruption of ordinary life reached unprecedented levels, as Argentina went into the 
                                                 
55 It should be noted, first, that both lawmaking devices had been validated by the Supreme Court before 
the Convention incorporated them to the Constitution (emergency decrees in Peralta —313 Fallos 1513 
(1990) and legislative delegation in Delfino —148 Fallos 430 (1927)—); and, second, that the Convention 
aimed at setting some limits to the practice admitted by the Court and at attenuating presidential powers. 
See CSJN, Consumidores Argentinos v. Estado Nacional, 333 Fallos 633 (2010) (analyzing the debates both in 
Congress when it enacted Law 24,309 —calling for a Constitutional Convention— and in the Convention 
itself and transcribing the parts of those debates where legislators and delegates to the Convention made 
explicit their intentions to limit the practice as regards emergency decrees) and CSJN, Colegio Público de 
Abogados de la Capital Federal v. Estado Nacional, 331 Fallos 2406 (2008) (same regarding legislative 
delegation). 
 
56 The Supreme Court dealt with these issues in the Guida —323 Fallos 1566 (2000)—, Tobar —325 Fallos 
2059 (2002)—, and Muller —326 Fallos 1138 (2003)— cases. It should be noted that the Argentine 
Supreme Court considers the pension benefits and public salaries as protected by the guarantee against 
confiscations of the Constitution‘s property clause. 
 
57 The original restrictions on the withdrawal of money from bank accounts, along with the scheme of 
deferment of maturities proposed by the government, were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court in the highly controversial Smith case, 325 Fallos 28 (2002).  
 
58 The issue of the conversion of bank deposits originally nominated in dollars was directly addressed by 
the Supreme Court in three leading cases: Provincia de San Luis, 326 Fallos 417 (2003) (declaring the conversion 
unconstitutional on both formal and substantive grounds); Bustos, 327 Fallos 4495 (2004) (where a plurality 
of the Court, with a new line-up made up of President Kirchner‘s appointees, ruled the measures 
constitutional); and Massa, 329 Fallos 5913 (2006) (declaring the conversion formula, suitably modified by 
the Court, constitutional, insofar as the amount of pesos to be paid to depositors was equivalent to the free 
market value of the dollars originally deposited). The conversion of national bonds, nominated in dollars, 
was ruled constitutional in Galli, 328 Fallos 690 (2005). The issue of obligations outside the financial system 
was dealt with in Rinaldi, 330 Fallos 855 (2007) and subsequent cases. 
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largest default of sovereign debt yet,59 and the social tension peaked with street riots, 
looting, and attacks on banks‘ buildings by furious depositors. 
Clearly, violent collisions between constitutionally protected property rights and 
economic emergency have occurred throughout Argentina‘s twentieth-century history. 
By examining the bits and pieces left after the smoke has faded, we can attempt to 
formulate a plausible reconstruction of the idea of economic emergency, one that 
uncovers its troublesome relationship with popular conceptions of constitutional 
property, its no-less complicated link with the sociological legitimacy of courts, the 
institutional and economic incentives it creates, and the opportunities for regressive 
redistributions of wealth it affords. Hopefully, such reconstruction will allow us to better 
understand how the economic emergency doctrine works and what alternatives we have, 
if any, to improve the perspectives of countries where economic emergency is a sword 
dangling over the citizens‘ heads.  
 Of course, my analysis will have important limitations, born out of the conditions 
of the case under examination. I will propose a different approach to interpretation of 
constitutional property rights, one that is both attentive to text and sensitive to popular 
conceptions of the concepts embodied in the text. I will also sketch a proposal for 
heightened judicial scrutiny of economic emergency regulations. Neither, however, will 
aspire to have universal value or to be applicable beyond countries where the institutional 
conditions that define Argentina‘s case obtain.60 I am confident, however, that lessons 
                                                 
59 See, e.g., Carlos Escudé, ―From Captive to Failed State: Argentina under Systemic Populism, 1975-
2006‖, 30 Fletcher F. Wld. Aff. 125, 141 (2006); Laura Tedesco, ―Argentina‘s Turmoil: The Politics of 
Informality and the Roots of Economic Meltdown‖, 15 Camb. Rev. Int. Aff. 469, 470 (2002). Matt Moffet, 
―Argentina Squeezes Bondholders‖, The Wall Street Journal, January, 11, 2005, C1 (referring to Argentina‘s 
default as the ―largest sovereign default in history‖); Maria Anastasia O‘Grady, ―Argentina‘s Lessons for 
Global Creditors‖, The Wall Street Journal, March, 4, 2005, Section Americas A15 (stating that Argentina‘s 
was the largest and most complicated restructuring ever attempted). 
 
60 Some of the relevant characteristics of Argentina‘s political system are: a) a strong presidential office; b) a 
recent tendency to a particular functionality of the system that may be qualified as ―delegative democracy‖; 
c) a repetitive history of economic crises, dealt with through the use of emergency measures; d) a strong 
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learned from Argentina‘s experience will be useful for a significant number of political 
systems beyond its borders. As Vicki Jackson has put it, ―single-case studies may 
contribute to functional understandings of constitutional law or institutions‖.61 
One further qualification is in order: although I think the traditional deferential 
approach to economic emergency measures is, in the long term, at best ineffectual and at 
worst, counterproductive, I don‘t take it as a starting point of my research that 
Argentina‘s economic and political crises have been produced by judicial toleration of 
governmental emergency measures. A number of other factors have surely played a 
much greater role in the unleashing of the unfortunate episodes referred above: internal 
and external economic factors, political mistakes, and miscalculations, among many 
others.62 But if law makes any difference in the actual outcomes of the political process, if 
                                                                                                                                            
perception by the people of lack of compliance with the Constitution, combined with an equally intense 
desire for its faithful observation. I will say more about these features along throughout the dissertation. 
 
61 Vicki C. Jackson, ―Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies‖, in Michel Rosenfeld & András 
Sajo (editors) THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 65 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). 
 
62 See, e.g., Carlos Escudé, above n. 59, at 125-126 (arguing that from 1975 on, Argentina has suffered 
repetitive cycles of regressive transferences of wealth from taxpayers to private businesses, prompted by 
the latter, which, in turn, create more political instability). Id., at 139 (arguing that in 2001, Argentina did 
not fall exclusively because of its own faults: there was also a purposeful hiding of information by 
investment banks who kept making profits out of the situation when the collapse was near and 
foreseeable); Laura Tedesco, above n. 59, at 469 (arguing that ―informal politics‖ has played a contributory 
role in the unleashing of social and political turmoil in 2001). Id, at 472 (stating that the roots of the 2001 
crisis can be found in the way democracy was reestablished after 1983). Id, at 480 (arguing that the lack of 
horizontal accountability explains why Argentina lurches from one crisis to the next); Carlos Escudé, 
―Argentina, a ‗Parasite State‘ on the Verge of Disintegration‖, 15 Camb. Rev. Int. Aff. 453, 453-454 (2002) 
(arguing that the 2001-2002 crisis is associated with an unprecedented and financially unsustainable level of 
indebtedness, which in turn is the result of years of political mismanagement, fiscal irresponsibility, and 
corruption). Id., at 455 (pointing towards the erosion of the rule of law as the overarching cause of the 
crisis). Alan Cibils & Ruben Lo Vuolo, ―At Debt‘s Door: What Can We Learn From Argentina‘s Recent 
Debt Crisis and Restructuring?‖, 5 Seattle J. for Soc. Just. 755 (2007) (analyzing alleged causes of the 2001-
2002 crisis, rejecting explanations based on the ―debt intolerance concept‖ and on the public sector‘s 
inability to reduce its deficit, and arguing that the crisis was the logical outcome of a massive debt 
accumulation process, fueled by the negative effects of policy prescriptions by the international financial 
institutions —implemented by Argentina officials— and by a series of exogenous shocks —U.S. interest 
rate hikes, financial crises in Asia, Russia, and Brazil—); John V. Paddock, ―IMF Policy and the Argentine 
Crisis‖, 34 U. Miami Iner-Am. L. Rev. 155 (2002) (arguing that the real problem in Argentina in the 1990s 
was not fiscal but economic —closely related to the perpetuation of the policy of pegging the peso to the 
dollar—, and pointing as causes of the 2001-2002 crisis IMF‘s policies —ill-suited to Argentina‘s 
situation—, United States‘ double-standard international economic policy and protectionism, and finally 
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it serves (to whatever extent) as an incentive for the behavior of political actors, then it is 
a legitimate question to ask what role the Supreme Court has played in the production 
and resolution of the crises and what alternative role, if any, was available.  
 The dissertation will be organized in two main parts. In Part One, I deal with the 
idea of a popular conception of constitutional property and explain why it is important 
when attempting to interpret the Constitution‘s property clause. I explore the 
relationship between emergency decision-making by the elected branches and the 
dominant conceptions of constitutional property. I also analyze the distributive effects of 
the measures and what influence, if any, the Judiciary‘s intervention had in this regard. 
The interplay of these two analyses returns some results at odds with widely held 
convictions regarding, first, what branches are more responsive to popular 
understandings of the concepts at stake and, second, which of them better protect the 
interests of the relatively weak and politically-unconnected. The ―countermajoritarian 
difficulty‖ is turned upside down, and a ―regressive redistribution difficulty‖ is brought 
to the fore of the constitutional discourse. In Part Two, I analyze the theoretical 
underpinnings of the justices‘ stances on some of the central cases dealing with economic 
emergency and provide some explanations for seemingly untenable doctrines, such as the 
―haircut versus deferment of maturities‖ distinction, itself related to the traditional 
―right-remedy‖ distinction of the U.S. Supreme Court case law. I also defend the use of 
such doctrinal distinction, drawing upon insights from the behavioral economics field 
and crossing them with observations from a growing literature on the legitimacy of 
courts.  
If it is true that a constitutional regime, in order to be able to survive, must tap 
into, and bear some consistency with, deeper social understandings of how that regime 
                                                                                                                                            
the Constitution‘s permission of discordancies between branches of government  regarding an economic 
plan —both interbranches at the federal level and between the federal government and the provinces—‘). 
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should be,63 then what people think about constitutional property and the political 
decisions dealing with it, must have some relevance in the assessment of what has been 
done so far. If it is true that governments have nothing to support them but opinion,64 
then it must be equally true that judicial rulings dealing with constitutional property 
should be aware of how people conceive of it. This doesn‘t mean, of course, that rights 
are to be construed in purely majoritarian terms, if by that we understand the political 
preferences of current majorities, as reflected in the elected branches‘ composition. 
Instead, I argue that constitutional interpretation of a property clause must bear a 
reasonably close relationship to contemporary public understandings of its text, in order 
to avoid noxious effects on the public perception of the rule of law.65 These effects 
include the devaluation of the very idea of the rule of law and the undermining of the 
Court‘s legitimacy. Firstly, in political cultures where the belief in law is closely associated 
with the effectiveness of its enforcement, under-enforced property rights may bring 
about a cynical attitude towards the Constitution. Secondly, in contexts where the 
Judiciary‘s legitimacy is not firmly grounded in any source of authority other than the 
written text of the Constitution it is supposed to apply, the consistent application of a 
model of adjudication that is responsive to pressures‘ from powerful political and 
economic actors severely undermines the courts‘ claims to legitimacy. Finally, rights must 
mean something other than a space of pure possibility of determination by current 
                                                 
63 See Barry Friedman, ―The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law‘s Politics‖, 148 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 971, 980 (2000). 
 
64 See David Hume, ―Of the First Principles of Government‖, in C. Hendel (editor), DAVID HUME’S 
POLITICAL ESSAYS 24 (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1953), cited by Robert A. Burt, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 34 (Cambridge-London, Belknap-Harvard, 1992). 
 
65 Clearly, a similar argument could be made regarding any other right. However, I will not attempt to 
defend such a broad argument here. If nothing else, because people seem to have a high sensitivity in 
matters pertaining to their property, I will limit myself to the specific case of property rights entrenched in 
a reasonably clear constitutional clause.  
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majorities, in order to be meaningful. Importantly, I contend that ultra-deferential 
attitudes towards political branches may be, paradoxically, countermajoritarian, due to 
the disjunction existent between the political process through which economic 
emergency measures are taken and the dominant conception of constitutional property.
 These themes appear, from different perspectives, in both Part One and Part 
Two of the work.  
 In the Epilogue I offer reasons why, despite the genetic connection between the 
Argentine and the U.S. constitutions,66 the Argentine Supreme Court should not follow 
the model of its U.S. counterpart regarding constitutional protection of economic rights. 
If there is any merit to the idea that what societies have gone through in the past partially 
determines what rights they should be particularly careful in protecting,67 then it may 
make sense to separate oil from water, so to speak, and to depart from the path the U.S. 
Supreme Court has generally followed since 1937. Finally, I advance a tentative proposal 
for a reform of the judicial approach to economic emergency and present a sketch of 
how such an approach, sensitive to different circumstances that should trigger more 
searching judicial scrutiny, might look like. 






                                                 
66 See Sujit Choudhry, ―Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative  
Constitutional Interpretation‖, 74 Ind. L.J. 819, 838 (1999) (arguing that constitutions are genetically related 
if one constitution influences the framing of the other, or if both are framed under the influence of a 
third). 
 
67 See, generally, Alan M. Dershowitz, RIGHTS FROM WRONGS: A SECULAR THEORY OF THE 
ORIGIN OF RIGHTS (New York, Basic Books, 2004) (arguing that rights may be explained as arising 
from particular human experiences with injustice).  
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B. Part One: Property and the People. Mood Swings? (The Popular Conception 
of Constitutional Property) 
 
The Importance of the Common Understanding of Constitutional Property. 
Argentina‘s Constitution introduces a concept68 of property in the constitutional realm, by 
declaring that every inhabitant has the right to use and dispose of his/her property and 
that such right is ―inviolable‖, only subject to reasonable legal limitations that cannot 
alter it (Arts. 14, 17, and 28 Arg. Constitution). While the document contains 
prescriptions that spell out, to a certain extent, the features of constitutional property,69 
no provision completely specifies what it is to be understood by constitutional property. 
Within —at least theoretically— certain restrictions of ―fit‖,70 different conceptions may 
dispute the prize of inviolability, and in fact they have done so in the past. People —and 
courts— have tried to read into the property clause their own ideas about the proper 
content for the protection of individual entitlements and, indirectly, about the adequate 
relationship that must exist between the Judiciary and the elected branches when it 
comes to deciding who bears what costs in emergency situations. This chapter will 
                                                 
68 See, e.g., W. B. Gallie, ―Essentially Contested Concepts‖, 56 P. Aristotelian Soc. 167, 176 (1955-1956) 
(introducing the idea of ―essentially contested concepts‖ as those where an examplary use of the concept 
must be recognized by all contesting parties, ―yet, because of the internally complex and variously 
describable character of the examplar [...] it is natural that different features in it should be differently 
weighted by different appraisers, and hence that [they] should have come to hold their very different 
conceptions‖ of the concept); John Rawls, above n. 4, at 5 (applying the ―concept‖-―conceptions‖ 
distinction to the idea of justice); Ronald Dworkin, LAW´S EMPIRE 70-76 (Cambridge, Massachussets, 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986) (explaining the distinction and applying it to the idea 
of justice). 
 
69 On the prohibition of confiscations, regulations of expropriations, etc. 
 
70 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, above n. 68, at 255 (―[Any working theory] will include convictions about 
both fit and justification. Convictions about fit will provide a rough threshold requirement that an 
interpretation of some part of the law must meet if it is to be eligible at all […] That threshold will 
eliminate interpretations that some judges would otherwise prefer, so the brute facts of legal history will in 
this way limit the role any judge‘s personal convictions can play‖).   
 
 31 
explore what conceptions of constitutional property have taken a hold in Argentina at 
different times of the country‘s existence and which, if any, are dominant today. 
 It is a widely held view among contemporary U.S. legal scholars that courts 
should not try to second-guess legislatures and should be, instead, deferential to 
legislative judgments on social and economic matters. A broad field of experimentation 
is, thus, open to political majorities.71 A central part of the thrust of this argument is that 
it is hard to say whether any given economic regulation is clearly unjust,72 and thus such 
judgments should be left for the citizens‘ representatives to make.73 Unelected, life-
tenured, politically-unaccountable judges should not substitute their policy judgments as 
to the wisdom of economic legislation for that of the elected branches of government.  
 In Ferguson v. Skrupa,74 the U.S. Supreme Court gave a clear formulation to this 
deferential stance on economic matters: 
―Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to 
legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation. There 
was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down 
laws which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some 
particular economic or social philosophy […] ‗the proper course is to recognize 
                                                 
71 High liberalism, a position currently dominant in the U.S. academia, holds a thin conception of 
economic liberty, which is subordinated to a robust idea of substantive equality to be achieved through 
redistribution by elected officials. See, e.g., John Tomasi, FREE MARKET FAIRNESS 54-56 (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton & Oxford, 2012). 
 
72 See, e.g., John Rawls, above n. 4, at 174-175 (arguing that, frequently, the most we can say about such 
regulations is that they are not clearly unjust). See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 72 (1905), (Harlan, 
J., dissenting, ―I do not stop to consider whether any particular view of this economic question presents 
the sounder theory [...] It is enough for the determination of this case, and it is enough for this court to 
know, that the question is one about which there is room for debate and for an honest difference of 
opinion‖). Id., at pp. 75, 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting, ―[...] a Constitution is not intended to embody a 
particular economic theory […] It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of 
our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our 
judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution.‖)  
 
73 An argument of this sort, based upon the generalization of the existence of good-faith disagreement 
concerning the content of any right, is at the base of the radical attack on judicial review of legislation. See, 
e.g., Jeremy Waldron, ―The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review‖, 115 Yale L. J. 1346 (2006). 
 
74 372 U.S. 726, 729-730 (1963).  
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that a state Legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by 
some express prohibition in the Constitution of the United States or of the State, 
and that Courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions beyond their 
obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of public policy that the 
particular Court may happen to entertain‘ […] We have returned to the original 
constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic 
beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. As 
this Court stated in a unanimous opinion in 1941, ‗We are not concerned [...] 
with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation.‘ Legislative bodies 
have broad scope to experiment with economic problems, and this Court does 
not sit to ‗subject the state to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic 
principles of our government‘ […]‖ 
 
While Argentina‘s Judiciary did not wholly embrace such a deferential conception of the 
judicial role for economic rights generally, the dominant trend in the Supreme Court‘s 
jurisprudence certainly did when emergency justifications were at play.75 Thus, in Bustos, 
for instance, it was held that: 
―It must be kept in mind that the powers of review of administrative action and 
of constitutional review that judges enjoy do not authorize them to substitute 
                                                 
75 There may be several reasons for this difference between the stances taken by the Argentina‘s Supreme 
Court and the U.S. Supreme Court —whose decisions have long been a source of inspiration for 
Argentina‘s Court—. One relevant factor may be the differences between both constitutional texts: while 
the U.S. Constitution provides for what seems to be, at least at face value, only a procedural protection of 
property (the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment), Argentina‘s text explicitly deems property 
―inviolable‖ (article 17) and establishes property, as any other right, cannot be ―altered‖ by laws purporting 
to regulate it (article 28). Arguably, both Courts have built their political capital upon different basis of 
legitimacy. Argentina‘s Court seems to have been more closely tied, in this regard, to textual constitutional 
support of its decisions which may have prevented the development of a more general theory of deference. 
See Jonathan M. Miller, ―Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the U.S. Model and 
Its Collapse in Argentina‖, 21 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 77 (1997) (explaining the sources of authority 
of Argentina‘s Supreme Court; however, Miller argues that a more general deferential position, extending 
to all areas of economic regulation, was adopted by the Court). In contrast, the rejection of the doctrine of 
emergency powers by U.S.‘ judges and scholars may help explain the rising of a different constitutional 
model, based upon deference in economic matters. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22, 
fn. 19  (1977) (Brennan, White, Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (―Blaisdell suggested further limitations that have 
since been subsumed in the overall determination of reasonableness. The legislation sustained in Blaisdell 
was adopted pursuant to a declared emergency in the State, and strictly limited in duration. Subsequent 
decisions struck down state laws that were not so limited […] Later decisions abandoned these limitations 
as absolute requirements […] Undoubtedly the existence of an emergency and the limited duration of a 
relief measure are factors to be assessed in determining the reasonableness of an impairment, but they 
cannot be regarded as essential in every case‖). See also Michal R. Belknap, ―The New Deal and the 
Emergency Powers Doctrine‖, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 67, 68 (1983) (arguing that the lack of enthusiasm of the 
legal community for the emergency doctrine played a role in the later adoption of the ultradeferential 
stance in economic matters). See also John A. Fliter & Derek S. Hoff, FIGHTING FORECLOSURE: 
THE BLAISDELL CASE, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE, AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 164 
(Kansas, University Press of Kansas, 2012) (arguing that ―Even after the economy dipped significantly 
during the ‗Roosevelt Recession‘ of 1937-1938, additional proposed economic regulation simply could not 
be justified as emergency measures. Liberals needed a new rationale. That rationale emerged in 1937, in the 
form of a new stress on judicial deference to legislatures on matters of economic regulation‖). 
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their criteria for those of the Administration in the determination of policies or in 
the appraisal of the opportunity of measures […] even less so when the 
impossibility of banks to repay their matured obligations exceeded the particular 
financial situation of each intermediary and acquired the dimension of a systemic 
crisis, whose revision requires an integral analysis […] The question involves not 
only the recovery […] of entities that operate in a sector that is essential for the 
good performance of the national economy, but also their ability to help to repay, 
in an orderly and egalitarian way, bank deposits.  The exercise of the aforementioned 
powers of revision cannot justify that all economic measures taken by the competent branches be 
reviewed, not under their legality but under their wisdom and opportunity instead, 
because such a situation would imply the substitution of the predominantly technical criteria of 
the Judiciary for those of the constitutional branches that are elected directly by popular will. 
[…] Judges are called upon to judge, not to administer or to set economic policies, nor to review 
the policies set by the political branches; otherwise, the democratic regime would be destroyed or 
substituted by a judicial dictatorship, which would impede the development of any 
coherent government program, especially in the context of an emergency which judges are 
not properly-equipped to contain […].‖76  
 
The gist of this part of the Bustos‘ plurality opinion is nothing but yet another 
invocation of the arch-famous ―countermajoritarian difficulty‖.77 There is another 
argument as well in the precedent paragraph, which I will call the ―technocratic 
objection‖, that is, the argument according to which judges wouldn‘t be suited to make 
decisions on emergency situations due to institutional limitations.78 They would be in no 
position to make accurate judgments as to what measures are appropriate to deal with 
contingencies whose scope exceed the traditional format of a contentious lawsuit. I will 
deal with it later. But for now I want to focus on the more classic objection to judicial 
review: its allegedly undemocratic character.  
                                                 
76 CSJN, Bustos, Alberto R. v. Estado Nacional et al., 327 Fallos 4495 (2004) (Belluscio, Maqueda, JJ., plurality 
opinion, section 12, emphasis added). The rationales used by the Court to justify emergency measures may 
have varied slightly through the different cases, but there has certainly been a very consistent line of 
precedents upholding most economic emergency legislation. See CSJN, Massa, Juan Agustín v. Estado 
Nacional et al., 329 Fallos 5913 (2006) (Lorenzetti, J., concurring, section 27). 
 
77 Alexander M. Bickel, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 16, 23 (New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 1986). Although I am citing to 
Justice Belluscio and Justice Maqueda‘s opinion here, similar lines of argument can be detected in the other 
concurring opinions (see, e.g., Zaffaroni, J., concurring, §3; Boggiano, J., concurring, §33; Highton de 
Nolasco, J., concurring, §22). 
 
78 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, ―The Forms and Limits of Adjudication‖, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 395 (1978-1979).  
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 My attention on the ―countermajoritarian objection‖ will have two prongs. First, 
I will argue that, at least in economic emergency situations, judges may often act in a 
countermajoritarian fashion by deferring to decisions by the elective branches, as 
Argentine history shows. This part of my argument does not attempt to prove a positive 
case for a more intrusive judicial review of economic emergency situations. Instead, here 
I pursue a more modest goal: to deflect the attacks launched against judicial review based 
upon arguments of deference towards democratically-elected branches, due to their 
purportedly closer connection to the ―popular will‖. Second, I will advance an argument 
to the effect that judicial decisions that systematically depart from popular 
understandings of constitutional property are self-defeating and, in the long run, they 
undermine the Judiciary‘s legitimacy while devaluing public perceptions on the value of 
the rule of law. Let us see. 
One could say, as Jerry Mashaw does, that it is the flawed image of democracy 
underlying most of the theorizing about the ―countermajoritarian difficulty‖ that creates 
the ―difficulty‖ in the first place: once a few insights of public choice theory are grasped, 
it is clear that we don‘t have the kind of democracy that the argument presupposes, and 
that we can never have it.79 In other words, ―if the suggestion is that courts reviewing 
statutes confront the will of the people, the image is surely false […] On the other hand, 
if all that is meant is that a majority of elected representatives voted for this bill, then 
‗countermajoritarianism‘ loses a good bit of its punch.‖80 I intend to tackle the 
                                                 
79 Jerry L. Mashaw, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO 





paradigmatic objection on its own terms, and show why it fails to give constitutional 
review a decisive blow —in economic emergency situations, at least—.81  
Mashaw‘s argument, however, could prove too much for my present purposes. It 
could be argued that if democracy cannot possibly consist of an accurate representation 
of collective preferences —due to conceptual impossibilities in the aggregation process, 
or any other problem—, then how could I aspire to reconstruct any popular conception 
of constitutional property? Surely, the aggregation problems that affect the democratic 
system would also trouble my enterprise.  
Moreover, Bruce Ackerman has pointed out the problems that anyone standing 
on the Ordinary Observer‘s shoes —to borrow his terminology—82 will face in 
attempting a reconstruction of the dominant social expectations regarding property 
rights, as expressed in ordinary language. In a complex society, people of different 
classes, with different cultures, will expect different things from the same interactional 
context.83 
My reply to these problems is as follows: public choice theory does not tell us 
that majoritarian collective preferences are a conceptual impossibility. All it tells us is that 
we are unlikely to ever design institutions that can flawlessly aggregate individual 
                                                 
81 Here I will follow the steps of a recent strand in the constitutional scholarship that, drawing partially 
upon political science empirical work, suggests that courts and public opinion stand in a closer relationship 
than the ―countermajoritarian‖ critique presupposes. See, among many others, Barry Friedman, THE 
WILL OF THE PEOPLE (New York, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2009); Barry Friedman, ―Mediated 
Popular Constitutionalism‖, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2596 (2003). 
 
82 Bruce A. Ackerman, above n. 28, at 15 (defining the Ordinary Observer as ―an analyst who elaborates 
the concepts of nonlegal conversation so as to illuminate the relationship between disputed legal rules and 
the structure of social expectations he understands to prevail in dominant institutional practice‖). 
 
83 Id., at 95. See also Jennifer Nedelsky PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 259 (Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press, 1990) (arguing that 
in the United States ―there seem to be somewhat different forms of belief about property rights in 
different segments of the population‖). 
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preferences into collective choices.84 My aim, on the other hand, is rather more modest. I 
don‘t attempt to offer a perfect description of what constitutional property meant for the 
majority of Argentineans at any given period of time. Neither do I seek to build 
counterfactual hypothesis about what a majority of the people would have preferred, as a 
matter of economic policy, on each of the economic emergency situations faced by the 
country in its history. Instead, I will survey Argentina‘s political, social, and legal 
landscape, to offer a general picture of popular reactions to certain paradigmatic 
economic emergency measures. Notice that this modest goal does not demand, either, 
that I show what measures could have been regarded as constitutionally-admissible, 
according to popular understandings. To paraphrase Lon Fuller, we can know what is 
plainly unconstitutional without committing ourselves to declare with finality what 
perfectly constitutional measures would be like.85 No aggregation of individual 
preferences into collective choices is at stake here.86  
Ackerman‘s challenge seems to be avoided by my minimalist goal. I need not 
offer an accurate, highly detailed reconstruction of popular views on property. As I said 
before, all I want to show is that judges will often contradict majority sentiment by 
deferring to economic emergency judgments by either the President or the Congress87 
                                                 
84 See Jerry L. Mashaw, above n. 79, at 15. 
 
85 Lon L. Fuller THE MORALITY OF LAW 12 (New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 1969) 
(arguing that we can know the bad on the basis of very imperfect notions of what would be good to 
perfection, and that ―we can, for example, know what is plainly unjust without committing ourselves to 
declare with finality what perfect justice would be like‖). 
 
86 I will occasionally resort to sources that are themselves affected by the problems of aggregation of 
preferences identified by public choice theory, such as legislative or constitutional reforms. Notice, 
however, that I will use these elements as traces that may help to rebuild general positions for or against 
certain economic measures and that may, hence, give content to a general conception of constitutional 
property.  
 
87 I must admit, though, that even this modest approach presents difficult tasks: history has a way of 
privileging voices, and public opinion on any given area of public interest is more of a collage of ever-
shifting views than a clear-cut, sharp picture of a coherent set of ideas. Nonetheless, at least in regard to 
the paradigmatic instances of emergency measures I will deal with, it is possible to reconstruct large 
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and, therefore, that we may have good reasons to put the conventional wisdom on the 
topic into question. 
 The second prong of my argument here will build upon the first one.  I will make 
a few brief introductory remarks about Argentina‘s legal and political system in order to 
introduce the second part of argument. 
Argentina has a mixed legal and political system, as far as sources and influences 
go. Our Constitution has followed fairly closely that of the United States.88 We have a 
presidential system, with a bicameral Congress, and an independent Judiciary, headed by 
a Supreme Court. The Court, building upon both Marbury v. Madison89 and our 
constitutional text‘s own potential for deriving such implications, started a practice of 
constitutional review early on.90 The power of judicial review can be exercised by any 
court, whatever the hierarchy and jurisdiction, but it is always restrained by the need of a 
case, understood as a concrete collision of rights between different parties. The effects of 
a judicial decision, in principle and theoretically at least, do not extend beyond the parties 
                                                                                                                                            
tendencies in public opinion, with an acceptable degree of accuracy. For an argument in this sense, which I 
believe to be generally applicable to Argentina‘s case on property rights and economic emergency, see 
Barry Friedman, above n. 81, at 16-18 (elaborating on the difficulty of reconstructing public opinion in the 
U.S. context and on the reasons why it is a possible task). 
 
88 See, e.g., José A. Seco Villalba, FUENTES DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN ARGENTINA 129 (Buenos 
Aires, Depalma, 1943) (quoting José Zuviría, secretary of the Constitutional Convention, to acknowledge 
the influence of the U.S. Constitution but stating expressly that the Argentine document has its own 
originality). 
 
89 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (Cranch). 
 
90 See CSJN, Municipalidad de la Capital v. Elortondo, 33 Fallos 162 (1888) (arguing that the power of 
constitutional review by the courts is a necessary corollary of the separation between constituent and 
legislative power, and of the inferiority of the latter, established by the Constitution, and applying such 
doctrine to invalidate a law authorizing a taking because it did not satisfy the ―public utility‖ requirement of 
the Constitution).  See also CSJN, Caffarena v. Banco Argentino del Rosario de Santa Fe, 10 Fallos 427 (1871) 
(arguing, obiter dictum, that constitutional judicial review is of the essence of the constitutional order); Sojo, 




of a case.91 Judges are appointed by the President, with the approval of the Senate.92 At 
the same time, the private law system was taken from the continental European tradition, 
following upon the Napoleon Civil Code of 1804. With the codification, Argentina also 
imported, at least partially, a certain view of a judge‘s proper role: a somewhat 
mechanical applicator of written laws, without much room for influencing the political 
process. Interpretation was to be rationalist in fashion. Legal education, suitably adapted 
to the new era of Codes, quickly took a heavily formalist stance.93 In this context, the 
Supreme Court initially relied on a strongly textualist approach to interpreting the 
Constitution.  
 Jonathan Miller has argued that the main source of the Supreme Court‘s authority 
and independence and, at least, a partial explanation of its initial relative success, was its 
ability to point to clearly established constitutional rules as grounds for its decisions.94 If 
this is true, then it seems relevant that the Court pays close attention to how its 
interpretations relate to the people‘s understandings about constitutional texts. Public 
                                                 
91 But see CSJN, Halabi, Ernesto v. Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, 332 Fallos 111 (2009) (acknowledging certain 
categories of cases where judicial rulings can have ―expansive effects‖ that reach beyond the parties to the 
case). See also Art. 43, Constitution (providing for amparo colectivo, a type of legal process in which judicial 
rulings may have expansive effects). 
 
92 After 1994, lower-court judges are nominated by the President from a list of three candidates, prepared 
by the ―Consejo de la Magistratura‖. They still need to be confirmed by the Senate. Supreme Court judges 
are not subject to this procedure, and they are selected directly by the President at his or her discretion, and 
subject to approval of the Senate. 
 
93 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Miller, above n. 75, at 110 (―[...] civil law courses began to offer a mechanical 
approach emphasizing exegesis of Code provisions based on the structure of the Code and extensive use 
of French commentators [...] By the mid-1870s Argentine legal education had transformed itself from a 
practical education in the courts combined with study of philosophy, natural law, and non-systematic study 
of some civil law concepts, to five years of legal science focused primarily on the Civil Code. The old 
requirement of three years of training in the courts disappeared entirely‖). 
 
94 Id., at 79-80. Correlatively, Miller holds that once the Court faced the need to adopt an interpretive 
approach that was more accommodating to new social needs, it lost all grounds of credible authority and 
fell prey to the Executive branch —who would not be prone to tolerate either a rationalist, formalist Court 
that would likely oppose its policies whenever they didn‘t fit acceptably within the letter of the 




perceptions on constitutional property do matter. If Roosevelt was right that a 
constitution is a ―layman‘s document, not a lawyer‘s contract‖,95 then judicial decisions 
that systematically depart, in a significant way, from what the people generally understand 
by constitutional property are self-defeating, in the sense that they undermine the very 
basis of the Judiciary‘s legitimacy to interpret the Constitution in the first place.96 Even if 
Roosevelt‘s case is a bit overstated —and it probably is— one could think that any 
constitution aiming at establishing government by the People, as well as for the People, 
should be interpreted in a way that does not frontally contradict popular understandings 
of the text. Not only are decisions of this kind detrimental to the Judiciary‘s legitimacy, 
but they also bring about a sensible devaluation on the public‘s perception of the rule of 
law, possibly creating incentives for lawless behaviour. Let‘s examine the reasons for 
these two assertions in a bit more detail. 
Any community of interpreters has standards for assessing the correctness or 
wrongness of decisions.97 These ―disciplining rules‖, to use Owen Fiss‘ terminology, 
constrain the range of acceptable interpretations of a legal norm, within the community 
that accepts the rules. If one takes the people at large as an important interpretive 
community in constitutional questions,98 then —for the purposes of this dissertation— 
                                                 
95 See Larry D. Kramer, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 217 (New York, Oxford University Press, 2004) 
(quoting F. D. Roosevelt). Although Roosevelt was referring to the U.S. Constitution, the same argument 
could be made regarding the Argentine Constitution, also made in the name of the People. 
 
96 This would be so unless, of course, the Court managed to build a different source of legitimacy that 
could sustain it as a credible independent guarantor of rights and controller of the elective branches. This, 
however, is a highly complicated task, in which the Court has been notoriously unsuccessful, so far. See, 
generally, Jonathan M. Miller, above n. 75. 
 
97 For an explanation of the possibility of objective interpretation in law and the role of the ―disciplining 
rules‖ in allowing for such a practice, see Owen M. Fiss, ―Objectivity and Interpretation‖, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 
739 (1982). 
 
98 Many would argue that it is the most important interpretive community. See, generally, Larry D. Kramer, 
above n. 95. See also Richard A. Epstein, TAKINGS 20 (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, Harvard 
University Press, 1985) (―The community of understanding that lends meaning to the Constitution comes 
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those standards are constituted, basically, by what the community thinks the expression 
―property is inviolable‖ (art. 17, Arg. Const.) means in each relevant context. These 
standards —the conception of constitutional property—, then, set the limits of 
―semantic resistance‖, using Justice Zaffaroni‘s very apt expression,99 of the property 
clause of the Constitution. 
If courts, giving way to pressures from the other branches at every juncture, 
consistently interpret the property clause as admitting measures that frontally contradict 
the people‘s understandings of what the text of the clause means —following Miller, let 
us call these decisions ―responsive‖ decisions—,100 then they cannot point towards the 
written text as a source of legitimacy for their decisions.101  
For a judicial decision to be legitimate, from this perspective, a reasonably 
informed layfolk should be able to consider it as a proper application of what he 
understands from the constitutional text. The expression ―property is inviolable‖ has 
                                                                                                                                            
of necessity from outside the text, in the way these words are used in ordinary discourse by persons who 
are educated in the normal social and cultural discourse of their own time‖). 
 
99 See CSJN, Simón, Julio H. et al., 328 Fallos 2056 (2005) (Zaffaroni, J., concurring, §24) (using the idea to 
delimit what is properly an interpretation of a legal norm and to distinguish it from what is not); See also 
CSJN, Casal, Matías et al., 328 Fallos 3399 (2005) (majority opinion, §21; Fayt, J., concurring opinion, §7) 
(taking up Justice Zaffaroni‘s expression in Simón). 
 
100 What is important here is that the decisions contradict common interpretations of the constitutional 
texts, not that they reflect the substantive views furthered by means of political pressures. There would be 
no problems, from this standpoint, if a decision fitted the constitutional text and also reflected views held 
by certain actors that pushed for the decision.  
 
101 It must be noticed that I am not making the argument here that the Court‘s legitimacy depended on any 
kind of myth about its purportedly apolitical and neutral decision-making processes as a legal expert and 
that it fell when people found out that law is relatively indeterminate. My claim is more modest: whatever 
the people‘s position regarding the indeterminacy of legal rules and its implications for the legitimacy of the 
Court, I hold that economic emergency decisions often went far beyond the realm of ―semantic resistance‖ 
of the texts, which presupposes that indeterminacy is not radical. It is not that the Court lost legitimacy 
because the people thought it decided cases using relatively indeterminate materials that allowed for extra-
legal considerations to enter the decision; it is that people thought that law was not indeterminate enough 
to accept such decisions as properly legal. For a slightly different argument, see Or Bassok, ―The 
Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty‖, 26 J. of Law & Politics 239, 272 (2011) (arguing that the sociological-
legitimacy difficulty originates from a clash between the promise of an expert legal authority and the 
indeterminacy of legal materials). 
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some core meaning, within which decisions need to fall in order to be acceptable. 
Otherwise, the general public will have no substantial reasons to take the Constitution 
seriously. If any measure can be taken, merely by invoking some urgent need 
(―emergency‖) and the convenience of the measure, then the general perception will be 
that the constitutional text plays little or no role in the actual decision-making that is, 
ultimately, what matters to people.102  
Should, by any chance, the prima facie unconstitutional measures occasionally 
succeed in their goals, there would be further reasons to disbelieve in the rule of law, 
regardless of one‘s position on whether the measures were justified in the first place. The 
strictures of legal procedures for decision-making and content-related restrictions will 
appear to the public as formalistic hindrances in the pursuit of collective happiness. 
Effective government will appear as incompatible with legalistic restraints. One reader, 
sceptical of my position, may ask ―So what? People just want to order their social life in 
ways that are considered satisfactory. Legal rules —including the Constitution— are just 
means to such ends, and if they do not foster those ends, well, only a rule-fetishist would 
want to keep them‖. If the people think that the measures are substantially correct, what 
is the problem with them having their way, regardless of what the judges think the 
Constitution says —or even regardless of what the Constitution is unanimously 
considered to say—? We can call this an ―instrumentalist‖ critique. 
I think an objection of this sort is just too strong, if aimed at my point about the 
deleterious effects of ―responsive‖ models of adjudication on the rule of law, and weak 
to the point of nonexistence if aimed at my more general assertion regarding the 
                                                 
102 See Bo Rothstein, ―Creating Political Legitimacy: Electoral Democracy versus Quality of Government‖, 
2008:2 QoG Working Paper Series (2008), available at 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/working_papers/2008_2_Rothstein.pdf (last visited, 05/12/2009) and at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1338615 (last visited, 05/12/2009) (arguing that 
even if democratic electoral process are an indispensable part of the concept of political legitimacy, what 
happens at the other end of the political machinery, that is, actual public policies is what matters most to 
people). 
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―countermajoritarian difficulty‖ and its relationship to adjudication of constitutional 
property claims in times of emergency. In this second reading, the criticism would be 
that people should have their way in all matters concerning redistribution, regardless of 
what the Constitution says. Understood in these terms, the objection does not even 
touch my position, because what I intend to prove is, precisely, that —as a matter of 
history— fairly often people have not wanted what the elected branches have imposed 
on them. People do not seem to have had their way, whether it is right or wrong that 
they do. 103 
As far as the objection concerns the incentives for disbelief in the rule of law, the 
―instrumentalist‖ critique misses the point. My whole argument is built within a 
conceptual framework in which people actually care about having a constitution, and do 
not treat the legal order in the instrumental way assumed by the criticism. Of course the 
reason for having any legal order may ultimately be instrumental. We have constitutions 
and all sorts of other norms because we believe they help us live in a better-ordered 
society, making it possible to live together. In that sense, probably we are all 
instrumentalists. But we do not treat each measure we collectively take as instrumental in 
precisely the same way. Surely ordinary measures embodied in legal norms pursue some 
end we think worthy. But this instrumental quality of these measures is not an overriding 
principle. Measures must respect the restrictions established by other more fundamental 
norms that are basic to the system. Otherwise, there is no point to the practice of having 
such a normative system at all. We should just act on a case-by-case basis, deciding 
whatever we think it is best in each instance, in an act-utilitarian fashion. This is not the 
                                                 
103 An example of a case where courts might have acted in a countermajoritarian fashion by upholding —
instead of by striking down— emergency legislation are the Legal Tender Cases in the United Stated. In Knox 
v. Lee, upholding the power of Congress to make notes legal tender for contracts celebrated before the 
passing of the Legal Tender Act, Justice Bradley admitted as much when he said that ―…It might subserve 
the present good if we declare the legal tender act unconstitutional, and a temporary public satisfaction might be the result. 
But what a miserable consideration would that be for the permanent loss of one of the just and necessary 
powers of the government; a power which, had Congress failed to exercise it when it did, we might have 
had no court here today to consider the question, not a government or a country to make it important to 
do so‖. See Know v. Lee, 79 U.S. 475, 562 (1870) (Bradley, J., concurring; the italics are mine)  
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way our constitutional practice is commonly understood. But even if it were, at the very 
least, we would need norms for making decisions that could not be themselves subject of 
discussion each time, if we are to avoid infinite regression. We would need norms to 
determine who gets to decide what is best in each case. 
The well-known rules-of-the-game analogy works just fine here.104 If we want to 
play any given game, we need to respect some basic rules that make the game be what it 
is. If we don‘t, because we think our ultimate goal of having fun, is going to be reached 
more easily by breaking such rules, then we are not playing the game we were supposed 
to be playing. We may be creating a new game, which may be more satisfactory to us 
than the previous one, but we are not playing the original game. If we don‘t like the 
soccer‘s prohibition for all players but the goalie to grab the ball with our hands, we can 
change the rule and start playing with our hands. Someone may say that this will not be 
soccer anymore, but handball or something like it instead. But in any case, we should 
stick to the new rules, if we are to play a game at all. Constant changes of rules would 
prevent us from coordinating our actions in order to play some game, thus depriving us of 
the fun we were pursuing in the first place. There is a minimum level of stability that is 
needed for the game to make sense. Of course, changes of legal rules have a broader and 
deeper impact, one not likely to be fully captured by the sports analogy I have just 
drawn.105 But this, if anything, just makes my case stronger; constant changes are 
profoundly disruptive and may even defeat their purposes altogether.  
                                                 
104 For an instance of the use of the analogy, similar to the one I make here, see Carlos S. Nino, 
FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 74-75 (2nd edition, Buenos Aires, Astrea, 
2002). 
 
105 Someone might rightfully observe that changes of legal rules have an impact in our lives that far exceeds 
changes in games‘ rules and, thus, that legal changes are qualitatively different from changes in other rule-
bound activities. My example would run the risk of trivializing what is at stake in constantly changing 
constitutional rules. While this is a fair observation, I do think that the soccer-handball analogy serves a 
useful purpose here. It shows that even if changes are made within permissible options (soccer and 
handball are both games that might serve our entertainment purposes), there is a limit to how much change 
is tolerable until it completely disturbs our practice and prevents it from making sense. This is especially 
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 Moreover, we value different things differently. If we have a constitutional system 
with certain restrictions on what we can do, it is because we think that the value of 
stability it fosters is, in general, more important that the value of being free to adopt the 
decision we think best in each case. It is also probably the case that we adopt 
constitutional restrictions as a matter of a second-best reasoning:106 we think that, all 
things considered and given the fact that it might well be hard to ascertain what course of 
action will be the best in each case and that it will be costly to agree on that, we will err 
less if we stick to the constitutional constraints, even if occasionally they may produce 
suboptimal results. 
 If we have a certain view of our constitutional practice, as I believe we do, 
according to which constitutional clauses do matter and, in some way, play an important 
role in determining what can be legitimately done to further our political ends at each 
time, then the legitimacy of judicial decisions must be linked to how they relate to 
constitutional texts. We can sure change these ―rules of the game‖, but we need a 
                                                                                                                                            
true of changes in legal rules that organize the economic realm. Even if there may be different paths to 
fostering economic development —let us assume it is a constitutional goal, as it is in Argentina (Preamble; 
Articles 75 sections 18 and 19)—, and even if, as Justice Holmes would have it (see above n. 25), any given 
constitution is compatible with a range of economic plans that have the purported goal of promoting 
economic development, constantly switching between plans may leave the country with no plan (in any 
meaningful sense of the word) at all. See, e.g., Michael D. Bordo, THE GOLD STANDARD & 
RELATED REGIMES: COLLECTED ESSAYS 196 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
(―Suppose the government calculates today an optimal plan, according to its objectives, for current and 
future policy choices. Now suppose that, sometime in the future. The remainder of the plan is re-evaluated 
by calculating the optimal plan from then on. Assuming the objectives have not changed, is this plan the 
continuation of the original one? The answer is generally ‗no‘‖. This is what it means to be time-
inconsistent [...] The literature on time inconsistency has demonstrated that, in almost all intertemporal 
policy situations, the government would benefit from having access to a commitment mechanism 
preventing it from changing planned future policy‖). For an analysis of the complex issues involved in legal 
transitions, see, generally, Louis Kaplow, ―Transitional Policy: A Conceptual Framework‖, 13 J. Contemp. 
Legal Issues 161 (2003). For a model that analyzes the impact of legal changes in litigants‘ behavior, see 
George L. Priest, ―Measuring Legal Change‖, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 193, 197-210 (1987). 
 
106 R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, ―The General Theory of Second Best‖, 24 Rev. Econ. Stud. 11, 12 
(1956-1957) (developing the general idea that if there is any given constraint that prevents the attainment 
of one of the conditions necessary for the existence of a Pareto optimum situation, then the other 
necessary conditions although still attainable are no longer desirable; in other words, given that one of the 
optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, then an optimum situation can only be achieved by departing from 
all other Paretian conditions; the situation thus achieved is second best, because it is attained subject to a 
constraint that prevents the attainment of the Paretian optimum). 
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mechanism of change that preserves the necessary minimum of stability. If everything is 
up for grabs at each juncture, then having a constitution, in the sense we understand it 
today, stops making sense. Judicial rubber-stamping of emergency measures that cannot 
be squared with reasonable interpretations of constitutional texts will hardly create 
incentives for lawful behaviour and, most certainly, it will not enhance the legitimacy of 
the courts. 
 Legitimacy is certainly a somewhat vague and ambiguous concept. It may be 
defined from various perspectives.107 I do not intend to enter this debate. Suffice it to say 
that, broadly understood, legitimacy is the belief that authorities, institutions, and social 
arrengements are appropriate, proper, and just.108 It is also a property that ―leads people 
to defer voluntarily to decisions, rules, and social arrangements‖.109 For the purposes of 
my argument in this chapter, it is useful to note that the idea of political legitimacy seems 
to encompass more than just fair electoral processes.110  
 Bo Rothstein has argued that while electoral democracy is an indispensable part 
of a legitimate political system, it cannot be the central pillar of the creation and 
maintenance of legitimacy. Political legitimacy is something that seems to be much more 
at stake on the output side of the political system than on its input side.111 Quality of 
                                                 
107 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., ―Legitimacy and the Constitution‖, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787, 1794-1800 
(2005) (distinguishing legitimacy as a legal, sociological, and moral concept); Michael L. Wells, 
―Sociological Legitimacy in Supreme Court Opinions‖, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1011, 1020-1031 (2007) 
(comparing legal and sociological legitimacy, and sociological and moral legitimacy). 
 
108 See Tom R. Tyler, ―Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation‖, 57 Annu. Rev. Psychol. 




110 Id., at 384 (arguing that procedural justice is not the only basis upon which authority can be legitimated 
and that law, for instance, has also been legitimated by reference to its substance). 
 
111 See Bo Rothstein, above n. 102, at 14. 
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government, not free elections or political representation, creates legitimacy.112 There is, 
of course, a normative side to legitimacy, which may be fairly independent of public 
perceptions. Certain measures may qualify as embodying quality of government from an 
objective standpoint. Sociological legitimacy, on the other hand, depends heavily on what 
people think about a certain governmental measure, or on how they perceive it, regardless 
of what an impartial observer may think of it.113 
 If this line of argument is sound, then it is utterly important to pay attention to 
public perceptions of what is done to property rights under emergency situations.114 
Notice that my argument, while built upon the idea of public perceptions of measures 
and popular conceptions of constitutional property, is not completely engulfed by 
sociological legitimacy. Under my argument, legitimate decisions are those that can be 
deemed, from a layman‘s standpoint, as proper applications of reasonable, non-esoteric, 
understandings of constitutional texts.115 Sociological legitimacy, on the other hand, does 
not need to rely on any text at all. An anomic people may well be content with 
institutions that contradict lay understandings of constitutional rules, if such institutions 
                                                 
112 Id., at 3, 15-17. It should be noted here that Rothstein equates ―quality of government‖ with impartiality 
(considered as a notion similar to, but broader than, the rule of law). For my present purposes, one need 
not argue about what constitutes ―quality of government‖, because whatever it may be the proper 
conception of that concept, my argument stands of the fact that many people have often thought 
emergency measures as not being representative of quality of government. One could also make an 
argument that in many instances the emergency measures taken in Argentina have not been impartial 
either. 
 
113 See, generally, Or Bassok, above n. 101. 
 
114 It may be quite important from other perspectives as well. See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, ―The 
Significance of the Public Perceptions of the Takings Doctrine‖, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1774 (1988) (explaining 
why, for different reasons, public perceptions regarding the protection that private property should enjoy 
are relevant to all major theories of takings).  
 
115 My argument is, in a way, a mixture between legal and sociological considerations. See Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., above n. 107, at 1848 (arguing that while ―legal legitimacy depends fundamentally on 
sociological legitimacy […] By no means, however, does legal legitimacy collapse into sociological 
legitimacy […] it is possible for prevailing majorities of judges and officials, including Supreme Court 




cater to the people‘s immediate preferences and opinions. I will argue, however, that in 
Argentina‘s history with property rights, sociological legitimacy and my text-based 
approach tend to converge.  
Judicial decisions upholding emergency measures that are thought to be contrary 
to popular conceptions of constitutional property are, under this light, illegitimate, as are 
the emergency measures themselves, of course. 
 A critic may say that this cannot be the whole story, that economic emergency 
situations are extremely complex phenomena and, thus, that often they cannot be solved 
at all, if we are to respect the people‘s immediate wishes. We should, therefore, be 
deferential to bureaucrats in the Executive Branch who know —or at least have better 
chances of knowing— what to do to overcome the emergency. We should focus on the 
people‘s best interests. Legitimacy should be assessed over the long run. People‘s 
perceptions should not be measured during the emergency situation, or immediately 
afterwards, but a long time later when people have the necessary hindsight to appreciate 
the results of the initially otiose measures.  
 Such an argument faces, at least, three problems. First, it cannot detach itself 
from the very target that the ―countermajoritarian difficulty‖ aims at: that there should be 
no platonic guardians telling the people what is best for them. In this case, the Executive 
Branch would play precisely that role. Second, evaluation over the long run presents 
some important time horizon issues. Time heals all wounds; life goes on; people move 
on. If we try to assess legitimacy of emergency measures long after their enactment, we 
run the risk of finding a blurred picture of the facts. It may well be the case that people 
stop complaining about or resenting the emergency measures not because they think 
better of them now, after careful consideration of their overall consequences, but just 
because they no longer care about them. Quite often, resignation settles in. Other issues 
occupy people‘s minds and attention. Many times, after going through a troublesome 
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experience, and having gotten over it, a person just does not want to think about it 
anymore. Or she just does not care anymore, even if she did, and strongly so, during the 
emergency, and even if she, faced with a similar situation again would oppose the 
measures once more. But none of this, by itself, means that there was no harm done, or 
that the harm was considered legitimate. Current lack of interest does not make earlier 
measures legitimate. The fact that some of the politicians responsible for the measures 
may have not been thrown out of office —or may have returned to an official position— 
cannot be interpreted as a popular validation of the emergency measures. 
Administrations are assessed over a whole term. Electoral results depend on many 
complex, interrelated variables. Bundling problems affect their significance as 
expressions of popular will, as individuals vote for candidates who hold differing 
positions across a large number of topics, many of which are unknown to the voter or 
even contrary to her preferences.116 Politicians may get re-elected because a significant 
portion of the electorate thinks that alternative candidates are worse, not because they 
think that every measure taken was indeed legitimate. Third, there are ways in which 
politicians may elude political responsibility for the (unconstitutional) measures they take, 
or may dilute it.117 Indeed, one could convincingly say that 
                                                 
116 Patrick Luff, ―Captured Legislatures and Public-Interested Courts‖, working paper 40, electronic version 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2195169 (last visited 03/18/2013) 
(―Aside from information difficulties —the difficulty of attributing a particular policy result to a particular 
legislation— representative control via election is also hindered by bundling problems: one may disagree 
with a clear wealth transfer to an interest group, and yet agree with the over job one‘s representative is 
doing‖). 
 
117 See, e.g., Ittai Bar-Simon-Tov, ―Lawmakers as Lawbreakers‖, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 805, 830-833 
(2010) (arguing that procedural lawmaking rules are unlikely to be enforced by lawmakers when they 
collide with their first-order policy preferences, among other reasons, because of voters‘ inattention to, and 
rational ignorance of, representative‘s procedural performances, as well as because of a likely preference for 
substantive policy decisions as key criteria for casting their votes); see also, generally, Frederick Schauer, 
―The Political Risks (If Any) of Breaking the Law‖, 4 J. Legal Analysis 83 (2012) (arguing that violating the 
law qua law is not ordinarily subject to non-legal sanctions and that the electorate, the media, and most 
other potential sources of social and political sanctions reward good policy choices and sanction bad ones, 
with the very fact of illegality playing a small role in constraining the choices of public officials, except 
possibly by increasing the sanctions for bad policy choices that are also illegal).  
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 ―[…] it is at least worth questioning whether the requirement of standing for 
election has much to do with accountability. The electorate increasingly feels it 
cannot control its elected officials in any meaningful sense. The numbers support 
the assertion: in many cases, despite the need to stand for election, legislators are 
serving every bit as long as unelected judges, and periodic elections do not appear 
to threaten this state of affairs significantly‖118 
 
Closely connected to time horizon problems, one could say that controversial 
measures can be taken immediately after holding office, and sufficiently far away from 
electoral contests, to decrease the impact of the measure on electoral results. A public 
interest façade may be erected in order to deflect criticisms on the measures. Often, the 
beneficiaries of the emergency measures will be powerful interest groups that have access 
to mass media and will use such influence to shape the public debate about the measures. 
Electoral systems may also help unfaithful representatives: earning a place in the ballot 
may depend not so much on the supposed constituency‘s ideas about a given topic, but 
on how faithful the politician has been to the administration. Collective action problems 
may plague the camp of those in disagreement with the measure, thus making it harder 
for them to exact political responsibility from representatives and to display their genuine 
substantive disagreement.  
We could keep on adding arguments to explain why there is a significant gap 
between theory and practice when it comes to political responsibility, but I think this is 
enough to make my point: the mere fact of retaining —or regaining— a political office 
does not tell us much about what people think about any given particular measure of 
government. 
 Another line of criticism that could be levelled at my argument is that the people 
may be simply wrong about property rights. In one version of the criticism, my argument 
would not take into account the fact that property seems to have a peculiar quality: for 
                                                 
118 Barry Friedman, ―Dialogue and Judicial Review‖, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577, 610 (1993). 
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different reasons, it takes a hold on people‘s minds that transcends the justification (or 
lack of) of existing property arrangements, in a way that is different from what happens 
with other institutions.119 Judgments about the moral worth and, therefore, the 
defensibility of particular instances of property rights seem to be relatively detached from 
judgments about the justifiability of the current distribution of entitlements and its initial 
legitimacy. For instance, theft is usually regarded as immoral, even if the victim cannot 
justify that his holding was morally deserved in the first place. A different version of the 
criticism could focus on the fact that many of the people who oppose emergency 
measures are property holders themselves, and thus their positions on the topic would 
not be impartial. But both versions would suffer from the same flaw: for different 
reasons, they disregard the people‘s preferences.120 This is precisely the vice that the 
―countermajoritarian difficulty‖ attributes to judicial review and the worry that I‘m trying 
to dispel here —bear in mind that I‘m not trying to make a positive case for judicial 
review yet—.   
 If my argument so far is convincing, we should move now to try to identify the 
different conceptions of constitutional property that seem to have prevailed at various 






                                                 
119 See Jeremy Waldron, above n. 20, at 174. 
 
120 There may be other reasons why the criticism should be rejected. For instance, one could argue that the 
reasons why property becomes ―resilient‖ are not morally irrelevant and, thus, provide grounds for 
justifying the protection of property holdings. 
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A Taste of Originalism: Property and the Founding of the Republic. 
 
If one is interested in common or popular understandings of constitutional property, it is 
not clear why it may be important to survey the dominant ideas on the topic at the time 
of the founding of the republic, when Argentina‘s founding, arguably, was neither 
particularly democratic121 nor inclusive enough to consider its conceptions of 
constitutional property sufficiently representative of a wider understanding of the idea. 
Until 1912, Argentina did not have universal suffrage nor were votes cast in anonymous 
envelopes. And it was only in 1947 that women were included in the franchise. One 
could conclude, thus, that massive political participation was not a feature of Argentina‘s 
politics until the beginning of the twentieth century at least.  
Yet I think it is worthwhile to explore briefly the founding era for several 
reasons. First, because grasping the conception dominant at Argentina‘s founding should 
tell us something about where we came from and where we have headed to since. 
Second, because no matter how elitist the framing era may have been —and I‘m not 
making any assertions in this regard here—, the idea of including property as a 
constitutional right, and making it the object of formally strong protections, must have 
been a response to some particular situation of the community that may have included 
more widely-shared concerns. Property being ubiquitous as it is, it is hard to think that its 
regulation did not reflect an accommodation of the concerns of different sectors of the 
population, reveal their situation in one way or another or, at least, stir a minimum of 
attention. Third, because electoral politics do not come even close to exhausting the 
political activities of a society nor do they always reflect accurately popular views on a 
number of topics. Indeed, this is a central point in my argument. Fourth, because the 
                                                 
121 See, e.g., Carlos S. Nino, above n. 104, at 34. 
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constitutional provisions dealing with property rights have not been modified,122 despite 
the fact that the Constitution has undergone several reforms —including one extensive 
revision in 1994—, which may make original understandings relevant as, at least, hints of 
current common understandings of constitutional property.123    
 One of the first sources deserving close attention, when it comes to original 
understandings of the 1853 Constitution is Juan Bautista Alberdi and his writings. 
Although Alberdi was not a delegate to the 1852 Constitutional Convention in Santa Fe, 
his influence on the Constitution is undeniable.124 He wrote a book called Bases y Puntos de 
Partida para la Organización Política de la República Argentina, where he presented his views 
on how a future Argentine Constitution should be crafted. He even drafted a 
constitutional project, which was added to Las Bases and used by the Framers as a base 
for the final text that would be enacted. Article 18 of Alberdi‘s project is the direct 
source, with very small variations, of Article 17 of the Constitution, the ―property 
clause‖.125 And Alberdi has been called The Father of the Argentine Constitution.126 Whatever 
                                                 
122 Property provisions were thoroughly revised, indeed, in the 1949 Constitution, approved during the 
Perón administration. But this text was abrogated in 1955 and the old 1853 constitutional text was put in 
force once again. More on this later. 
 
123 Of course, even if the text itself has not changed, context has, and current common understandings are 
heavily influenced by current context. See, e.g. Lawrence Lessig, ―Understanding Changed Readings: 
Fidelity and Translation‖, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395 (1995). However, this does not, in itself, rule out the 
possibility that some features of the interpretation of constitutional property clauses have remained fairly 
stable over time or that some contextual issues repeat themselves over time.   
 
124 See, e.g., Jorge M. Mayer, ALBERDI Y SU TIEMPO 452, 461-462 (Buenos Aires, Editorial 
Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1963) (stating that Alberdi´s ideas on constitution-making were generally 
accepted by the Framers and that his ideas inspired the Constitution); Manuel José García Mansilla & 
Ricardo Ramírez Calvo, LA CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL Y LA OBSESIÓN 
ANTINORMEAMERICANA 65-67 (Salta, Virtudes, 2008) (acknowledging that Alberdi‘s ideas were very 
influential among the Framers). 
 
125 José A. Seco Villalba, above n. 88, at 151 (transcribing article 18 of Alberdi‘s project, and mentioning it 
as one of the national sources of article 17). 
 
126 See Segundo V. Linares Quintana, EL PODER IMPOSITIVO Y LA LIBERTAD INDIVIDUAL 24 
(Buenos Aires, Editorial Alfa, 1951). 
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the merit of this bold assertion, the truth is that Alberdi was, and remains, an extremely 
influential thinker in constitutional matters, and that he is frequently treated —nothing 
less than by the Supreme Court itself— as if he were indeed an authoritative voice in 
expounding the Constitution. His writings on public law are frequently cited by the Court 
in the most varied constitutional topics: federalism;127 interprovincial commerce;128 
taxation;129 forced loans;130 parliamentary immunities;131 public education;132 separation of 
powers;133 constitutional guarantees in criminal procedures and trials;134 horizontal effects 
of constitutional guarantees;135 state of siege;136 jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to 
decide and settle disputes between provinces;137 impeachment;138 the power of each 
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1154 (1995), (Belluscio, J., concurring); 306 Fallos 516 (1984); 305 Fallos 1672 (1983). 
 
130 318 Fallos 676 (1995), (Petracchi, J., dissenting). 
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Chamber in Congress to judge the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members;139 
the power of Congress to exercise exclusive legislation in all ―needful buildings‖;140 the 
rights of immigrants;141 the relationship between the Constitution and international law;142 
the independence of the judiciary, the rule of law and judicial review;143 the need for 
judicial rulings to express the reasons that support them;144 the role of the state in the 
regulation of the economy and the permissible limitations of property rights;145 freedom 
of speech;146 access to justice;147 judicial review of constitutional reforms;148 the relative 
character of constitutional liberties;149 the constitutional foundations of public debt;150 the 
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143 330 Fallos 2361 (2007), (Fayt, J., concurring); 328 Fallos 3741 (2005), (Zaffaroni, Maqueda, JJ., plurality 
opinion); 328 Fallos 3399 (2005); 328 Fallos 2740 (2005); 326 Fallos 417 (2003), (Moliné O‘Connor, López, 
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136 Fallos 170 (1922), (Bermejo, J., dissenting). 
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constitutional requirement that legislation be reasonable;151 the need for the Constitution 
to be interpreted dynamically;152 the supremacy of the federal legal order over the 
states‘;153 the character of the Constitution as the basis, but not the details, of an ever-
changing collective project;154 the relationship between the Congressional powers to 
promote the general welfare and the constitutional protection of the right to pursue a 
lawful industry as well as of freedom of contract,155 the constitutionality of road tolls;156 
takings and expropriations;157 judicial supremacy;158 among others.  
 A commentator has described Alberdi‘s influence in the following terms: 
 ―Alberdi‘s intellectual influence is the most intense and enduring feature in the 
annals of Argentine thought. In institutional and economic matters, he exercises a 
dictatorship…Such a power of influence and irradiation is reached only when one 
hits the truth or interprets correctly a state of the collective soul…Alberdi represents an 
extraordinary case of influence and persuasion over the country‘s public opinion, 
without even being present in Argentina…He exercises an effective and constant 
influence in the Government of the Confederation. His writings circulate in all 
provinces and though them, he creates and supports opinion…‖159  
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Alberdi‘s views on constitutional property seem relevant not only because of his 
general influence in all constitutional matters, but also because article 17 of the 
Constitution, the ―property clause‖, was taken almost word by word from article 18 of 
Alberdi‘s constitutional project. 
Among his many writings, Sistema Económico y Rentístico de la Confederación Argentina, 
published in 1854, is of particular interest for my topic. In Alberdi‘s views, the 1853 
constitutional text contained a complete system of economic policy.160 The book aims at 
presenting the alleged system in its entirety, and to analyze the best means —which were 
the constitutional means— to achieve economic prosperity and growth for the country 
as well as the risks to such goal, posed by the circumstances of the time. Economic 
liberty was central for Alberdi and, unsurprisingly, so was the protection of individual 
property. Interestingly enough, Alberdi also favored a strong central government, with 
important taxation powers. Taxes, when justly and constitutionally established, were 
considered a spending made in the self interest of the taxes property owner, not an 
unwarranted governmental intrusion, insofar as they provided for the maintenance of 
law, peace, and security that were pre-requisites of the enjoyment of property and wealth. 
In Alberdi‘s thought, ―laissez-faire‖ economic ideas, with some libertarian overtones, co-
existed —perhaps somewhat uneasily— with the embrace of a strong government. At 
the same time, his views were that the government was not to provide for social benefits, 
nor to engage in any redistributive enterprise, any more than what is the inevitable effect 
of providing certain limited public services. Bad luck in life was to be accepted as such, 
and governments should not mess with the natural distribution of skills and talents. 
Alberdi would have none of Rawls‘ arguments on the moral arbitrariness of natural 
                                                 
160 Juan Bautista Alberdi, SISTEMA ECONÓMICO Y RENTÍSTICO DE LA CONFEDERACIÓN 
ARGENTINA 11 (Buenos Aires, Ediciones Ciudad Argentina, 1998). 
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lottery.161 This is the general philosophical background on which his conception of 
constitutional property rests. Let us explore Alberdi‘s ideas on property rights in a bit of 
detail. 
He thought that economic liberty was a central part of the constitutional project: 
―The Preamble, in which the Constitution expresses summarily the great goals 
that preside over its provisions, enumerates […] to promote the general welfare, and to 
secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and for all men in the world who wish to dwell on 
Argentine soil […] The liberty whose blessings the Constitution aspires to secure is 
not political liberty exclusively, but all kinds of liberty, civil and religious, 
economic and intelligent […] all kinds of interests contribute to the general 
welfare, but none does so in such an immediate way as material interests‖162 
 
So central was the place economic liberty occupied in Alberdi‘s interpretation of 
the Constitution that he emphasized the enforceability of its protections and the limits 
set by the Constitution to the legislature: 
―Right is the name and rank that the Constitution gives to economic liberty, 
which is immensely consequential, because liberty, as Guizot says, is an illusory 
gift when it is not a right whose enforcement can be demanded holding the 
Constitution in one hand. Neither law nor any power can deprive Argentine 
industry from its right to constitutional liberty […] To regulate liberty is not to 
chain it […] Every regulation that, under pretense of organizing the exercise of 
economic liberty, restricts it and encroaches upon it, attacks both the 
Constitution and national wealth‖163 
 
Thus, private property, as an expression of, and means for, economic liberty, was 
to be protected very intensely, both in regard to the intangibility of the object of property 
and to the liberty to use and dispose of the entitlements: 
―[t]he liberty to use and dispose of one‘s property is a complement of the liberty 
to work and of the right of property; [it is] a very useful guarantee against the 
tendency of these times‘ socialist economy that, under pretense of organizing those 
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rights, attempts to restrict the use […] of property (when it does not deny the 
right of property itself), and it equates the work of the imbecile with that of the genius‖164 
 
―Property, as a guarantee of public law, has two aspects: one legal and moral, 
another purely economic and material. Considered as a general principle of 
wealth and as a merely economic fact, the Argentine Constitution establishes property in 
the most advantageous terms for national wealth in its article 17 […] the most perfect and 
advanced political economy could not demand more complete guarantees in favor of property, as a 
basic principle of wealth-creation […] Compromise or take away property, that is, the exclusive 
right that each man has to use and dispose […] of his work, his capital and his lands to 
produce what is convenient to his needs and pleasures, and you will do nothing but to deprive 
production of its instruments…paralyze it in its fruitful functions, and make wealth 
impossible. Such is the economic transcendence of any attack to property […]‖165 
 
As can be easily imagined, Alberdi held a deep distrust of the State as a regulator 
of property rights and, more generally, of the economy.166 However, the role he 
envisioned for property rights was mainly one of promoting the creation of wealth. 
Alberdi was not concerned so much with the individual aspects of property rights and 
what it meant to be (or become) an owner. Making the pie bigger was the idea behind 
such a strong view of property. How to distribute the benefits of the bigger pie was a 
wholly different issue, and one in which Alberdi was not to be inconsistent with the 
libertarian leanings in his thought. Let us explore these insights of his vision. 
Alberdi states clearly that ―the private thief is property‘s weakest enemy‖167 and 
that article‘s 14 guarantee of the use and disposition of one‘s property is an iron safety 
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166 At some points, Alberdi held a deep distrust of the State generally, showing his most libertarian 
leanings. See, e.g., Juan B. Alberdi, ―La omnipotencia del Estado es la negación de la libertad individual‖, in 
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lock against socialism.168 Trying to explain why he did not embrace a more absolute 
conception of individual rights and accepted that they are subject to the laws that 
regulate them, Alberdi explained, in a somewhat apologetic fashion, that 
―Neither the Argentine Constitution nor any other would have been capable of 
avoiding this difficulty, granting the liberty without subjection or reference to the 
laws. This […] was impossible, because […] no Constitution realizes itself by the 
force of its own provisions and without the help of the law that regulates the 
means for the Constitution‘s execution. If a Constitution were self-sufficient, 
there would be no need for any other law but it, and all civil and criminal 
legislation would lack their reason for being [...] [But] what the Constitution 
should have done in this regard, it certainly did, and it was to give the antidote, 
the counter-poison, the guarantee to prevent the power given to realize the 
Constitution from degenerating into the power of derogating the Constitution 
under the pretext of complying with it […] the Argentine Constitution […] saw 
the obstacles to the liberties not so much in the abuse of the private individuals 
as in abuse of [public] power‖169 
  
These guarantees for property and liberty were reinforced in the constitutional 
text through Article 29, a clause with a very concrete historical meaning, of which 
Alberdi strongly approved.170 The clause reads: 
―Congress may not vest on the National Executive Power —nor may the 
provincial legislatures vest on the provincial governors— extraordinary powers 
or the total public authority; it may not grant acts of submission or supremacy 
whereby the life, honor, or wealth of the Argentine people will be at the mercy of 
governments or any person whatsoever. Acts of this nature shall be utterly void, 
and shall render those who formulate them, consent to them or sign them, liable 
to be condemned as infamous traitors to their fatherland‖.   
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169 Juan B. Alberdi, above n. 160, at 76-77. The antidote Alberdi talks about is Article 28 of the 
Constitution: ―The principles, guarantees and rights recognized in the preceding sections shall not be 
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1886) (arguing, in Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la República Argentina —1852—, that all 
constitutions need to provide for their defense against the actions of the legislators). 
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What was the role of equality in this constitutional vision? Was there any 
redistributive role for the State to play? Let us not forget that Alberdi foresaw a strong 
central government with important taxation powers. He elaborated a somewhat 
complicated idea of the relationship between wealth, equality, and distribution: 
―Acknowledging that wealth is a means, and not an end in itself, the Argentine 
Constitution tends, by the spirit of its economic provisions, not so much towards making public 
wealth large, but well-distributed, evenly allocated; because only under such conditions it is 
national and it is deserving of the Constitution’s favor, [the Constitution] aims at the 
welfare and prosperity of [all] the inhabitants that form the Argentine people, not 
at the welfare and prosperity of only a part of the people, with the exclusion of 
another part. It has provided guarantees for the protection of this social end of 
wealth, without overlooking the fact that the social order stands on the bases of 
liberty, equality, property, security, etc.‖171 
 
However, in order to better protect the social end of wealth, the Constitution 
―[H]as preferred free distribution to statutory and artificial distribution. The distribution 
of wealth occurs spontaneously, in a much fairer way as the State intervenes less 
in creating rules for it. Thus, the Argentine Constitution, instead of despotically 
creating rules and principles for the distribution of wealth, has taken them from 
the natural laws that govern this phenomenon of social economy…‖172 
 
Therefore,  
―The Constitution, by itself, creates or gives nothing: it declares as man‘s own 
what is man‘s by God‘s deeds, man‘s primitive legislator, who has shaped all men 
equal in right, [but] has given skills to some and ineptitude to others, thus creating 
unequal fortunes, which are the by-product of capacity, not of law. The 
Constitution should not alter God‘s work, but it should express it and confirm it 
instead. It was not within its reach to equalize fortunes, nor was it its goal to do 
anything but declare the equality of rights.‖173 
 
So basically Alberdi aspired to an equal distribution of wealth, for he thought it 
was the only way in which wealth could be truly national, but at the same time he 
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disregarded any role for the State in attempting to equalize fortunes. Skills and efforts, 
however unevenly distributed, and not the State‘s aid or intervention, were the means to 
improving one‘s lot.   
Interestingly enough, Alberdi‘s thought seems to acknowledge libertarian and 
consequentialist (perhaps utilitarian) inspirations, contradictory as this may seem.174 More 
precisely, in El Sistema Económico Alberdi embraces the libertarian idea according to which 
misfortune (comprehensive of the lack of traits valued by a society at a given time) 
should stay where it falls, and that the State has no legitimate business in trying to 
compensate for the results of the ―natural lottery‖.175 Another libertarian overtone, 
perhaps more important in this context, can be found in his explanation of natural justice 
as a reason for the distribution of the fruits of work among those who took part in the 
effort through their own doings.176 My work on something entitles me to enjoy the 
benefits I contributed to producing, as a matter of natural justice. Moreover, Alberdi 
believes that ―work and the personal powers needed for its performance are man‘s most 
genuine property‖.177 These ideas seem to have been inspired by John Locke‘s theory of 
labor as a basis for property.178 
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175 See, e.g., Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, ―Mischief and Misfortune‖, 41 McGill L.J. 91, 96-103 (1995), 
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At the same time, Alberdi seems to be inspired by a wealth-maximizing principle 
not unlike the one once championed by Richard Posner.179 Property exists, and deserves 
protection, not because it is the only way we could imagine to arrange the social 
disposition of wealth and the relationships with things (which is not),180 nor because it 
has some desirable features as regards the individual (which it has),181 nor because 
individuals deserve it (which they may),182 but because it fosters national wealth. On this 
reading, by far dominant in El Sistema Económico, collective prosperity, not individual 
interests, lurks behind Alberdi‘s justification of constitutional property.183 
Perhaps this tension is a part of the explanation of later developments in 
Argentine history, and our current (and past) attitudes have not been all that different 
from the somewhat contradictory principles that animated Alberdi‘s thought. Perhaps all 
that would happen later in the realm of constitutional property is nothing but the 
consequence of a different assessment of the value property has for collective 
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prosperity.184 It may be the case that later politicians have taken measures Alberdi would 
have agreed with, had he shared their vision of the effects of such encroachments of 
rights on the national wealth. We cannot rule out such a possibility. It is also possible to 
speculate about the source of our uneasiness and discomfort with many such measures. 
Perhaps Alberdi‘s libertarian intuitions, closely linked to the ideas of desert and self-
ownership, still have a hold in Argentine minds, and sit uneasily besides the wealth-
maximization rationale. For now, let us be content with having a fairly complete sketch 
of what constitutional property may have looked like during the founding era, through 
the eyes of one of the most influential thinkers of the time, the Framer that never was, 
Juan Bautista Alberdi. 
But what happened after the enactment of the Constitution? Was Alberdi‘s view 
on property rights the main conception, even among the ruling elites? Were there any 
instances where those principles could be tested against reality? What were the 
Government‘s schemes to deal with economic crises and, more importantly, the people‘s 
reactions to them? 
I will try to survey popular moods and reactions and to answer these questions 
mainly through the use of published materials and, especially, newspapers. Why are 
newspapers so important? Besides their obvious general goal of trying to reflect the 
views of their readers —and to influence them as well—, newspapers of this era are of 
particular interest in Argentina, because electoral origins were not yet the exclusive or 
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dominant source of political legitimacy.185 Fraudulent electoral practices, the lack of a 
universal franchise, among other reasons, turned elections into one ambiguous source of 
legitimacy, a source that needed to be completed by other means.186 It was not 
infrequent, then, that the battle for political legitimacy was fought in the pages of the 
press. With these caveats in mind, let us move on to substantive the issues, then. 
Preliminary, let me say that Alberdi was right in one broad point: the formation 
of the national state brought about a period of significant economic growth. The clear 
demarcation and protection of property rights, helped by the enactment of the Civil 
Code in 1869, along with the expansion of national territories —through displacement of 
native Indian tribes—, fueled development.187 The successful establishment of a 
constitution meant institutional normalization, which in turn improved substantially the 
country‘s access to capital markets, thus fostering investments and growth and, at the 
same time, further consolidating the national state.188  
None of this, of course, was enough to avert economic crises; quite the opposite. 
Crises arose, emergency measures were taken, and reactions took place. We will examine 
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these events in more detail below. But let me pause to make one important caveat: the 
Argentine Supreme Court had not risen to much prominence yet, and extended 
economic crises, for the most part, were not judicialized. There were not many 
pronouncements of courts dealing with economic emergency measures at the time.  
 In 1871, the Supreme Court did decide an important case involving the alteration 
of banking contracts. In Caffarena v. Banco Argentino del Rosario de Santa Fe,189 the Court 
upheld a provincial law that modified the terms in which bank notes should be 
redeemed. Concretely, a law enacted by the province of Santa Fe compelled banks that 
had issued notes nominated in Bolivian silver to repay them in gold. Of course, gold was 
a stronger, more valuable metal than silver. When Mr. Caffarena demanded the bank to 
repay his notes under the terms of the local law, the bank refused to do so, deposited the 
total amount it owed in accordance to the original terms of the note, and alleged the 
unconstitutionality of the local law, insofar as it purported to alter retroactively the terms 
of a private convention —thus impairing the obligations arising from such contract— 
and to set the value of a foreign currency, a power expressly delegated to the national 
government by the federal constitution. The Supreme Court found for Mr. Caffarena 
and, to uphold the provincial law, it argued that unlike the U.S. Constitution, the 
Argentine Constitution did not contain a provision forbidding the states to impair the 
obligations of contracts. Absent a similar provision from the corresponding local 
constitution, state legislatures could alter contracts, however unwise such policies might 
be. The Court also adopted a restrictive position regarding the doctrine of vested rights 
and the non-retroactivity of civil laws, a position that would be changed later. In this 
regard, it held that the federal Constitution did not provide expressly for the non-
retroactivity of civil laws, therefore the principles underlying such a doctrine were 
nothing but pieces of advice to legislators, who were free to disregard them. As for 
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vested rights, the Court limited its understanding of the idea to facts that had already 
occurred at the time of the enactment of new legislation, facts that could not be changed 
by legislative fiat.  
 Although one could think that the Court was ultimately protecting investors, this 
seems to have been something incidental, as the doctrine the justices developed allowed 
for the intrusion of contracts. The Court did not consider that article 17 of the federal 
Constitution, which declares property as ―inviolable‖, protected the bank‘s property, in 
the sense of its rights arising from the terms of issuance of the notes. The decision 
seemed to leave ample room for the state, not only federal but also local, to regulate 
contracts in ways that implied altering their literal terms. This seems at odds with the 
conception of constitutional property analyzed a few paragraphs before. One should bear 
in mind, however, that in 1871 the Court had not developed yet the doctrine according 
to which constitutional property encompasses contractual rights, an idea that would not 
see the light of the day until the mid 1920s. This being the case, it is more 
understandable, from the doctrinal standpoint, why the Court argued —and ruled— as it 
did. One could also argue that Caffarena involved concurring property rights —the bank‘s 
and Mr. Caffarena‘s— and thus, finding for any of them would respect property. But this 
is not satisfactory. Property is linked to stability and respect for promises, and the Court‘s 
decision permitted changing the obligations the bank had consented to. Moreover, in 
order to see ―property rights‖ on both sides of the question, one needs to consider that 
constitutional property protects contractual rights and, as we have seen, this idea had not 
appeared in the Court‘s case-law yet.   
There are two other reasons that may account for the Court‘s decision. First, the 
note‘s issuing terms provided that repayment should be made in Bolivian silver or in gold, 
the option to be made by the bank. Therefore, the Court may have thought that the local 
law was not really imposing on the bank a burden it had not foreseen. Moreover, the 
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Court considered that such way of issuing notes contradicted the Bank‘s Charter, which 
authorized it to issue notes payable in silver or notes payable in gold, but not notes 
payable in one or another metal, to the option of the debtor.190 More importantly, the 
federal government was embarked in a fight to establish a unified monetary system and 
was trying to take out of circulation Bolivian metals, which had played an important role 
during the 1860s and 1870s to avert liquidity crises in some provinces. Thus, the local 
law was considered as consistent with the Congressional policy of eliminating Bolivian 
silver from circulation, which in turn was deemed as within Congress‘ powers.191 It is 
important to bear in mind that Argentina did not have a unified monetary system until 
1881.192 
 The case seems to have received no attention in the media. I could find no 
mention whatsoever in the main national newspapers of the time,193 despite the fact the 
issue of the conversion of paper money was being widely discussed. The decision was 
not published in the 1872 issue of the Revista de Legislación y Jurisprudencia, a law journal, 
either. 
In 1876 Argentina suffered its first convertibility crisis. While the available 
sources for media coverage are definitely few and sparse —which severely hinders the 
kind of analysis I undertake here—,194 the fact that there was no unified monetary system 
                                                 
190 10 Fallos 427, 436-437 (1871). 
 
191 Id., at 435 (1871) 
 
192 Leandro Losada, above n. 187, at 126 (explaining that during most of the nineteenth century currency 
issued by the Bank of the Province of Buenos Aires coexisted with other provincial currencies and with 
Bolivian currency, in the national circulation of money) 
 
193 Among the available archives for the time of the decision, neither the newspapers El Nacional and La 
Prensa nor the magazine Revista del Río de la Plata run articles or news that mentioned the decision. 
 
194 I could only find two newspapers and one magazine. See above n. 193. 
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in the country at the time, and the lack of judicial cases dealing with the emergency 
measures which elaborate —directly or indirectly— on the constitutional conception of 
property rights, all justify focusing in the 1885 crisis instead, a brief overview of the 
underlying facts may help understand the context in which the later suspension of 
convertibility, in 1885, took place.  
In 1876 the country operated under a bimetallic (gold and silver) standard, as 
seen, for instance, in the Caffarena case analyzed above. While the world shifted from 
bimetallism to gold monometallism during the 1870s,195 in Argentina as many as four 
different foreign currencies, using gold and silver, circulated in the different regions of 
the country.196 Under the gold standard, which prevailed from 1880 to 1914,  
―[...] the money supply is determined by (and in some cases consists partially or 
entirely of) the monetary gold stock. A gold standard provides a natural 
constraint to monetary growth because new production is limited (by increasing 
costs) relative to the existing stock. Under a fiat or paper money monetary 
standard, by contrast, there is no limit to money issue other than the good 
performance of the monetary authorities. Unlike a fiat standard, however, under a 
gold standard, authorities have considerably less flexibility to deal with shocks. 
Under a gold standard the monetary authority defines the weight of gold coins or, 
alternatively, fixes the price of gold in terms of national currency. By being willing 
to buy and sell gold freely at the mint price, the authority maintains the fixed 
price [...]‖197 
 
According to Cortés Conde, crisis struck in 1876 due to a peculiar feature of the 
Argentine monetary system of the times that differentiated it from the classic gold 
standard: there was no legal obligation to withdraw notes from circulation every time 
                                                 
195 See, e.g., Michael D. Bordo, above n. 105, at 7 (summarizing the arguments explaining the shift). 
 
196 Roberto Cortés Conde, DINERO, DEUDA Y CRISIS 124 (Buenos Aires, Sudamericana-Instituto 
Torcuato Di Tella, 1989). 
 
197 Michael D. Bordo, above n. 105, at 6.  
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banks converted them and gold went out of their vaults.198 Instead, banks continued 
expanding credit using their notes. This fueled a further reduction of their gold reserves, 
as people preferred to reduce their holdings of notes and move to gold instead, to 
protect themselves from a possible devaluation as gold reserves diminished. Banks were 
legally obliged to convert notes to gold at a fixed rate. The gold drain got to a point 
where the President issued a decree suspending convertibility.199 While depreciation of 
notes reached 30% immediately after the suspension of convertibility,200 a subsequent 
strict fiscal policy, which brought about a series of operating surpluses, instilled 
confidence in the public that there would be no further depreciations of notes, which in 
turn increased their demand and thus prompted a return to the pre-crisis parity of 
exchange.201 Convertibility was resumed in 1880. 
 In 1885 the debate around the ―convertibility‖ issue returned to the forefront. 
Argentina had decided to stick to conversion of bank notes (promissory notes) to 
metal,202 even when it was contested whether it was a sound policy for a country with 
huge needs of currency and relatively low production of metals of its own. At the time, 
                                                 
198 See, e.g., Roberto Cortés Conde, above n. 193, at 11 (arguing that ―[a] closer look at the 1870‘s events in 
Argentina shows that the [1876] crisis was the consequence of a drain of gold that was not followed by an 
equivalent reduction in notes, one of the basic requiremens of the gold standard‖). See also Roberto Cortés 
Conde, above n. 196, at 127-128 (explaining in detail the operation of the conversion mechanism and the 
dynamics that ultimately led to the suspension of convertibility in 1876). 
 
199 Interestingly, the Executive branch acknowledged that it lacked constitutional powers to order the 
suspension of convertibility and, thus, it urged Congress to make a decision on the issue with no delay, to 
secure legal certainty. See Roberto Cortés Conde, above n. 196, at 129. 
 
200 Id., at 127-128. 
 
201 Id., at 128. 
 
202 However, strictly speaking Argentina was not really under the gold standard. See Roberto Cortés Conde, 
―The Failure of the Gold Standard in Argentina: The Debate Revisited‖, Documento de trabajo (working 
paper) #6 Universidad de San Andrés Departamento de Economía 7 (1995) (explaining that the law that enacted 
convertibility did not have any rule forcing the banks to reduce the amounts of notes outstanding when 
there were outflows of gold). 
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authorized banks issued promissory notes, not legal tender, but these notes were 
accepted by the public in cancellation of all kinds of obligation and they circulated as 
money. Two banks were the leaders of the market: the Banco Nacional, set up by the 
federal government, and the older Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, Argentina‘s richest 
province and the official capital of the country since 1880. Both banks were somehow 
competing, and the federal government was trying to make the Banco Nacional dominant 
and, ideally, to unify the monetary system with the national bank monopolizing the 
issuing of notes which would receive the status of legal tender.203 However, uncontrolled 
issuing of notes, fueled by political necessities, led to an outflow of reserves and posed a 
serious threat to convertibility.204 In early January, President Roca issued an emergency 
decree establishing that bank notes issued by Banco Nacional were not to be converted in 
gold and were legal tender. There was strong pressure from Buenos Aires to extend the 
benefits of non-convertibility to notes from Banco de la Provincia,205 which Roca did a 
couple of days later by another emergency decree.206 Eventually, both emergency decrees 
would be ratified by Congress in October.207  
                                                 
203 See Pablo Gerchunoff, Fernando Rocchi & Gastón Rossi, DESORDEN Y PROGRESO: LAS CRISIS 
ECONÓMICAS ARGENTINAS 1870-1905 45 (Buenos Aires, Edhasa, 2008). 
 
204 Roberto Cortés Conde, ―Fiscal Crisis and Inflation in XIX Century Argentina‖, Documento de trabajo 
(working paper) #18 Universidad de San Andrés Departamento de Economía 17 (1998) (arguing that excessive 
issuing of bank notes led to the incapacity of banks to pay in gold and to the suspension of convertibility). 
 
205 The Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires began to pay the savers their notes with notes from Banco 
Nacional, which had been declared non-convertible, instead of with gold. This was a maneuver to press 
president Roca to extend non-convertibility to the provincial bank. See ―La cuestión palpitante‖, El 
Nacional January, 13, 1885, at 1. The formal argument made by the provincial bank to justify its new policy 
was that since the national bonds had become ―legal tender‖ by virtue of the emergency decree, the 
provincial bank was legally entitled to pay its debts with such notes. See ―La conversión de los billetes del 
Banco de la Provincia‖, El Nacional, January 14, at 1, and ―Moneda de conversión‖, El Nacional, January, 
15, at 1. See also ―El curso forzoso y el Banco de la Provincia‖, La Pampa, January, 11, at 1. 
 
206 Article 1 of the emergency decree of January 15 granted the character of legal tender to the notes issued 
by the provincial bank, and article 2 authorized the bank to ―suspend‖ for two years the conversion of its 
notes to metal currency. However, the bank could not diminish its reserves in metallic and while the 
conversion was suspended, half of the bank‘s annual profits were to be saved in order to increase the 
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Of course, non-convertibility implied a change of the terms of issuance of bank 
notes (promissory notes), as had been the case in Caffarena, and an alteration of 
expectations as well as a certain loss of value for note holders: they would have to be 
content with paper money which could not be redeemed in valuable gold as promised. 
Property rights did not seem to be well treated in this episode either. Was this treatment 
compatible with the conception of constitutional property held by Alberdi and, most 
likely, by the Framers? What was the people‘s reaction to the government‘s measures? 
 First of all, one should bear in mind that this was not a problem that concerned 
contractual rights exclusively or even mainly, but it also included the very central state 
power to ―coin money, [and] regulate the value thereof‖ (article 67, section 10, Argentine 
Constitution).208 What was at stake was the power, expressly conferred by the 
Constitution, to establish a currency and regulate its value.209 Of course, contractual 
rights arising from promissory notes had been modified. But, as in Caffarena before, it 
was not clear yet, at least from the judicial standpoint, whether constitutional property 
protected obligations arising from contracts. But leaving these issues aside, for we are 
concerned here with popular conceptions of property rather than legal or technical ones, it 
important to remark that the convertibility crisis of 1885 seems to have been perceived, 
at least partially, as a part of a larger conflict between the federal government and the 
                                                                                                                                            
bank‘s reserves (article 5). The text of the decree was published in its entirety in ―El decreto esperado‖, El 
Nacional, January, 16, at 1. 
 
207 Pablo Gerchunoff, Fernando Rocchi & Gastón Rossi, above n. 203, at 58. 
 
208 Its direct source was Article I, Section 8, point 5, U.S. Constitution. 
 
209 Some newspapers framed the issue in exactly those terms. See, e.g., ―Los dos bandos‖, La Prensa, 
January, 10, at 3 (arguing that in the circumstances of the emergency, the government did ―not act as a 
Banker, but as a representative and constitutional embodiment of the Nation‘s sovereignty, regulating the 
monetary system, and providing for the normal organization of the circulation of currency and the 
measures of values‖). 
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government of Buenos Aires,210 rather than as a state regulation interfering contracts 
between private parties —the banks and the holders of notes—. Thus, public reactions, 
at least as reflected in the mainstream newspapers of the time, focused on this aspect of 
the crisis, leaving in the background whatever impact the measures may have had over 
individual rights. Second, it seems that it was a fairly extended opinion that common 
people were not demanding conversion of their notes, and that demand came mostly 
from speculators and from brokers trying to remit gold abroad.211 This last argument 
points to a certain conception of the values constitutional property served: the fostering 
of national wealth, for sure, as Alberdi repeatedly claimed, but also —at least implicitly— 
the protection of a sphere of personal autonomy, free from state interference,212 and the 
                                                 
210 See, e.g., ―Curso forzoso‖, La Pampa, January, 11, at 1 (arguing that the federal government was trying 
to hurt Banco de la Provincia by excluding it from the suspension of convertibility, in order to boost the 
position of the Banco Nacional). See also ―Quieren más ruina y más desquicio‖, January, 16, at 1 (discussing 
federal plans to nationalize the Banco de la Provincia); ―Los dos bandos‖, La Prensa, January, 10, at 3 
(reporting that it was a common impression among business people that the exclusion of the Banco de la 
Provincia from the suspension of conversion was a hostile maneuver of the federal government against the 
Governor of Buenos Aires); ―La cuestión bancaria‖, La Prensa, January, 14, at 3 (discussing nationalization 
plans and the exclusion of suspension of convertibility as measures aimed at the destruction of the local 
bank); ―La cuestión del día‖, La República, January, 10, at 1 (arguing that President Roca‘s advisors intended 
to harm the provincial bank by limiting the suspension of convertibility to the Banco Nacional); ―La cuestión 
bancaria‖, La República, January, 11, at 1 (interpreting the suspension of convertibility limited exclusively to 
the notes of the national bank implied a tacit declaration of hostility towards the Banco de la Provincia and 
wondering whether the national government ―longed for the extermination of the provincial bank‖). 
 
211 If Cortés Conde is right, public perception may have been accurate. See Roberto Cortés Conde, above 
n. 204, at 18 (arguing that there was a speculative attack on bank notes in 1885, causing the government to 
take the analyzed emergency measures). See also ―La obra del Banco Nacional‖, La Pampa, January 11 & 
12, at 1 (arguing that ―rogues benefitted from immoral speculation‖); ―Chillidos destemplados‖, El 
Nacional, January, 8, at 1 (explaining the mechanics of ―agio‖ [a form of abusive speculation] in the crisis); 
―La inconversión‖, La República, January, 6, at 1 (mentioning ―agio‖ and stock market speculation among 
the causes of the crisis‖. But see ―Inacción‖, La Prensa, January, 31, at 1 (arguing that ―nobody believes the 
nonsense that speculation caused the suspension of convertibility‖).  
 
212 Interestingly, at the time even some administrative law scholars, usually strong supporters of 
governmental powers at the expense of individual rights, paid close attention to the protection of property 
as the protection of self-government. See Lucio V. López, DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO 
ARGENTINO: LECCIONES DADAS EN LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO POR EL PROFESOR 
DE LA MATERIA DR. LUCIO V. LÓPEZ  199 (Buenos Aires, La Imprenta de La Nación, 1902) 
(arguing that ―if a single person‘s will rules what is ours, there is tyranny and freedom disappears; if the will 
of the [greater] number disposes of the wealth formed by the taxation of property, it is clear that the owner 
does not govern what is his. It is likely that this is very democratic, but surely it is not the government of 
one‘s own, because before civil and natural law, throngs are not the owners of the interests of proprietors 
and when throngs rule them based solely upon numbers, they do it like tyrants and absolutist kings do‖). 
Thanks go to Eduardo Zimmermann for calling my attention to this and providing the citation.    
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protection of the ―most genuine of man‘s properties‖: work and its fruits. Speculation 
and dubious remittances of money to foreign countries do not fit easily into this picture 
of constitutional property. Therefore, it may have been the case that most people did not 
believe the measures encroached upon anyone‘s lawful property interests, at least not 
centrally. Let us see. 
The newspaper El Nacional reported the situation on the days immediately before 
the suspension of convertibility in the following terms: 
―Today the conversion in gold of bank notes has continued normally in both 
official banks [Banco Nacional and Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires]. Until 1 p.m. 
there had been very little conversion […] Most people who have showed up today in 
Banco de la Provincia are working people. Yesterday, a gentleman had 74,000 nationals 
[notes] to convert. After talking with the President [of the bank], he decided to deposit the 
full amount of money and not to convert one single peso, as he found no reason to get metals 
[...]‖213 
 
Immediately after the issuance of the first emergency decree, suspending 
convertibility of the national bank‘s notes only, El Nacional insisted that very few people 
were demanding conversion in Banco de la Provincia, still formally obliged to convert its 
notes in gold: 
―The influx of people in the Banco de la Provincia is made up not of people intending to 
convert notes, but of people intending to deposit them […] At 1 p.m. there were very few 
people converting notes in the exchange office of Banco de la Provincia. Most of them 
are day-laborers trying to convert small amounts of money […]‖214 
 
Materials from other media point in the same direction. La República asserted that 
―until now, the public has not requested the conversion of their notes here‖.215 And the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
213 ―Chillidos destemplados‖, El Nacional, January, 8, at 1. The italics are mine. 
 
214 ―La cuestión palpitante‖, El Nacional, January, 10, at 1. The italics are mine. 
 
215 ―La cuestión del día‖, La República, January, 8, at 1. The italics are mine. 
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newspaper La Pampa, attributing the suspension of convertibility to excessive issuance of 
notes by the national bank, remarked that  
 ―[…] the surplus of paper money, obeying the rules that govern fiduciary 
circulation in the market, had to flow back to the banks‘ vaults for conversion, 
either directly or by requests for remittances abroad. For well-known reasons, 
conversion was made through requests for remittances to foreign countries […]‖216 
 
 Surely, most lay people in XIX century Argentina did not have access to foreign 
accounts, and thus the fact that the bulk of the demand for conversion was channeled 
through remittances of gold to foreign countries points in the direction of relatively little 
involvement of the middle and lower classes in the outflow of gold that ultimately 
brought about the conversion crisis. 
By emphasizing that common people, as opposed to brokers and —more 
generally— speculators, were not demanding conversion, at least not on a large scale, 
newspapers seemed to deflect the readers‘ attention from the fact that note holders, 
common people among them, would lose value as a consequence of non-conversion. If 
this was an intentional strategy, it only made sense if one assumes that public reaction 
would have been more negative if focused on the loss of value for ―the regular guy on 
the street‖. If there was no such intention on part of the media, then the evidence is even 
clearer in showing that public opinion very much saw the crisis as sparkled by speculators 
who, in any event, seem to have been the only ones requesting conversion.  
A few days before the emergency decrees, three newspapers —El Nacional, La 
Prensa217and La República— proposed establishing the voluntary conversion of notes, 
                                                 
216 ―La obra del Banco Nacional‖, La Pampa, January, 12, at 1. The italics are mine. 
 
217 La Prensa was, at the time and along with La Nación, the newspaper with the largest print run and the 
best reputation and neither newspaper was partisan, in the sense of acting as official voices of political 
factions, and La Nación conceived its journalistic role as that of representing public opinion See Paula 
Alonso, above n. 185, at 205, 228, 228. See also Ricardo Sidicaro, LA POLÍTICA MIRADA DESDE 
ARRIBA: LAS IDEAS DEL DIARIO LA NACIÓN 1909-1989 16, 18 (Buenos Aires, Editorial 
Sudamericana, 1993) (citing a Municipal Census in 1887 that reported La Nación and La Prensa has having a 
similar daily print run of 18,000 copies and arguing that ―For decades, La Nación and La Prensa shared the 
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leaving up to each banking institution to decide whether to convert or not notes and 
when to do so. The main argument was that 
―[…] it would be a death blow to speculation with bank giros, because banks, 
authorized to grant or deny conversion at will, would close their doors to 
speculators without any risks, and would reserve its metallic elements […] to 
attend to commerce‘s needs and, thus, they would increase the value of their 
paper […]‖218 
 
Importantly, the article remarked that 
―Public opinion has no antipathy for such a measure because there is a founded conviction 
that national work and production is going through an era of prosperity and, 
therefore, that once the pace of the Nation is rid of the hindrance of a ruinous conversion that 
leaves room for the aforementioned unbridled speculation, there must be sufficient values to 
support international trade, leaving banks with the important mission of fulfilling, 
with their own resources, the legitimate remaining needs of commerce […] banks 
have metallic reserves good enough for…normal situations and since their notes, 
convertible at will, are not used to support wars or unproductive spending, but to support the 
productive sources, there is no fear that its devaluation surpasses the limit reached 
today by gold‘s prices and, on the contrary, taking action the resources produced 
by exportations of wool, notes should experience a sudden revaluation, heading towards the 
par of exchange […]‖219 
 
 Similarly, Roberto Cortés Conde explains that ―public expectations were those of 
a prompt return to convertibility at par‖.220 Such expectations may have been induced, 
among other causes, by the prior experience of 1876 —when inconvertibility lasted only 
four years and the same parity was achieved after the return of conversion— as well as 
                                                                                                                                            
media segment that became known as the ‗serious press‘‖), and Leandro Losada, above n. 187, at 215 
(arguing that, until the end of the nineteenth century, La Nación and La Prensa constituted almost a 
monopoly of the press in the capital).  
 
218 ―La conversión facultativa‖, El Nacional, January, 7, at 1 (reprinted from La Prensa‘s magazine aimed at 
foreign readers). The italics are mine. Exactly the same argument appears in ―La cuestión del día‖, La 
República, January, 8, at 1. 
 
219 ―La conversión facultativa‖, El Nacional, January, 7, at 1. The italics are mine. See also ―La cuestión del 
día‖, La República, January, 8, at 1 (arguing that as soon as the national product had increased enough, the 
country would return to convertibility) and ―La inconversión‖, La República, January, 6, at 1 (mentioning 
agio and stock market speculation among the causes of the crisis). 
 
220 See Roberto Cortés Conde, above n. 202, at 14. 
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by the terms of the 1885 decrees, which provided for the suspension of convertibility for 
two years, instead of, say, indefinitely.  
 The 1876 experience was very much present in the public‘s memory when the 
Executive once again suspended convertibility in 1885. The combination of the belief in 
speculation as the source of the conversion crisis and optimism regarding the revaluation 
of bank notes, even after non-convertibility, may account for the relative lack of evidence 
regarding strong public opposition to the emergency measures in 1885. Another factor at 
play may have been the perception of the suspension of convertibility, and the ensuing 
legal tender law, as an inevitable calamity, something terrible but ultimately 
unavoidable.221 
 In any case, there were complaints and signs of disagreement with the emergency 
measures. Cortés Conde states that ―[f]oreign creditors that had invested in internal 
bonds in pesos [national currency] and domestic ones that had done so in internal debt in 
pesos fuertes (gold), complained against a decision that generated widespread disbelief‖222 
and that the measures caused ―an angry and energetic reaction from bondholders‖223. We 
don‘t really know how energetic, or how angry, the reaction was and, in any event, it 
wouldn‘t tell us much about how the people at large conceived of the emergency 
measures just to know that some of those prejudiced by the measures —bondholders— 
complained about them. We need to know how extended the reaction was as well. Let us 
see what the press, aiming at broader audiences, said about the topic. 
                                                 
221 See, e.g., ―Curso forzoso‖, La República, January, 9, at 1; ―Curso forzoso‖, La Pampa, January, 8, at 1; ―El 
decreto de inconversión‖, La Prensa, January, 15, at 1. 
 
222 Roberto Cortés Conde, above n. 204, at 18.  
 
223 Roberto Cortés Conde, ―Nuevos Aspectos de la Crisis de 1890‖, Serie Documentos de Trabajo Instituto 
Torcuato Di Tella Centro de Investigaciones Económicas 15 (1987). 
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 La Pampa, with a slight hint of resignation before what may have been inevitable, 
said 
 ―[…] the situation has worsened day after day, until it put the [national] bank in a 
position where it has to swindle the public, deceiving it with promises to convert its notes […] 
promises that are not fulfilled, under the pretense that conversion is requested 
with speculative purposes. Because, in truth, what the Banco Nacional is doing 
today is a real fraud and a hoax on the holders of its notes, even more shameful because 
it would be better that it acknowledged openly and frankly that it does not 
convert its notes because it doesn‘t have the means to do it […]‖224 
 
 A few days later, the same newspaper —this time complaining bitterly about the 
permanence of the members of the Directory of Banco Nacional after the decree 
suspending convertibility— would elaborate further on the perceived injustice of a 
situation created by the emergency measure: 
 ―[…] that a Pacheco, aerolite fallen in the middle of Buenos Aires, a Gómez, a 
Forari, yesterday‘s upstarts, e altri tipi, will reinstate the credit of the Banco 
Nacional, amidst non-conversion, surrounded by the antipathy that necessarily inspires 
someone who does not pay what he owes and does not pay it because public force protects him 
[…] is to dream of chimeras [...]‖225 
  
 In the writer‘s view, someone who does not pay his debts is someone rightly 
deserving of antipathy. But even graver is the case where the debtor is protected by the 
laws.  
 Another newspaper, La Prensa, analyzing the policy of the Banco de la Provincia of 
converting its own notes in notes issued by Banco Nacional —legal tender by virtue of the 
emergency decree of January, 9th— said that  
 ―[…] we don‘t realize exactly what makes the solution morally-sound. Certainly, 
it will not be a delight for the holder of a convertible bank note to be invited to 
exchange it for another note, only that this time is non-convertible!‖226  
                                                 
224 ―Curso forzoso‖, La Pampa, January, 8, at 1. The italics are mine. 
 
225 ―¿Quiénes van a manejar bajo el curso forzoso?‖, La Pampa, January, 12, at 1. The italics are mine. 
 
226 ―Después del decreto‖, La Prensa, January, 11, at 3. This argument was quoted, with approval, by La 
República. See ―La solución financiera‖, La República, January, 12, at 1 (it must be noted, however, that the 
argument is used to support extending the suspension of convertibility to Banco de la Provincia). 
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 Later on, after the suspension of conversion had been extended to include the 
provincial bank, the same newspaper criticized the federal government for its apparent 
approval of non-conversion, and emphasized the strong losses the holders of (former) 
promissory notes and bonds were bearing: 
 ―The absolute lack of initiative and energy of the public officials…cannot be 
watched without discontent and suspicion […] The passive attitude of the 
Ministry seems to indicate that they are very satisfied with the situation, that they 
deem depreciation of paper money as convenient, that the country goes well and 
that there is nothing else to do […] the national currency in circulation results in 
a loss for note holders of 30 percent!‖227  
 
La República, in turn, stated that the gold price and the depreciation of the 
currency  
―[…] have to be great due to the warranted expectations that new instances of 
economic arbitrariness will come from the State, worsening the causes [of the crisis]. 
But, given that freedom of contract among individuals harmonizes and equalizes all interests, 
today is the turn of individual initiative, well directed, to take the necessary —today 
indispensable— measures as a future safeguard for their now-injured interests‖228 
 
 The emergency decrees had mandated that both banks benefitting from the 
suspension of convertibility set half of their annual profits aside to recover their gold 
reserve. La Prensa suggested using the gold reserves to stop the depreciation of the 
inconvertible money, and stated: 
 ―That gold, kept by the banks in their vaults, belongs to the creditors in the public, and 
it is even morally required that they put it to use in order to foster revaluation of 
depreciated paper‖229  
                                                                                                                                            
 
227 ―Inacción‖, La Prensa, January, 31, at 3.  
 
228 ―Descuentos en oro‖, La República, January, 25, at 1. The italics are mine. 
 
229 ―Valorización del papel‖, La Prensa, January, 26, at 3. The italics are mine. La República, in turn, chastised 
the government for allowing that both banks distributed up to half of their annual utilities among 
shareholders, thus effectively turning them into preferential creditors, instead of making them responsible 




 Both President Roca and his Minister of Finance Victorino de la Plaza gave 
public assurances of their opposition to inconvertibility more than once. El Nacional 
reported, one day before the issuing of the first emergency decree, that: 
 ―The President of the Republic has declared that his administration will not decree 
the suspension of convertibility, and that before speculation makes the situation 
untenable, the abuse shall be nipped in the bud, without resorting to any kind of 
arbitrariness and demanding only that those who demand conversion justify their 
request‖230   
 
La Pampa, on January, 12th, brought to the fore the President‘s recent statements, 
in the same way as El Nacional, and wondered: 
 ―¿Is the President sacrificing his promises of a few days ago, when in his letter to 
Mr. Tornquist and in other statements, he assured that he would never sign the 
inconvertibility decree and that he would rather sell the Casa Rosada  instead?‖231 
 
On January 13, after the decree, El Nacional elaborated on the Minister‘s views: 
 ―The Finance Minister is entirely hostile to the suspension of convertibility, and he can’t 
find consolation for having caused it by his recklessness. The Minister seems to be a 
family father who, certain that he has no descendants, is forced to recognize a 
newborn […] He will never find solace for having brought about inconvertibility 
and has submitted his resignation several times […]‖232   
 
                                                                                                                                            
at 1 (transcribing a piece published by Revista Financiera, whose opinions and conclusions the newspaper 
declare to agree with). 
 
 
230 ―Chillidos destemplados‖, El Nacional, January, 8, at 1. The italics are mine.  
 
231 ―¿Quiénes van a manejar el curso forzoso?‖, La Pampa, January, 12, at 1. The italics are mine. The Casa 
Rosada —literally, the ―Pink House‖— is the building where the Executive Branch sits. However, and 
differently from the U.S.‘ ―White House‖, the Casa Rosada does not serve as a residence for the President. 
A slightly different, though equally strong, rhetoric figure appears in Mr. Paz‘s account, in his interventions 
in Congress during the debate of the law that eventually ratified the decrees. According to representative 
Paz, the president would have said that he would ―cut his hand off before decreeing the suspension of 
convertibility‖. See ―La ley de curso forzoso. Discusión del artículo 2 en la Cámara de diputados. Discurso 
del Sr. Paz‖,  La Nación, October, 3, 1885, at 1. 
 
232 ―La cuestión palpitante‖, El Nacional, January, 13, at 1. The italics are mine. 
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 Notice that the President‘s discourse brings a moral dimension to the issue once 
again and considers the suspension of convertibility an arbitrary means to reach an 
important end,233 such as cutting off speculation, and thus impermissible to the point of 
using a strong rhetoric figure to illustrate his opposition. Minister de la Plaza is depicted 
as a man devastated by his involvement in the maneuver. Of course, this may all well be 
cheap talk and expressions pour la gallerie,234 but this is precisely the point. Why would 
anyone make such assertions if they did not ring a bell with the audience? If opposition 
to the measures, on any grounds,235 were not an extended political opinion —probably 
even an opinion of a majority—, why bother using exaggerated expressions to show 
reluctance to take them? Sincere or not, what these political statements show is that the 
themes of respect for promises and, more generally, property rights, clearly resonated 
with the public at large.  Let us move forward a little bit, in order to explore further these 
issues. 
                                                 
233 La República held that the government‘s actions were arbitrary and that the individuals, through freedom 
of contract, should make the necessary arrangements to protect in the future their then-injured interests, as 
new instances of arbitrariness could be expected from the State. See ―Descuentos en oro‖, La República, 
January, 25, at 1.  
 
234 Notice, however, that a similar aversion to granting legal tender status, at a fixed rate, to inconvertible 
notes appears in a private letter that then-Vice President Carlos Pellegrini —who in 1885 had had to defend 
the administration‘s actions as a member of the cabinet— wrote in 1890 to President Juárez Celman. 
Explicitly invoking judicial protection of vested rights, Pellegrini stated: ―I have heard rumors of legal 
tender as a suggested remedy [to the crisis]. I will not take them to mean granting retroactive legal tender 
status, as some have suggested, for such a measure would be struck down by the Judiciary insofar as it would encroach 
upon vested rights. I understand that [the proposal] only aims at prohibiting future internal obligations in gold, 
believing that it would thus reduce the demand of gold. I believe there is a fundamental mistake in such 
idea…‖ (the italics are mine). The private character of the letter allows some inferences regarding the 
sincerity of the statement. See Pablo Gerchunoff, Fernando Rocchi & Gastón Rossi, above n. 203, at 342 
(reprinting Pellegrini‘s letter).  
 
235 Admittedly, opposition could be based on rights-related arguments —or morality, for that matter— or 
on grounds of convenience. Convenience-related opposition need not convey any substantive position on 
rights and could be compatible with a position that saw no violation of property rights in the measures or, 
even more, with a position that saw no problem in violating property. But President Roca clearly rested his 
case against the suspension of convertibility on moral or rights-related grounds, by making reference to the 
arbitrariness of suspending convertibility. 
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 In October, 13h, Congress finally ratified the decrees that had suspended 
conversion of notes in January. One the most important provisions of the law dealt with 
the scope of the cancelling power that the now inconvertible notes would have. Should 
they reach all and any obligations created before the issuing of the decrees? Or should 
their effect be limited to certain kinds of obligations? The Minister of Finance defended 
the bill in the Senate and argued for the former position: all obligations born before the 
decrees should be paid in nonconvertible notes at their nominal value, while obligations 
born after the decree were to be paid in the currency agreed by the parties.236 In the end, 
Congress adopted a different position regarding obligations born before the decrees. 
Obligations established in ―peso de oro moneda nacional‖ (gold peso national currency) 
could be paid with inconvertible notes at their nominal value. Obligations incurred 
before the decrees but where the parties had established a special currency could be paid 
in nonconvertible notes, but at their market value.237 This was an important exception, as 
it allowed certain obligations to retain their value, despite the fact that they could no 
longer be enforced in species (gold). There were heated arguments about this issue in 
Congress, in the press, and finally, in courts. 
The debate in Congress, as well as opinions in the press, reinforce the idea that 
the people at large thought the suspension of conversion a grievous measure to property 
rights, however inevitable it may have been.  
 The Executive branch sent to Congress a very short project, limited to the 
ratification of the January decrees. The Senate, however, inserted an article in the bill, 
providing for the retroactive scope of the cancelling power of non-convertible notes at 
                                                 
236 Roberto Cortés Conde, above n. 196, at 163-164. 
 
237 Article 3 of the law. See the text in ―La ley de curso forzoso. Sanción definitiva‖, La Nación, October, 
14, at 1. Roberto Cortés Conde, above n. 196, at 164.  
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their nominal value. When the bill reached the lower chamber —Cámara de Diputados—, 
things got complicated and the majority rejected the Senate‘s addition.  
 Representative Villamayor held that the projected article was at odds with the 
Constitution and the civil law, as it impaired the obligations of contracts, that it 
contradicted public opinion, and that Congress did not have the power to take such 
measures.238 To quote him: 
 ―The Constitution determines the times of emergency […] the state of siege and 
the other cases that go beyond the normalcy, are foreseen by it [the Constitution], 
that establishes the way to proceed, the limitation to individual rights. It is 
necessary to react against this great political superstition that has come to replace 
the old superstition about the kings‘ divine rights with the unlimited power of 
Parliament, as Spencer says […] to hold that Parliament can do anything is an 
unconstitutional theory that must be reacted against […] It is necessary to 
become convinced of this: that all powers are delegated and limited; that the 
government is nothing but a committee of administration that has no intrinsic 
authority; […] that if such authority goes beyond those bounds, the people can 
repudiate it. I, Mr. President, remember that in Belgium, not long ago, a law of 
beneficence, giving the clergy more participation […] was discussed by the 
Chambers, enacted, and approved by the King, and nonetheless, it was not 
observed. The people gathered in meeting, in a great popular movement […] But 
neither the Chambers nor the government took any offense regarding their 
respective authority in the episode; they deemed it as a burst of public opinion 
and the law was abandoned. It is necessary, in order to pass these laws, to stick to the 
constitutional principles, to stay within the scope of [our] own powers, to act with all 
the prestige of legality, of the precedents, and consulting the public opinion as well as 
the country‘s interests […]‖239 
 
Representative Dávila, in turn, had someone read aloud a petition signed by the 
association of tradesmen to prove that the public opinion did not accept the project, 240 
and recalled that ―all newspapers, without exception, have rejected the proposed 
                                                 
238 See ―La ley de curso forzoso. Sesión de ayer de la Cámara. Discusión del art. 4. Debate animado. 
Discurso del Sr. Villamayor…‖, La Nación, October, 7, at 1. 
 
239 Id. The italics are mine. 
 
240 Some signs of support for the Senate‘s projected text, however marginal, can be found. See, e.g., an 
unsigned advertisement on ―curso forzoso‖, La Nación, October, 9, at 1. 
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article‖.241 He went on along themes of popular constitutionalism, recalling that in Italy a 
similar law had been rejected by all tradesmen but one, who was expelled as a leper.242 In 
his view, the proposed article implied a limitation of freedom of contract that was 
inadmissible under the Constitution. Dávila recalled that when slavery was abolished by a 
public order law, the same law provided for the payment of compensation for the 
destruction of property, and that even if no one actually showed up to claim the price of 
the slaves that had been freed, the law was careful in protecting the right of property.243 
―Magnificent law, that which under the pretext of being a public order law, forces an 
individual to receive in payment papers that diminished his property‖.244 
Previously, representative Solveira had attacked the retroactive character of the 
Senate‘s proposal because, if approved, neither liberty, nor industry, nor commerce, nor 
wealth would exist.245 Representative Argento, after attacking the Executive‘s exercise of 
legislative powers through the decrees, had emphasized:  
―[…] the power to contract in any determinate species of money, established by 
the laws, guaranteed again and again by the Constitution as well as by many laws, we 
knock down such a principle by saying: these obligations have no effect […] [the 
legal tender status of nonconvertible notes] is the financial cholera‖.246 
  
                                                 
241 Id.  
 
242 Id.  
 
243 Id.  
 
244 Id.  
 
245 See ―La ley de curso forzoso. La discusión en la Cámara de Diputados‖, La Nación, October, 2, at 1. 
 
246 Id. The italics are mine.  
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 The Executive branch, through the voice of the Minister or War,247 insisted that 
Congress could not refuse to ratify the decrees, for severe damage to the collectivity 
would follow, and that a slightly modified version of the proposed text should be 
approved. The representatives dissented. They approved a text that, with minor revisions 
by the Senate, would become article 3 of the law and which created an important 
exception to the retroactive effects of granting legal tender status to non-convertible 
bank notes. The text exempted obligations where the parties had agreed to pay in ―sealed 
gold‖ or where they had established a special currency, or had excluded expressly the 
possibility of payments with any kind of paper money. The bill went back to the Senate, 
where future president Juárez Celman took the lead to push forward the Executive‘s 
project, within the political and constitutional constraints set by the Cámara de 
Diputados.248 Astutely, he tried to minimize the reach of the original Senate text, and 
dismissed the exceptions approved by the lower house as unnecessary: 
 ―I have requested that we take a vote on the proposed text by parts, because I 
want to rid article 4 of Chamber of Deputies of a mistake and an unnecessary 
insinuation. The first is [the reference to] ‗sealed gold‘. It‘s natural, gold needs to 
be sealed to become nationalized. Only in that way it becomes currency, by the 
seal. The second part is ‗with the exception of those [obligations] that designed a 
special currency‘. All this is futile. The stipulations made by private individuals, as long as 
they are not contrary to morals, are judged by the general laws. It is not necessary to include 
them here.‖249  
 
The bill went back to Cámara de Diputados —Chamber of Deputies—, where there 
was still strong opposition to the retroactive effect of the Senate‘s proposal. 
Representative Gil, for instance, emphasized three different constitutional problems: the 
                                                 
247 The Minister of War stood in for the Minister of Finance, who was sick. 
 
248 Contraints arising from Article 71 of the Constitution, similar in spirit and functioning to Article I, 
section 7 of the U.S. Constitution. 
 
249 See ―El Banco de Entre Ríos ante el Senado. Sesión de ayer. Discusión de la ley de curso forzoso‖, La 
Nación, October, 10, at 1. Emphasis added. 
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law would encroach upon freedom of contract, thus it would not be a public order law; it 
would be a ―bill of attainder‖ of sorts with clear redistributive implications that turned it 
into ―class legislation‖; and it would alter property retroactively, a power that could not 
be inferred from Congress‘ power to coin money and regulate the value thereof. 
―This article 4 does not constitute what can be called a ‗public order law‘. Far 
from it, this article is an attack on public order […] it messes with a point not even 
private law could touch […] it attacks the only right […] reserved to the exclusive 
will of the contracting parties […] This law, Mr. President, which does not look 
forward, which looks only to the past, that in this way contradicts the very essence of law […] 
this law knows the persons over which it falls […] it even knows their names and 
it already has a name list of the creditors it will defraud and of those it will enrich, it is not a 
public order law. This law is unconstitutional; it is a law-sentence, and law-
sentences are always law-deals‖250  
 
Emphasizing the nullity of the retroactive effects the Senate‘s texts provided for, 
Mr. Gil went on: 
―Today I buy a piece of land of 50 meters front and 100 meters deep. Tomorrow 
Congress passes a law, establishing that the meter no longer has one hundred 
centimeters, but half of it instead. ¿Would it be just that the law forced me to 
receive that land measured in [these new] small meters?‖251 
 
 
The text was finally approved with the Senate‘s slight revisions, which left in 
place a still significant exception to the retroactive cancelling power of nonconvertible 
notes. The lower house was only four votes short of the two-thirds constitutional 
requirement to insist upon its original modification of the project.  Reactions in the 
media generally supported the Cámara de Diputados position, eventually enacted into law, 
against the Senate‘s original proposal. The suspension of convertibility was mainly 
depicted as an unconstitutional, albeit more or less inevitable, measure. General 
retroactive alteration of contracts was a whole different matter. However, freedom of 
                                                 
250 See ―La Ley de Curso Forzoso. Sanción Definitiva. Discurso del Diputado Gil‖, La Nación, October, 14, 





contract, not the inviolability of property, was at the center of the stage. Constitutional 
property had not yet fully engulfed contractual rights. 
La Tribuna Nacional, for instance, accepted the suspension of convertibility as the 
lesser evil, but argued for reducing the scope of the measures to the minimum necessary. 
The law of necessity might justify extra-legal measures but there were limits to what 
could be done under its invocation. Allow me to quote it at some length: 
―Everybody has acknowledged and do acknowledge that the suspension of 
convertibility is a serious evil and it is not necessary to point out its pernicious effects 
upon civil and commercial transactions and upon the highest spheres of public 
credit. Just by applying the rigor of the universal principles, and even of our own 
constitutional principles; by judging it with the inexorable logic of the doctrines that 
limit the powers of government and declare the guarantees of the individual, it 
would be easy to prove that the official decrees authorizing the suspension of convertibility are in 
themselves null and void. But everybody steps back before such a conclusion, and rejects a 
passive and indifferent role for the State, in the face of extreme circumstances that profoundly 
affect private wealth. The adoption of fiat money is seen as a sort of inevitable law, 
which barely claims for official recognition. Nobody can point towards a 
determinate origin. It is born out of unknown sources […] It is, in reality, a bane 
that falls over every person. Social blame is a collective responsibility, and nobody is 
allowed to split it in order to make it weigh down on the […] less fortunate. On 
that score, the bill should not have been opposed. The country has gotten ahead 
of the legislative approval, and nobody dissents on legal tender being an 
imposition of circumstances […] The Executive‘s bill limited itself to only one 
article that approved the government‘s decrees. The Senate broadened its scope 
considerably‖252  
 
―Article 4 […] as approved by the chamber of senators, establishes that 
‗obligations incurred before the date of the Executive decrees may be paid in 
legal tender notes at their face value, notwithstanding the currency agreed upon 
by the parties‘. This provision, the most momentous and culminating of the bill under 
discussion, the one that affects the most important interests and principles, is the one that 
has […] stirred up the most violent protests and the best-grounded objections […] We tend to 
believe that the provision […], in its literal terms, has an extremely broad scope, and 
that it goes beyond the intentions of the legislators that lent their vote to the bill, as well as 
those of the Executive branch that decreed the inconvertibility of banks‘ note issues 
[…] Congress has the high power of coining money, establishing its value as well 
as the value of foreign coins, and making all the laws […] that are necessary for 
carrying into execution the powers vested into the Government of the Nation 
[…] But the difficulty resides, precisely, in determining the features of money and 
in giving a concrete and clear notion of the value of money: does coining money 
amounts to creating an intrinsic value, beyond the variable relations of exchange, 
                                                 
252 See ―El curso forzoso‖, La Tribuna Nacional, October, 3, at 1. The italics are mine. 
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or does it consist in simply certificating value, or the quality and quantity of fine 
metal that each coin contains, whose valuation depends solely on the universal 
law of exchanges? […] Granting legal tender status to bank notes is an extraordinary, 
almost extra-legal, measure, taken to save the country‘s situation, which had been 
compromised by unforeseen or unavoidable events. And that’s why such a measure 
must be subordinated, in its application, to the circumstances and must limit itself to the 
demands of social interest, in order to prevent the worsening of its effects, which are necessarily 
harmful. Moreover, one must bear in mind that, in this matter, there in an unwritten 
law, that perhaps for that very reason imposes itself with the authority of facts 
[…] It‘s the law of individual interest, of private transactions…civil law establishes 
that, for a payment to be legitimate, it must consist in [the delivery of] the same 
thing that was owed and not of a different one…It is also a principle of our laws 
that they prescribe for the future, they don‘t have retroactive effect, and they 
cannot alter vested rights […] Those declarations are constitutional law in some states. 
Such are our principles, and there is no reason to alter them radically. The adoption of the 
Senate‘s article, with no modification whatsoever, would unnecessarily disrupt 
those equity rules, without fundamentally solving the problem, and deflecting the 
conflict towards the courts […] the courts would have to decide consulting the intention of 
the parties. It is a principle of law that contractual clauses bind the parties with the same force of 
the law itself […] [a court] would have to investigate the circumstances and history 
of the contract. If the currency at the time the contract was made was gold notes, 
or if the clauses expressed the obligation of paying the nominal amount in metal 
or the stipulations simply obliged to pay a sum of gold national currency, without 
designating a particular species of currency, such as sealed gold, it could be 
thought that payment with the same circulating money, now legal tender, 
complies with such contractual provisions. It could not be said […] that the 
parties have wanted to protect themselves from the depreciation or non-
conversion of money […] it would not be the same if the private contract 
excluded expressly […] payment with depreciated notes‖253   
 
Interestingly, La Tribuna Nacional suggested that courts could find a middle 
ground and avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality, by engaging in contractual 
interpretation and giving priority to the parties‘ express and implied intentions. That 
courts could (and perhaps should) strike down the emergency legislation in order to 
protect private property seems clear enough from this fragment, taken from an article 
discussing the reform of the Judiciary, amidst the crisis: 
―Delicate and transcendental is the function courts have in our constitutional 
regime. Meant to protect and safeguard the security and liberty of individuals, private 
property, and, ultimately, the primary rights of the individual, [the courts‘ function] 
responds to the first of social needs. Without their free and untrammeled action, amidst 
the conflicts that threaten the life, liberty and possessions of the country‘s 
                                                 
253 See ―La cuestión del día‖, La Tribuna Nacional, October, 4, at 1. The italics are mine. 
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inhabitants, the laws would be a chimera and the grandiose statements that we would 
stamp in the first page of our constitutions would be a vain artifice […]‖254 
 
In a similar vein, La Nación accepted somewhat reluctantly the constitutionality of 
the initial decrees, legitimated by the principle of necessity,255 but attacked ferociously the 
Senate‘s proposed retroactivity of the law with constitutional arguments.256 Necessity 
does justify modifying contracts, but only to the minimum extent indispensable to cure 
the evil. It is striking how polished and lawyerly the arguments look, including direct 
references to John Marshall and Joseph Story, as well as to national and foreign case law. 
The tone of the argument sounds nothing like a layman‘s opinion, but the themes must 
have clearly resonated with the people at large. Indeed, La Nación emphasized the public 
reaction against perceived constitutional transgressions. Once again, a fairly lengthy 
transcription may help illustrate the position: 
―Lately, there has been in the House of Representatives […] an interesting 
discussion of the draft law on legal tender, sent under review by the Senate […] It 
has been denied that the Executive has the power to issue the decrees [that 
suspended convertibility] […] The saving propaganda that is made within 
                                                 
254 See ―Administración de Justicia‖, La Tribuna Nacional, October 9, at 1. The italics are mine. See also 
―Justicia‖, La Tribuna Nacional, October, 16, at 1 (arguing that the Constitution established the Judiciary as 
an independent power, and that such independece is a pre-condition of liberty). 
 
255 On the legitimating force of the idea of necessity in La Nación‘s views, See also ―La sección hipotecaria‖, 
La Nación, October, 20, at 1 (arguing that although certain project dealing with mortgage bonds was, in the 
newspaper view, unconstitutional, the authorization for banks to operate in the mortgages market was 
―imposed by the force of circumstances‖ and, given that the law had been enacted, it was necessary to look 
for an interpretation that minimized its problems).  
  
256 From its birth, and throughout the nineteenth century, La Nación wrote aiming at lecturing 
administrations on the proper role of the State, resorting to the Constitution as a definitive argument. Its 
position was, obviously, not neutral, and it tended to sympathize with the interests of owners. Ricardo 
Sidicaro has put this point nicely: ―The newspaper always questioned the different administrations and the 
State from its own doctrinaire perspective. By taking up such a role, it acted as a kind of Freudian 
superego, saying in the name of the Constitution what had to be done and what was prohibited. The 
newspaper managed to ground its positions on tradition and the Constitution at the same time, by means 
of showing them both as politically neutral…It can be said that the newspaper‘s concern with reminding 
the different administrations of the content of constitutional norms was framed within the defense of the 
social order, and emphasis was put in those cases in which the supposed transgressions to the Constitution 
affected the interests of the main owners. But the coincidence of viewpoints between certain social sectors 
and the newspaper […] is not enough to consider La Nación as an ideological instrument of such sectors‖. 
See Ricardo Sidicaro, above n. 217, at 10, 11. 
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Congress and in the press is plausible, because violations of the principles happen 
time after time and they seem not to get the interest and attention of the public, 
who to a certain extent remains indifferent before those facts. It is not so, 
however. There is a latent and vivid repulsion against the violators of the institutions and a 
complete condemnation of those attacks. The constitutional doctrine that is invoked, and which 
negates the Executive the power to issue decrees such those suspending 
convertibility, is substantially correct; but the facts modify it […] in its various applications. 
Public authorities are not passive entities in the constitutional body. They have 
the power to avoid unforeseen evils that may arise suddenly, and that power 
comes from the nature of things […] The legal tender is a condition imposed as a result 
of unavoidable events […] Thus, the Executive branch, for lack of another entity that works 
instantly, has to intervene to prevent the evil […] Our own Supreme Court has said that 
government intervenes in matters pertaining to legal tender, for it is a first-order 
general interest matter. The decree did not create anything: it simply accepted the 
fact, trying to prevent or limit its bad effects. If it weren’t so, Congress would have 
the…remedy in its hands, be it by negating approval of the decrees and making the 
member of the Executive branch who signed them responsible for their illegal 
effects, or by accusing them [the member of the Executive] politically if, as it is 
said, they have committed political crimes […] Congress has the power to coin 
money and regulate the value thereof […] so it can determine that such money 
has the power to cancel obligations […] according to the value Congress set for 
it, but without violating the law of the contracts […] It has been said that the legal tender bill 
ignores the constitutional provision that declares property to be inviolable, and it would be so if 
the bill exceeded the prudent limit set by the same decrees […] When the Constitution 
guarantees property rights, and forbids the enactment of laws that affect vested 
rights or impair the obligations of contracts, it refers to direct expropriations and not 
the indirect harms that property may suffer as a consequence of the exercise of a legal power‖257 
 
Slightly changing its position regarding the implications of the power of Congress 
to coin money and set the value thereof, the same newspaper went on: 
―That decree did nothing but to translate into law a fact, namely: that the bank could not 
convert its notes […] and that, hence, it was released from such obligation […] It did not say 
anything about prior obligations incurred by the government or by individuals, and therefore, 
current legislation on the matter was not changed, either for the past or for the 
future. Those decrees embodied a public order law, in the sense that the social 
interest overrode particular interest, by exception and due to a fact that imposed itself fatally as 
a necessity and a general convenience, but only insofar as it concerned commitments taken by the 
banks to the public […] that is, the conversion of bank notes. It was a simple 
suspension, not an abrogation, of the laws that govern reciprocal monetary obligations 
[…] Once the decrees were submitted to Congress, the Senate […] exaggerated their 
scope and distorted their economy by proposing that obligations prior to the date of the 
decrees could be paid in legal tender notes, regardless of the currency agreed 
upon by the parties. This was more than exaggerating the scope of the decrees […]: it meant 
going out of the constitutional ground, regulating a point that, in addition to having its 
own special law, was beyond the legislative power. In effect, Congress, according 
                                                 
257 See ―Curso forzoso y emisión‖, La Nación, October 3, at 1. The italics are mine. 
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to the incise 10 of article 67 of the Constitution, only has the power to coin 
money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin. Leaving aside that, taken 
literally, this provision only refers to metal money […] the word value stamps its 
constitutional, as well as legal and economic, seal by linking the currency with real 
values that dominate exchanges and contracts and have nothing to do with the 
written or nominal value […] Moreover, it was an unconstitutional violation due to its 
retroactive character, which abrogated the law of contracts in the past, abusively and 
needlessly damaging rights of the individuals which in no way affected the public 
order. It was more than this, [it was] an economic absurdity that intended, like 
alchemy, to turn paper into gold by legislative fiat […] the Senate‘s bill could not 
be sustained, and so is that as soon as it was within the domain of the Chamber 
of Deputies, there was a reaction against it, and it was replaced by another article 
which prescribes a diametrically opposed solution […] It is a triumph of the good 
doctrine […] and the Chamber of Deputies deserves a warm greeting […] The 
capital argument, which has not appeared in the discussion, is that even if the Senate’s 
bill had assumed the form of law, it would have never had the force of law, because being in itself 
unconstitutional, courts would have so declared it, and they would not have applied it to 
the cases brought before them, in accordance to their established case law and 
using the constitutional power that they have over the legislative power when it 
exceeds its own [constitutional powers]‖258 
 
The article also criticized the arguments made by the Minister of War in defense 
of the Senate‘s bill, by denouncing a confusion between the law of war and public order 
laws, and by complaining bitterly about the —in its view wholly inappropriate— 
equation of the legitimate creditors with conspirators against the health of the State. 
Finally, it rebutted the arguments based upon similar precedents in the U.S.A. and France 
by claiming that, leaving aside that in some cases courts had found those measures 
unconstitutional,259 there was a crucial difference between the foreign cases and our own 
local situation. According to La Nación both in France and in the U.S.A. legal tender 
notes were not depreciated, due to either the strong metallic reserves in their banks or 
the confidence in their governments; hence, there was no defrauding of creditors and no 
substantial alteration of the value of contracts.260 
                                                 
258 See ―El 4º‖, La Nación, October, 8, at 1. 
 
259 See, e.g., Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 8 (1869). 
 
260 See above n. 258. 
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 So this newspaper was willing to accept the suspension of convertibility, a 
measure that, while undoubtedly harmful for some people, was perceived as transitory,261 
but it decried the intention to go beyond that and retroactively affect all contracts. From 
a legal standpoint, it is remarkable that its reading of the property clause does not differ 
much from the case law in the U.S. at the time, where the takings clause was not read yet 
as encompassing regulatory takings.262 
 Sud-América, instead, in its characteristic partisan style,263 supported the Senate‘s 
bill and tried to depict the sessions in the Chamber of Deputies as a total victory for the 
Administration. Its assertions, however, are not very persuasive. A careful reading of 
debates in Congress show a very different picture from the one Sud-América attempted to 
convey. It is true that there were voices in support of broadening the retroactive reach of 
the bill. But they were not a majority. In fact, the Chamber of Deputies was pretty close 
to overriding the Senate‘s modifications to its projected article, by a two-thirds vote, and 
the Senate accepted to keep an important limitation to its preferred text. More 
importantly, the exaggerated and triumphal style in which the newspaper depicts Minister 
Pellegrini‘s presence in Congress does not fit well with the rest of the testimonies. As per 
                                                 
261 See Robert Cortés Conde, above n. 202. See also ―La ley de curso forzoso. Sesión de ayer de la 
Cámara…‖, La Nación, October, 8, at 1 (transcribing the debate in the House of Representatives, where 
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262 The first U.S. Supreme Court case were a regulatory taking was found is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 
263 Sud-América was founded to support Miguel Juárez Celman, a senator of the governing party at the time 
and later president of Argentina. As opposed to La Nación, which thought of itself as representing public 
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its own open confession, Sud-América was not trying to reflect public opinion, but only to 
transform it.264 Let us take a glimpse of its rather poetic statements: 
―The Finance Committee of the Chamber, by a majority of its members, rejected 
in limine the Senate‘s article […] they all relied on constitutional norms that forbid 
public authorities to alter contracts and to pass resolutions with retroactive effect, 
as well as on economic principles that condemn legal tender and the arbitrary 
modifications in the value of money. The minority […] relied on the 
constitutional power of public authorities to take all measures necessary to save 
and preserve the public order and the interests of the community […] It was after 
[Mr. Dávila‘s] discourse had given the opponents of article 4 hopes of triumph, that 
Doctor Pellegrini, the Minister of War, entered the debate…Dr. Pellegrini, despite 
his improvisation […] garnered lively shows of approval and dislodged the majority of the 
committee from their position, turning the result of the debate, of course, in favor of an 
article that, without going as far as the Senate‘s, would be enough to bring light 
to the chaos in commercial transactions before the legal tender decrees. Dr. 
Pellegrini showed that the public authorities‘ powers of self-preservation […] 
imposed partial sacrifices to save the fate of states […] Then he proved how the 
idea behind article 4, whose scope it was believed to be limitable, constituted all 
that there is to the legal tender law […] Dr. Pellegrini fundamentally discredited the 
opposing discourses and, always moving forward, he took complete possession of the spirit of the 
Chamber and even of the majority of the committee itself […] Nonetheless, we 
deem the Senate‘s article […] more acceptable than the one approved yesterday 
by the Chamber of Deputies and we believe that [the Senate] should reestablish 
it‖265 
 
 It must be born in mind that Sud-América was Juárez Celman‘s newspaper, and 
that he had worked —and would still work— very actively in the Senate to push forward 
the idea of giving the legal tender law the broadest possible reach. Their statements, thus, 
are at least suspect, and in this concrete case, clearly false. The Chamber of Deputies 
approved a text that introduced a substantial exception to the retroactive effect of the 
law, an exception that the supposedly victorious and crowd-enchanting Pellegrini had 
opposed.266 
                                                 
264 See ―La prensa. A propósito del mensaje‖, Sud-América, May 11, 1888, reproduced in Paula Alonso, 
above n. 185, at 222-223. 
 
265 See ―El Curso Forzoso ante el Congreso. Dr. Pellegrini‖, Sud-América, October, 7, at 1. The italics are 
mine. 
 
266 Pellegrini supported the Senate‘s bill. See ―La ley de curso forzoso. La discusión en la Cámara de 
Diputados…‖, La Nación, October, 2, at 1. 
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The Supreme Court decided on the applicability of inconvertible notes to 
payment of obligations arising from contracts in ―pesos fuertes‖ —an old currency— in 
early 1886. It is important to bear in mind that the ―peso fuerte‖ was a gold currency 
(1,66 grams of gold per coin) created by the law of September, 29th, 1875, that had lost its 
legal status as money by the law of November, 5th, 1881, which in turn created the ―peso 
de oro moneda nacional‖, another gold currency of lesser value (1,6129 gram of gold per 
coin).  
In Gowland v. Mallman267 the Court ruled that a contract that, prior to the 
suspension of convertibility, stipulated payment in ―pesos fuertes‖ was included in the 
exception from cancellation in nonconvertible notes at their nominal value established by 
Congress (article 3). This was so because the ―peso fuerte‖ had been ―demonetized‖ (lost 
its legal status as money) by law in 1881 and, thus, it was a ―special currency‖ that did not 
ordinarily circulate in the country, within the terms of the legal exception.268 Gowland was, 
in a sense, an easy case. The Court did not need to address any constitutional issue, as it 
relied solely on the law that had exempted certain obligations from cancellation in 
inconvertible notes at face value. There are no constitutional arguments whatsoever in 
the very short decision, which at best was a case of statutory interpretation and, as I said, 
an easy one at that. But, in different sense, Gowland may have been an important case.  
La Tribuna Nacional, for instance, considered the decision a very important one, as 
a large number of lawsuits with identical objects existed in the provinces, with new 
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lawsuits being filed everyday.269 Admittedly, the Court‘s reading of the scope of article 3 
is very plausible and, to a modern reader, it seems the more natural understanding of the 
clause and its implications. But it may have not been quite so obvious at the time. The 
mere fact that, as La Tribuna Nacional reported, numerous similar cases were being 
litigated throughout the country proves that it was contested whether contracts in ―pesos 
fuertes‖ were subject to being paid in paper money at nominal value. A lay reader of La 
Nación, complaining about what he deemed as a lack of clarity in the Cámara de Diputados 
proposed exceptions, expressed exactly the same kind of doubts that may have led the 
parties in Gowland to litigate: 
―Mr. Editor of LA NACIÓN: ¿What does it mean ‗moneda nacional oro‘ (gold 
national currency)? Article 4 […] passed by Cámara de Diputados makes a 
substantial difference between ‗moneda nacional oro‘ and ‗moneda nacional oro 
sellado‘ (sealed gold national currency), and I ask: when one says gold, isn‘t it 
understood that one means ‗sealed gold‘? [...] I understand perfectly that the designation 
of a special currency, or a clause ‘with the exclusion of any kind of paper money in existence or 
to be created, are binding and that they compel compliance with the agreed terms [of a 
contract]; but to establish a difference between ‗moneda nacional oro‘ and 
‗moneda nacional oro sellado‘ is something I cannot fully comprehend, as many 
others cannot […] And what about still-existing agreements in old legal currency? How 
shall they be cancelled? In what kind of currency [shall they be paid]? All these points should 
be clarified by the law‖270  
 
Thus, in Gowland there may have been more than one interpretive option open to 
the Court. Significantly, the justices chose the path of a broad interpretation of the 
exception, giving more space to the parties‘ intentions, and leaving a larger universe of 
cases beyond the retroactive effect of the restrictive legislation. The ruling does not seem 
to have received criticisms of any sort for taking such an interpretive stance. 
                                                 
269 See ―Impactante resolución de la Corte‖, La Tribuna Nacional, February, 7, 1886, at 2-3. The article 
transcribed the Court‘s decision and, without taking sides explicitly, it considered the decision a high-
impact one. 
 
270 See ―¿Cuántas clases de oro hay‖, a reader‘s letter signed by one C.s. de V., La Nación, October, 9, at 2. 
The italics are mine. The underlining reflects emphasis in the original. 
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Similarly to La Tribuna Nacional, La Prensa and The Herald used a very objective 
reporting style in their coverage of the case. The former simply transcribed the 
decision,271 while the latter ran a short story describing the details of the litigation and the 
gist of the Court‘s argument.272 Neither media criticized the Court. 
La Pampa ran a rather curious story, mixing two property-related topics in one 
article.273 The first part of the piece tells a story about one Teófilo N., owner of a hotel in 
a locality, who had suffered a theft a few nights before. According to the newspaper, 
when the said Teófilo N. was about to fall asleep, he heard a burglar breaking into his 
home. The burglar went into Teófilo‘s room, where he stayed very quiet and still, 
pretending to be sleeping. The burglar took some items and money, and left. The 
following day, Teófilo N. told his friends about the episode. Some of them asked: 
―-Why didn‘t you ask for help or defend your property?‖ 
―-Dude, for a very simple reason: I was afraid that he would stab me, and that‘s 
why I didn‘t even breath‖, Teófilo replied. 
Right after this dialogue, without any line of separation or noticeable break 
between the two topics, the article launches into the details of the lawsuit filed by Jorge 
Gowland and his sons against the Messrs. Mallman and the Court‘s decision. Is it just a 
press mistake, an article‘s title missed, the lack of an intended, but absent, line of 
separation between two unrelated stories? Perhaps. But La Pampa could also be read as 
establishing some sort of link between the theft that Teófilo N. had suffered at the hands 
of a burglar and the loss experienced by those who were creditors in contracts with gold 
clauses due to the government‘s emergency measures. Teófilo lost its property because 
                                                 
271 ―Pagos a oro‖, La Prensa, February, 7, at 4. 
 
272 ―Business notes‖, The Herald, February, 7, at 4. 
 
273 See ―Teófilo N.‖, La Pampa, February, 7, at 1-2. 
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he feared for his life and he had no one who could defend him and his property. The 
creditors, on the other hand, were threatened by the emergency measures but some of 
them were eventually protected by the Court‘s decision. Is there a moral link between 
both stories? Is there an implicit reference to theft in Gowland‘s case? I do not want to 
make too much of what can perfectly be an editorial mistake. But in any case, Teófilo‘s 
story has another important cue for my reconstruction of popular conceptions of 
property rights. Teófilo‘s friends assume that property is to be defended against all 
illegitimate attacks, even if they may pose some risk, an assumption that is shared by 
Teófilo himself, who only declines to stand up for his property because he feared for his 
life.  
 But regardless of how one reads La Pampa‘s intriguing coverage of the Gowland 
decision, what is true is that no negative references to the Court‘s ruling are found in the 
press that covered the case.  
What can we learn from the 1885 conversion crisis? At any rate, it is hard to tell 
whether an actual majority of the people thought the suspension of convertibility 
unconstitutional because it violated property rights. The public discourse at the time of 
the emergency decrees, as could be reconstructed from press articles and news, was 
clearly dominated by considerations regarding the effects of convertibility, or its 
suspension, on national prosperity and domestic and international trade.274 I could find 
only one explicit invocation of property as affected by the emergency, and it was not 
referred to individual property but to the provinces‘ property.275 On the one hand, this is 
                                                 
274 See, e.g., ―Curso forzoso‖, La Pampa, January, 7 & 8, at 1 (criticizing the suspension of convertibility on 
the grounds of the greater progress than a convertibility regime was bound to bring about). 
 
275 ―Las camarillas y la cuestión bancaria‖, El Nacional, January, 15, at 1 (claiming that ―the federal 
government and the national bank should not congratulate themselves on the good judgment of their 
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understandable: as Alberdi‘s preoccupations showed, Argentina was a country rich in 
natural resources, but lacking enormously in development. Thus, economic prosperity 
was probably a central concern in most people‘s minds. On the other hand, the discourse 
of rights had not taken hold yet.276 With the country just coming out of a royalist 
system277 and decades of internal war,278 and barely breaking out of the rule of Juan 
Manuel de Rosas —a person who dismissed constitutions as ―little paper notebooks‖—
279 it is likely that public problems were not thought, at least not primarily, in terms of 
individual rights.280  However, this does not mean that the protection of property was not 
an important concern for the people, or that its violations went unnoticed. At the time 
Congress debated whether to ratify the emergency measures taken by the President, 
arguments about property rights and the respect for contracts appeared prominently in 
the debates and carved a broad exception to the retroactive effects of the legislation. 
                                                 
276 Even constitutional law class books paid relatively scarce attention to issues of rights, the field being 
dominated by analysis of state‘s powers.  In general, they devoted no more than one chapter to rights‘ 
topics. See Santiago Legarre, PODER DE POLICÍA Y MORALIDAD PÚBLICA 252 (Ábaco, Buenos 
Aires, 2004). 
 
277 Argentina was part of the Viceroy of the River Plate, created in 1776, and its process of independence 
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regulations remained in place until the enactment of the Constitution in 1853 and, afterwards, the Civil, 
Commercial, and Criminal Codes. 
 
278 From 1820 to 1853, there was internal division and no national government. Each province was on its 
own, commanded by a caudillo, and the external representation was delegated to the government of Buenos 
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279 See, e.g., ―El cuadernito‖, La Gazeta Federal, available at http://www.lagazeta.com.ar/cuadernito.htm 
(last visited 04/25/2013). 
 
280 Esteban Echeverría, in a powerful short story that aimed at depicting the kind of people that were 
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would take a mud-covered liver. This was a simulation, in a small scale, of the barbaric way in which all questions and 
individual and social rights are decided‖. See Esteban Echevarría, ―El matadero‖, 1839 (published in 1871), 
available in Spanish at http://www.biblioteca.clarin.com/pbda/cuentos/matadero/matadero.htmI (last 




Moreover, as I think I have shown, public outrage at emergency measures did take place, 
newspapers reflected such outrage in different ways, and politicians were quite ready to 
make statements appealing to values commonly associated with property rights. Finally, 
when the Supreme Court construed broadly the legislative exception to cancellation of 
gold obligations in non-convertible notes at nominal value, there was no outrage or even 
negative reactions towards the Court‘s seeming protection of contractual rights.  
 What about the redistributive effects of the emergency measures? The 
redistribution caused by the 1885 measures was probably regressive. The Banco Nacional, 
which had played an important role in unleashing the convertibility crisis by excessive 
issuing of notes and by lending to friends and associates at rates below the market‘s,281 
obtained large profits and, merely a year after the crisis, distributed a twelve-per-cent 
dividend.282 Money holders, and among them wage earners especially, suffered the 
consequences of depreciation.283 As it would happen again in 1890, large landowners 
associated with the export business lived in a different reality, benefitting from a 
depreciated national currency. The continuous influx of sterling pounds and French 
francs in their accounts ―seemed to isolate them from the harsh reality, from the rapidly 
increasing gap between the value of gold and the value of paper‖.284 Even Congress‘ 
                                                 
281 See, e.g., ―Quiénes van a manejar el curso forzoso‖, La Pampa, January, 12, at 1 (arguing that the 
national bank lent money to debtors who would pay back ―late, badly, and never‖, among other criticisms 
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sanctioning of narrow retroactive effects to the now-legal tender notes seems moderately 
regressive. Based upon the idea that contracts that merely stipulated payment in gold 
currency, as opposed to those that stipulated ―a special currency‖, could not be 
interpreted as aiming at preventing payment in paper money, Article 3 of the law put less 
skillful parties at disadvantage. Learned and well-advised people had probably set clauses 
that specified payment in special currencies. But why would do such a thing someone 
less familiar with legalese? To common people, agreeing upon a contract that set gold 
currency as money for payments could not have meant anything different than receiving, 
well, gold currency. Thus, the assumption underlying the contractual interpretation made 
by Article 3 only held when the parties were fairly acquainted with contractual niceties. 
The lay man in the street, bearing most of the burden of the crisis, had good reasons to 
oppose the measures and to appreciate property rights. 
 Almost contemporarily with the process leading to the 1890 great economic and 
financial crisis, the Supreme Court had the chance of deciding an important takings case, 
involving a project that enjoyed wide popular support. Buenos Aires had been growing at 
steady pace, requiring the opening of new streets and avenues. One of the main projects 
at the time was the opening of ―Avenida de Mayo‖, a wide avenue in the middle of the 
urban radio of the City that today connects the ―Pink House‖ and ―Plaza de Mayo‖ with 
the Congress building. Unfortunately, the City did not have the necessary resources to 
undertake the project. In this context, Congress —legislating for the federal capital as a 
local legislature— passed a law declaring the project as satisfying ―public utility‖.285 It also 
declared the lands in both sides of the projected route of the avenue as subject to 
expropriation. As interpreted by the City, the law authorized to expropriate the full 
                                                 
285 Article 17 of the Argentine constitution, in the part regarding expropriations, establishes two conditions 
for the State to constitutionally take private property: a declaration by Congress of ―public utility‖ (similar, 
but not identical, to the ―public use‖ requirement in the takings clause of the U.S. Constitution), and the 
prior payment of compensation.   
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extension of the real properties ―affected by the opening of the avenue‖, regardless of 
the portion of land actually needed to physically open the avenue. If the avenue barely 
touched a piece of land, the City could expropriate the whole land. The undisguised goal 
of the State was to keep the remaining portions of land for itself and to sell them at a 
much higher price, taking advantage of the raise in value that the prospect of the opening 
of ―Avenida de Mayo‖ would bring about. The profits thus made would be used, 
allegedly, to fund the works. 
 Isabel de Elortondo, owner of one of the lands adjacent to the route of the 
projected avenue, challenged the expropriation as contrary to the inviolability of 
property, insofar as it encompassed portions of land not necessary to the physical 
opening of the avenue. She argued, thus, that public profit —the confessed goal pursued 
by the City— was not the ―public utility‖ demanded by the Constitution. The Supreme 
Court, in a four-to-one decision, agreed with her and struck down the law in 
Municipalidad de la Capital v. Elortondo, Isabel.286  
 Some of the arguments used by the majority emphasized the importance of 
property rights in our constitutional scheme. Basically, the majority argued that the 
Constitution establishes as an absolute principle the inviolability of private property and 
that, in order to better protect it against all possible illegitimate aggression on the part of 
the State, the Constitution declares that nobody shall be deprived of his property but by 
virtue of a judicial decision grounded upon law.287 The majority also stated that even if 
the power to determine what is public utility resides with Congress, it cannot be 
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which judges are to be extremely deferential to legislative assessments of ―public utility‖, unless a clear 
arbitrariness can be shown. The evolution of the ―public utility‖ case-law in Argentina, thus, has not been 
too different from the evolution of the caselaw on ―public use‖ in the U.S.  See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 
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exercised arbitrarily or beyond the limits set by the Constitution.288 Specifically, the 
justices held that the expropriation power cannot be used for purposes of mere 
speculation or profit, or to increase public revenue, or to carry out public works that are 
useful and beneficial to the social interest, if they can be completed without resorting to 
such an extreme measure.289 Otherwise, they held, 
 ―[…] in order to carry out public works in one extreme of the Republic, it would 
be permissible to expropriate real property located in the opposite extreme, and 
to attack the sacred right of property arbitrarily and equally in every corner of the 
country; because if the right to expropriation were grounded not in the […] 
concrete application of private goods to services or works done for national 
public utility, but in the greater or lesser pecuniary convenience [of the taking] or 
in the discretionary and arbitrary decision of the Legislature, there would be no 
reason to distinguish between those properties adjacent to the works, or fairly 
close to them, and those properties located the farthest from them, and all 
properties could be equally attacked, as long as this was deemed advantageous for 
the fiscal interest or it was the will of that body [the Legislature]‖290  
 
  Far from generating public outcry or a political backlash, the decision was 
received warmly by the public. Even newspapers which were extremely supportive of the 
―Avenida de Mayo‖ project approved of the Court‘s decision. Interestingly enough, and 
consistent with Jonathan Miller‘s interpretation,291 it seems to have been the fact that the 
decision was perceived as basically legal, as opposed to political, and grounded in the 
clear text of the Constitution, that garnered support for the decision, even among those 
who strongly favored the opening of the avenue. Let us see.292 
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 La Prensa, in an article entitled ―Avenida de Mayo‖ welcomed the decision and 
described it in the following terms: ―Remarkable decision of the Federal Court. The right 
to property, guaranteed. Limitation to the expropriation for the boulevard‖.  The 
newspaper recommended ―the whole country, and specially its rulers, [to read] the 
following remarkable document‖, and then transcribed integrally the majority opinion.293   
 La Tribuna Nacional, a newspaper specially supportive of the opening of the 
avenue that had been following the course of the matter in courts —to the point of 
having published, prior to the Supreme Court decision, the advisory opinion of the 
Solicitor General Eduardo Costa, urging the Court to uphold the law—, said that 
 ―The Supreme Court decision, declaring unconstitutional and, therefore, 
inapplicable, the law of October, 31st, 1884, related to the opening of the Avenida 
de Mayor […] is without a doubt the most serious, and for many, unexpected, 
obstacle this great project, whose urgent necessity is in the conscience of all 
inhabitants of this capital, could have run into. We are pleased to say, given that it 
is a decision from the Highest Court in the Nation, that there is no possible 
disagreement about the merits and the correctness of the doctrine adopted in it. Allow us, 
however, to lament that the strictness of principles has, in the present case, 
turned out a hindrance to a project that, after one thousand efforts, had deserved 
the unanimous applause of public opinion, and to express our wish that other 
means to carry it out are found‖294     
 
 And it went on: 
 ―[…] The Supreme Court‘s ruling, it is only fair to say, is a remarkable document, as 
regards both its style and substance, which stands out especially because of its strictly 
juridical character, even if it hurts momentarily one of the liveliest aspirations of the 
neighborhood. In light of the richness and clarity of its exposition, the strength of 
the logic by which the reasons that have weighted in the judges‘ minds…flow, 
the science and conscience of the Court shine with qualities that honor our 
magistrature. Enthusiastic supporters of the boulevard […] as we are, after 
reading this legal piece, we would barely dare to repeat the old latin adage: 
summum jus, summa injuria. Meanwhile, fortunately there are still available legal 
means to carry out the project, modifying it as far as the ways to raise the 
necessary funds are concerned. The City must trust the progressive spirit of its 
citizens, who shall offer their unanimous support to establish arrangements that 
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promptly make sure that, if legal principles have been saved in all their rigidity, 
there are still the intention and the possibility of making this great avenue a reality 
[…]‖295   
 
 La Nación, in turn, ran a rather neutral article merely telling the story of the case 
and the decisions of the different courts, as well as the positions of both parties, but 
without explicitly taking sides. Neither praising nor criticizing the Supreme Court, La 
Nación limited itself to reporting the details of the litigation and the content of the 
decision.296 
 There was some criticism as well. Sud-América, a particularly passionate and 
partisan newspaper,297 criticized the Court and the owners affected by the expropriation 
in its characteristic sharp style. I will transcribe the article at some length, for the 
paragraphs are worthy of some attention: 
 ―The recent ruling of the National Supreme Court, on the issue of the Avenida 
de Mayo, may be as just as anyone wants, but certainly, Mr. Walls has hit the nail on 
the head: il la blesse a mort. The great avenue, destined to change radically the 
looks of our great city, taking off its ancient colonial aspect, will remain a 
generous aspiration of two municipal administrations. Under pretext that the right of 
property —precisely the most secured and guaranteed of all rights— is attacked, the Supreme 
Court rules against the Municipality […] declaring that it cannot expropriate the 
portion of the private lands that it intended to resell, and with which […] the 
works would be funded. Perfectly. A neighbor of the City gets away with it, as it is 
vulgarly said; the many progressive neighbors suffer a true disappointment and see how 
the much-awaited transformation of the Municipality is delayed. And what a great 
work was projected! Buenos Aires, divided materially in two by a magnificent 
communication via, where the elegant society would set its rendezvous point in 
the mornings and in the afternoons, with the great avenue showing its grand 
buildings, full of everything the arts and industry of a new and lively country have 
created for making life charming and comfortable. Out, filthy slums in the 
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 104 
Victoria street…! […] But nothing. It is apparent that our criolla indifference, our 
stupid indolence regarding anything that means progress […] must trump the projects of 
other individuals, candid enough to think that in this great capital of the South, 
the majority of its inhabitants have some attachment to the wonderful 
transformations of the century […] The great avenue was dead long ago […] it 
was killed for an entirely simple, and uncomplicated, reason: in this country, 
unfortunately, there exist the custom of exploiting the State. The government tries to 
expropriate a private lot […] it it is worth five cents per square vara, two 
‗nacionales‘ per vara are asked, with incredible self-assurance […] SUD-
AMÉRICA, faithful to its prior propaganda, and despite all the Jews, born and to 
be born, maintains the imperious necessity of proceeding to the opening of the 
big ways of communication […]‖298     
 
 There are quite a few interesting remarks in the preceding paragraph. Its style and 
tone may gives us a hint of the editorial line of Sud-América, its political positions, and 
why it may have opposed the generally accepted ruling in Elortondo. 
 The article describes the landowners as selfish, and claims of the type of Mrs. 
Elortondo‘s were depicted as nothing but pure hold out speculation. The writer 
complains about certain collective attitude that, in his view, dominated the nation at the 
time, and is generally critical of the effects of the ruling on the Avenida de Mayo project. 
All this may suggest a critical stance towards constitutional property vis-à-vis collective 
progress. But there may be more to the article than meets the eye. First of all, it is 
important to point out that the newspaper says that the ruling ―may be as just as anyone 
wants‖, thus conceding, arguendo at least, that the decision was legally sound.299 Moreover, 
the way the phrase is coined points towards a seeming consensus on the correctness of 
the Court‘s decision, an idea further supported by the positions taken by La Prensa, La 
Tribuna Nacional, and La Nación. A second point of interest, when it comes to trying to 
                                                 
298 Dirzi, ―La Avenida de Mayo. Herida de muerte‖, Sud-América, April, 17, at 1-2. The italics are mine. 
 
299 Of course, the fact that any given decision may be just does not mean, by itself, that as a legal matter 
such decision is sound. But in this context, I take the author to be using the word ―just‖ as equivalent to 
―legally correct‖, since it wouldn‘t make any sense to concede that the ruling might be ―just‖ and then to 
proceed to criticize it on moral grounds that, if anything, seem to point towards the alleged injustice of the 
decision. Alternatively, the author may be intending to say that the ruling itself was just, but that its 
consequences were not. Either reading supports my argument in the main text. 
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reconstruct popular opinion on this matter, is that Sud-América does not argues that 
protecting property is wrong, even if constitutionally mandated. Notice that the article 
asserts, without a particularly derogatory tone, that property is sufficiently secured and 
that the alleged attack on it is just a pretext. In its view, the decision goes well beyond 
protecting the property rights of landowners, since they were in fact exercising their 
rights in an dysfunctional way, attempting to extract an unwarranted surplus from the 
State, by holding out. In any case, it must be born in mind that Sud-América was not a 
newspaper particularly respectful of individual rights and that it was openly partisan and 
non-neutral. It aimed at furthering President Juárez Celman‘s hegemonic aspirations. As 
Paula Alonso has pointed out: 
 ―[…] Sud-América ignored the issue of representation and electoral fraud, 
defended the idea of limiting freedom of the press, stood by the idea that a 
unique party was beneficial, asked for absolute power for the Only Chief of the 
Nation, and redefined the federal system, emptying it of any content and re-
signifying it as a unitary system of provincial administrations […] one of the main 
weaknesses of the juarist discourse lied in […] its reduction of legitimacy to a discourse 
of progress as an end […]‖300 
 
 If all there was to legitimacy was material progress, then it is easy to understand 
why Sud-América did not like the solution in Elortondo and, more generally, individual 
rights, except perhaps if conceived in utilitarian fashion. But more crucially for this 
inquiry, Sud-América attempted not to reflect public opinion, but to shape it through the 
passionate defense of its positions.301  
 All in all, Elortondo was generally praised, even if it implied that the great Avenida 
de Mayo project would be more costly to carry out. This points out to the slow rising of 
                                                 
300 See Paula Alonso, above n. 185, at 237 (comparing Sud-América‘s discourse with La Tribuna Nacional‘s, 
another partisan newspaper, whose focus was on legitimizing Roca, its chief, through a discourse of a the 
exercise of power within constitutional limits and through the idea that popular sovereignty showed itself 
through the exercise of power limited by the Constitution). Emphasis added. 
 
301 Id., at 222-223. 
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a modern, individualistic conception of rights, because what are rights if not devices that, 
for some more important moral reason, make effective government costlier?302 Also, part 
of the praise seems to be based on the decision‘s apparent respect for a strong law-
politics distinction, and more importantly for my thesis, on a close link between the 
constitutional text (the property clause), the Court‘s interpretation, and what a layman 
could have understood by reading the text. It‘s the Court‘s reliance on a clear 
constitutional text that allowed the justices to be perceived as doing legitimate lawyer‘s 
work and, therefore, justified even if the ruling contradicted the majority‘s preference for 
an easier way for the project to go forward. Granted, a takings case, with its 
individualistic nature, it is quite different from emergency cases, which are almost always 
systemic in character. Thus, the kind of challenges faced by the justices is rather different 
in both types of cases, and it seems easier to defend property in individual cases that do 
not involve potential systemic threats. But, taken together, Gowland —an emergency 
powers case in essence, even if the Court did not treat it that way— and Elortondo —a 
takings case— seem to point towards the consolidation of the idea that property rights 
should be protected even if it meant somewhat hindering collective goals. Let us see 
what happened during the next big emergency, an event that was to occur shortly after. 
 1890 was a year of a tremendous economic crisis, a crisis that would bring down 
a president. I will not delve here into the economic and financial details of the crisis, and 
I will be content with describing some of the measures taken by the government that 
could be considered as encroaching on property rights and with trying to survey the 
public reactions to those measures. 
 One of the recurrent features of Argentine crises was already there: the high price 
of strong currencies or, in this case, gold, which was of course a means of preserving 
                                                 
302 See Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1977) (―The institution of rights against the Government is […] a complex and troublesome practice that 
makes the Government‘s job of securing the general benefit more difficult and more expensive‖). 
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value, including the value of savers‘ and investors‘ monies. It must be borne in mind that 
although Argentina did not have a convertibility standard at the time, the gold standard 
was prevalent among the central nations,303 and gold played an important role as an 
alternative to state currencies. As Michael Bordo points out 
―Commodity standards based on silver and gold bimetallism and silver and gold 
monometallism emerged as part of the evolution from barter to a money 
economy. Primitive monies were commodities. The precious metals because of 
their special properties —they were durable, easily recognizable, storable, 
portable, divisible, and easily standardized— ensured their universal adoption as 
monies [...] they were also viewed as a good store of value because new production was limited 
relative to the existing stock and because [...] the money supply would vary with the profitability 
of gold production, in turn ensuring long-run price stability‖304 
  
In 1885 Argentina was heavily indebted, with a mixture of standard national 
bonds and national and provincial mortgage bonds held by foreign investors. The 
capacity to repay was in doubt, and the rise of the price of gold was almost unstoppable.  
 According to Cortés Conde, the unleashing of the crisis resulted, mainly, from 
monetary causes.305 The Government had set a system of floating exchange rate, but it 
still intervened in the market in order to keep the value of the national currency. This 
was so because the Government saw its revenue fall, as the national money depreciated, 
while their external debts rose, as the gold price grew.  Intervention meant selling the 
gold reserves that, under the ―law of guaranteed banks‖ of 1887, the State had gotten 
from the banks in exchange for legal tender notes that the banks issued and gave to the 
                                                 
303 See Michael D. Bordo, above n. 105, at 35 (arguing that ―[t]he gold standard, a variant of a commodity 
money standard, was the prevalent money arrangement in the world from 1880 to 1914‖). 
 
304 Id., at 27. The italics are mine. See also Roberto Cortés Conde, above n. 196, at 228 (arguing that since 
the first suspension of convertibility, in 1826 [prior to the formation of the national state], gold had been a 
good insurance against the loss of value of paper money). 
 
305 See Roberto Cortés Conde, above n. 196, at 216-217. 
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public.306 This behavior led to the loss of reserves, which undermined public confidence 
in the administration‘s ability to keep the exchange rate. This lack of confidence led to 
the exchange of domestic assets for external assets and to the ensuing further 
depreciation of the national currency. In sum, the crisis resulted in a devaluation of the 
currency.307 Between 1889 and 1891, the national currency depreciated, in terms of gold, 
virtually 100%.308 
Devaluations are generally described in the economics literature as leading, at least 
initially,309 towards regressive redistributions, and more recent empirical evidence seems 
to back these theoretical claims.310 Thus, it has been held that 
                                                 
306 Roughly speaking, the ―law of guaranteed banks‖ worked like this: banks were authorized to issue notes 
against the national public funds issued by the State as a guarantee of the notes. The national public funds, 
in turn, were bought from the State, with gold, by the banks that wanted to issue. In the event of 
bankruptcy, the national public funds were to be sold and the notes bought back.  
 
307 Interestingly, the depreciation of the national currency was not followed, not at least during some time, 
by a substantial general increase in prices. While prices rose close to 20% between 1889 and 1891, the gold 
price more than doubled during the same period. See, e.g., Roberto Cortés Conde, above n. 196, at 210, 
224-226 (explaining the reasons for this phenomenon). See also Orlando J. Ferreres (editor), DOS SIGLOS 
DE ECONOMÍA ARGENTINA 563 (Buenos Aires, El Ateneo, 2010) (indicating an increase in the 
consumer prices index of 14,5% for the year 1890, and a total accumulated of 19,5% for the years 1889-
1891).  
 
308 See Orlando J. Ferreres (editor), above n. 307, at 675 (showing an increase of the gold price from a 1.91 
parity to a 3.87 parity for the years 1889-1891). 
 
309 See, e.g., J. B. Knight, ―Devaluation and Income Distribution in Less-Developed Economies‖, 28 Oxford 
Econ. Pap. 208, 226-227 (1976) (arguing that after a devaluation, and ―[o]wing to factor immobility the 
initial redistribution of income between the pricing sectors (exportables, importables and non-tradables) 
may stick, or it may be diluted to correspond to the institutional sectors (modern and traditional). Within 
the tradable or tradable-intensive sector, the initial benefit accrues to the hirers of factors. It subsequently 
tends to be transferred, depending on the degree of intra-sector and factor mobility and factor price 
responsiveness to market forces, and on the bargaining position of organized labour. A more likely form of 
response to the initial sectoral redistribution than market forces is non-market reaction by pressure groups 
trying to restore their real income. It is possible in certain conditions for such response to set off a spiral of 
inflation and further devaluations‖). 
 
310 See, e.g., Mohsen Bahmani-Oskooee, ―Effects of Devaluation on Income Distribution‖, 4 Appl. Econ. 
Lett. 321, 323 (1997) (using cross-country data from 24 countries to show that ―indeed devaluations have 
unequalizing effect on income distribution‖); Michael J. Twomey, ―Devaluations and Income Distribution 
in Latin America‖, 49 Southern Econ. J. 804, 818 (1983) (arguing that ―the evidence suggests that 
devaluations lower real wages and worsen the function distribution of income‖). 
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―[t]he redistribution of income effect is also well recognized. There may be a long 
lag of wages behind prices, and profits might therefore gain at the expense of 
wages as a result of the devaluation. Rising prices will transfer income from fixed 
money income groups to the rest of the economy.‖311 
 
―Devaluation will raise the price of [a given good] in domestic currency [...] in 
proportion to the increase in the price of foreign currency. Thus, the impact effect 
of devaluation will result in an increase of the real income of capitalists [...] and a 
decrease in the real income of workers [...], since the money wage rate is 
unchanged‖312 
 
 In early 1890, the incredible expansion in the quantity of money in circulation313 
had reached a point where public opinion was well-aware of its pernicious effects on the 
wealth of the layman. When the Juárez Celman administration attempted to issue 
mortgage-backed bonds intended to circulate as money, the reaction was unanimous and 
extremely energetic. Newspapers accused the administration of acting against the 
People‘s wills and interests, and only in favor of cronies and friends. Public reaction was 
focused on the depreciation of money, with the ensuing impoverishment of note holders, 
as well as on an almost primal fear of non-convertible money. Property arguments also 
appeared in the media.  
 El Argentino314criticized the administration heavily, accusing the president of 
violating the Constitution and contradicting the majority‘s will and Congress of being 
subservient to Juárez Celman and, basically, allowing the administration to enact 
legislation beneficial to a few allies and friends, and harmful to the many: 
                                                 
311 Sidney S. Alexander, ―Effects of a Devaluation on a Trade Balance‖, 2 Staff Pap. Int. Monet. Fund 263, 
273 (1952). 
 
312 Carlos F. Díaz Alejandro, ―A Note on the Impact of Devaluation and the Redistributive Effect‖, 71 J. 
Polit. Econ. 577, 579 (1963). 
 
313 See Roberto Cortés Conde, above n. 196, at 209-210. 
 
314 The newspaper first appeared in 1890, lasted only six years, and it was the journalistic appendix of the 
then-recently founded Unión Cívica Radical. 
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 ―Who would have thought that all those great problems that worried the men of 
the Revolution […] would come to be reduced to this single humiliating 
question: on one side, the proud Nation of other times, their flag and their fate; 
on the other side, Mr. Miguel Juárez Celman, one single man, and what a man! 
Go look at the sad picture of what was the Republic of Argentina (today it is not 
a Republic), and you will see that everything revolves around the President, they 
are all wheels spinning at his will […] National chambers, provincial 
governments, judges, banks; where has he not intended to make things at his entire 
will? Where has he not showed up to sow disorder and tread upon the laws? […] 
What is Congress for? To pay homage to him and enact anything he wishes […] It can be 
asserted with no hesitation that wherever there is a public interest, the hand of the President is in 
the opposite side […] Perennial violator of the Constitution, [Juárez Celman] has turned 
our fundamental law into the regular terrain for his [schemes]. From the 
Preamble to article 110, there is no constitutional prescription that has not 
received serious injury from him […] we are under the gentle dictatorship of a 
usurer […]‖315 
 
 ―[…] this anti-parliamentarian and suspicious procedure […] which demands 
from Congress the immediate dispatch and instantaneous sanction of bills of the 
highest importance […] has been repeated many times during the Juarez 
administration […] thus, in countless cases the discussion in Congress is 
suppressed, in order to achieve the instantaneous enactment of unconstitutional, if not 
immoral, measures […] And it is not the case that the Executive fears a contrary 
vote in the Chamber, for it is composed of all staunch supporters who approve 
by acclamation anything the Executive proposes […] the country receives with 
remarkable repulsion this new ‘papering’, because there is no minimum of confidence 
in the capacity of the government, or in the equitable distribution of these 
mortgage-backed bonds; because there is the certainty that these hybrid notes will 
be swallowed by the avarice of the political circle around the President […]‖316  
  
 Criticizing the attempt of the Ministry of Finance to get a loan from private 
English bankers the same newspaper stated that ―only two embarrassments are yet to be 
born by the Republic: bankruptcy and non-convertibility‖317 and that: 
―[…] once the loan has failed, the most disastrous of all financial expedients —the issue of 
inconvertible notes— is the panacea that the Minister offers to the country […] 
                                                 
315 ―Un hombre contra un pueblo‖, El Argentino, July, 3, at 1. See also ―La Cámara de Diputados‖, El 
Argentino, July, 7, at 1 (arguing that Juárez Celman exercised some sort of despotism over Congress and 
that congressmen were not, and could not be, the People‘s representatives). 
 
316 ―Caos financiero‖, El Argentino, July, 8, at 1. 
 
317 ―La honra nacional está en peligro‖, El Argentino, July, 12, at 1. 
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inconvertibility appears to the eyes of our rulers as the supreme law on which 
argentine finances and the economic system of the country must rest‖318  
 
Other media coincided in the complete rejection of new issues of inconvertible 
notes or financial instruments that were functionally equivalent. The desperate economic 
measures were perceived as instantiating a regressive redistribution and, at the same time, 
―class legislation‖. Thus, La Prensa said that 
―We must rush all and any efforts in defense of the social interests threatened by 
the bill of issue of mortgage-backed notes, as long as there is even a remote hope 
of reaction by the public authorities to whose arbitrary judgment the questions concerning the 
life and fortune of the people are left […] any increase of issue [of notes] will be 
nothing but more fuel thrown to the bonfire that burns the credit of the nation 
[…] so that the crisis is deepened, and that a small number of privileged or favorites of fortune 
gamble and prosper at the expense of the People […] To assume that the administration faces 
the general protest in order to [protect] […] small owners is a naivety, even more so when 
such small owners have not lobbied to deserve such a diligent protection. The intention of 
the bill and its result would benefit big speculators, those who make efforts to get official 
favors [...] [the bill] sacrifices the social interest, the interest of the owners and of 
those who are not owners […] to the relatively small numbers of possessors of 
lands and debtors of the bank to whom the one hundred million of the new issue 
will be distributed‖319 
 
El Argentino, discussing a project by a Congressman aiming at expanding the 
issue, said: 
―We are already down that road, let the one hundred million of Mr. Minister and 
the three hundred million of Mr. Deputy come and soon we will have come all 
the way and we will not have to worry about gold reserves, reserve funds […] 
anymore. Complete and absolute demonetization will free our rulers of any concern about the 
possibility of returning to convertibility at some point […] Undoubtedly, that road will not be 
traveled across without the country being impoverished, the commerce and 
industries being ruined, and without the savings accumulated by the constant work of the 
modest workman disappearing […] Instead [the measures] will enrich a few privileged and, 
meanwhile, the same people who already took the millions of the official banks will swim in a 
sea of wealth again. The financial ideas of Mr. Minister, perfected by those of Mr. Deputy, 
amount to nothing but the spoliation of the many in favor of the few […] The issue of three 
hundred million, sponsored by Mr. Deputy, will take paper money to utmost 
                                                 
318 ―Cómo se manejan las finanzas argentinas‖, El Argentino, July, 11, at 1. The italics are mine. 
 
319 ―Los cien millones. El derecho de petición‖, La Prensa, July, 15, at 5. The italics are mine. See also 




limits of depreciation. The aforementioned twenty and thirty percent of loss for 
their current holders will become sixty or seventy percent, and bond holders will be 
deprived of their capitals, which were entrusted to the rectitude of public 
administration guaranteed by the honor of the Nation […] we cannot find a moderate 
word or term to describe it [the government‘s behavior].  Moreover, the proper word 
is already in everybody‘s mouths and we do not need to write it down here‖320 
 
―Inconvertibility today […] would be nothing but a swindle, carried on by public authorities, in 
favor of a few insolvent debtors. A swindle, because debtors would have defrauded their 
respective creditors as to the substance, the quality, and the quantity of the things they were 
bound to deliver in accordance to their obligations […]‖321   
 
El Nacional, in turn, held that the financial policy of the government instilled ―fear 
in all social classes‖,322 that inconvertibility would imply that by virtue of ―a tyrannical 
and abusive law, gold became simple paper money, depreciated by a 70% or 80% off its 
face value‖,323 that the issue of the bonds would cause political friends and allies of the 
President to increase their wealth to the detriment of the People‘s,324 and described 
Juárez Celman‘s presidency as ―an unchecked administration, who respects neither law 
nor opinion‖.325  
Explicit property-based arguments, as well as constitutional arguments, also made 
an appearance in the debate. El Nacional thought that ―property itself would be the first 
                                                 
320 ―Cómo se manejan las finanzas argentinas‖, El Argentino, July, 11, at 1. The italics are mine. 
 
321 ―Crisis de descrédito‖, El Argentino, July, 16, at 1. The italics are mine. 
 
322 ―Cien millones‖, El Nacional, July, 8, at 1. 
 
323 ―Actualidad financiera‖, El Nacional, July, 12, at 1. See also ―Finanzas pampas‖, El Nacional, July, 3, at 1 
(arguing that the country was drowning in a flood of paper money); ―Sin rumbo‖, El Nacional, July, at 1 
(arguing that the administration had illegally ―papered‖ the country). 
 
324 Id. See also ―La emisión es la ruina‖, El Nacional, July, 11, at 1 (arguing that political allies of the 
president favored additional issues of paper money to enrich themselves while sinking the country). 
 
325 ―La farza del empréstito‖, El Nacional, July, 5, at 1. 
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to benefit from a financial plan that aimed at revaluating the currency‖326 and that, if the 
new, circulating, mortgage-backed bonds had a higher market value than the old —also 
circulating— notes, then the government —in order to redeem the bonds in accordance 
with the projected amortization scheme— would have to either pay the premium for the 
bonds or ―resort to the arbitrariness of demonetizing them, to return them to the State‘s 
vaults [...] [this] would be an spoliation, forcing people to turn over good money in 
exchange for bad money‖.327 La Prensa dedicated considerable space to discussing the 
constitutionality of granting legal tender status to notes. Approving the arguments of 
those who thought it to be beyond Congress‘ powers, the newspaper held that 
―To Moreno […] the doctrine of the written value of inconvertible notes […] infringes upon 
the principles of our political Constitution […] Such a doctrine implied the supremacy 
of force and absolute power […] ‘national law […] based upon free institutions, does 
not grant public authorities any more powers and duties over money than those 
provided for by the laws […] in accordance with constitutional limitations that guarantee 
property and freedom of contract’ […] Brilliant defense, without a doubt […] Moreno 
proved that […] legal tender does not mean imposing paper at face value [...] 
Moreno‘s doctrine, grounded upon history, our legislative and judicial precedents, 
as well as American case-law has constantly gained ground, and we could invoke 
in its favor new laws and new judicial rulings that confirm it. But before 
continuing, we are going to recall some ideas and statements made within the Constitutional 
Convention of 1853, which we have not seen cited in […] the debates on the issue. 
When the subject of Congress‘ power regarding the establishment of a national 
bank empowered to issue notes came for discussion, one delegate requested an 
explanation on whether the bank included the power to issue paper money, the 
reporting member of the committee stated that: ‗the bank would issue notes, but 
not legal tender notes‘. When, after enacting the Constitution, the Convention 
took up […] the project of the establishment of the national bank, important 
statements were made. Referring to the notes that the bank would issue, Mr. 
Gorostiaga stated that they would represent the obligation or debt of the Nation, 
but that their actual value would be ‗the one they had in the market‘ […] Mr. 
Bedoya asked whether the notes would be legal tender or freely-circulating notes. 
He recalled that ‗there would be prior obligations, payable in different currencies, 
and that such obligations would have to be secured and respected, so that 
everybody rests assured that this law in no way harmed vested rights or altered 
the nature of contracts‘ […] These are precedents that confirm the doctrine of freedom of 
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327 ―De los cien millones‖, El Nacional, July, 14, at 1. The italics are mine. 
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contract, which moreover enjoy the prestige of their origins, because they come into existence as an 
interpretation of our constitutional provisions on matters of banks and issue of money […]‖328 
 
Moreover, the same newspaper emphasized that this time was different from the 
previous crisis (1885), where unforeseen circumstances might have forced the 
administration to act swiftly and, thus, might have excused a breach of the fundamental 
law.329 This time the public authorities were trying to carry out deliberate acts, previously 
discussed and freely decided, which ―were contrary to the constitutional system and to 
the uniform intentions and aspirations that drove our constituents‖.330  
One of the measures supported by some legislators and debated in Congress was 
the retroactive ―papelization‖ of all contracts: instead of repaying obligations in gold, as 
per their original terms, which was sold at over 3 paper pesos at the time, ―papelization‖ 
would permit repayment in paper money, at a conversion rate clearly below par.  
 Representative Molina, a supporter of the idea, argued that obligations in gold 
should be converted to paper pesos, at a parity of 2,50 paper pesos per gold peso of the 
original contract, and that there should be a fixed term of six months for all obligations 
to be settled.331 This would have meant that creditors lost some 50 cents for every gold 
peso, around twenty percent of the value of their credits. Notice that the effects of such 
                                                 
328 ―El curso forzoso‖, La Prensa, July, 11, at 1 (quoting approvingly Moreno‘s doctrine on the 
unconstitutionality of legal tender). The italics are mine. José Benjamin Gorostiaga, whose opinions on the 
character of the notes to be issued by the national bank are quoted in the article, was a very prominent 
member of the 1853 Constitutional Convention, and partially responsible for drafting the text. See also 
―Los cien millones. Derecho de petición‖, La Prensa, July, 15, at 5 (arguing that the Constitution intended 
the notes issued by the national bank to be convertible, not inconvertible). 
 
329 It must be noted that La Prensa admitted the exceptional possibility of justifying the 1885 decrees 
establishing non-convertibility on grounds of necessity, but clearly approved of Congress‘ later 
intervention, where the doctrine that distinguished between contracts with no designation of special 
currency and those with one such clause was set. See ―El curso forzoso‖, La Prensa, July, 11, at 1. This was, 
basically, the same position adopted by other media, such as La Nación and La Tribuna Nacional, in 1885.  
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331 See Pablo Gerchunoff, Fernando Rocchi & Gastón Rossi, above n. 203, at 118. 
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a measure are similar to granting legal tender status to bank notes, but they are not quite 
the same. The idea, similar to what the U.S. Congress did in 1933, did not take off but it 
would be applied, in much more brutal fashion, during the latest great crisis, in 2002.  
  In early 1891 a bank run seemed inevitable. Despite the fact that Juárez Celman 
had been thrown out of power, the economic situation had reached an extreme point. 
We cannot forget that the administration was attempting to keep the gold price under 
control, in order to avoid the deleterious effects of getting revenue in depreciated money 
and having debts in gold. Thus, the Banco Nacional sold gold to individuals. But this gold, 
contrary to the government‘s expectations, did not return to the system. At least, it did 
not go to the official banks.332 According to Cortés Conde, this was due, partially at least, 
to the fear the 1885 decrees that suspended convertibility and granted legal tender status 
to bank notes, as well as the later law that granted limited retroactive effect to legal 
tender notes, had instilled in depositors.333 At the same time, we cannot leave out of the 
picture the generalized rejection observed in regard to legal tender, non-convertibility 
and, mainly, excessive issues that depreciated the money each time, thus impoverishing 
the layman. Public perception pointed towards public ownership of the main banks as 
the cause of uncontrolled issues. The monetary system was at the center of the criticisms. 
Therefore, when both the Banco Nacional and the Banco de la Provincia were up for a 
bankruptcy declaration, followed by the promise of a broad reorganization of the 
banking system, under private hands, the public reaction was way milder than one could 
have expected, given that depositors were to suffer serious encroachments on their 
rights. One could say that there were mixed emotions: while the debate in the press hints 
at broad sympathy for depositors, it also points toward the thought that there was no 
                                                 





way out without cutting off uncontrolled issues. And the way to do it was, in all 
likelihood, by reorganizing the system and keeping the governments‘ hands off the 
money-printing machine.334 Issuing more money to pay the depositors would not save 
the banks. Also, and not less importantly, there seems to have been an awareness of the 
dubious constitutionality of the emergency measures that were taken. Yet, as it had been 
the case with the 1885 decrees, necessity seemed to be a powerful justification for what 
was perceived, at most, as a temporary breach of the Constitution. Even more so, when 
the restrictive emergency measures, which suspended payment of bank deposits, were 
supposed to be temporary. Let us cover the debate, as it was held in the main 
newspapers. 
 On April, 4th, El Nacional warned that the situation was becoming desperate and 
that ―the crisis that is deepening everyday increases social unrest, as it drags everybody to 
the ruin‖.335 According to the same paper, the crisis was neither financial, nor economic, 
nor political. It was caused by ―our vicious monetary system‖.336 The situation was grave 
enough to put in danger the very same existence of the Argentine Nation.337 Such ―do-
or-die‖ arguments would become common in later crises. 
 At the same time, La Prensa argued for the liquidation of the banks, as the only 
measure to put an end to a crisis that had already lingered on for way too long. 
                                                 
334 See, e.g., ―La reforma bancaria‖, El Nacional, April, 9, at 1 (arguing that official interference with the 
management of banks was an evil, as it generally aimed at ―liberticide and corrupting ends‖). See also Pablo 
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335 ―Actualidad financiera‖, El Nacional, April, 4, at 1. 
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337 ―Actualidad financiera‖, El Nacional, April, 4, at 1. See also ―La fuente del mal‖, El Nacional, April, 6, at 
1 (arguing that the crisis put at risk the stability of institutions and public order). 
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Importantly, the paper emphasized that no country was viable without a banking system, 
but that those banks had to be done away with and replaced by a healthy system.338 They 
had lost the trust of the public, without which no bank could work, and the media saw 
no way of saving them.339 In its view, 
 ―[…] creditors cannot, and should not, demand the integrity of the right warranted by their 
papers, because the situation of the bank is as it is, and because the Province lacks the 
means to satisfy their credits. But neither can the State deprive its creditors of that which is 
possible to pay them and which […] is legally and morally their due‖340  
  
 Necessity seemed to call for shared sacrifices: creditors could not get all they were 
legitimately entitled to, but they should get as much as possible, given the circumstances.  
Thus, the newspapers suggested that the State should declare the debts as its own, 
accordingly with the status of ―guaranteed banks‖ the entities enjoyed under the 1887 
law, and that it should issue three-year amortization bonds to cover the debts of the 
banks.341 
 Interestingly, the paper emphasized that the restriction to property rights would 
be temporary, an idea that would be picked up later by the Supreme Court itself to build 
the doctrine of economic emergency, and that it would be in the best interest of 
depositors themselves. Legal tender was once again repudiated as otiose. 
 ―The suspension of payment of deposits of public banks is an event of great 
significance […] the disturbances that it is bound to cause are multiple and far-reaching, 
both in the conduct of general business and in life‘s most intimate needs […] In 
any other situation, this event would mean the dislocation and ruin of the country, with the 
                                                 
338 ―El punto negro. Ventajas e inconvenientes de la liquidación‖, La Prensa, April, 5, at 4. See also ―En 
plena orden del día‖, La Prensa, April, 7, at 4 (arguing that liquidation procedures were the only way out of 
the crisis). 
 
339 ―En plena orden del día‖, La Prensa, April, 7, at 4. 
 






ensuing loss of money for depositors and creditors of the banks. But in this occasion, it is 
but a transient disturbance upon depositors‘ interests, for the sake of their own interests 
and the most firm principle of mending the Nation and saving those same 
creditors […] The depositors in the public have no reasonable grounds to be alarmed: the 
suspension of payment of the deposits will last no longer than 50 days, and they are guaranteed 
by the Nation. It is the time necessary to elaborate the bill that will establish the 
new Bank of the Republic, owned and run exclusively by private parties, with no 
interference whatsoever from the State. With that bank, all deposits will be secured, 
and not one cent will be lost […] And for those in an urgent need of money, national 
public bonds at a 6% interest rate are offered at a 75% of their nominal value, 
which means getting a profit of 7% —papers that are negotiable in the stock 
market— […] Public opinion will sympathize with the decree, because it shares [the 
administration‘s] longings of honesty‖342  
  
The Government‘s decree remarked that a judicial liquidation of the banks would 
be ruinous for everybody, especially for depositors, and thus it had to be avoided at all 
costs. In its own view,  
―The Government has the duty to avert the danger, not only as an 
acknowledgement for the services rendered to the Nation by those banks, but 
also in defense of the private interests that may be compromised, especially those of 
the most interesting classes of the population, who made those banks their savings banks and 
where they deposited the fruits of many years of labor‖343 
   
 Generally speaking, the measure seems to have been well-received.344 The 
business community and the stock market reacted very favorably to the Government‘s 
measure,345 and —according to La Prensa— the decree ―caused a deep and lasting 
                                                 
342 ―En plena reparación. La primera medida fundamental‖, La Prensa, April, 8, at 5. The italics are mine. 
 
343 See the full text of the decree, including its whereas clauses‘, in ―Boletín del día‖, La Prensa, April, 8, at 
5-6. The italics are mine. 
 
344 See Pablo Gerchunoff, Fernando Rocchi & Gastón Rossi, above n. 203, at 196 (arguing that ―the 
impressive decision of April, 7th, aroused the alarm of some and the joy of many. With Congress in recess, 
the commotion caused by the situation was palpable in the streets of the city [Buenos Aires] and in the 
agrarian cities of the province of Buenos Aires‖). 
 
345 See, e.g., ―Boletín del día‖, La Prensa, April, 9, at 7 (arguing that in the stock market most people were in 
favor of the decree and that some three hundred people gathered to show their support to the President). 
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impression upon […] the social conscience‖.346 In this paper‘s view, the government 
could have left banks to go bankrupt and to be liquidated judicially, for that was the 
procedure provided for by the laws, but it chose a more benevolent path, attempting at 
―reconciling public and private interests, causing the lesser possible disturbances and 
harms to each other‖.347 However, El Nacional warned,  
 ―The national government must bear in mind at all times that if the public 
opinion has not spoken vigorously against the decree…from the first instant, it 
has been due to the [government‘s] promise to carry on a deep and complete 
reform to our monetary regime‖348 
 
 ―The considerable fall in the price of gold experienced yesterday seems to 
indicate a favorable opinion towards the Governments’ sensational decree regarding the future 
reorganization of the republic’s banking system. This is, undoubtedly, what makes the 
Executive Branch’s attitude sympathetic to [public] opinion in this case, to the point of 
disregarding an examination from the constitutional standpoint. Because it cannot be 
overlooked that, even in the context of this abnormal situation, the government 
is stepping into Congress‘ powers too much‖349 
 
 There are some hints that the media was in fact reflecting accurately a widespread 
public view. An anonymous depositor and reader of La Prensa wrote 
 ―Mr. Director of La Prensa: I am a long-time depositor of Banco de la Provincia, and 
despite the fact that the decree suspending payment of deposits affects me 
deeply, I am the first to celebrate the decree […] thinking that it is a necessary 
step […] The day that the bank of issue of the Nation is an entity independent of 
public authorities […] that the right to issue money is not influenced by political 
necessities, civic corruption will disappear […] Let the new bank be born, in spite 
of the pains that its birth will inflict us, but let it be serious, incorruptible, bound 
exclusively to its own conservation for the benefit of the people and the 
commerce, absolutely free from any political and official interference that may 
                                                 
346 ―Los tiempos de la verdad‖, La Prensa, April, 8, at 5. 
 
347 ―Las grandes líneas de la reforma‖, La Prensa, April, 10, at 4. 
 
348 ―La reforma bancaria‖, El Nacional, April, 11, at 1. It must be noticed, however, that the newspaper‘s 
statements are made in the context of an argument that seems to point more towards the salvation of Banco 
de la Provincia (the bank of Buenos Aires) than towards the depositors‘ fate as a central concern.  
 
349 ―La reforma bancaria‖, El Nacional, April, 9, at 1. The italics are mine. The fall in the price of gold lasted 
only a few days. See Pablo Gerchunoff, Fernando Rocchi & Gastón Rossi, above n. 203, at 197. 
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disturb the integrity of its operation. Otherwise, the sacrifices that begin today 
will be completely fruitless. Signed: a subscriber.‖  
 
 The decree acknowledged the public pressure for a reform and laid out the bases 
of a new bank, but in vague and ambiguous terms.350 Article 5 provided that as soon as 
Congress gathered the Executive Branch would enter a bill proposing the consolidation 
of both banks under suspension of payments in a new bank of the republic and would 
ask Congress to provide the means to repay the deposits. It was not clear that the bank 
would not be under official control, as much as the public would have liked it to be so.351 
Article 3 allowed depositors to exchange their deposits for national bonds a twenty-five 
percent below the nominal value, and article 4 allowed the banks to repay in cash small 
deposits. 
 It seems to me that four points must be made in the analysis of the public 
reactions to the early 1891 emergency measures: first, at the time of the decree, the 
measure appeared as a short-term suspension of payments —an essentially transitory 
move— and there were assurances that deposits would not be lost; second, depositors 
could opt for receiving bonds of the Federal government at a seventy-five percent of 
their nominal value, which —according to La Prensa— meant a profit of seven percent;352 
third, the virtual declaration of bankruptcy was seen as more or less a simple 
acknowledgement of an irrevocable fact, and bankruptcy, which was also a constitutional 
                                                 
350 The full text of the decree was published in ―Boletín del día‖, La Prensa, April, 8, at 5-6.  
 
351 See, e.g., Pablo Gerchunoff, Fernando Rocchi & Gastón Rossi, above n. 203, at 209 (arguing that the 
administration was deliberately ambiguous and did not express clearly what kind of bank it had in mind 
due to the unpopularity of public financial institutions).  
 
352 See ―En plena reparación. La primera medida fundamental‖, La Prensa, April, 8, at 5 
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institution,353 as an opportunity to reorganize from scratch a banking system that was 
largely considered as inefficient and as a cause of generalized crisis due to its submission 
to political urgencies; last, because the only perceived alternative was to keep issuing 
paper money, with the ensuing further depreciation and no real gains for anybody.354 
 Later, the problem extended from official banks to private banks.355 In June, they 
were demanding the application of moratoria under the Commerce Code. The 
administration pressed Congress to modify the Commerce Code quickly in order to 
include in its moratorium provisions private banks. Congress chose a different path, 
enacting a law that provided for a ninety-day moratorium of all obligations. The 
Executive vetoed it, but Congress insisted, and the bill became law. The bank run 
eventually stopped for a number of reasons. The Bank of London brought to the 
country money from England and started repaying its debts, thus restoring depositors‘ 
confidence. Other banks suspended payments during the time of moratorium and, with 
the help of their respective communities of immigrants, they opened their doors back 
some months later. Once again, the solution involved temporary restrictions of the use 
of property, not permanent loss. And this is something to be kept in mind. 
In the meantime, another front of the financial war was open. The battle was 
certainly smaller, but it is interesting nonetheless to complete the broader economic 
emergency picture and the public perception of what was going on. The province of 
                                                 
353 Article 67 section 11 of the Constitution enumerated among Congress‘ powers, the power to enact a 
general bankruptcy law. 
 
354 Pablo Gerchunoff, Fernando Rocchi & Gastón Rossi, above n. 203, at 197 (arguing that ―porteños‖ —
the citizens of Buenos Aires— had become financial experts and that they had learned that, in a situation 
of extreme lack of public confidence, in order to pay back depositors it was necessary to pay the price of 
an uncontrolled increase in gold prices). This kind of argument would appear much later in judicial 
decisions dealing with similar issues in the late twentieth century. See CSJN, Peralta v. Estado Nacional, 313 
Fallos 1513 (1990). 
 




Buenos Aires had decided to stop payment of the April bond coupon on its mortgage-
backed bonds, due to the seeming insolvency of its issuer, the Banco Hipotecario. 
Bondholders tried to organize collectively to claim for their property (contractual) rights. 
On April, 1st, there was a meeting of the assembly of bondholders. According to La 
Prensa, between 3,500 and 4,500 people gathered in the national theater.356 There, the 
Committee of the Conservative Center, which had been commissioned to conduct 
negotiations, on behalf of the bondholders, with the local government to try to find an 
acceptable solution, reported that they saw no alternative but to resort to courts.357 It 
filed a suit before the Supreme Court, in original jurisdiction, which had gotten to a slow 
start due to trouble constituting the court: three of the justices excused themselves as 
they were holders of the same bonds, and so was the first judge appointed to stand in for 
the excused justices.358 What it is important for our present purposes is how the 
bondholders saw the situation, in both legal and economic terms. In somewhat 
pamphlet-like style, the Committee stated that 
―Given that the legal question is so clear that there can be no doubt as to the success we must 
obtain and given that, on the other hand, it is necessary to demoralize the creditor in order 
to induce him to burn his values and sell them at any price to the benefit of the debtors, who will 
then be able to cover their frauds against the bank, it is possible that we are threatened 
with suspension of payments and insolvency […] We […] have conducted the 
necessary investigations […] and we have come to believe that […] the situation of 
the bank is not such that it cannot pay its creditors some 80 percent of the debt […] if the 
bank is administrated regularly and if its debtors are subjected to foreclosure procedures, 
slowly and with the prudence and discretion required by the state of crisis we are going 
through […] Justice will be done —and it will be done soon. Federal courts […] 
will not take long to pronounce their decisions, inspired by the respect of law, the 
sane principles of morality, and the patriotic zeal of the Argentine good name. 
The Judiciary, imbued with its high mission of protecting the life, liberty, and fortune of every 
inhabitant of this country, will restore the bread to the orphan, the shelter to the widow, the 
                                                 




358 Id. I have not been able to find out what decision, if any, was handed down in the case. A search in the 
Argentine Supreme Court‘s website does not return any decisions dealing with such bonds. 
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estate to the underage heir, the savings to the day-laborer, all of which they are today deprived of, 
due to a belief in impunity and in the supremacy of force over law‖359 
 
 Creditors seem to have been well aware of the need to sacrifice part of their 
expected returns upon their investments.360 They were sensitive to the need for prudence 
and discretion to be applied in deciding whether to instate foreclosure procedures. It is 
not the case that they thought all debtors to be deserving of the same treatment. 
However, the idea that the insolvency situation obeyed, at least partially, to fraudulent 
maneuvers by some debtors who, in fact, benefitted illegitimately from the crisis, is once 
again present. Remember that in 1885 public opinion seems to have believed that a 
substantial cause of the crisis was corrupt lending and speculation.361 And the same 
happened in 1890, when the administration planned to issue mortgage-backed bonds that 
would circulate as currency.362  
There seems to have been a perception of regressive redistribution in the 
measures. That‘s why the bondholders emphasized that if the Judiciary protected their 
rights —which they trusted it would—, courts would be helping the ―orphan‖, the 
                                                 
359 Id. The italics are mine. 
 
360 Notice that the article talks about the possibility of payment of eighty percent of ―the debt‖, not of the 
capital. Thus, one can infer that most of the unpaid portion of the debt, in the Center‘s estimates, may 
have been interest. This is important, as it marks a line between the capital and the interest, regarding what 
can be legitimately sacrificed in situations of necessity, in the People‘s views. More on this perception, and 
its explanatory power as regards the Supreme Court caselaw on property rights, in the second part of this 
dissertation. 
 
361 See, e.g., ―Quiénes van a manejar el curso forzoso‖, La Pampa, January, 12, 1885, at 1 (arguing that the 
national bank lent money to debtors who would pay back ―late, badly, and never‖, among other criticisms 
of the bank‘s operations); ―La obra del Banco Nacional‖, La Pampa, January 11 & 12, at 1 (arguing that 
―rogues benefitted from immoral agio‖); ―Chillidos destemplados‖, El Nacional, January, 8, at 1 (explaining 
the mechanics of agio in the crisis); ―La inconversión‖, La República, January, 6, at 1 (mentioning agio and 
stock market speculation among the causes of the crisis‖ 
 
362 See, e.g., ―Los cien millones. El derecho de petición‖, La Prensa, July, 15, 1890, at 5 (arguing that the 
administration‘s intention was to benefit a relative small number of speculators); ―Cómo se manejan las 
finanzas argentinas‖, El Argentino, July, 11, at 1 (arguing that a privileged few, who had already taken the 
money from official banks, would benefit from the bill, at the expense of the People). 
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―widow‖, the ―underage heir‖, the ―day-laborer‖. This is a very important, and quite 
often overlooked, point: protecting property rights does not necessarily mean protecting 
the rich and powerful against the poor, as Madison may have erroneously thought,363 and 
being deferential to elective branches does not necessarily entail helping the poor and 
powerless. In fact, it may often be quite the opposite. The people knew this.364  
 Roberto Cortés Conde assessed the distributive effects of the 1890 crisis in the 
following terms:  
 ―After the 1885 suspension of convertibility until the 1890-91 crisis, there were 
several attempts of [sic] stabilization. All of them failed mainly because there was 
no solution to the distributional conflict on who was going to bear the burden of 
fiscal and monetary adjustments, given the debt incurred by the national and 
provincial governments. A solution was reached several years after [sic] in 1892-96, 
when there was a definition in favor of external creditors, provincial governments and some 
privileged domestic creditors. In some cases, they obtained more than full satisfaction 
for their claims (financial and commercial); in others they passed the debt 
incurred on to the government (as provincial governments and debtors of the 
banking system). Finally, there were others left to bear the burden. Who were they? One 
was the national government that undertook private and provincial debts. 
However, even when the debt arrangement ended with [sic] and enormous 
increase in its stock, [the national government] […] rescheduled it in a way that 
financial charges were reduced. Money holders, mainly wage earners (that were [sic] an 
important mass of the population this time [sic]) […] suffered its consequences. Why did they 
accept the losses […]? Primarily, they had no other escape but migration, which was not an 
easy thing. However, they did it [migrate] in 1891-92. Secondly, because they may 
have thought that it was a circumstance that would change in a short time. In 
fact, after a few years wages had conditions improved […]‖365 
  
As it had happened before, the crisis seems to have shifted wealth from the 
hands of the politically weak to those of the well-connected and informed.  
                                                 
363 See Jennifer Nedelsky, above n. 83, at 145 (arguing that James Madison‘s view on property rights 
focused on protecting the necessarily few propertied against the inevitable poverty of the majority). 
 
364 Of course a critic could argue that the bondholders‘ group must have surely included at least some 
wealthy individuals and that they made those statements to appeal to the broader public‘s sensibilities in 
order to bring sympathy to their own cause. True as it may be, this argument does not undermine my 
point: statements linking the protection of property with helping relatively powerless and needy people 
need to have had resonance in the public to make sense. These statements must have been perceived as 
plausible at least.   
 
365 Roberto Cortés Conde, above n. 204, at 17-18. The italics are mine. 
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One last episode is worth our attention, before turning the page and moving well 
into the early decades of the twenty century: the Hileret case of the Supreme Court, our 
own paradigm of Lochner-type, laissez-faire constitutionalism. Let us see what happened, 
what the Court said, and how it was received by the public. 
 In June 1902 the province of Tucumán, invoking a situation of economic 
distress in the sugar industry —an industry of vital importance in the region—, enacted a 
tax law that established an additional tax on the sale of sugar within the Argentine 
Republic. Basically, it was thought that due to overproduction sugar prices would fall 
considerably, thus harming the industry and, indirectly, the large sectors of the 
population of Tucumán whose livelihood depended of the sugar industry. The official 
estimates pointed towards an excess of supply over demand of some fifty thousand tons. 
Hence, the local legislature decided to set a tax of half a cent per kilo of sugar sold, up to 
a maximum quota allocated to each sugar mill, and a tax of forty cents per each kilo sold 
above the quota. The quotas were allocated unequally among sugar mills, and together 
they amounted to some seventy one thousand and five hundred tons of sugar —the 
expected equilibrium quantity—. The forty-cent tax aimed at discouraging sales of sugar 
that would bring down its price. As a matter of fact, the collected taxes were destined to 
indemnify sugar producers who could not sell their production and who agreed to 
destroy the product or to apply it to any use other than sugar or alcohol production.366 
And the market price of sugar never reached forty cents per kilo, which made sale of 
excess quantities uneconomical.367   
 Some producers thought the law violated the provisions of the Constitution that 
established the right of equality before the law and the principle of equality in taxes as 
well as the right to exercise any licit industry and demanded that the Province paid back 
                                                 
366 CSJN, Hileret y Rodríguez v. Prov. de Tucumán, 98 Fallos 20 (1903), introductory section (―Vistos‖). 
 
367 Id., §7. 
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the sums collected upon the allegedly unconstitutional law. The Court agreed with the 
plaintiffs and handed down a decision that portrays laissez-faire constitutionalism in as 
strong a face as it would ever have in Argentina. Predating Lochner by almost three years, 
Hileret is perhaps the most elaborate judicial statement of the liberty to work —which, in 
a different context, could be understood as freedom of contract— as a pillar of liberty 
and a bulwark against communism ever made in the country.  
 Although the Court claimed that it could only analyze the law under its juridical, 
and not economic, aspect, the justices could not hold their tongues and said: 
 ―[…] the law‘s goal was to limit the production of sugar in the province to the 
quantity of 71,500 tons […] thus preventing, by means of the forty cent tax, the 
overproduction of the item in the quantity of 50,000 tons, quantity estimated as 
the surplus over the necessities of consumption that the 1902 harvest would yield 
[…] [the law‘s] immediate effect had to be to eliminate from the sugar industry, 
which was regarded as employing between sixty thousand and eight thousand 
workers, at least a third of them, because such is the proportion that corresponds 
to the reduction in the total production. It can also be said that the law has 
harmed the trade in Tucumán and other neighbor provinces for the portion 
whose commercialization the forty-cent tax made impossible; it has harmed in 
the same way the business of transportation by railroad through the suppression 
of thousands of tons of cargo represented by the overproduction restricted by 
[the law]; graver still, it has inflicted damage upon the thousands of consumers for whom 
sugar is a first-need article, making them pay almost one hundred percent more than the price 
sugar had before the enactment of the law […] therefore sacrificing the interests of almost the 
totality of the Nation’s inhabitants to the benefit of a score of sugar producers, who are 
already beneficiaries of the national government‘s policies of premiums on the 
exportation of sugar and especially of the high import tariffs on foreign sugar 
[…] if this protection […] had not been enough to avert the crisis and the ruin 
that allegedly threatened sugar producers in the province of Tucumán, as a 
consequence of overproduction […] it would always be true that those very same 
producers would be to blame, for they would have made calculations that did not match their 
expectations of a munificent profit, as it ordinarily happens in business life, but this does not 
make fair at all that those who took no part in such mistakes, or fault, of speculators have to 
provide at the expense of their own interest […] a positive utility for these tradesmen […]‖368  
 
                                                 
368 Id., §3. The italics are mine. 
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 The Court was on the lookout for ―class legislation‖, and was not willing to be 
force-fed a public interest façade too easily.369 Arguments about equality as regards 
taxation are present in the decision, but more interesting for my present purposes are the 
justices‘ ideas of police power and the proper role of the State in the economy. 
Argentina‘s highest court was not ready to accept ―broad and plenary‖ police power to 
direct economic affairs, even if emergency arguments were at play: 
 ―[…] neither is this case an instance of legitimate regulation of domestic commerce, aiming at 
protecting the rights of third parties or of the community, for there is nothing […] in 
the production of sugar, or in the way it is carried out, that is contrary to the good order, 
morality, health and welfare of the province. Far from it, it is evident that such 
production is but the exercise of a licit industry, as it has been regarded by the 
province and by the Nation that count it among its sources of revenue and that 
has enacted several measures for the development of such industry […]‖370 
 
 The dangers of giving too ample a room to the State seemed all-too-evident for 
the Court: 
 ―[…] the law, fixing the quantity of sugar to be produced by each mill, under 
penalty of payment, for any excess, of a tax that amounts to something more 
than the very confiscation of such excess of production […] cannot be considered in any 
way as conforming to the prescriptions of articles 16 and 14 of the Constitution, nor to any of 
the principles of liberty and governance contained therein […] if the regulation imposed on sugar 
were acceptable, it could be extended to every industrial activity, and the economic life of the 
Nation, with the liberties that promote it, would be confiscated in the hands of Legislatures or 
Congress that would usurp, by means of ingenious regulations, all individual rights. 
Administrations would consider themselves free to set the quantity of grapes the 
vintner can legally grow, the quantity of cereals allowed to the farmer, or the 
number of goods the stock-breeder may produce, and so on and so forth, until 
we fell into a communism of state where governments are the regents of industry and 
commerce as well as the arbiters of capital and private property […]‖371 
 
                                                 
369 It may well have been true that the law was enacted upon shaky factual predictions. On the aftermath of 
the Hileret decision, La Nación reported from Tucumán that ―the sugar stock from last year is very small 
and the surplus of this year‘s harvest will not be as much as it is believed, due to the exportation of large 
quantities to England prior to the closure of the ports‖. See ―Tucumán. Otro proyecto sobre Azúcares. 
Stock del artículo. Nuevos impuestos‖, La Nación, September, 8, at 4. 
 
370 Id., §21. The italics are mine. 
 
371 Id., §24. The italics are mine. 
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 The issue was generally considered as an important one and the ruling was met 
with approval. La Nación, for instance, considered the decision a ―transcendent‖ one and, 
approvingly, stated that it recorded ―with pleasure‖ the opinions it had collected. An 
anonymous and ―distinguished jurist and professor of law‖, who was also a member of 
the bar, was quoted saying: 
 ―[…] in this economic question that is of so much interest to the country, I can 
say that for the last several years the Court had not handed down a decision as 
transcendent as this one, both for the industrial problem that so bravely resolves 
and for the thorough study of the constitutional questions involved it makes in 
defense of national production encumbered by capricious laws enacted upon 
protectionist purposes, but which in fact turn out to be gabelles upon the poor 
consumer‖372 
 
 La Tribuna went even further, embracing the decision most explicitly. It reprinted 
arguments from the Court‘s decision without quoting them, thus making them its own 
arguments.373 It praised judicial review as ―one of the Judiciary‘s most precious powers 
[…] to secure and realize the supremacy of the Constitution and the individual 
guarantees and rights‖.374 It considered that the Court had done precisely so in the Hileret 
case.375 
 ―No system more contrary to the principles of the Constitution that guarantee all 
inhabitants the right to work and perform any lawful industry, stating that 
equality is the basis of taxes and public charges, could be imagined […] That law, 
which was the most blatant violation of the constitutional principles, claimed to be based 
upon economic arguments, as overproduction of the item would have threatened 
to ruin the sugar industry. While no actual fact supported such hypothesis, it was 
evident that, by limiting production, [the law] harmed trade in Tucuman and the 
neighbor provinces […] The most serious consequence was the hardship that 
                                                 
372 ―Notas Judiciales. Asuntos de Interés General. Un fallo de trascendencia‖, La Nación, September, 5, at 
3. 
 







such measure imposed on thousands of consumers […] The Court has put an end to 
such a system, by declaring that the law violates articles 14 and 16 of the 
constitution and by stating, in a clear and precise way, the fundamental principles 
of juridical and economic liberty. Decisions of this kind greatly elevate the dignity and 
prestige of the national judiciary. Thanks to [the Court‘s] intervention, to its rectitude and 
firmness, the restrictions imposed on public authorities or the rights ensured to all inhabitants by 
the constitution, will not be dead letter in the future […]‖376 
 
 El País, El Pueblo, and La Prensa took a more neutral stance, reporting the case in 
rather objective terms. All three of them covered the decision, summing up the 
arguments of the parties, as well as the gist of the Court‘s ruling, but without endorsing 
or criticizing the decision.377 However, a couple of days later La Prensa reported on the 
reactions in Tucumán to the Court‘s decision. According to it, a local newspaper had 
received ―countless congratulations on the Supreme Court‘s decision that strikes down 
the law‖ and that ―it is almost unanimous the opinion that the Governor […] must 
resign his position, as a consequence of the fateful mistake made in signing the law‖.378 
 I could find no negative reaction to the ruling in the mainstream press. Of course, 
one could say that the case involved a local, very circumscribed, problem and, therefore, 
that it was of scarce interests for national (or Buenos Aires‘ newspapers). But most likely 
the situation was different. Even the newspapers that took a neutral position towards the 
decision seem to have regarded the issue as important, and the titles of their stories on 
the ruling appear to assume the reader‘s awareness of the topic. The legal issue raised by 
the case clearly transcended the question of sugar. What was at stake was the scope of 
                                                 
376 Id. The italics are mine. 
 
377 See ―La Cuestión Azucarera. Sentencia de la suprema corte contra la Provincia de Tucumán‖, El País, 
September, 6, at 4; ―La ley azucarera de Tucumán declarada inconstitucional‖, El Pueblo, September, 6, at 4; 
―El impuesto a los azúcares en Tucumán. Declarado inconstitucional. Tres sentencias de la Suprema 
Corte‖, La Prensa, September, 6, at 4. 
 
378 ―Tucumán. La inconstitucionalidad de la ley azucarera. Sus consecuencias en las finanzas‖, La Prensa, 
September, 7, at 5 (also stating that in some sectors there was discontent and that the law had turned out to 
be innocuous as to the problem it aimed to solve). 
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the State intervention in the economy, as the Court made clear in its final remarks in the 
decision. To overstate things a little bit (but only a little bit), Hileret was about free 
markets and private property vis-à-vis communism of state. Whatever the lack of 
nuances one may attribute to such a blunt way of framing the issue, it is clear that the 
justices saw the problem of an interventionist state as a slippery slope with no 
foreseeable stopping point. For the most part and to the extent that debate in the press 
reflected public opinion, the Court‘s position was not regarded as untenable. Even more, 
it was not even criticized, and some newspapers applauded the justices for upholding the 
Constitution and resisting pressures. Once again, as in Elortondo, the key point may have 
been the perception that the Court was acting legally, not politically. In the context of the 
times, the Court‘s decision must have looked as squaring perfectly with the 
Constitution‘s letter: ―All inhabitants will have the […] rights: […] to work and perform 
any lawful industry‖. Sugar production must have been perceived, naturally, as a ―lawful 
industry‖. And the suspicion of interest groups taking over the (local) political process 
was an apparent explanation for the advances of the economic-emergency regulatory 
state. 
 What can we learn, from the perspective of constitutional property, from the ups-
and-downs of the first fifty years of Argentina‘s constitutional history? One could make a 
few points. First of all, that public debate was not dominated by a discourse of rights, 
even if rights-based arguments did appear on occasion. The focus seems to have been on 
state powers. Even when what was being argued was largely who had to bear what 
burden in a crisis, and rights were clearly at stake, the debate was mostly framed in terms 
of whether the President could do one thing or another or, eventually, whether Congress 
could pass retroactive laws or enter the realm of private agreements (a space considered 
as largely beyond the reach of public law). Eventually, rights discourse started to gain 
ground. In any event, arguments that could be considered as protecting rights (either by 
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direct invocation of a right, or indirectly by denial of the state power to advance over the 
private sphere) did appear in public debates. The morality of promising was certainly 
appreciated and, slowly, freedom of contract and private property —as constitutionally 
protected rights— made their appearances in the stage. Necessity was recognized as a 
legitimate limitation on rights, but not beyond what was strictly indispensable to tame 
crises and only insofar as the measures were, to anachronistically import a terminology, 
―narrowly-tailored‖ to the ends pursued. Insolvency and virtual bankruptcy were 
realistically deemed as facts of life, but this did not mean that anything could be done 
under the cloak of ―bankruptcy justice‖. One important consideration in many people‘s 
minds seems to have been the perceived injustice of emergency redistributions. Friends-
of-power and well-connected people were perceived as frequent beneficiaries of State 
measures and sometimes even as factors in unleashing crises. Day-laborers, wage earners, 
and more generally, the least well-off were considered as defenseless against economic 
measures. Private property, thus, was appreciated not as a right the rich and wealthy 
specially treasure, but as a right every person has a deep stake in. But what did it mean 
―property is inviolable‖? One important element that appears in the early crises is that 
the inviolability of property does not mean absolute protection. Temporariness of the 
restrictions is the key. The full and free exercise of property rights (including rights 
arising from contracts) could be postponed, but their content could not be completely 
destroyed in a definitive manner. The rise of the substance-of-obligations (rights) versus 
remedies distinction was near.379 In a way, this idea appears to have been regarded as the 
lesser evil in situations where exact fulfillment of obligations was simply impossible. 
  Congress felt these pressures, alongside all kinds of other, usual, pressures, and 
did what it could not to stray too far from public ideas on the sanctity of contracts and 
                                                 
379 The distinction would play an important role in the landmark case of Avico v. De la Pesa, 172 Fallos 21 
(1934), a decision where the Argentine Court followed closely Home and Loan Building Association v. Blaisdell, 
290 U.S. 398 (1934).  
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property rights. Surely, not all congressional products were in accordance with the ideals, 
but there is a trend to avoid pushing too far against the popular conception of 
constitutional property. Whenever it could, it cut off short more ambitious and rights-
restricting presidential policies. 
And what about the Supreme Court? The Court was not a central political player 
yet, in the sense of being too comfortable in deciding large questions that touched upon 
economic policies. In the instances in which it could not avoid passing judgment on 
emergency measures, it took a decidedly minimalist approach, basically following 
Congress‘ policies. No national emergency measures —they were so, even if the name 
had not come up yet— were struck down. Cases involving economic problems of a 
systemic character were not the kind of cases they Court would use to push whatever 
ideas on property rights the justices had. It is clear, though, that they shared the broad 
outlines of Alberdi‘s view. When more circumscribed problems came to the Court —e.g., 
Elortondo and Hileret—, the justices were keen on defending ―the sanctity of property‖ 
and ―the right to work‖ unencumbered by an intrusive and redistributionist state. 
Interestingly, the cases where the Court vindicated property rights and relative freedom 
from state regulation were generally praised and created no backlash. And cases where 
the Court followed the somewhat constrained Congress were not strongly criticized 
either.  
Summing up, laissez-faire constitutionalism was not dominant, but it was not a 
pariah either. Strong property rights, event if sometimes inconvenient, were appreciated.  
To put it in comtemporary political philosophy terms, the most extended 
conception of constitutional property seems to have had a strong classical liberal 
grounding, with a dose of consequentialist-utilitarian inspiration (e.g., Alberdi), as well as 
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some occasional libertarian overtones, emphasizing the utmost importance of property 
rights (e.g., Elortondo, Hileret).380 


















                                                 
380 See John Tomasi, above n. 71, at 53 (―Classic liberals affirm a thick conception of economic liberty […] 
Many thinkers in this tradition […] take a broadly […] consequentialist, or ‗end-directed‘ approach […] 
Their political position rests on a view of the person as a utilitarian agent […] Libertarians affirm economic 
liberty as the fundamental ordering principle of political life. They treat economic liberties as the most 
weighty of all basic liberties and perhaps even as moral absolutes‖). 
 
381 This was not a phenomenon exclusive to Argentina. See, e.g., Richard Pipes, above n. 7, at 209 (arguing 
that, for both political and economic reasons, ―[o]f all ages in history, the twentieth century has been the 
least favorable to the institution of private property‖). 
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A New Century: Masses Democracy, Economic Emergency, and the 
“Softening” of Property Rights. 
 
a. The Beginnings of the Economic Emergency Jurisprudence. 
The turn of the century would bring about quite a few substantial changes in Argentina‘s 
political system. Importantly, after 1912 suffrage would become secret, mandatory, and 
universal, opening up a new world of possibilities and allowing for the advent of a 
democracy of masses.382 This would not imply, however, the disappearence of fraudulent 
electoral practices.383  
The new century would also be witness to a historic period of extraordinary 
economic growth. Between 1902 and 1913, the nation‘s production grew an average of 
seven per cent a year, resulting in the highest gross product per capita Argentina has had 
yet.384 Material progress conduced to better living standards:385 However, ―the 
phenomenal economic climate […] created a concentration of wealth and social 
inequality much more pronounced than had existed before‖.386 The combination of the 
                                                 
382 Law 8,871, also known as ―Sáenz Peña‖ Law for the President who promoted its enactment, was 
enacted in 1912 and applied for the first time in the 1916 national elections. 
 
383 Thus, newspapers still played a significant role as proxies for public opinion. Additionally, the turn of 
the century saw a democratization of the access to cultural goods. This implied a considerable expansion of 
the newspapers‘ readership, which in turn justifies paying close attention to newspapers as means to survey 
public opinion. 
 
384 See, e.g., Pablo Gerchunoff, Fernando Rocchi & Gastón Rossi, above n. 203, at 286.  
 
385 See, e.g., George L. Priest, ―Poverty…‖, above n. 26 (arguing that ―[m]ost obviously, economic growth 
is responsible for the most basic improvements in the quality of the lives of citizens, such as increases in 
life expectancy and reductions in infant mortality, among others‖ and that ―[t]he empirics are clear and 
dramatic‖); see also Pablo Gerchunoff, Fernando Rocchi & Gastón Rossi, above n. 203, at 288 (stating that 
life expectancy in Argentina jumped from 33 years in 1869 to 48 and a half years in 1914, and that the 
number of pupils attending elementary school more than doubled between 1902 and 1913). 
 
386 Leandro Losada, above n. 187, at 130. 
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opening of the political process to large numbers of people and an increasing material 
inequality could only result in growing tensions between aspirations for a more 
widespread distribution of property and the protection of entitlements. This tension, 
which had less dramatic ways of working itself out by means of a combination of 
taxation and an economy with more opportunities for all, would reach peaks in situations 
of objective crises.387 A ―softening‖ of the conception of protected property entitlements 
could be expected. But as property became more widely distributed, and more 
individuals became owners, a more widespread appreciation of its worth as an individual 
right could also be expected. What exactly did it happen?  
 As Eduardo Zimmermann has pointed out 
 ―The institutional structure set up by liberalism, which played the role of an 
unifying principle in the political debate from the second half of the nineteenth 
century on, began to receive strong attacks […] in the political-institutional level, 
the dissatisfaction with political practices of which liberal governments took 
advantage generated strong demands on the part of excluded groups […] the 
raise of this social question sparkled a debate about the capacity of classic liberal 
institutions to solve the new problems […]‖388 
 
 This enlarged role for the masses did not mean, however, that property rights 
were rejected nor that the entire economic order pre-arranged by the liberal Constitution 
was repudiated. Argentina progressively became a country characterized by the presence 
of a large middle-class.389 This social structure would be very influential in the 
construction of our collective identity. One scholar claims that ―[...] the middle classes 
                                                 
387 Id., at 223 (arguing that the new democracy established a different social frame, one in which while 
social mobility was still one of its features, ―social frontiers became sharper, and tense, when the economic 
situations were critical‖). 
 
388 Eduardo A. Zimmermann, LOS LIBERALES REFORMISTAS 13 (Buenos Aires, Editorial 
Sudamericana & Universidad de San Andrés, 1995). 
 
389 See, e.g., Leandro Losada, above n. 187, at 155 (arguing that at the turn of the century, social mobility 
found a new expression in the birth of a broad middle class). 
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[…] [have] an identity that blends with that of the entire nation. Argentina has learned to 
think of itself as a ‗middle-class country‘‖.390 Thus, in the early part of the century, the 
movement for reform tried to find a middle ground. The Argentine Socialist Party, for 
instance, supported free trade and the gold standard and condemned both protectionist 
policies supported by local industrialists and inconvertible paper money as attacks on the 
workers‘ purchasing power.391 Ernesto Quesada, one the fathers of sociology in 
Argentina and someone worried by the ‗social question‘, criticized the ―red international‖ 
for ―attacking liberty, property, and concurrence, the three pillars on which every civilized 
social organization must necessarily rest‖.392 Marxism was judged as not viable in the 
country, because 
 ―Each new day the terms of Marx‘s Manifest are reverted in a more favourable 
sense: capital is not concentrated, but property is democratized instead, to the point 
that it is incalculable the proportion of proletarians that have become members of the 
bourgeoisie‖393 
 
 Nineteenth century liberalism, however, was not a tension-free, dominant 
alternative and its supposedly natural connection with the protection of property rights 
did not escape such internal strains. As in other Latin American countries, the liberal 
thought encompassed much more than economic laissez-faire: it brought under the same 
umbrella the preoccupation with establishing strong guarantees for individual 
constitutional rights and the ensuing limitation of State power as well as the concern with 
                                                 
390 Ezequiel Adamovsky, above n. 187, at 9. 
 
391 See Eduardo A. Zimmermann, above n. 388, at 59. 
 
392 Id., at 88 (quoting Ernesto Quesada). 
 
393 Id., at 90 (quoting Enrique Ruiz Guiñazú). The italics are mine. See also Leandro Losada, above n. 187, 
at 147 (using the province of Mendoza as a study of regional elites in Argentina at the time and arguing 
that the development of a wine industry shook the status quo, ―fostering a fairly diversified property 
structure‖, upon which a significant middle class arose).  
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the consolidation of the national states, which arguably needed a strong central 
government.394 In Argentina, faith in markets seemed compatible with a more complex 
role for State than that of ―demolishing the legal barriers inherited from the past‖.395 
Interventionism did not appear, as one may be led to think by the Hileret case and the 
reactions it got, as an inevitable enemy of the well-to-do. In fact, it may have even 
appealed to broad audiences:396 the wealthy and well-connected may have seen it as a way 
to protect themselves in various instances in which market laws were not tender with 
their interests; those relatively worse-off may have seen it as a way of ameliorating their 
situation in ways the market would not even let them dream of. Obtaining individual or, 
more precisely, group advantages seems to have justified the abandonment of any 
orthodoxy, quite independently of where each group stood, either ideologically or 
economically.  
An early instance of the use of the idea of economic emergency to protect the 
well-off and the politically connected appeared when, after a sudden fall in the 
international prices of meat, meat-packing companies —mostly, foreign-owned— were 
in a position to impose conditions that the breeders judged disadvantageous. La Sociedad 
Rural Argentina, a powerful interest group that represents the interest of rural producers, 
resorted to the public authorities. In 1921, a proposal to fix a minimum price a meat-
packing company had to pay was introduced in Congress. La Nación, a newspaper often 
                                                 
394 See Eduardo A. Zimmermann, above n. 388, at 41. This tension between individual rights and liberties 
and strong governmental powers is clear in Juan Bautista Alberdi‘s thought. See above n. 159 and 
accompanying text. 
 
395 Id., at 46 (quoting Tulio Halperín Donghi). 
 
396 See, e.g., Roberto Cortés Conde, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARGENTINA IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 76-77 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009) (arguing that during the 
1920‘s interest groups ―finally started to garner power‖ and that ―[e]ntrepreneurs as well as wage earners 
began to realize that their income no longer solely depended on productivity […] In sum, they learned that 
it was worthwhile to pressure the government to effect changes‖). 
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close to the interests of proprietors, supported the measure. As Ricardo Sidicaro has put 
it  
―[…] it would have been hard to propose a greater restriction to the free market. 
However, La Nación welcomed the initiative. The unquestioned faith in laissez-faire 
gave way to the most diverse arguments, when it was necessary to find reasons to 
protect the profits of the breeders‖397      
 
 The resort to the emergency rhetoric to cover redistributive struggles under the 
cloak of the general welfare was becoming increasingly common. That is not to say, mind 
you, that emergency powers could not be exercised in a way that actually benefited the 
general public, nor that they never were exercised in such a way. But their all-powerful, 
far-reaching arms were flexing their muscles to subordinate all individual rights to the 
―superior interests of the Nation‖. A discourse of rights had barely been born when it 
was about to be crushed by an increasingly sophisticated discourse driven by the sectors 
that were fighting to capture the State —or its favour—, drawing upon the language of 
the existential threats that the world was so plentiful of at the time and importing it into 
the economic realm.    
In rebuilding the story of constitutional property in the early twentieth century, I 
am going to focus on two very important episodes involving what could be, somewhat 
loosely, called ―economic emergency‖. Both episodes are part of larger problems, not 
limited to Argentina‘s national borders, which with small differences repeated themselves 
in many countries around the world: the housing crisis (which would linger on for a few 
decades, perhaps due in part to political mismanagement) and the mortgage crisis in the 
early 1930‘s. In both instances, the national Supreme Court would look to the U.S. 
Supreme Court for inspiration and, in the mortgage case, even for authority. These two 
events would be perhaps the last time in the twentieth century in which Argentina and 
the United States would endure similar kinds of emergencies. It would not be the last 
                                                 
397 Ricardo Sidicaro, above n. 217, at 68. 
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time Argentina‘s Court would, perhaps too confidently and blind to important textual 
and contextual differences, take a leap of faith and follow in the footsteps of its U.S. 
counterpart. Let us see.  
 The first episode involved the shortage of housing in the early twenties. The 
problem was not new: since the beginning of the twentieth century, the situation had 
steadily deteriorated, and tenants in numerous tenement houses had declared themselves 
―on strike‖ in 1907, refusing to pay their rents unless the landlords granted substantial 
reductions on the rent prices.398 By 1921, the problem had reached significant 
proportions. It was a socially-salient, controversial issue. Whether the State, itself 
submerged in a process of slow transformation, should do anything to remedy the 
problem was in itself a polemic question. But, even granting that it should, what was the 
constitutionally-permissible remedy was an even more divisive topic. The housing crisis, 
then, signalled the first time in Argentina‘s history when an economic crisis polarized 
public opinion in two clearly defined groups. Owners and tenants would both organize 
themselves and prepare to fight the war over rents in Congress, in the courts and, sadly, 
occasionally even in the streets.399 In my view, this social polarization would influence the 
way the Supreme Court would ultimately handle the issue. 
 Two newspapers would assume the defence of each side to the contest. El Diario 
would side with the landlords and El Pueblo would carry the flag of the tenants from the 
very beginning and in very intense terms. The tone of the articles and reports was one of 
                                                 
398 For an interesting account of ―the rent strike‖, see James A. Baer, ―Tenant Mobilization and the 1907 
Rent Strike in Buenos Aires‖, 49 The Americas 343 (1993).  
 
399 See, e.g., ―Por una cuestión de alquileres‖, El Diario, October, 11, 1921, at 11 (reporting that, faced with 
the offer by the tenant to pay the rent at the lower price set by the emergency law, a sub-lessor attacked the 
tenant with a knife, hurting him in the head and groin). For different stories on the retorts by landlords, see 
also ―La ley electoral de alquileres‖, El Diario, October, 6, at 1 (reporting the case of the owner of an 
apartments building that, faced by the refusal of tenants to keep on paying the agreed upon rent, 
suspended payment of utilities and the doormen services, forcing tenants to have to take out garbage by 
themselvesand leaving them without electricity and, as a consequence, also without water supply and 
elevator services; also the case of a landlord who brought four german shepherd dogs into his apartment 
and played music quite loudly to make neighbors —who happened to be his tenants— uncomfortable).   
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open confrontation. Other newspapers would later join one or the other side as events 
developed and judicial decisions were handed down.   
  In September, 1921, Congress passed the 11,157 law, also known as the Rent 
Act, providing, among other things, that from the promulgation of the law on, and 
during two years, rents were to be frozen at the prices they had in January, 1920. This 
provision served both as a cap for rents that had not risen since that date and as a cut-off 
for leases in which raises had occurred. The law stirred a great controversy, and the 
people clearly divided over the issue. Tenants rebelled against what they perceived to be 
unjust increases in rents and owners showed a clearly confrontational attitude towards 
what they took to be an unjust deprivation of their property rights.400 The topic 
dominated conversations in the streets.401  
Caras y Caretas, a magazine aiming at political humour, published quite a few 
cartoons reflecting the different feelings the law had sparkled in the public. In one of 
them, graphically entitled ―Out War‖, depicted in a set of wordplays the feelings of the 
owners: ―The public all of a sudden gets irritated and begins to sing this way: The rent is 
denied. The house is ravaged. And the tenant wins. And the tenant enjoys. Belligerent, he 
makes fun of our grief. Oh, infamous tenant; Oh, otiose tenant.‖402  
                                                 
400 See, e.g., ―Los alquileres‖, Crítica, September, 24, at 1. 
 
401 Id. See also ―La ley electoral de alquileres. La protesta pública…‖, El Diario, September, 20, at 1 (stating 
that the law ―has been, and will be for many days to come, the topic of all conversations and comments‖).  
 
402 ―Guerra sin cuartel‖, Caras y Caretas, Number 1201, October, 8 (the Spanish version is playful and the 
words rhyme, making up a credible mock song; there is far more content in the same tone in the issue).  
More cartoons in fairly the same line can be seen in ―Comentarios‖, Caras y Caretas, number 1204, 
October, 15 (where an owner is depicted complaining that a person cannot be a radical —a supporter of 
the then governing party— and an owner anymore).  
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 In the owners‘ camp, the organization was almost immediate.403 They got 
together in meetings and found legal counsel fairly quickly, even if many of them did not 
want to look like a union or to entrust the defence of their interest to a common body.404 
They seemed to believe that their cause was morally and legally sound, and were very 
optimistic about the chances of winning an eventual constitutional case in the Supreme 
Court.405 They seemed to have lobbied for a presidential veto,406 without success. The 
province of Buenos Aires, in its capacity as owner of the Rambla de Mar del Plata —a nice 
commercial boulevard by the sea in the touristic city of Mar del Plata— , immediately 
raised the rents it charged to existing tenants of the premises, under various pretexts, 
searching to protect itself from the new law.407  
                                                 
403 See, e.g., the advertisement of the Asociación de Propietarios de Bienes Raíces —Real Estate Owners‘ 
Association— in El Diario, September, 29, at 1 (informing that the association had changed its address and 
that ―to become a member is a duty‖). See also ―El asunto de los alquileres. Algunos casos producidos‖, 
Crítica, September, 26, at 1 (asserting that the exciment produced among owners by the law had resulted so 
far in meetings and the formations of ―resistance centers‖); and ―La ley de alquileres. El día terrible…‖, El 
Diario, September, 29, at 3 (reporting that the Asociación de Propietarios de Bienes Raíces was ―setting in motion 
its campaign for justice‖ and that it was expected that almost every owner would enroll in the association).  
 
404 See ―La ley de alquileres ante la Suprema Corte. Esperando la promulgación. Los abogados defenderán 
la inviolabilidad de la propiedad‖, El Diario, September, 16, at 1. Also see ―La ley electoral de alquileres‖, 
El Diario, September, 20, at 1 (mentioning that the Asociación de Propietarios —Owners‘ Association— was 
calling a meeting and that the venue was going to be too small to fit the large turn out that was expected). 
There was also a Corporación de Propietarios y Subarrendadores —Owner‘s and Sublessors‘ Corporation— 
formed largely by owners of casas de inquilinato —buildings destined to be nothing more than tenements—. 
See ―La ley electoral de alquileres‖, El Diario, September, 24, at 1. 
 
405 See ―La ley de alquileres ante la Suprema Corte. Esperando la promulgación. Los abogados defenderán 
la inviolabilidad de la propiedad‖, El Diario, September, 16, at 1.  See also ―Primeros efectos de la ley de 
alquileres‖, El Diario; September, 17, at 1 (arguing that the lawyers that were advising the Asociación de 
Propietarios ―did not hide their optimistic impression‖ about the chances of winning the case before the 
Supreme Court). 
 
406 See ―Los alquileres, ¿por qué no promulga la ley el Presidente?‖, Crítica, September, 19, at 1 (affirming 
that the owners were preparing themselves to lobby the President to veto the bill). 
 
407 See ―Un caso oportuno para la ley de alquileres‖, El Dario, September, 24, at 3. 
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 For their part, tenants were ―getting ready for the resistance‖,408 and the state of 
agitation threatened ―to degenerate into a real brouhaha‖.409 El Diario accused the 
administration of turning the law into an instrument of political propaganda, by sending 
attorneys to the conventillos —tenement houses— and offering tenants to cover the 
expenses of the litigation necessary to force the landlords to receive the payments under 
the new law.410 In these meetings, the official party attorneys would also incite the crowds 
to support the administration. The law had given politics the chance it was waiting, and 
the Socialist and Radical parties did not pass on it: ―[…] every Radical and Socialist 
committee has turned into a legal clinic, in order to make more diabolical, if at all 
possible, the relationship between owners and tenants‖.411 A more sympathetic view of 
the facts was offered by El Pueblo, which reported that an executive decree had ordered 
that the National Department of Work lent its help to those employees and workers that 
so required, by means of preparing legal documents and providing assistance.412  
In any case, it was pretty clear that public opinion was sharply divided in two 
camps. Which of them was more numerous, and what implications their positions had 
for the conception of constitutional property is what I will try to find out now. 
 El Diario made a clear, though not fanatical, case on behalf of property rights: 
                                                 




410 See ―La ley ‗electoral‘ de alquileres. En base a ella se inicia la propaganda política…‖, El Diario, October, 
9 & 10, at 1. See also ―La ley ‗electoral‘ de alquileres. Protesta pública…‖, El Diario, September, 20, at 1 
(stating that the housing problem had been turned into a mere electoral question, a manipulation aiming at 
gaining the sympathies of the popular sectors and a mocking of the institutions). 
 
411 ―La ley electoral de alquileres. Un consultorio jurídico en cada comité político…‖, El Diario, October, 
12, at 3. 
 
412 ―La ley de alquileres. Cooperación oficial‖, El Pueblo, October, 10, at 1.  
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―We have fought the abuse of the owners, taken to really objectionable extremes, but 
always thought that the means chosen to combat such scarcity was not only the 
least suitable, but also the most inconsistent, due to the nullity that would affect the 
new law. In order to induce the fall of prices, which in the current situation are 
ruled by the uncompromising necessity of supply and demand, there was no 
other resource but to promote edification, and to do so, the last thing that could 
be done was to scare capital with an extortionist and [rights-]violating law. Now, with 
the accomplished facts, it only remains to wait for the judicial decision, which will 
necessarily have to rule on the unconstitutionality of the law […]‖413   
  
 In the newspaper‘s view, the new law  
 ―[…] attacks freedom of contract and alters the ownership of real property, 
ignoring everything that the Constitution enshrines as inviolable […] it grieves to think that 
such a swill has passed the Senate because it suggests the lightness with which […] 
the arduous and momentous legislative issues are addressed‖.414 
 
According to El Diario, the passing of the law —which it deemed as ―absolutely 
bad‖ and a ―disastrous precedent‖— generated public protest.415 It its view, the law‘s 
effects would be anything but the ones intended, bringing about the paralysation of the 
building industry and the immediate retraction of the available units for rent, with the 
ensuing harm to workers and tenants alike.416 Moreover, the law provoked an ―irritating 
injustice‖ as it deprived owners of part of their properties‘ profits while the State raised 
                                                 
413 ―La ley de alquileres ante la Suprema Corte. Esperando la promulgación…‖, El Diario, September, 16, at 
1. The italics are mine. 
 




416 See, e.g., ―La nueva ley de alquileres. Sus efectos prácticos…‖, El Diario, November, 5, at 3 
(interviewing a well-known real estate investor and developer, whose views were that the law was not 
producing its intended effects and that those most harmed were the tenants themselves); ―La ley ‗electoral‘ 
de alquileres. Sus efectos en las transacciones inmobiliarias…‖, El Diario, October, 8, at 1 (stating that the 
intended beneficiaries of the legislation, the tenants, would be its ―final victims‖ and that after a brief fall in 
the rents, the tenants would find themselves in a much more precarious situation, due to the lack of 
incentives to both Guild new houses and to rent them; this paralysis of new constructions would, in turn, 
leave thousands of workers unemployed). 
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the taxes on the very same properties.417 And, not less importantly, it created 
opportunities for ―rapacious behaviour‖ on the part of some sectors with possibilities of 
capturing the political process or making it work to their particular benefit.418 None of 
these noxious effects could be erased by an eventual declaration of unconstitutionality by 
the Supreme Court, as the ―memory of the most extraordinary aggression on private 
wealth‖ would linger on forever.419 
 Caras y Caretas printed a cartoon that attempted to depict the different views the 
various sectors of the population had on the rent law. There must have been a clear 
public perception of the opportunities for self-interested, and perhaps abusive, behavior 
that the enactment of the law opened, as the magazine illustrated the views of the 
delinquent tenant in the following terms: ―Property does not exist. Everything there is on 
Earth belongs to its inhabitants. These two houses are mine‖.420 Even more clearly, in the 
same vignette, a character by the name of Goyo Sarrasqueta expressed his views on the 
law in the following terms: ―That the law is just, because with the refund he will get on the 
overcharge paid since 1920, he will purchase a house, in order to rent it at high prices‖.421 It is clear 
                                                 
417 ―La ley ‗electoral‘ de alquileres. Protesta pública…‖, El Diario, September, 20, at 1. See also ―La ley 
‗electoral‘ de alquileres. Sus efectos en las transacciones inmobiliarias…‖, El Diario, October, 8, at 1 
(insisting on the idea of the irritating injustice of the situation and claiming that municipal taxes had been 
raised by 70% and that the then-national taxes on water service to the property and sewage had been raised 
by a 45% and a 60%, respectively); ―La ley ‗electoral‘ de alquileres. Los propietarios ante el Banco 
Hipotecario Nacional‖, El Diario, October, 18, at 1 (reporting that mortgagors were complaining to the 
bank that while their property‘s profits had fallen by 30% due to the law, taxes rates had been raised and a 
new fiscal valuation would make taxes on property even higher, thus making it difficult to comply with 
repayment schedules).  
 
418 ―La ley ‗electoral‘ de alquileres. Protesta pública…‖, El Diario, September, 20, at 1. 
 
419 ―La ley ‗electoral‘ de alquileres. Protesta pública…‖, El Diario, September, 20, at 1. 
 
420 Redondo, ―Dicho y Hecho. Impresiones sobre la Ley de Alquileres‖, Caras y Caretas, Number 1202, 
October, 15 (depicting a tenant with two multi-storey buildings under his arms).  The italics are mine. 
 
421 Id. (depicting the character nicely dressed and standing in front of a tenement house of his property, 
with a sign reading ―Rooms for rent‖ on it). The italics are mine. According to Giunta, ―Goyo Sarrasqueta‖ 
was the first character ever in the history of Argentine comic. Created by Manuel Redondo, ―Goyo 
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that both Sarrasqueta and the delinquent tenant speculated with the benefits they could 
get from the law, which would not merely alleviate their supposedly difficult situation, 
but would put them in an advantageous position. El Diario denounced such attitude by 
decrying that ―a large majority of tenants are decided to take advantage of the yrigoyenist 
[referring to then-President Yrigoyen] absurdity‖.422 
 The possibility of self-seeking, abusive attitudes on the part of at least some 
tenants is proved by a small poll done by Crítica —a pro-tenants newspaper— in 1925, 
when it was being debated whether the emergency law should be extended (once more). 
The poll was very peculiar, since all respondents were tenants. Nonetheless, it is useful to 
analyze the answers given, in order to see that it must not have been too infrequent that 
tenants were seeking to take advantage, and not mere temporary shelter, through the 
emergency powers. The question was whether the emergency law should be extended for 
another couple of years. One respondent argued that further reductions in the rents 
―would be ideal‖ and that he would prefer that the law was prorogated ―forever‖.423 
Another respondent held that he ―would like to pay less‖ for his rent, and when the 
journalist replied that such a decision would be for the landlord to make, the tenant said 
that ―it could also be a matter for the law‖.424 In many cases, an attitude of enviousness 
towards the owners was explicit.425 
                                                                                                                                            
Sarrasqueta‖ routinely faced situations that corresponded to hot topics in the news. Generally, Sarrasqueta 
took a critical stance towards the situations he faced in the cartoons. See Néstor Giunta, ―Historia del 
cómic en Argentina‖, available at  http://www.todohistorietas.com.ar/historia_argentina_1.htm (last 
visited July, 27, 2011) (building up on a text by Oscar de Majo, published in 29 Signos Universitarios (1996)). 
 
422 ―La ley de alquileres. El día terrible…‖, El Diario, September, 29, at 3. The italics are mine. 
 
423 See ―La pregunta del día: ¿Debe o no ser prorrogada la ley de alquileres?‖, Crítica, August, 29, 1925, at 6 
(transcribing the reply of one José López Rodriguez).  
 
424 Id. (transcribing the reply of one Andrés Ferreyra). 
 
425 Id. (replies by one Matías Martí and one Andrés Ferreyra). 
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 La Fronda also took a critical stance towards the emergency law, which considered 
as ―fatidical‖.426 It criticized President Yrigoyen, who apparently had a long history as a 
tenant and had just issued a decree establishing how the rent of public offices located in 
private premises should be paid, by asking ironically:  
 ―What is the presidential decree‘s goal? That rents are paid at the value they had 
in January, 1st, 1920, as prescribed by the law, or that no rent is paid at all, as hints 
the precedent set by the well-known case of El Quemao [President Yrigoyen] 
himself? […] There have always existed in our legislation strict legal rules that oblige tenants 
to pay their rents punctually, and such rules have been observed only by the prudish citizens, 
those who have even believed in the apparition of widows and of the deceased. But men pure, 
austere, energetic, and providential have passed over such despicable scruples and over any 
statutory provision whatsoever in order not to pay any amount in concept of rent and to make 
appear the leased house and field as their own.‖427  
 
 Meanwhile, the tenants‘ defenders saw the issue differently and had their own 
complaints. El Pueblo thought the law to be a ―plausible idea‖ that benefitted the less 
affluent,428 and printed a set of ―interesting instructions on the rent laws‖ whereby it gave 
tenants advice on how to proceed to vindicate the rights created by the emergency law.429 
It also denounced maneuvers by some owners who wanted to circumvent the law by 
invoking the need to introduce improvements in the rented unit to regain possession of 
it and then making a list of those tenants who were intending to take advantage of the 
law.430 After being dispossessed, tenants were in grave danger of not finding a place to 
                                                                                                                                            
 




428 See ―Las leyes de alquileres. La verdad en su lugar…‖, El Pueblo, September, 18, at 1. 
 
429 See ―Instrucciones interesantes sobre las leyes de alquileres‖, El Pueblo, October, 16, at 1. 
 
430 ―Contra el espíritu de la ley‖, El Pueblo, October, 21, at 1. See also ―El asunto de los alquileres. Algunos 
casos producidos‖, Crítica, September, 26, at 1 (reporting the same kind of cases as El Pueblo and informing 
about a seeming intention to resist and circumvent the law on the part of some owners). For a different 
take on the same issue, but one that hints strongly at the actual existence of such ―Black‖ lists, see ―La ley 
 147 
live, as landlords were not likely to rent their property to anyone in the ―black‖ list. 
According to this newspaper, owners who resorted to this kind of maneuvers suffered 
from  
 ―…[an] utilitarian blindness that makes them forget […] what our fundamental law 
ordains in a very explicit way for all inhabitants, without distinction of social 
hierarchies or monetary conditions: […] that the laws made in pursuance thereof 
[…] are the supreme law of the land, to which all must conform, whether they 
are to our benefit or not […]‖431 
 
 The law, in the view of El Pueblo, was ―a beneficial solution, demanded by the 
interests of the community‖, which also meant a departure point from the ―today 
anachronistic concept of private property‖.432 Interestingly enough, the gist of the 
critique concerns a particular conception of private property, but not the concept itself, 
despite the somewhat misleading language.433 What underlies El Pueblo‘s position is a 
rejection of the ―reprehensible attitude of many unscrupulous owners‖, who were 
scheming to frustrate whatever protection the law was aiming to provide tenants. It was 
the owners‘ ―utilitarian blindness‖, their obsessive focus on profit, and their lack of 
sensitivity that led them to disregard completely whatever valid claims tenants might have 
had. The point is nicely illustrated in Caras y Caretas, where a large landowner is depicted 
as being hit in the back of the neck by a rock falling from the sky —with the legend ―rent 
                                                                                                                                            
electoral de alquileres‖, El Diario, October, 6, at 1 (reporting that the Asociación de Propietarios claimed that 
the agreed-upon terms of contracts were to be respected by businessmen of honor and that the invocation 
of the rights granted by the emergency law should have an immediate impact on the trustworthiness of any 
person, and informing that the banks would take such information into account when conducting their 
business). 
 




433 It is easy to see that a popular newspaper is not a philosophical journal and that, thus, a certain degree 
of terminological inaccuracy is to be expected. What should matter in an analysis of the sort I am trying to 
carry out is what the news reflected more generally, more than whether they used philosophically-accurate, 
as well as anachronistic, technical words. 
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law‖ on it—. The impact forces the greedy character to throw out of his mouth a large 
number of gold coins. His impression on the law is that it is ―a cataclysm‖, and that ―the 
world falls upon him, depriving him of all his profit‖.434 Both the exaggeration in the 
perception and the fact that the measure, whatever its real extent, was taken to have an 
impact only on profits —as opposed to the capital that is the source of profit— seem to 
be important points to bear in mind. The same comic depicted a small owner has having 
different feelings regarding the emergency law: he was concerned by the intrusion upon 
the allegedly freely-celebrated contracts.435  
 The newspaper Crítica also supported the law. In its view, the Senate had been 
forced to pass the bill due to ―popular demand‖,436 and the situation could be framed in 
terms of class struggle. Crítica‘s initial reactions were a mix of skepticism about the law‘s 
ability to remedy the situation and depiction of a surely exaggerated contrast between 
rich, opulent and somewhat parasitic owners and poor, dignified tenants: 
 ―We bet that the law will not resolve anything. We bet that it will be made to be 
broken, and that a tramp will be invented, so that the tenant is annoyed and the 
capitalists […] smile. We will soon see that the law is useless when the parties to 
the contract are one weak and the other strong; that is, a poor pater familiae […] 
and a rich person who owns a house that [allows] to live like a prince […]‖437 
 
 Roughly painted, this was the social situation when the Supreme Court was called 
on to decide. The Court ruled on the issue of the constitutionality of the freezing of rents 
                                                 
434 Redondo, above n. 420, at 15. The italics are mine. 
 
435 Id. (depicting the owners, generally, as claiming that the free operation of the market, by means of the 
law of supply and demand, was the only way to solve the question). 
 
436 ―Los alquileres. El Peludo no promulgó la ley ayer‖, Crítica, September, 12, at 1 (also arguing that the 
law should have been passed two years earlier). 
 
437 ―La ley de los alquileres‖, Crítica, September, 22, at 1. Italics in the original. 
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on several occasions. The most surprising, perhaps, was its first decision, Ercolano,438 
when the justices admitted, by a three-to-one vote, the emergency rationale for the law, 
albeit in a very restricted fashion. The majority said that 
 ―There are restrictions to property rights and to individual activities whose 
legitimacy cannot be discussed as a matter of principle, but only as to their 
extent. Such are the limitations aimed at ensuring the collective order, health, and 
morals; and there are also other restrictions, such as those aiming at the protection of the 
economic interests [of the community], which cannot be accepted without a careful scrutiny, 
for they could contravene the principles of economic liberty and individualism 
professed by our Constitution […]‖439   
  
 The justices argued that while in principle the power to set the price of a rental 
unit was proper of the owner, the law could intervene, exceptionally, when the object of 
the rent was imbued with an ―intense public interest‖ and there was a situation of 
monopoly over the object. The majority thought that the extraordinary situation created 
by the shortage of housing erased the ―common regulator of the market‖, the 
concurrence, and determined that there was a ―virtual monopoly‖ that allowed landlords 
to oppress the community by asking for prices that would not be possible but for the 
artificial lack of concurrence in the market. There was a market failure that had in fact 
suppressed freedom of contract. Such circumstances justified the State‘s intervention on 
the market. Moreover, the restriction was temporary —which dispelled the suspicion of 
partiality—, it was not proved that the rents paid in January, 1920, were not reasonable at 
the time the law was enacted —which implied that there was not a confiscation of 
property—, and —a seemingly irrelevant detail that would later play a key role in 
reversing the trend— there was no written contract, so there was no question of whether 
vested rights had been violated. Thus, the law passed the ―careful scrutiny‖ the majority 
had established as proper for such regulations. 
                                                 
438 CSJN, Ercolano, Agustín v. Lanteri de Renshaw, Julieta, 136 Fallos 161 (1922). 
 
439 Id., ¶3. The italics are mine. 
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 Ercolano, for all it came to mean later as a first instance of a strong doctrine of 
economic emergency powers, was a rather cautious departure from Hileret. It did not 
open the door to unbridled state regulation of the economy, nor did it mean that the 
judiciary would step back and take a second seat in all constitutional economic rights. 
Rather, its language suggests that the justices were quite conscious of both the changes in 
society that demanded a re-conceptualization of the rhetoric of property and the perils of 
admitting the emergency rationale for peculiarly invasive restrictions upon property 
rights. Thus, they tried to walk a middle way but, as it happens, it was not as effective a 
move as they might have hoped. Time would push constitutional safeguards for property 
rights over the brink. 
 In any case, the decision was met with enthusiasm by Crítica and other supporters 
of the law. Crítica, in its characteristic combative style, thought the decision to be ―a 
battle won by the large oppressed majority against the capital‖440 as well as ―one of the 
most solid juridical pieces of the recent times‖.441 It exalted Justice Figueroa Alcorta‘s 
figure, whose position in the issue was suspected to be contrary to the validity of the law, 
by highlighting his ―solid legal background‖ and his ―favorable disposition to march in 
accordance to the historical times, its necessities, and the aspirations of the masses‖.442 
Interestingly, the newspaper was praising former President, and then Supreme Court 
justice, Figueroa Alcorta for favoring what the paper thought to be a dynamic 
interpretation of the law, driven by class-needs. In other words, the justice was praised 
for being politically conscious and ruling in accordance with such perceptions. This was, 
for Crítica, what being a remarkable jurist meant. As we will see shortly, this kind of 
                                                 







disregard for traditional legal factors in constitutional adjudication and their substitution 
for more openly political considerations was not something that all supporters of the 
emergency law appreciated. They would find out quite quickly that openly political 
considerations cut both ways and that with everything up-for-grabs at every juncture, it 
was far from clear that ―the masses‖ were to be protected ultimately. 
 El Pueblo reported that the ruling caused ―a great feeling of relief and satisfaction 
among the public‖, specially when there had been speculations as to the likelihood of an 
adverse decision by the Court.443 In the newspaper‘s view, ―the law was perfectly 
constitutional‖ and the majority of the people thought so.444 Interestingly, El Pueblo 
elaborated both on the new contours of the conception of property that it was advancing 
and on the dangers of letting the ―new spirit‖ that animated such redefinition break loose 
completely unrestrained: 
 ―The right of property, so broad and so absolute in days gone by, to the extent, 
unconceivable today, of permitting the owner ‗to degrade and destroy‘ his things, 
that right […] can be subject, by virtue of new concepts that the circumstances and 
the pace of life have formed in the minds of healthy men, to restrictions that upon 
closer inspection are no restrictions at all. And they are not restrictions because they do not 
alter the essence of the right and, in this case of the rent law, have only a temporary 
character […] It is a new spirit that escapes a little bit from narrow moulds, from a 
pigeonhole built some fifty years ago, from the rigidity of texts that are beginning 
to become moldy […] It should not be rejected without understanding it, not should it be 
encouraged without reining it conveniently. Because it is a new spirit, a docile spirit, [that 
is] easy to mould and to guide too […] without taking away a bit of its fertile 
creative force. Let there be no fear, then. The decision of the Supreme Court ends 
the discussion on an issue that has been debated very intensely during the last 
few months, in accordance with the opinion of the popular majority […]‖445     
  
 El Pueblo emphasized that the emergency law was constitutional because it did not 
alter the essence of the right and the measures taken were temporary. This rhetoric of 
                                                 




445 Id. The italics are mine. 
 
 152 
temporariness and respect for the ―essence‖ of the right would take a hold in the case 
law.  
 La Época reported that that the ruling was ―of paramount importance‖, awaited 
eagerly by the people, and that ―it brought to an end an almost despairing anguish that 
was felt intensely throughout the country‖.446 La Fronda, which had been critical of the 
law, decided to move beyond the discussion of the constitutionality or unconstitutionality 
of the law, because ―the Highest Court in the Republic has ruled for the former, and we 
are not allowed to cast doubt on the expertise or seriousness of the Court‖ and 
considered that, legally speaking, the constitutional validity could not be put in doubt any 
longer, any arguments to the contrary notwithstanding.447 
 El Diario, a persistent foe of the law, criticized the Court‘s ruling for being 
―incomplete‖ and ―late‖.448 The newspaper acutely noticed that the particulars of the case 
limited the holding: in Ercolano there had been no written contract, a fairly atypical case, 
and thus, the ruling could not be said to solve the pressing question wholly.449 In a large 
majority of cases there were written contracts. The Court, somewhat disingenuously, 
preferred to pass on the issue, as the facts of the case did not present a written contract. 
El Diario was critical of such an attitude, hinting that the Court might come to decide the 
rest of the cases when the issue no longer mattered.450 In any event, as La Fronda did, El 
Diario chose not to repeat its arguments against the validity of the law, accepting the legal 
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447 See ―El problema de la vivienda‖, La Fronda, April, 29, at 1. 
 







force of the ruling but considering it wrongly decided, as the law could be recognized as 
legally-binding, for authority‘s sake, but it ―would never be constitutional‖.451 
 As a matter of fact, the Court would not take long to rule on a case that did 
involve a written contract celebrated before the enactment of the emergency law. Less 
than four months after Ercolano, in what was perceived as an inconsistent step backwards 
from the previous decision, the justices ruled the emergency law unconstitutional. In 
Horta, the justices held that the doctrine of legislative supremacy, grounded upon the 
―supposed will of a majority of the people‖, could not be accommodated within a system 
whose essence consisted in the limitation of governmental powers and the supremacy of 
the Constitution.452 When the parties had agreed upon a price and a term, there was a 
vested right that could not be taken by the legislature: 
 ―Be it much or little what is taken from the owner by action of the law, it is no longer possible 
to reconcile the law with Article 17 of the Constitution, which protects property against 
actions by private individuals as well as against actions by public authorities […] 
The act of depriving the landlord of a portion of the price he has the right to 
demand, in accordance with the contract, to benefit the tenant, is as grave a 
violation of such guarantee as it would be to deprive the owner of a fraction of 
the leased property to be donated to the tenant […]‖453  
 
 In addition to the argument of ―conceptual severance‖,454 the Court resorted to 
the alleged higher importance of respecting the sanctity of contracts and dispelling any 
fears of exceptional legislation:  
                                                 
451 Id. 
 
452 CSJN, Horta, José v. Harguindeguy, Ernesto, 136 Fallos 59 (1922), (majority opinion, ¶16). 
 
453 Id., ¶10.  
 
454 Conceptual severance is commonly defined, following Margaret Jane Radin‘s work, as the idea 
according to which, once property is defined as ―a bundle of sticks‖ (rights) as opposed to things, every 
stick in a property bundle itself counts as property. This thesis has important implications for takings, as 
the Argentine Supreme Court passage in n. 453 shows: if each stick is property, then removing a stick from 
someone's bundle must be a taking regardless of what other sticks remain in the person's bundle (if any). 
See, e.g., Leif Wenar, ―The Concept of Property and the Takings Clause‖, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1923, 1928 
(1997). 
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―It is inconceivable, moreover, that the public order may demand […] that 
contracts be altered without the consent of the parties, because it is easy to see 
that if there is anything that concerns a society based upon the recognition and 
respect for private property, and upon the strengthening of justice, it is the 
stability of economic rights; it is that contracts are faithfully executed; and it is, in 
short, that it is not possible to even entertain the fear that exceptional laws can be 
enacted and enforced […]‖455  
 
 Unsurprisingly, the decision was well-received by El Diario, and criticized by 
Crítica and El Pueblo. Other papers, such as La Fronda, covered the decision without 
taking sides explicitly. 
 Crítica advised ―the owners not to claim victory‖ because due to its own arguments, 
the decision was not to have retroactive effects and it only reached the allegedly ―very 
few cases‖ in which, at the time of the decision, written contracts made before the 
passing of the law were still in force.456 However, the newspaper did not miss the 
opportunity to chastise the Court with its characteristic forceful style. In Critica‘s view, 
the Court took the chance to ―sign hymns to the ‗inviolable, sacred, all-powerful, 
immune and sovereign property, essence and substance of every right and legislation‘‖; in 
its ―efforts to safeguard the unlimited rights of the owners‖, the justices ignored the 
emergency law and omitted to establish limits to the ―omnipotence‖ of the owners, such 
as setting a cap to the profits any property can yield in a certain percentage of its tax 
valuation.457 The ruling was deemed as ―reactionary‖ and the paper wondered whether  
                                                                                                                                            
 










―[…] the Court, erected a champion of the inviolability of a property that nobody is 
violating, ignores that above the inviolability of property is the general good, the 
social tranquility, and thus, property itself […]‖458 
 
 Crítica argued that if the ruling were to have any effects, they would be disastrous, 
for it would leave the ―pocket and welfare and tranquility of the many‖ to fall prey to the 
―insatiable jaws of the avarice of the ‗inviolable, intangible, immune…owners‖.459 It also 
beat the Court for the zeal it showed when property was infringed, a zeal that —in the 
newspaper‘s opinion— the justices had not displayed when other rights were at stake.460 
 El Pueblo, in turn, stated that the ruling was surprising. Quoting extensively from 
a lower court decision that had recently upheld the law as applied to written contracts, 
the paper attacked the majority of the Court for its seeming lack of consistency: Since the 
contract is not born out of the written paper, which only proves the existence of the 
agreement, it was imperative to admit that the law was either constitutional in all cases or 
unconstitutional in all cases.461 Thus, the decision suffered ―from a rather important lack 
of logic‖.462 Interestingly, the newspaper excludes from the criticism the lone dissenter in 
Ercolano, Justice Antonio Bermejo, who concurred in the judgment in Horta and whose 
coherency the paper praised. El Pueblo clearly dissented from Bermejo on what was the 
proper conception of constitutional property. It thought the justice‘s views were ―a bit 
outdated‖, as had been proved by evidence ―both in Argentina and in the rest of the 
                                                 






461 See ―Cuando es inconstitucional la ley de alquileres. El fallo de la Corte Suprema. Una falta de lógica a 





world‖, but nonetheless the newspaper found his opinion ―more satisfactory than the 
majority‘s, in which a lack of logic is apparent‖.463 The idea that the Court was supposed 
to apply the law in a principled way, rather than engage in politically-driven decision-
making pervades the article. Bermejo, whatever the shortcomings of his legal views, was 
preferable to a majority that was willing to engage in complicated legal acrobatics to 
justify their varying preferred outcomes. 
 El Diario thought that the ruling ―returns constitutional guarantees, hurt by the 
devastating action of the […] presidency […] their entire force‖.464 Despite its long and 
unwarranted delay, itself a cause of ―severe moral and material disturbances‖, the Court‘s 
decision was very important because  
 ―[…] it annulled […] a law that is repugnant to the spirit of justice and to one of 
the basic principles of organic democracy. The right of property and the 
obligations of contracts have been spared the depredations to which the rent law 
subjected them; a baseless law […] that knocked down secular winnings to the 
benefit of banal and transitory electoral interests and destroyed the foundations 
of the National Constitution in the struggle to win voters‖465  
  
According to El Diario, the arguments embraced in Horta had been first advanced 
by the press, ―almost without exception‖, when the law was debated in Congress and had 
been ―repeated by the man in the street, bewildered by the fact that such respectable 
principles were trampled for those lowermost interests‖.466   
Three years later, in August of 1925, the Court would be faced with the issue of 
whether successive extensions of the emergency law were constitutionally-acceptable. In 
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Mango, all five justices ruled they were not.467 They emphasized that Ercolano rested 
heavily on the transitory character of the measures, a character that had been 
progressively distorted by the extension of the law, to the point where landlords had 
been ―deprived of the free disposal of the properties during a term…of four years‖ 
despite the fact that, in the case, the leases allowed the landlord to regain possession of 
the property after the first term had expired.468 Moreover, an emergency regime, 
―tolerated in view of the time of extreme economic oppression faced by tenants due to 
the lack […] of housing supply‖, could not become permanent,469 especially when there 
were clear signs that the worst part of the crisis was over, as a ―steady increase in the 
supply of premises for living‖ could be noticed through a reading of the newspapers and 
a rise in the taxes over urban property pointed in the same direction.470  
 Unsurprisingly, Crítica attacked the ruling for being grounded ―in the old and 
retrograde concept of private property‖ which created ―an absurd privilege‖ and was out 
of sync with the ―new social concept, dominant in the spirit of‖ the country‘s modern 
institutions.471 The decision was an instance, in its view, of ―how one of the three 
branches of the Nation annuls the drafting and enactment of a law that is the People‘s 
and for the People‖ in opposition to the view of the other two branches.472 There are 
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471 See ―CRÍTICA provocó la definición de la Corte‖, Crítica, August, 27, at 2 (quoting in part from Doctor 






overtones of what we know today as the ―countermajoritarian difficulty‖ in Crítica‘s 
criticisms.473 The newspaper insisted that a new adjudicative paradigm was in order; thus 
it was 
 ―[…] very important to know whether our courts of justice interpret the laws in 
accordance with the social and humane content Parliament gives them. The times 
when the cold and rigid application of legal rules prevailed are gone. To reject, on behalf of 
the free exercise of property rights, laws aiming at protecting the masses while 
saving the constitutional anathema when the free trade of meat is restricted […] 
because the restriction favors the interests of powerful landowners, is to interpret 
the Constitution with a class-spirit […]‖474 
 
 However, not all the supporters of the original emergency law were in complete 
disagreement with the justices, and even those who were opposed to the ruling seemed 
to have perceived that the idea of the ―remarkable jurist‖ that Crítica had pushed forward 
when praising Ercolano had its limits. Politically, it was far from clear that allowing the 
Court to ground its decisions in what were considered as openly-political considerations 
would advance the cause of the worse-off (whatever this might mean).475 A certain 
appreciation of the value of a clearer institutional division of labor between courts and 
legislatures, and of a degree of separation of law and politics began to re-emerge. The 
                                                 
473 See, e.g., ―Hay que votar la prórroga…‖, Crítica, August, 28, at 5 (arguing that the Court had ventured 
into a terrain that was beyond its proper function and that only Congress had a say in the matter); and ―La 
prórroga de la ley de alquileres es imprescindible‖, Crítica, August, 31, at 6 (arguing that Congress would 
have the final word on the issue). 
 
474 ―Hay que votar la prórroga‖, Crítica, August, 27, at 2. See also Ricardo Sidicaro, above n. 217, at 68 
(arguing that restrictions on free trade of meat benefitted powerful local breeders). 
 
475 Crítica itself, showing once more the extremely partisan character of its interventions, seemed to back 
off from its previous position about what being a ―remarkable jurist‖ meant. Echoing Representative De 
Tomasso, the newspaper criticized the Court for using ―false arguments‖ based upon unwarranted factual 
assumptions about the actual situation in the rental market, arguments proper of a discussion in 
―Parliament‖. See, e.g., ―Hay que votar la prórroga‖, Crítica, August, 27, at 2. See also ―Hay que votar la 
prórroga‖, Crítica, August, 29, at 4 (arguing that the disagreement of the Supreme Court with Congress 
would not be legal, but social instead, and that would make the ruling essentially illegitimate) and ―Hay que 
votar la prórroga…‖, Crítica, August, 28, at 5 (arguing that the Court had ventured into a terrain that was 
beyond its proper function and that only Congress had a say in the matter).  
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legitimacy of judicial decisions, to many people, was closely tied to these ideas. 
Consistency was also perceived as a valuable judicial trait.  
 Representative De Tomasso, interviewed by Crítica, stated that: 
 ―I believe strongly that the Court ruling is a serious legal mistake, because it is 
grounded, mainly, in considerations that are not legal-juridical in nature and that are, 
thus, improper in a court of strict law. This sort of considerations put the Court 
in a terrain that is beyond its constitutional and legal orbit, so much that when I 
read the decision this morning I thought that it looked rather like a discourse by a 
legislator in opposition to the extension of the law that is being debated. The 
Supreme Court is a body created to guard the constitutional provisions […] Its 
characteristic, much more than any other judicial body in our country, is to be a court of law. It 
already has enormous powers […] three men (a majority over five) in each concrete case 
[…] annul the decision of the unanimity of the two Chambers in Congress, by proclaiming that 
a legislative text violates the Constitution. For that reason, it is inadmissible that the 
Court wants to enlarge its powers by claiming for itself, as it has in the instant 
case, the power to evaluate the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the laws 
[…] the Supreme Court says that it has ‘tolerated’ the emergency law and its second extension; 
that the situation […] has changed, as demonstrated by the advertisements in the papers and 
the tax increases […] and that it is no longer reasonable to ‘tolerate’ such an abnormal regime. 
Such language is improper for the Court; it is the language of a political body, not of a court of 
law […] the judges have no role but to apply the law and, if any interested party 
claims that the law violates a constitutional principle, the Supreme Court must only 
examine and say, with a legal and juridical criterion and by examining the text and the spirit of 
the law and of the constitutional text, whether the law conforms with, or is in opposition to, the 
constitution. If there was a constitutional violation in the Rent Law, it existed from the very 
first moment, and I cannot understand this puzzle that arises from the Court‘s 
argumentation: the Rent law (that fixed prices) was constitutional, for transitory 
reasons, and the extensions are not […]‖476 
  
 In a certain sense, De Tomasso, a reformer, was demanding that the Court be 
more formalist, so to speak. If three men had the power to overrule the decisions of the 
people‘s representatives, such power could only be exercised legitimately if it was 
constrained by the text of the Constitution and the established rules and methods of the 
legal profession. De Tomasso was chastising the Court not (only) for ruling against the 
law, but for the reasons it used to do so. As it had been the case before with Elortondo, in 
1888, opponents of particular decisions of the Court were prepared to accept them as 
                                                 
476 ―Es un grave error, dice De Tomasso. Lenguaje político‖, Crítica, August, 27, at 2. The italics are mine. 




legitimate as long as they were the product of legal, as opposed to political, reasoning, 
and the Court could be perceived as an impartial applicator of laws.477 
 Representative Bas, another original supporter of the emergency law, thought 
that the decision was ―perfectly logical‖ and grounded in solid arguments.478 Recalling his 
own intervention in Congress, Bas told Crítica that he had warned his fellow 
congressmen that they should worry about the permanent solution of the problem, that 
was, increasing the supply of housing, and that the law could only be temporary in 
character, for otherwise it would imply 
 ―[…] the establishment of a regime of arbitrariness, by granting Congress the 
power to fix by itself the prices of all things, thus ignoring indisputably 
categorical prescriptions of our fundamental law […] there would be no court 
that would not rule [the law] unconstitutional […] the day that Congress implant 
such policy of fixing by itself the value of things, without any rule or criterion 
whatsoever, there will be nobody who dares to invest their money or savings in 
buildings […]‖479  
 
 The passage of time and the ―normalization‖ of the emergency were also raising 
alarm. El Pueblo, a staunch supporter of the original emergency law, thought that it was 
high time to resolve the issue definitely: ―what was originally an emergency law is 
becoming, as a matter of fact, a permanent situation‖, a situation that was always 
disturbing because of the uncertainty it created among owners and tenants.480 La Fronda 
                                                 
477 See above n. 291-294 and accompanying text. 
 




480 The newspaper was all for State interventionism, though: it argued that the permanent solution should 
come by establishing the fair price of leases, which should bear an appropriate relation with the land tax 
paid by each property. See ―La ley de alquileres‖, El Pueblo, August, 26, at 3. 
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thought that the only criticism that could be leveled at the Court was that it had taken so 
long to hand down ―the decisive and definitive ruling‖.481 
 La Prensa published a lengthy summary of the decision and emphasized that the 
passage of time482 and the change of the circumstances deprived the emergency law of 
the rationale that had justified it in the first place: 
―As the extensions of the emergency law followed one another, the arbitrariness 
inherent in that procedure has increased, because the public order reasons that originally 
justified the suspension of the right of property as regards the right to dispose of houses 
in accordance with the civil code, progressively disappeared‖483 
 
The newspaper thought that the emergency law was a sort of ―legal violence‖ 
exerted over the owners that would be self-defeating, as it created incentives both for the 
owners to find legal loopholes to evict their tenants and for general increases in the rental 
prices once the emergency regime was over.484 The partial suspension of the 
constitutional guarantee of property ―becomes its negation, when it loses its character as 
an exceptional measure demanded by the public order and turns into the routine of 
renewing leases by the will of Congress‖.485  
  El Diario stated that the Court‘s ruling rested on ―incontrovertible reasons‖.486 
The law had been enacted ―under exceptional circumstances and catered for the public 
                                                 
481 ―La Corte y los alquileres‖, La Fronda, August, 31, at 1. 
 
482 ―La Suprema Corte declaró que la prórroga de la ley de alquileres es contraria a la Constitución y afecta 
el dominio‖, La Prensa, August, 27, at 1, 15. 
 
483 ―La prórroga de los alquileres‖, La Prensa, August, 28, at 9. The italics are mine. 
 
484 Id. See also ―Los perjuicios de la ley de alquileres‖, El Diario, August, 25, at 3 (reporting the large 
number of houses on offer for rent and the high prices asked for as a consequence of the emergency law) 
and ―¡Hay que votar la prórroga!‖, Crítica, August, 28, at 5 (reporting a large number of houses on offer for 
rent and the high prices asked for). 
 
485 ―La prórroga de los alquileres‖, La Prensa, August, 28, at 9. 
 
486 ―La ley de alquileres‖, El Diario, August, 28, at 3.  
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interests [that were] affected by factors rightly considered as an emergency‖.487 Those 
reasons were no more. The law had always been a transitory measure and the interests of 
the owners, ―as respectable‖ as those of the tenants, were not consulted at all by the 
successive extensions of law. To the contrary, taxes on property had been raised and a 
new extension would be clearly unfair.488  
 The waters were clearly divided. The views on the constitutionality of regulating 
property in what could be considered relatively unheard-of ways were starkly different. 
But which of these opposing views were prevalent? Were Crítica and El Pueblo reflecting 
the view of a majority of the people? Or, contrarily, did La Prensa, El Diario and others 
pro-property papers have the more accurate reflection of such opinions? What did it 
mean, in the context, that property was constitutionally inviolable? 
 The answer to these questions may have not been immediately apparent to the 
Supreme Court. The justices embarked on a jurisprudential zigzagging that may have 
reflected more the divisive nature of the issue and the undeniable importance of the 
matters at stake than their deep juridical conviction about what the Constitution meant. 
In a way, the Court may have been doing what Robert Burt would suggest them to do: if 
it was not possible to leave every disputant equally satisfied, then it may have been 
constitutionally commendable that all were left similarly unhappy.489 The justices seem to 
have navigated the rough waters of the housing crisis by doing some sort of conflict 
management, leaving open to both parties the possibility of prevailing in an on-going 
                                                                                                                                            
 
487 Id.  
 
488 ―La ley de alquileres‖, El Diario, August, 28, at 3. Interestingly, the newspaper did not seem to consider 
that some of the justices‘ arguments, dealing with the allegedly unfair consequences of the successive 
extensions of the law, were beyond the realm of legal argumentation.  
 
489 See Robert A. Burt, above n. 64, at 368. 
 
 163 
struggle that clearly transcended courts. The process would re-shape the meaning of 
constitutionally-protected property. 
 But going back to the popularity of the different views on constitutional 
property, if sheer numbers say anything on this matter, La Prensa was the newspaper with 
the largest daily print run by far, with an average of 230,000 copies, followed by La 
Nación, with some 188,835 daily copies.490 Crítica was quickly positioning itself in a third 
place, with 166,385 daily copies.491 El Diario and El Pueblo, whose positions were, 
respectively, against and in favor of the emergency law, seemed to have played a relatively 
minor role in terms of circulation, at least when compared to La Prensa, La Nación, and 
Crítica.492 In any case, it seems clear that a substantial part of the readership of the times 
chose to read papers that considered that property was being treated in constitutionally-
problematic ways. 
 But what was the real disagreement between these groups? Is there any common 
ground between them, as to what constitutional property meant? Let us see.  
El Diario, perhaps the staunchest supporter of owners, explicitly stated that it had 
―fought the abuses committed by owners‖, abuses that sometimes reached ―censurable 
extremes‖.493 It even admitted the initial justification of a temporary emergency measure 
                                                 
490 See Silvya Saitta, REGUEROS DE TINTA 73 (Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 1998) (quoting numbers 




492 According to the Guía Periodística Argentina, in 1913 —10 years before the time of the facts analyzed in 
the main text— El Diario had the fourth largest daily print run, with some 60,000 copies, while El Pueblo 
came at a distant seventh place, with some 18,000 copies per day. By way of reference, at the time La Prensa 
had a print run of 160,000 copies. Also, in 1920, the year of El Diario‘s thirty-nine anniversary, Crítica 
thought it to be part of the old tradition of ―noble and chivalrous journalism belonging to the old Buenos 
Aires‖. See Sylvia Saitta, above n. 490, at 33 (reproducing a table from Guía Periodística Argentina and 
quoting Crítica).  
 
493 See ―La ley de alquileres ante la Suprema Corte. Esperando la promulgación…‖, El Diario, September, 
16, 1921, at 1. 
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that could, for a short time, privilege the interests of one of the parties to the problem.494 
The paper was worried by what it thought to be unfair distributive effects of the law, 
which made ―small owners‖ tremble and tenants rejoice.495 And it thought that a bright 
line could be drawn between owners who, either directly or through a sub-lessor, ran 
tenement houses, and the ―true owners‖,496 who —presumably— were not prone to 
commit abuses.497 The paper was not defending an absolute conception of property. 
El Pueblo, in turn, defended the constitutionality of the emergency law by 
emphasizing that the restrictions imposed on property, being temporary as they were and 
preserving the ―essence‖ of the right, were not really restrictions.498 The ―new spirit‖ of 
the times, which mandated a new conception of property, should be neither rejected 
without being understood nor encouraged with being conveniently restrained.499 A 
middle ground seemed to be needed. 
Lay supporters of the law may have framed the issue as one in which the owners 
were not really deprived of anything but extra profits that could not be regarded as a loss. 
Thus, in a poll conducted by Crítica, one tenant by the name of Andrés Ferreyra was 
quoted as saying ―no owner is going to be poorer or less rich because of the prudential 
                                                 
494 See ―Los perjuicios de la ley de alquileres‖, El Diario, August, 25, 1925, at 3 (arguing that the emergency 
law, as any laws that give excessive weight to the interests of one of the parties to the problem, could only 
be accepted temporarily, while the right way to tackle the issue was studied). 
 
495 See ―La ley electoral de alquileres. Agitación pública‖, El Diario, September, 23, 1921, at 1. 
 
496 See ―La ley electoral de alquileres. Reunión esta tarde…‖, El Diario, September, 24, at 1 (arguing that the 
Corporación de Propietarios y Subarrendadores was a ―special guild‖ which had nothing to do with the ―true‖ 
owners) . 
 
497 Id. (arguing that there were ―plenty of tenants‖ who thought their rents to be acceptable and that in 
many cases the raises had been modest and acceptable). 
 





reduction of his profits‖.500 But wait a minute. The emergency law did make landlords 
poorer, didn‘t it? After all, not only did it suspend evictions, but it also cut off rent prices 
down to the level they had in January 1920, some 20 months before its passing. That‘s 
true. But one should not lose sight of one important element: the actual value of money. 
While 1920 showed a level of inflation of 17,1 percent,501 the two subsequent years were 
clearly deflationary. In 1921 the general level of prices fell by a 11,1 percent, while in 
1922 it did so at a rate of 15,8 percent.502 Thus, rent prices agreed upon in late 1919 or 
early 1920 may well have retained their prior purchasing power,503 as the Court had 
suggested in Ercolano.504  
In any case, the idea that deprivations of gains are permissible, while inflictions of 
actual losses are more problematic is present in Ferreyra‘s testimony505 and, I will hold 
                                                 
500 See ―La pregunta del día: ¿Debe o no ser prorrogada la ley de alquileres?‖, Crítica, August, 29, 1925, at 6. 
The italics are mine. 
 




503 See Roberto Cortés Conde, above n. 396, at 72 (arguing that, ―at the beginning of the 1920s, although 
the peso devalued against other foreign currencies, its purchasing power in terms of goods did not 
diminish in equal measure, because since the postwar period, prices of manufactured goods and especially 
those of foodstuff had decreased‖). One could certainly argue that the emergency law itself, with its 
compulsory reduction of rent prices, had an impact on the deflationary statistics used in the main text. 
While this is true, it is hard to argue that the whole gap between the inflation in 1920 and the deflation in 
1921 and 1922 was brought about by a reduction in rent prices. 
 
504 136 Fallos 161 (1922), (majority opinion, ¶12) (arguing that ―it had not been proved […] that the rent 
payable in January 1920 […] was not reasonable at the time of enactment of the law‖). 
 
505 Of course, the testimony‘s reference to the owners not becoming ―less rich‖ fits uneasily with the idea 
that deprivations of gains are impermissible, because they lead people to be less rich than they could otherwise 
be. But the testimony may also be read in a different fashion: as pointing out that the measures were 
permissible because they did not make the owners less rich than they already were. This reading, which seems 




later, is a central and more-or-less stable part of the popular conception of constitutional 
property, one that has survived the mood swings of the twentieth century.506 
It is clear, then, that the old vision, embedded in the Civil Code‘s rhetoric, of 
property as an almost absolute right whose occasional abusive exercises were to be 
tolerated as the price to avoid the dangers of an overzealous regulatory state,507 had fallen 
out of favor, if it ever existed in such an extreme form at all. But it was also clear that, 
while state interventionism was on the rise,508 the people were not quite ready to accept 
unbounded governmental authority over private property. It had become apparent that 
the idea of economic emergency was a powerful tool for realizing potentially unjustified 
transfers of wealth, transfers that might be way beyond any rationales supporting the 
need for governmental action in the first place.  
Recent empirical research shows that ―ordinary adults are acutely sensitive to the 
moral dimensions of breach of contract, especially the perceived intention of the 
breaching party‖.509 The risk of abuses was perceived clearly, and it is illustrated quite 
nicely with examples from both sides of the emergency rent law divide. 
                                                 
506 It is also unsurprising, given that people seem to have a different psychological perception of losses vis-
à-vis gains. I will use this evidence in the second part of the dissertation to try to explain the Supreme 
Court‘s otherwise hardly explainable caselaw. 
 
507 Vélez Sársfield, the author of the 1869 Civil Code, wrote that while the laws did not approve of the 
abusive exercises of property rights, they were ―the unavoidable consequence of the absolute right of 
property […] we must recognize that to be the absolute property, confers the right to destroy the thing. 
Any preventive restrictions would pose more dangers than the advantages it might offer. If the government were to be the 
judge of the abuses of property, said a philosopher, it would soon become the judge of the uses, and any 
true idea of property and liberty would be lost‖, note to article 2513, Civil Code. The italics are mine. 
 
508 See, e.g.., ¨Hay que votar la prórroga…‖, Crítica, September, 1, 1925, at 4 (transcribing a project for a 
municipal ordinance, filed by the Communist Party, according to which the State would set maximum rent 
prices and individuals who owned houses in which the number of rooms was higher than the number of 
persons who inhabited the house would be forced to rent such extra rooms at the State-fixed prices).  See 
also ―La ley de alquileres‖, El Pueblo, August, 26, at 3 (arguing that the ―real price‖ of houses had to be 
―secured in the law‖, thus preserving it from the ―speculative capìtal‖). 
 
509 See, e.g., John Mikhail, ―Moral Grammar and Human Rights: Some Reflections on Cognitive Science 
and Enlightenment Rationalism‖, in Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks & Andrew Woods (editors), 
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford University Press, 
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La Prensa argued in 1925 that there was no true ―claim for protection anymore‖ 
and that the extension of the emergency law was nothing but ―the greedy desire of the 
privileged‖, a group that was becoming smaller by the day, as the natural rotation of 
tenants plus the incentives for owners —created by the emergency regulation— to get 
the restitution of their houses by any legal means suggested.510 The informal polls carried 
out by Crítica show how the intention to take advantage of the law, well beyond its 
purported rationale, was present in many tenants.511 And Caras y Caretas‘ cartoons on the 
topic point in the same direction.512 
Thus, the new, softened but still-appreciated, conception of property opened the 
door cautiously to regulation that was essentially temporary and that did not affect the 
object of property —or the capital— in itself, but allowed for a reduction on property‘s 
profit-making potential. In truly dire situations, patience and a diminution of profits 
could be demanded from owners. But they could not be subject to inflictions of actual 
losses, considered against a baseline consisting of what they previously had. 
Two questions pop up at this point. First, what were the main redistributive 
effects of the housing crisis and the emergency law? Second, what were the effects of the 
jurisprudential turn towards a broad conception of the regulatory powers of the State in 
the people‘s view of the Court? Let us see.  
                                                                                                                                            
forthcoming 2012) (draft available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924915; last 
visited November, 7, 2011). 
  
510 ―La prórroga de los alquileres‖, La Prensa, August, 28, at 9. 
 
511 See above n. 423. 
 
512 See Redondo, above n. 420, at 15 (depicting a tenant with two multi-storey buildings under his arms).   
 
 168 
Some commentators have argued that the lack of the most elemental economic 
analysis in the Ercolano decision made the whole plan backfire,513 generating one of the 
well-known ―paradoxes of the regulatory state‖.514 Some evidence points in that 
direction. Right after the enactment of the emergency laws many building projects were 
halted515 and, as a consequence, the demand for masons‘ work declined noticeably.516 The 
potentially paradoxical effects of the regulation were anticipated by people in the building 
industry: the most prejudiced by the law would not be the owners, but the ―tenants of 
limited economic resources; the workers, who will not find it so easy to command 
today‘s high wages‖, among others.517 And in 1925, after successive extensions of the 
emergency regime, rent prices had not decreased, despite the fact that large numbers of 
homes were unrented and vacant.518 In La Fronda‘s view whatever benefits the law was 
                                                 
513 See Eduardo Stordeur (Jr.), ―Eficiencia, Poder de Policía y Decisiones de la Corte Suprema de Justicia 
de la Nación‖, in Martin Krause (editor), ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO DEL DERECHO: APLICACIÓN 
A FALLOS JUDICIALES 115-189 (Buenos Aires, Editorial La Ley, 2006) (arguing that the Court, by 
upholding the capped rent prices below the market prices, could only achieve the opposite effect to the 
one pursued by the legislation, that is, increasing the supply and lowering the prices). Contra Stordeur (Jr.) 
one could argue that the law did not aim at lowering the prices by increasing the supply. It did so by 
legislative fiat. Whether that‘s a feasible, effective, means, is a different question. 
 
514 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, ―Paradoxes of the Regulatory State‖, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 407, 422 (1990) 
(defining ―paradoxes of the regulatory state‖ as self-defeating regulatory strategies and highlighting rent 
control laws as usual examples of such paradoxes). 
 
515 See, e.g., ―Primeros efectos de la ley de alquileres‖, El Diario, September, 17, 1921, at 1(reporting that a 
building company, Compañía Sud América de Edificación, had resolved to stop a project involving the building 
of 22 ―high‖ and ―low‖ houses, and that one important entrepreneur in the building business thought the 
emergency law to be equivalent to an order to stop building); ―La ley electoral de alquileres. Sus funestas 
consecuencias…‖, El Diario, October, 17, 1921, at 3 (reporting the withdrawal of a large number of 
building permit requests, as reported by architects, owners, and builders, and the indefinite suspension of 
the building of a whole block of two-and-three-storey houses by the Compañía Edificadora de Buenos Aires). 
 
516 See ―La edificación y la ley ‗electoral‘ de alquileres. Constatando hechos‖, El Diario, October, 26, 1921, 
at 1 (reporting the increasing number of masons roaming near building sites and offering their work). 
 
517 See ―La nueva ley de alquileres. Sus efectos prácticos…‖, El Diario, November, 5, 1921, at 3 
(interviewing Rodolfo Peracca, a real estate developer). 
 
518 See, e.g., ―¡Hay que votar la prórroga!‖, Crítica, August, 28, 1925, at 5 (arguing that in spite of the large 
number of unrented houses in the market, the rent prices did not fall);  ―Hay que votar la prórroga‖, 
 169 
expected to bring about, in fact they had been ―only minimal and uncommon‖, and it 
could not have been otherwise.519  
So couldn‘t one just be content with the predictable fact that the emergency 
regime had not achieved its objectives of protecting the weak and poor? There could be 
more to the facts than meets the eye. What began as a measure to attack an undeniable 
problem, turned into a golden cage, which was ever harder to leave. The longer the 
regime was in force, the less incentives to build new houses and expand the supply there 
were. So prices were unsurprisingly high. But, as owners eventually managed to recover 
their property, less and less people were benefitting from the law. Were these ever fewer 
beneficiaries in need of the State‘s protection? It is far from clear.  
Real wages increased continually from 1918 until 1928.520 Taxes on property also 
saw significant rises.521 Many small owners who had borrowed money using the rental 
housing units as collateral faced difficulties to make the payments, once the emergency 
                                                                                                                                            
Crítica, September, 1, 1925, at 4 (interviewing a communist party member who emphasizes that there are 
many vacant homes and that the prices were ―very high‖). 
 
519 ―El problema de la vivienda‖, La Fronda, April, 29, 1922, at 1. 
 
520 See Roberto Cortés Conde above n. 396, at 73-74 (showing index figures and explaining that ―there was 
a significant increase in real wages in Argentina in the 1920s‖, due both to wages increasing more than the 
cost of living between 1918-1920 and the cost of living decreasing from 1920 on). See also ―La prórroga de 
los alquileres‖, La Prensa, August, 28, 1925, at 9 (arguing that Congress had raised public employees‘ 
salaries, and that the general level of salaries had risen as a consequence of the appreciation of the national 
currency). 
 
521 See, e.g., ―Hay que votar la prórroga‖, Crítica, August, 27, 1925, at 2 (criticizing the Court‘s ruling in 
Mango because of its assumption that normalcy had returned and that rent prices were to fall and arguing, 
instead, that the ruling almost announces new rises, based upon the new taxes on property); ―La prórroga 
de los alquileres‖, La Prensa, August, 28, 1925, at 9 (arguing that owners were subject to increased taxes); 
―La ley ‗electoral‘ de alquileres […] La renta de la propiedad y las hipotecas‖, El Diario, October, 8, 1922, at 
11 (informing that municipal taxes on real property had increased by 70 percent that year and that the 
national services of sewage and water supply —also due by virtue of owning real property— had seen rises 
of between 45 and 60 percent); ―La ley ‗electoral‘ de alquileres […] Algunos datos interesantes‖, El Diario, 




law had cut down their profitability.522 Under the light of such evidence, it is possible that 
by 1925 the emergency regime was redistributing wealth from owners under increasing 
fiscal pressure to tenants with a favorable economic situation, without attacking the 
causes of the housing shortage problem. The use of the economic emergency doctrine as 
a cloak for distributive struggles was ready to take off, as the ―legal violence exerted over 
[…] owners‖ became ―irritating‖ and ―institutionally harmful‖.523 
However, for all the lack of economic soundness in the emergency scheme, an 
apologist of the Court could well invoke the institutional division of labor to argue that it 
was not for the Court to see that the emergency law was economically-sound, and that 
such a task fell squarely on Congress. Whatever the merits of this argument, the Court 
would prominently fail in enforcing legal, not economic, rules. Specifically, its own rules 
announced in Mango, and supported by the majority of the population: restrictions on 
property were to be temporary and could not linger on forever. Different emergency 
regimes would come to regulate leases, of both urban and rural properties, for some forty 
years more.524 Emergency regimes of different sorts would be enacted to deal with new 
exigencies. Thus, the Court would depart slowly and somewhat surreptitiously from the 
core, more stable, aspects of the popular understanding of constitutional property. This 
would later have an impact on the erosion of its sociological legitimacy. But let us not 
fast-forward. First, we need to analyze 1930‘s mortgage crisis, an important step for the 
Court and the anteroom for the advent of the ―social function‖ of property, through the 
                                                 
522 See ―La ley ‗electoral‘ de alquileres […] Algunos datos interesantes‖, El Diario, October, 18, 1921, at 1 
(explaining the situation of small owners who had taken loans on the houses on the basis of a profitability 
some 30 percent higher than the one set by the emergency law). 
 
523 See  ―La prórroga de los alquileres‖, La Prensa, August, 28, 1925, at 9. 
 
524 See, e.g., 264 Fallos 344, 348 (1966), (Boffi Boggero, J., dissenting, §11 and §13) (summarizing the 
emergency regime for leases of both urban and rural property since 1943 and emphasizing that it had lasted 
for more than 22 years). 
 
 171 
Peronist Constitution of 1949. A few words about the world context are in order to 
better understand Argentina‘s mortgage crisis. 
The 1930s saw the world immersed in the most profound and long-lasting 
recession of modern times. While there are disputes as to what the causes of the Great 
Depression were,525 and as to when and where it began,526 its effects in the U.S. and in 
many countries of the world were heavily felt throughout the 1930s. The Great 
Depression is an extremely complex historic event, which can be divided in different 
phases for each country, with a multiplicity of causes at play in each of them. It is beyond 
the scope of this work to explore such a vast field of economic history. For my present 
purposes it will be enough to provide a brief description of the situation in the U.S. and 
to draw some parallelisms with Argentina.527  
Despite the scholarly debate, it is now believed that the stock-market crash 
cannot be blamed exclusively for the depression.528 Still, the crash of 1929 severely 
affected the value of assets generally, as demand for them plummeted.529 By the summer 
of 1931, the United States was in the grip of a severe recession. When in 1931 the 
Germans and the British went out of the gold standard, investors figured that the dollar 
                                                 
525 See, generally., Peter Temin, ―The Great Depression‖, NBER Historical Working Paper No. 62 (1994) 
(available at http://www.nber.org/papers/h0062.pdf; last visited 12/18/2013) (discussing several different 
factors as causes of the Great Depression in the United States). 
 
526 See also Roberto Cortés Conde above n. 396, at 78 (―There is no real consensus regarding when and 
where the financial crisis began. For some, it is the moment when the New York Stock Exchange crashed 
[...] Others point to the bankruptcy of Credit Anstaldt in Austria [...] According to Sauvy, the crisis began 
in France, yet Kindleberger asserts the origin of the crisis can be found in the agricultural depression of the 
mid-1920s‖). 
 
527 I base my extremely compressed account of the Great Depression in the United States in Peter Temin‘s 
work. See, generally, Peter Temin, above n. 525. 
 
528 See Id., at 6 (―Time has not been kind to the school of thought that blames the Depression on the 
stock-market crash‖). 
 
529 Id., at 14. 
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would be devaluated shortly and rushed to sell them. The Federal Reserve reacted rising 
interest rates sharply, which further restricted credit and consumption. According to 
Peter Temin, the Federal Reserve‘s commitment to preserving the value of the dollar —
and the gold standard— at any rate played a decisive role in turning the already grave 
recession into the Great Depression.530 Contractionary monetary policy fueled depression 
and hindered recovery. The rest of the decade saw partial recoveries and renewed 
downfalls, until the trend seemed to stabilize in a positive direction by the time the 
World War II unleashed.531  
Gerardo Della Paolera and Alan Taylor have examined Argentina‘s performance 
during the Great Depression very carefully. In their view, there are some remarkable 
differences when compared to the United States: 
―The Great Depression began in Argentina in the late 1920s, even before the 
traditional date for the onset of the Depression in the core, the Wall Street crash 
of 1929. Like many countries of the periphery, Argentina was exposed to the 
commodity lottery [...] this exposure led to macroeconomic fortunes collapsing as 
the terms of trade worsened through the 1920s. By December 1929, the balance 
of payments crisis was severe, and the exchange rate was allowed to float [...] 
Recovery began in 1931, as output grew for the first time in several years, and by 
1934-35, output had regained its 1929 level [...] From 1929 to 1932, Argentina 
imported the severe deflationary pressures in the international economy. 
However, it is astonishing is that the Argentine Great Depression was so mild 
and short-lived by international standards‖532 
 
According to these scholars, the key to Argentina‘s relative success in dodging the 
worst effects of the Great Depression was the decision to part ways with the United 
                                                 
530 Id., at 17. 
 
531 Id., at 20-45. 
 
532 Gerardo Della Paolera & Alan M. Taylor, ―Steering through the Great Depression: Institutions, 
Expectations, and the Change of Macroeconomic Regime‖, in Gerardo Della Paolera & Alan M. Taylor 
(editors), STRAINING AT THE ANCHOR: THE ARGENTINE CURRENCY BOARD AND THE 
SEARCH FOR MACROECONOMIC STABILITY, 1880-1935 188-190 (Chicago, The University of 
Chicago Press, 2001). 
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States and other core countries and leave the monetary orthodoxy behind —at least, 
partially. Argentina abandoned the gold standard early on, and this helped protect the 
country from deflationary pressures. The destruction of deflationary expectations, 
through the permanent lowering of previously high real interest rates, was the recipe to 
overcome the crisis.533 This is something that must be born in mind when assessing the 
caselaw on the 1930‘s economic emergency measures. We can move now to 
reconstructing constitutional property conceptions in this era.  
Property ownership was fairly extended in the Argentina of the 1920s and 1930s. 
Many owners had resorted to credit, using their real estate property of collateral for the 
loans. Some loans were destined to different productive activities, mainly agricultural. 
When the world crisis hit the country, many debtors could not afford their debt 
payments anymore, and an ever-increasing number of foreclosures took place. Congress 
enacted temporary suspensions of the foreclosures procedures, and debated more 
substantial measures to tackle the problem of the owners who were at risk of losing their 
property. The situation, in many respects, was similar to the one that gave rise to the 
Minnesota moratorium law that prompted the Blaisdell decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
Once again, property rights were in the center of public debate. This time, 
however, they were on both sides of the dispute. While in the 1920‘s housing crisis 
property rights were claimed only by landlords, this time the issue was further 
complicated by the fact that not only creditors had property rights at stake (the right to 
be paid in accordance to the contractual agreement) but, in a different but yet equally 
direct way, the property of many arguably innocent debtors was at stake. There was also 
the risk of a collective action problem, where generalized foreclosures could lead to a 
                                                 
533 Id., at 189. Notice that Della Paolera‘s and Taylor‘s position is consistent with the theoretical bases of 
Temin‘s account of the Great Depression in the United States. 
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(further) dramatic fall in the prices of houses and the ensuing loss of property for both 
creditors and debtors. Congress would ultimately decide, against strong opposition from 
the Executive Branch, to enact Law #11,741, establishing —among other measures— a 
three-year moratorium on mortgage-backed loans, with a reduction of interests to a 
maximum rate of 6% annually.534 It also passed a similar special regime for debtors of the 
Banco Hipotecario (the Mortgages‘ Bank), a state-owned credit institution, which reduced 
the financial cost of the debt from 8 to 6% per year. 
It is interesting to analyze the public debate around these laws, in order to 
appreciate how the concept of property, as well as the very idea of what justified state 
intervention was changing, in tune with developments in the U.S. Interventionism was, 
first, no longer limited to emergency reasons. The discourse shows that it had arrived to 
stay.535 Second, it was not circumscribed to the alleged the protection of the weak and 
vulnerable. It could be used openly for the protection of certain owners.536 Still, both 
sides of the debate claimed to be arguing for measures respectful of property rights and 
the Constitution. Let us see how this conception of property took shape. 
It was a fairly widespread idea that owners who were facing trouble in paying 
their debts were suffering from a very special economic context. The economy made 
most of them unable to pay in a timely manner.537 Thus, it was not to be expected that 
                                                 
534 See Law #11,741 (available at 
http://www.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do;jsessionid=020DBFDD0ED55117C9DF11CA5
D39A80B?id=42965; last visited 04/01/2013). 
 
535 See, e.g., ―La Cámara de Senadores inició la consideración de los despachos sobre moratoria 
hipotecaria‖, La Fronda, September, 13, at 3 (quoting Sánchez Sorondo, hinting that the crisis was the basis 
for a ―new world order, created upon the ruins of the liberal world economy‖). 
 
536 Id. (quoting Sánchez Sorondo, admitting that the ―defended‖ rural property owners as well as rural 
workers). 
 
537 See exposition of Minister Federico Pinedo before the Senate, arguing that the Senate‘s bill aimed at the 
―laudable goals‖ of bringing relief to argentine producer and ending the situation of injustice that, ―due to 
nobody‘s willingness‖, is done to one part of the population in ―La Cámara de Senadores inició la 
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official credit institutions did not contribute to the relief of the existing situation and to 
the better development of the ―industrious peoples of the country, who were hampered 
in fulfilling their commitments‖.538 The reduction of interests for the debtors of the Banco 
Hipotecario, the same newspaper argued, would ―be received with delight by the millions of 
owners who have operated with the institution‖.539  
Senator Sánchez Sorondo was one of the firmest supporters of the moratorium 
regime that was eventually enacted. He argued that it was ―necessary to tackle the issue 
thoroughly, [and] issue emergency laws, regardless of what has been agreed [upon by the 
parties] and what has been legislated before‖ and posed the question in the following, 
dilemmatic, terms: ―either we keep the legal structure and perish, or we reform it and try 
to save ourselves‖.540 In view, the crisis was so deep and pervasive that it was a true 
public calamity for which ―the remedy is not to be found within the existing legal order; 
it is not to be found in the fulfillment of obligations; it is not to be found in the respect 
of contracts‖, all of which was nothing but ―legal scruples‖.541 As far as the substance of 
the measures is concerned, he argued that the ―happy capitalist‖ was the only one who 
wouldn‘t have suffered losses in a crisis that imposed large losses among the 
                                                                                                                                            
consideración de los despachos sobre moratoria‖, La Fronda, September, 13, 1933 at 3 (quoting then 
Minister of Finance Federico Pinedo). See also ―Una ley oportuna‖, La Fronda, September, 26, at 1 (arguing 
that the crisis had put many debtors in the impossibility to repay their mortgages), 
 
538 ―Se disminuirá la tasa hipotecaria‖, Crítica, September, 16, 1933, at 11 (praising the bill proposed by the 
Executive branch). 
 
539 Id. The italics are mine. 
 
540 See, e.g., ―Resolvió ayer el Senado postergar hasta el martes la consideración del proyecto sobre 
moratoria hipotecaria‖, El Mundo, September, 6, at 19 (quoting Senator Sánchez Sorondo). 
 
541 See, e.g., ―La Cámara de Senadores inició la consideración de los despachos sobre moratoria 
hipotecaria‖, La Fronda, September, 13, at 3 (quoting Sánchez Sorondo); see also ―Comenzó a considerar 
proyectos de moratoria hipotecaria‖, La Vanguardia, September, 13, 1933, at 1 (same). 
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population.542 Still, Sánchez Sorondo claimed not to be against property rights of the 
creditors. He wondered what was the sacrifice that the law demanded from them, when 
the bills he had introduced only aimed at allowing the debtor to keep on working so that 
in time he would be able to pay back his debts, while providing no debt forgiveness at 
all.543 He insisted that the legislation imposed no losses on creditors and that it ―only 
asked from them that they cease to collect the difference between the 3 percent interest 
rate which the bill would impose upon them and the 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 percent they would 
have collected from their debtors‖.544  
Notice that Sánchez Sorondo was appealing to the conception of constitutional 
property that had been gaining ground from the 1920s: impermissible violations did not 
occurred if capital losses were not imposed; profits could be reduced under exceptional 
circumstances. This appeal to an increasingly accepted notion of what was the core of the 
protection of private property under the Constitution may account for the relative lack of 
harsh criticism of the law.  
In an interesting shift from its positions in the previous decade, the newspaper 
Crítica did attack Sánchez Sorondo, calling his position ―nihilistic demagoguery‖ and 
accusing him of almost proposing ―the abolition of private property‖,545 and El Mundo 
reported that the bill had been ―consistently opposed by the most diverse sectors of 
opinion‖ while expressing the view that the Executive‘s opposition to the bill was ―well 
                                                 
542 See ―Expresó en el Senado su disconformidad con la moratoria hipotecaria el Ministro de Hacienda‖, El 
Mundo, September, 13, at 10 (quoting Sánchez Sorondo). 
 
543 See, e.g., ―La Cámara de Senadores inició la consideración de los despachos sobre moratoria 
hipotecaria‖, La Fronda, September, 13, at 3 (quoting Sánchez Sorondo). 
 
544 Id., at 3-6 (quoting Sánchez Sorondo). 
 
545 See ―Se disminuirá la tasa hipotecaria‖, Crítica, September, 16, at 11. 
 
 177 
justified‖.546 La Nación, contrarily, supported the measures,547 as did La Fronda. This 
smaller newspaper thought the ―shaken law‖ to be constitutional, due to its ―emergency 
nature‖ and the ―fundamental interests, bordering in a social problem, that […] have 
been protected fairly through the measures‖.548 
What does all this hint at? It is not easy to say conclusively, but it seems clear that 
the idea of interventionism under the cloak of economic emergency rhetoric had been 
acquired by powerful sectors to use it in their favor.549 Minister Pinedo argued as much in 
the Senate, accusing Senator Sánchez Sorondo of defending the interests of the 
privileged few. In the Minister‘s words,  
―There is a certain quality of debtors who do not pay and who claim the need to 
enact the moratorium. These are the largest borrowers, i.e. those who have received 
the most credit […] What Mr. Senator wants is to save the small, privileged class […] 
before Mr. Senator wanted measures to be taken against the leftist demagogues 
because their preaching could alter the constitutional order, now he advocates for 
the breaking of the legal order because that‘s what men who lead the right 
want‖.550 
  
                                                 
546 See ―La moratoria hipotecaria y el Poder Ejecutivo‖, El Mundo, September, 17, at 4. 
 
547 Admittedly, La Nación acknowledged the difficult and controversial character of the constitutional issue 
at stake. In its view, the very essence of the Constitution was being debated. Whether it should be 
interpreted as a rigid, unchanging text, or as a flexible instrument that can accommodate new 
circumstances, was at the heart of the moratorium litigation. Still, the newspaper argued that as ―progress 
stresses the economic character of the social relations‖, the importance of determining the limits of the 
state‘s power to intervene and regulate freely agreed contracts was increasingly important. La Nación 
supported a dynamic approach to constitutional interpretation by citing the example of the U.S. caselaw 
and citing an unnamed author who argued for the same interpretive approach. See ―Natural expectativa‖, 
La Nación, December, 5, 1934, at 6. Moreover, when the Court handed down the Avico decision, La Nación 
argued that Justice Repetto‘s dissent would ―keep encouraging those who always thought there was an 
inadmissible encroachment [of constitutional rights] in the rule that reduced contractual interest [rates][…] 
the debate should be considered over, in spite of the sacrifice of individual interests‖. See ―La moratoria 
hipotecaria‖, La Nación, December, 8, 1934, at 6. 
 
548 See ―La moratoria hipotecaria ante la justicia‖, La Fronda, April, 12, 1934, at 1. 
 
549 See Jonathan M. Miller, above n. 75, at 144 (holding that from the 1930s on, ―[T]he Argentine Supreme 
Court supported essentially all the changes favored by the economic elite‖). 
 
550 ―Comenzó a considerar proyectos de moratoria hipotecaria‖, La Vanguardia, September, 13, 1933, at 1 
(quoting Pinedo). The italics are mine.  
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Whether Pinedo was right or not, I cannot say. It is suggestive, though, that La 
Fronda, a newspaper of profoundly conservative origins,551 and La Nación, in its new, pro-
intervention, phase, supported the measures. But beyond the issue of who were the 
beneficiaries of the emergency regime, one can point out two things. First, the new, 
softened, yet still meaningful conception of property had consolidated. Second, there was 
more to the new attitude towards State‘s regulation of economic affairs than just the 
emergency discourse: the welfare state was on the rise in Argentina, as was in the rest of 
the world, and emergency circumstances slowly meshed with structural, permanent 
situations.552 
It may well be that property had been ―downsized‖, constitutionally speaking, not 
because the people had abandoned the original principles supported by Alberdi‘s ideas, 
but because they were faithful to his most basic ideas on the topic. Remember that 
Alberdi was a strong supporter of property rights and freedom of contract. But his 
commitment to both ideas relied on a belief in property‘s fundamental role as the engine 
of progress. Alberdi wrote a constitutional draft that granted strong protection to private 
property, most likely, for instrumental reasons. The people of the 1930s had lost their 
faith in the ―invisible hand‖ that had seduced Alberdi so much and, in tune with the rest 
of the world, were starting to believe that state interventionism could improve upon 
                                                 
551 See, e.g., José Luis Carnagui, ―La ley de represión de las actividades comunistas de 1936: miradas y 
discursos sobre un mismo actor‖, Revista Escuela de Historia (2007) (available at: 
http://www.unsa.edu.ar/histocat/revista/revista0608.htm; last visited 01/23/2012). 
 
552 See, e.g., 171 Fallos 349, 360 (1934) (adopting a broad conception of the police power beyond 
emergency situations, by arguing that the promotion of the general convenience and welfare was a 
legitimate exercise of the police power and that the legitimate extension of the regulation in any given case 
would depend on the importance of the interests and public principles to be protected). See also Jonathan 
M. Miller, above n. 75, at 146 (holding that ―when Avico is read alongside a case decided several weeks 
earlier that upheld accounting and reporting requirements imposed on the meat packing industry, it does 





laissez-faire economics. It would still be some time until the dangers of state intervention 
began to be more evident to the masses. Therefore, the interpretive turn regarding 
constitutional property may have represented a deeper continuity with Alberdi‘s thought, 
despite the apparent opposition of new and old ideas. Argentina‘s mild departure from 
strong property rights may well have been due to an underlying foundational 
commitment to the idea of doing whatever it was needed to foster economic 
development. Given that state interventionism was on the rise, and that many people 
believed that, if properly used, interventionism could be an instrument for prosperity, a 
relativization of individual rights —especially property rights— began to seem natural 
even for those who strongly cared for economic development. These ideas seem to have 
enjoyed increasing support, for different reasons, among both the lower and upper 
classes. Still, private property was not repudiated —it wouldn‘t be repudiated by the 
more populist Peronist movement either—, but only adapted to new dominant economic 
and political ideas. 
In the judicial front, opinions were divided. Based upon the restrictive attitude 
towards the emergency powers taken by the Supreme Court in Horta and, especially, 
Mango, some lower courts ruled the moratorium unconstitutional.553 But the Court, with 
one partial dissent, upheld the law as a valid exercise of emergency powers. To support 
its conclusions, it drew heavily upon the then-recent decision of its U.S. counterpart in 
the Home & Loan Building Ass’n v. Blaisdell,554 quoting at length paragraphs of Chief Justice 
                                                 
553 See, e.g., ―La moratoria hipotecaria ante la justicia‖, La Fronda, April, 12, 1934, at 1 (reporting the 
uncertain constitutional status of the emergency law, as courts were divided on the issue); ―Declara 
inconstitucional la moratoria un fallo de la Cámara Civil Primera‖, El Pueblo, April, 12, 1934, at 1, 11 
(reporting a decision by one of the Chambers of Appeals in civil matters, striking down the moratorium); 
―Por ser retroactiva y afectar los derechos de propiedad ha sido declarada inconstitucional la ley de 
moratoria por la C.C. 1a.‖, El Mundo, April, 12, at 34 (reporting the same decision and stating that the 
Second Chamber had previously handed down a similar ruling) 
 
554 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
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Hughes‘ majority opinion, and taking the distinction between obligation and remedy 
from the U.S. Supreme Court case law: 
―The distinction between the obligation of a contract and the remedy given by 
the legislature to enforce that obligation has been taken at the bar, and exists in 
the nature of things. Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy 
may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct […] The 
obligations of a contract are impaired by a law which renders them invalid, or 
releases or extinguishes them [internal citations omitted] and impairment, as 
above noted, has been predicated of laws which, without destroying contracts, 
derogate from substantial contractual rights […]‖555 
 
The justices equated the case of the moratorium to that of the rent laws upheld in 
Ercolano: 
―Undoubtedly, the 11,741 law that reduces the interest and extends the deadline 
for payment of the loan to the mortgagor, is, from the constitutional point of 
view, identical to the 11,157 law that reduced the rent of houses and extended the 
term of their occupation in favor of tenants‖556 
 
Still, the Court felt obliged to argue that although interests had been reduced, 
there was really no loss to the creditor, due to the valorization of the currency and the 
generalized deflation:557 
―This economic disaster is so deep and it has so abruptly changed the value of all 
property and agricultural products and livestock, and consequently the price of 
the lease of fields and houses, that if Congress had not been resolved to establish 
the moratorium and especially the lowering of mortgage interest, mortgage 
lenders would have received during these years their capital in a currency 
                                                 
555 290 U.S. 398, 430-431 (1934), translated and transcribed in Avico v. De la Pesa, 172 Fallos 21 (1934), §8, 
majority opinion. The distinction also played a central role in the partial dissent of Justice Repetto (see 
Repetto, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, §5). For a discussion of the reluctance of some of the 
justices in the Blaisdell majority to embrace giving the distinction an important role in the opinion, see John 
A. Fliter & Derek S. Hoff, above n. 75, at 135-138 (discussing Justices Cardozo and Stone‘s lack of support 
for the distinction and their opposition to Chief Justice Hughes‘ initial draft on the ground that it gave too 
much weight to an artificial doctrinal distinction). 
  
556 172 Fallos 21 (1934), §9, majority opinion. 
 
557 For an argument explaining the U.S. Supreme Court Gold Clause Cases in terms of the impact that 
deflation would have had in the purchasing power to be received by creditors, see Kenneth W. Dam, 
―From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of American Monetary Law‖, 50 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 504, 520-525 (1983). 
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extremely valued due to the emergency, and would have acquired a much higher 
purchase power than what was lent. And the same would happen with interests, 
because a 6% rate represents effectively, given the fall in the prices of the 
products and properties in the country, a 9, 10% or more percent‖558 
 
The decision was received with cautious approval or neutrally. No signs of harsh 
rejection are found in the press of the time. Crítica reported the decision in the front 
page, elaborating on the details of the litigation and the previous decisions of the lower 
courts, all with a neutral tone.559 El Mundo followed a similar trend.560 La Fronda, in turn, 
approved of the decision, emphasizing that the regime established only a temporary 
restriction.561 La Vanguardia, a the newspaper of the socialist party, also applauded the 
decision for having embraced ―novel principles‖, abandoning its prior attitude of 
adjusting to ―the principles of the cold, rigid and immutable law, without addressing the 
needs dictated by a reality that is produced each day‖.562 In short, La Vanguardia was 
praising the Court for embracing a ―dynamic‖ interpretative attitude or, in other words, a 
model of ―responsive adjudication‖.  It is far from clear that such a model would end up 
advancing the cause of progressive reform. But we will analyze that topic later. 
                                                 
558 172 Fallos 21 (1934), §12. See also Gerardo Della Paolera & Alan M. Taylor, above n. 531, at 211 (―Real 
interest rates were high in 1929-31, at about 10 percent. Although nominal rates were much lower [...] ex 
post deflation and ex ante expected deflation contributed to high real rates.  [...} The turning point was the 
start of rediscounts. Absent this action by the Conversion Office the real interest rate would have risen 
dramatically to between 20 and 30 percent in the years 1931-34, largely as a result of worsening deflation 
and persistence in the forecasting equation‖). 
 
559 See ―La Corte declaró constitucional la ley de moratoria hipotecaria‖, Crítica, December, 7, 1934, at 1, 6. 
 
560 See ―Sobre la constitucionalidad de toda la ley de moratoria hipotecaria falló la C.S.‖, El Mundo, 
December, 8, at 6. 
 
561 See ―Constitucionalidad de una ley‖, La Fronda, December, 8, at 1. 
 
562 See ―Moratoria hipotecaria. El fallo de la Corte‖, La Vanguardia, December, 10, at 1. 
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For the time being, suffice it to say that Avico, as predicted by the dissenters in 
the U.S. Supreme Court case Blaisdell,563 would pave the way for the arrival of a much 
more intrusive regulatory state, beyond the allegedly narrow confines of the emergency 
doctrine. Avico would bridge the gap between Ercolano and our own ―New Deal‖: 
Peronism and the ―social function of property‖.  
 
b. Our Own “New Deal”: Peronism, Constitutional Reform, and the Social 
Function of Property. 
With the advent of Juan Domingo Perón to the presidency, a new era for Argentine 
politics dawned. A certain brand of populism,564 coupled with an increasing instability of 
property rights took over the political scene. Peronism was —and still is— a very 
complex political phenomenon and, accordingly, several theses have been advanced 
regarding the reasons why Juan Domingo Perón could rise to absolute prominence and 
end up dominating Argentine politics, directly or in absentia, for decades to come.  
 Lee Alston and Andrés Gallo provide a good summary of the main causes of his 
political ascent:  
―[...] it was the confluence of the Great Depression, a military coup, electoral 
fraud, and the countenance of electoral fraud by the Supreme Court and the 
Executive which paved the way for the populist policies and institutional reforms 
of Juan Perón‖565 
 
 The 1912 Electoral Law (the so-called ―Sáenz Peña‖ Law) greatly enlarged the 
                                                 
563 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934) (Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, JJ., dissenting). 
 
564 See Joel Horowitz, ―Industrialists and the Rise of Perón, 1943-1946: Some Implications for the 
Conceptualization of Populism‖, 47 The Americas 199, 213 (1990) (stating that ―many commentators see 
Peronism as an archetypical example of populism‖). 
 
565 Lee J. Alston & Andrés A. Gallo, ―Electoral fraud, the rise of Peron and demise of checks and balances 
in Argentina‖, 47 Explor. Econ. Hist. 179, 180 (2010). 
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franchise, and it was followed by intense, mainly middle-class, social mobilization. The 
lower classes, while formally enfranchised, were largely ineffective in the political arena. 
The Radical Party embodied the new political winds, and ruled the country between 1916 
and 1930, when Radical caudillo Hipólito Yrigoyen was ousted from power by a putsch 
led by General Uriburu, a conservative military man of fascist inclinations. It is generally 
agreed that the ineptitude of the aging President Yrigoyen in the face of the drop into the 
Great Depression was the main factor leading to the military coup.566  
 Power was eventually returned to civilian authorities in 1932, but democratic 
procedures would be nothing but a mere façade for a decade to come. The 1930s were 
dominated by a series of conservative administrations (under the Concordancia banner) 
that got to power, and managed to remain there, by electoral fraud. For this reason, many 
scholars have called it the ―infamous decade‖. In 1943, the second coup d’etat of the 
century would bring the ―infamous decade‖ to an end and open the doors of power to 
then-Colonel Perón. He occupied several important positions in the de facto government. 
He was Vice-Minister of the Ministry of War and Head of the newly-created Secretary of 
Labor (from which he built his ties with the Labor movement),567 and then went on to 
become Minister of War and Vice-President. He kept his post as Head of the Secretary 
of Labor while being Vice-President.  
 Perón had never been an activist for the rights of the lower classes that would be 
his core constituency.568 He was, first and foremost, a military man with ambitions. How, 
                                                 
566 Id., at 180, esp. fn. 7. 
 
567 Peter H. Smith, ―Social Mobilization, Political Participation, and the Rise of Juan Peron‖, 84 Pol. Sci. 
Quart. 30, 44 (1969) (―Openly courting the laborers, using both the carrot and the stick, Peron used this 
office to establish a political base which eventually helped carry him into the presidency‖).  
 
568 See Joel Horowitz, above n. 564, at 214 (―Clearly, Per6n's urban base became the working class. He did 
receive backing from other elements, the Church, major portions of the military, some dissaffected 
Radicals and nationalist groups, but no true urban-based multiclass coalition can be found. Per6n did draw 
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then, did he gain the favor of the urban lower class masses?569 Basically, by establishing 
himself as the only credible means for lower classes to have effective political 
participation. His stance was not particularly respectful of democratic and republican 
institutions —after all, he was a putschist— nor did it display particular concern with 
constitutional niceties. Perón was mostly concerned with effective political action. It may 
well be that Perón's supporters might have accepted his eventually undemocratic political 
procedures because of their unfortunate experiences with democratic institutions as the 
Municipal Council and the Congress.570 According to Peter Smith, 
―[i]n the late nineteen-thirties and early forties, leaders of this sector [....] sought 
to promote urban mass interests through established and constitutional political 
institutions. Before 1943 these leaders, mostly Socialists, were stopped at every 
turn by the ruling Concordancia; and the institutions through which they pressed 
their demands, particularly the national Congress, were devitalized and 
discredited‖571 
 
 Moreover, when Perón was campaigning for the 1946 election that eventually 
made him president, the opposition —basically, Radicals and Socialists— ran the 
campaign by claiming that they represented the return to ―the Constitution‖, which was 
understood as against many of Perón‘s reforms.572 In many ways, Perón represented the 
promise of institutional reforms in favor of his main constituencies.  
―By 1946 it had evidently become clear to the urban masses that the way to gain 
power was through the elevation of Peron. In the elections of that year the 
                                                                                                                                            
support from the lower middle class-as the excellent voting studies have indicated-but the line between this 
group and the working class was artificial‖). 
 
569 See Peter H. Smith, above n. 566, at 31 (―It is not as though he had been a life-long crusader for social 
reform. Raised in the lower middle class, Perón was essentially a military man of great ambition‖). 
 




572 See Lee J. Alston & Andrés A. Gallo, above n. 565, at 187. 
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central issue was quite clearly drawn: whether Argentina should continue with her 
openly authoritarian political system or return to time-worn constitutional 
procedure‖573 
 
It was a momentous election, one that posed a choice between alternative 
constitutional systems, and one determined to no small extent by the fact of the 
continued electoral fraud and the closing down of clean political processes during the 
preceding decade: 
―[...] citizens in Argentina found themselves not just electing a new president but 
also choosing between two different systems that would determine the 
institutional structure of the country for many decades to come. Though close, 
the citizens chose populism over a return to the path of checks and balances 
followed from 1914 until the interruption of the coup of 1930 and the fraud of 
the 1930s. The appeal of Juan Peron was in part a reaction to the electoral fraud 
in the 1930s‖574 
 
It is no wonder, then, that Peronism served as a vehicle for substantial 
constitutional change. Indeed, Bruce Ackerman and Carlos Rosenkrantz have rightly 
suggested that this era was a successful ―constitutional moment‖ for Argentina, in the 
terms of a dualist theory of democracy.575 Perón‘s successful constitutional politics would 
have momentous consequences for property rights. The so-called ―social function of 
property‖ would be the paramount conception in those years.  
 One must bear in mind three channels through which changes were 
accomplished: normal legislation of a ―social character‖, judicial appointments, and 
formal constitutional reform. I will not focus on the first channel, as it was neither a 
                                                 
573 See Peter H. Smith, above n. 566, at 47. 
 
574 Lee J. Alston & Andrés A. Gallo, above n. 565, at 188. See also Id. at 188-190 (using statistical data to 
present a model that shows how previous fraud was a very important component of Perón‘s triumph in 
1946). 
 
575 See Bruce Ackerman & Carlos Rosenkrantz, ―Tres Concepciones de la Democracia Constitucional‖, 29 
Cuadernos y Debates 1, 16 (1991). 
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complete novelty of Peronism nor could have had, per se, the durable effects we can 
observe. The second channel, I can only mention here and it has been sufficiently 
explored in the literature.576 It is very important to notice here that Perón, backed up by 
an unstoppable support in both Chambers of a Congress he dominated, successfully 
impeached four out of the five justices of the Supreme Court —the fifth justice, spared 
the impeachment procedures, was Tomás Casares, a catholic appointed by the military 
government of which Perón had been a part—, plus the Solicitor General, basically, 
because he did not see any advantages to preserving the Judiciary‘s integrity and aspired, 
instead, to ―peronize‖ the Court.577 The impeachment procedures, certainly more than 
the new appointments themselves, would have a long-lasting, pernicious effect on 
Argentina‘s practices regarding separation of powers and on the Court‘s case law.578 
From then on, there has been a deep-rooted presidential aspiration to ―have their own 
Court‖.579 The sparse de iure governments Argentina enjoyed during the second part of 
                                                 
576 See, e.g., Arturo Pellet Lastra HISTORIA POLÍTICA DE LA CORTE (1930-1990) (Buenos Aires, Ad-
Hoc, 2001). 
 
577 See, e.g., Joseph A. Page, PERÓN: UNA BIOGRAFÍA 195-196 (Buenos Aires, Javier Vergara Editor, 
1984). The original in English: PERÓN: A BIOGRAPHY (New York, Random House, 1983). See also 
Arturo Pellet Lastra, above n. 576, at 30 (arguing that ―Perón appointed four unconditional judges‖ and 
that the Court was ―addicted to Perón‖). 
 
578 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Miller, above n. 75, at 153 (arguing that ―[t]he Supreme Court has been marked 
by relative weakness during all democratically elected governments since its 1947 impeachment, particularly 
in comparison with the many decisions in which it challenged the government in previous years‖). See also 
Arturo Pellet Lastra, above n. 576, at 32, 37-39 (arguing that there are two distinctly different phases in the 
political history of the Argentine Supreme Court, one from its establishment in 1862 until the 1947 
impeachment, in which there was an axiom of respecting the independence of the Judiciary, and another 
one, beginning in 1947, where Courts were frequently addicted to the incumbent president); Lee J. Alston 
& Andrés A. Gallo, above n. 565, at 194 (―The impeachment of the Court could be viewed as the 
culmination of the departure from the road towards a true system of checks and balances that was started 
by the coup of 1930 but burrowed into the beliefs of constituents with the decade of fraud during the 
1930s‖). 
 
579 See Diana Kapiszewski, HIGH COURTS AND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN ARGENTINA 
AND BRAZIL 69 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012) (―In Argentina, more often than not, 
elected leaders sought to proactively shape the Supreme Court into a judicial ally by politicizing it. They 
repeatedly attempted to manipulate the CSJN‘s [Supreme Court} size and composition [...] and executives 
often sought to appoint justices who, being ideologically compatible, were close allies or party affiliates‖). 
See also Arturo Pellet Lastra, above n. 576, at 32, 37-39 (arguing that ―[e]very civilian President since Perón 
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the twentieth century frequently had the intention of tampering with the Court‘s number 
of seats,580 in order to build a consistently supportive majority. This undoubtedly affected 
the Court‘s performance and its ability to protect individual rights against Governmental 
decisions. 
 More centrally, the administration moved successfully to ―peronize the 
Constitution‖.581 In 1949, after a highly controversial political process for calling a 
Constitutional Convention582 and with the main opposition party abandoning the 
sessions,583 a new, thoroughly revised, constitutional text was enacted, and property was 
                                                                                                                                            
has tried to choose a docile Supreme Court‖); Alberto B. Bianchi, UNA CORTE LIBERAL: LA CORTE 
DE ALFONSÍN 26 (Buenos Aires, Editorial Ábaco, 2007) (arguing that the presidents‘ temptation for 
court packing has not ceased). It is remarkable that quite often Supreme Court integrations are named not 
after one justice (as it is the case in the U.S. with the Chief Justice), but after the president who managed to 
re-shape the Court‘s composition. This is especially the case with the Courts of the 1980s and 1990s, 
known as La Corte de Alfonsín and La Corte Menemista —or, even worse, the automatic majority—. See Id., at 25 
(arguing that the 1947 impeachment interrupted the possibility of calling the Court by the name of the 
most influential justice: ―[u]ntil then, we could talk about the Gorostiaga‘s, Bermejo‘s or Repetto‘s Court. 
From then on, we have to tell the story in accordance to the changes occurred in the Executive Branch‖).  
 
580 See, e.g., ―La ampliación de la Corte trata Diputados‖, Clarín, April, 5, 1990, at 6 (citing Peronist Deputy 
Jorge Yoma as saying that the ―enlargement of the Court is an old aspiration of constitutional 
governments‖). In 1990, Menem managed to enlarged the bench from five to nine justices, effectively 
appointing six justices to the Court (one justice from the old composition of the Court, Jorge Bacqué, 
resigned in protest for the enlargement, and another one —José Caballero— had resigned for personal 
reasons shortly before). In 2006, the Kirchner administration got Congress to shrink to the Court, from 
nine members to seven —in a transitional phase—, and down to five once two justices leave the bench. 
See Law #26,183 (available at: http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/120000-
124999/123154/norma.htm; last visited 01/24/2012). Arguably, the Kirchner couple, after having 
succeeded in removing the Menem-appointed majority through threats of impeachments and impeachment 
procedures in 2003 and having appointed four justices themselves, did not want to give the chance of re-
shaping the Court to an eventual competitor that might have gained the presidency, especially when the 
two justices who were neither appointed nor politically close to Kirchner —Justices Fayt and Petracchi— 
were already the two most senior justices and, thus, the two most likely to leave the Court first. 
 
581  See Joseph A. Page, above n. 577, at 237-244. 
 
582 Peronists failed to secure the necessary majority of two-thirds of the total members of both Cameras for 
the legality of the bill authorizing the reform and the election of delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention, according to article 30 of the Constitution and the interpretive practice. Instead, they counted 
two-thirds of the members present at the moment of voting, and went along with the reform. The main 
opposition party, Unión Cívica Radical protested, but then, inconsistently took part in the election and took 
their seats in the Convention. See, e.g., Lucretia Illsley, ―The Argentine Constitutional Revision of 1949‖, 
14 J. Polit. 224, 227 (1952). 
 
583 See, e.g., ―El bloque radical se retiró de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente‖, La Nación, March, 9, 
1949, at 1-4 (reporting the session and the Redicales‘ leaving the Convention); ―Con la sola presencia de la 
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one of the institutions that received deep changes. Social justice was the driving idea of 
the movement, at the rhetorical level at least, and the ―social function of property‖, an 
idea first articulated by the French jurist Leon Duguit in 1911 in a series of lectures in 
Buenos Aires,584 would serve as the means for realizing social justice in the economic 
sphere. 
 The inviolability of property which opened the text of Article 17 of the 1853 
liberal Constitution was quickly replaced by the clear declaration that ―private ownership 
has a social function and, therefore, shall be subject to the obligations imposed by law 
for the common good‖ (Article 38, 1949 Constitution). Moreover, it was for the State to 
control and intervene in the exploitation of the fields, and to procure that each farmer 
could become owner of the land he worked in (Article 38). Capital had to ―serve the 
national economy‖ and have ―social welfare as its main objective‖ (Article 39), and ―the 
organization of wealth and its exploitation are meant to serve the people's welfare, within 
an economic order in accordance with the principles of social justice‖ (Article 40). The 
changes were substantial and quite visible. 
 Arturo Enrique Sampay, the mastermind behind the new constitutional text, 
denounced the laissez-faire economics that had inspired Alberdi:  
―Non-intervention means leaving the different groups their hands free in their 
social and economic conflicts, and therefore, it means leaving the solutions to [be 
determined by] the power struggles between these groups. In such circumstances, 
non-intervention entails intervention in favor of stronger [party]‖585 
 
                                                                                                                                            
mayoría deliberó la Convención Constituyente‖, La Prensa, March, 10, at 5-6 (reporting sessions with the 
sole presence of the majority sector). 
 
584 See Sheila R. Foster & Daniel Bonilla, ―The Social Function of Property: A Comparative Perspective‖, 
80 Ford. L. Rev. 101, 102 (2011).  
 




 To replace the political economy behind the liberal Constitution of 1853, Sampay 
proposed a ―humanist programmatic economy‖ based upon the social function of 
property and social justice.586 The text did not reject private property. Its underlying 
philosophy considered it a natural right, companion to free individual activity.587 But both 
needed to be strictly limited by their social function, whose scope would be provided by 
the principles of social justice.588 Such principles would also serve to set the ―fair limits‖ 
of the profits generated by economic activity, because the Constitution ―rejects unjust 
benefits‖.589 The new conception of property recognized a double function: individual, as 
the basis of liberty and the affirmation of personhood; and social, ―insofar as such 
affirmation is not possible outside society […] private property fulfills an individual goal 
by providing for the needs of the possessor, and a social goal by assigning the remaining 
[resources] to the community‖.590 The social orientation and the often authoritarian 
nature of the new constitutional text stands out in the following passage from Sampay, 
defending the constitutionalization of a solidarity principle that limited, among other 
things, the permissible uses of property rights: 
―[T]he recognition of personal liberty cannot be understood as the protection of 
some individuals to the detriment […] of others […] [It is established that] the 
abuse of personal rights —note that we aim at the center of the legal order of 
bourgeois liberalism—, if it harms the common good or leads to any form of 
exploitation of man by man, is considered a crime that is punishable by law [...] 
We elevate the abuse of rights principle to a constitutional category [...] but we go 
                                                 
586 Id., at 43-44. 
 




589 Id., at 47. 
 
590 Id., at 45. 
 
 190 
further still, because we consider a crime the lack of social solidarity, the misuse of 
personal freedom‖591 
 
 Despite these clearly illiberal and sometimes authoritarian overtones, the new 
conception of property was not particularly unpopular, even among elites. On the 
contrary, it was widely assumed among legal scholars and practitioners that some sort of 
social obligation annexed to property rights was not inappropriate.592  
The reaction in the press was not unfavourable either, although this is a less 
useful indicator, as freedom of speech and of the press was not a particularly protected 
right in Argentina at the time. From 1947 on, Perón launched a campaign to control the 
press. His wife Evita bought the newspaper Democracia, and a pro-Perón holding called 
―Alea‖, whose shareholders almost certainly included Evita, purchased Crítica, La Razón, 
Noticias Gráficas and La Época.593 La Prensa was later confiscated, and La Nación and Clarín 
managed to survive by avoiding any substantial criticism of the administration.594 
 Clarín, for instance, opined that  
―The Constitution of 1949 is superior to the Constitution of 1853 because the 
latter was simply liberal while the one that has been just sworn not only keeps the 
substantial principles of democracy but it also states clearly the most advanced 
concepts regarding the most salient economic and social problems of the times 
[…] It is not conducive to cling to outdated concepts of absolute property and unbridled 
capitalism‖595  
 
                                                 
591 Id., at 48-49. The italics are mine. 
 
592 See Susana T. Ramella, ―Propiedad en función social en la Constitución de 1949: Una ‗mentalidad‘ del 
Antiguo Régimen representada en el constitucionalismo social de la época‖, 35 Revista de Historia del Derecho 
297, 323-330 (2007) (surveying the opinions of law professors and practitioners before the constitutional 
reform of 1949). 
 
593 See Joseph A. Page, above n. 577, at 250. 
 
594 Id., at 253. 
 




 La Nación allowed itself a small dose of sober and restrained critical attitude: 
 ―[…] under the appearance of simple partial amendments [the project] 
introduced deep changes in our fundamental law […] which altered its spirit in 
matters of vital importance […] The presidential re-election, the independence of 
the Judiciary, the statute of economic rights, […] economic interventionism […] 
were issues in which the draft contained reckless innovations, sometimes because 
of their revolutionary scope, sometimes because of the confusion of concepts on 
which they were grounded‖596 
 
 It is unsurprising that the substantial reform on the property rights regime was 
not emphatically rejected by any sector.597 On the one hand, private property as such was 
not abolished, so a major rebellion by the owners, wealthy or not, was not to be 
expected. On the other hand, the social rights included in the new constitutional text 
were a major advance of the times, and the kind of advance that large parts of the 
population could appreciate. They were so much so that even after the Peronist 
Constitution was abrogated de facto in 1955, the new Constitutional Convention that 
convened in 1957 added a social rights clause to the original text of the 1853 
Constitution (Article 14 bis). So the combination of the preservation of private property 
—it might have seemed to be in relative risk only for large capitalists who were not close 
to the regime— and the new social rights must have made good sense for the average 
person. For the wealthy, the reform might have been seen as a concession in their self-
interest, the kind of argument that Frank Michelman aptly described as the ―big bribe‖ 
theory of redistribution.598 Apparently, Perón himself made such an argument. According 
                                                 
596 ―Un plan inflexible‖, La Nación, March, 7, at 4. 
 
597 See, e.g., ―La cuestión constitucional‖, Clarín, May, 3, 1956, at 3 (arguing that the true fears about the 
constitutional reform in 1949 had been a turn towards a corporatist state, whether rightist or leftist, and 
that innovations of economic and social order that the 1949 Constitution had included were not causes of 
anxiety as they ―were resisted only in circles opposed to any sort of [social and economic] 
transformations‖). 
 
598 See Frank I. Michelman, ―Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial 
Models of Local Government Legitimacy‖, 53 Ind. L.J. 145, 154 (1977-1978) (describing redistribution as a 
price or bribe that the naturally well-endowed should find worth paying in exchange for peaceful 
acceptance by the naturally worse-endowed of the government‘s police protective authority). 
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to Clarín, Perón would have said that ―[…] structured innovation is an insurance policy 
against possible and serious problems of social nature‖ and, thus, the reform implied  
―[…] a tentative to reconcile, without useless violence, the privilege of the few 
with the rights and needs of the many; a purpose that should be celebrated and 
supported both by the masses and […] the holders of the accumulated wealth‖599 
 
Three additional factors must be born in mind to account for the reception of the 
reforms. First, Sampay‘s political philosophy was very much in line with the social 
doctrine of the Catholic Church, still a very influential political actor at the time. The 
social function of private property had been part of the Church‘s doctrine for quite some 
time. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that large sectors of the population were 
influenced by the Catholic Church‘s official position on the topic. Second, the concepts 
of the new Constitution were also attuned to the general direction of ideas in the rest of 
the world. While Perón stressed that Argentina followed a ―third path‖ —not unbridled 
capitalism, not communism—, the truth of the matter is that the regulatory state was on 
the rise, and the ―constitutional revolution of 1937‖, the ―constitutional moment‖ of the 
New Deal, was explicitly cited by Sampay as an example of an attempt to organize the 
economy in the benefit of the weak, exactly what he thought the 1949 Constitution was 
trying to do.600 Third, the wealthy sectors, traditionally opposed to Perón, were never 
really liberal, not even in the economic realm; they were socially conservative and 
politically authoritarian.601 In economic matters, they had already grasped the possibilities 
                                                                                                                                            
 
599 See Roberto J. Noble, above n. 595, at 6. 
 
600 See Arturo E. Sampay, above n. 585, at 35. 
 
601 See Carlos S. Nino, above n. 104, at 158. 
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that interventionism opened for their own benefit.602 Maybe it was just a matter of time. 
They could wait and see. 
In fact, the true constitutional change had been coming along for quite a while, 
and outside the formal amendment tracks. Even traditionally formalist legal operators 
could recognize such a change. Thus, the Supreme Court could argue in 1955, shortly 
before the coup d’etat that would overthrow Perón, that 
―The evolution of the concept of property, in order to adjust it to the social sense 
of its function, has been taking place in the country on the base of an adequate 
interpretation of the common law, without the need to wait for a new 
constitutional text‖603 
 
 Thus, landmark rulings prior to the constitutional reform, upholding intrusive 
regulations of economic rights, had gone through the media without being criticized. As 
early as 1944 and following in the footsteps of Avico, the justices had upheld a law that 
established a mandatory contribution of up to 1.5% of the total sales of livestock, to be 
paid by breeders and destined to fund the Junta Nacional de Carnes, a regulatory agency 
created by the same law to safeguard the national meat industry. The Junta was to invest 
the funds, among other goals, in the defense of the national breeding industry and the 
elimination of trusts and monopolies, favoring the supply of meat to the domestic 
market. Pursuant to a legislative authorization, the agency created the Corporación 
Argentina de Productores de Carne, making the contributing breeders forced members of the 
corporation. In Inchauspe604 the Court gave constitutional blessing to the measures 
arguing, among other things, that  
                                                 
602 See above n. 397 and accompanying text. 
 
603 See CS, Caillard de O'Neill, Magdalena E. M. v. Heguiabehere, Gerónimo, 234 Fallos 384, 395 (1955). The 
reference to the ―common law‖ in the quote is to the ―derecho común‖, the civil, criminal, labor, etc. laws 
that Congress enacts for the whole country, and not –obviously- to the anglo-saxon common law. It is 
usually referred as a ―common‖ law because it is common to all the provinces. 
 
604 199 Fallos 483 (1944). 
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―Freedom of contract cannot, of course, be legitimately invoked when [the 
attacked measure] does not mean parting up with material goods of some 
importance. In this case, the contribution is negligible, since it is, or may be, 
compensated with the rising price of the product, which adds up to the 
possibility of potential earnings achievable by the corporation. At all events, the 
compulsory association would be justified by the principle of social solidarity and 
the defense of the national interests‖605 
 
Notice that in Inchauspe the justices were not merely deferential to an arguably 
paternalistic measure: they built constitutional meaning by measuring up the popularity 
of the interventionist plan. A strongly ―responsive‖ mode of adjudication, sensitive to the 
perceived needs of the dominant players of the time, was clearly displayed. Among the 
evidence of the reasonableness of the measures, the Court cited 
―The vigorous defense of the law publicly made by all livestock associations in 
the country [and] the fact that no other lawsuits have been filed or any protests, 
other than those showing adherence to the law and repudiating the action 
attempted by very few livestock dissidents, have been made‖.606 
 
The decision was reported in a neutral tone in the press. El Diario, El Federal, El 
Pueblo and La Razón all adopted an almost identical style, which showed no criticism of 
the measures whatsoever.607 The interventionist state had come to stay, and apparently it 
had not raised much opposition yet. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
605 Id., §10. 
 
606 Id., §7. 
 
607 See, e.g., ―La Corte declaró constitucional la ley de carnes‖, El Diario, September, 3, 1944, at 3; ―La 
contribución con que se grava la venta de ganado no es inconstitucional, expresa la Corte Suprema 
Nacional‖, El Federal, September, 3, 1944, at 4; ―Declaró la Corte que es constitucional la ley de carnes‖, El 
Pueblo, September, 3, 1944, at 5; ―Declara la Corte que es constitucional la ley de carnes‖, La Razón, 
September, 3, 1944, at 10 (headlining that the Junta had avoided the formation of a monopoly and the 




The kind of adjudication shown in Inchauspe would be deepened by the reformed 
Court after 1947. The social function of property justified a number of ever increasing 
restrictions on property rights. 
Still, however addicted the Court to the regime and as much as the social 
function was the dominant discourse of the day, private property would not be swept off 
the constitutional map in the alleged search for social justice. According to the Court 
―The constitutional text does not establish that property is a social function, in a 
way that could be understood as enrolled in Duguit‘s position [internal citations 
omitted], a theory that leads to the negation of all individual rights, property 
among them. Property, as an individual right, is expressly recognized and its use 
and disposition in accordance to the laws that, without altering such right, 
regulate its exercise, is guaranteed [internal citations omitted]. The fact that 
property is assigned a social function has only the consequence of subjecting it to 
the obligations established by law for the common good‖.608 
 
So Peronist constitutional reform was, in a way, Argentina‘s own New Deal, with 
its own particularities: a new constitutional conception became dominant, without much 
opposition from the supposedly conservative branch;609 the Supreme Court was re-
shaped in order to guarantee the judicial blessing of the new doctrines; and, finally, the 
movement would be more rigidly entrenched in a new Constitution. Property rights 
would take a second seat to rights more closely related, in the dominant view, to social 
justice. Judicial solicitude would change its focus, without ever completely abandoning 
property. There are quite a few similarities between the constitutional moment in 
Argentina and in the U.S.  In a sense, it would have been striking that Argentina had 
retained a conception of property whose roots lied in a prior century, in the face of the 
changes the world had been witness to. 
                                                 
608 234 Fallos 384, 394-395 (1955). The italics are mine. 
 
609 The Supreme Court would declare unconstitutional some measures of the Farrell‘s military government 
and of the Perón administration, such as the creation of specialized labor courts, but it was not, by any 
means, an obstructionist Court. 
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For all these reasons, it is understandable that the conception of constitutional 
property embraced by the new fundamental law was not seriously questioned. The 
people had had a change of mood regarding property rights. Within certain limits, they 
were conceived as basically subject to regulation in pursuance of the common good, in 
accordance to the comprehensive view610 now enshrined in the Constitution —social 
justice—. Seen through the lenses of a contemporary political philosopher, the Peronist 
era could be labeled, with some serious reservations, as the rise of high liberalism in all 
economic matters.611 
It would take a while until the people noticed the persistent preference for the 
rich and the powerful that the ―scientific policymaker‖ (the politicians who were being 
entrusted with achieving social justice, relatively unrestrained by property rights) would 






                                                 
610 Bruce A. Ackerman, above n. 28, at 15. 
 
611 See John Tomasi, above n. 71, at 54 (―[…] high liberals are skeptical of the moral importance of private 
economic liberty […] For them social justice is the ‗first virtue‘, or primary ordering principle, of social 
institutions […] high liberals advocate expansive state-based programs of economic redistribution (whether 
within generations or between them) in pursuit of social justice‖). I emphasize that the label could only be 
used with serious reservations because, as I mentioned before, the new constitutional regime was not really 
liberal and had displayed significant authoritarian leanings. Even in issues regarding private property there 
were instances of open arbitrariness that would hardly be approved of by any ―high liberal‖ that takes pride 
in being so called. For instance, during the Perón administration, the Government expropriated an 
expensive, unique sports car that had been stopped in Customs when its driver and owner was entering the 
country, as part of an international race, only to be sold at a fraction of its actual value to a friend of the 
Administration due to Perón‘s express ―recommendation‖. The post-Peronist Supreme Court struck down 
the expropriation a few years later. See CSJN, Nación v. Ferrario, Jorge, 251 Fallos 246 (1961). 
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The Times of Permanent Emergency and The Rise of the Regressive 
Redistribution Difficulty. 
a. Post-Peronism and the Advent of Permanent Emergency. 
Peronism, for all its political force and its appeal to a significant sector of the people, 
would not escape the perils of being profoundly controversial. In 1955, after a period of 
economic decline and increasing domestic political battles, Perón would be overthrown 
by so-called Revolución Libertadora, a military coup d’etat that, sadly and similarly to many 
other episodes in Argentina‘s history, enjoyed broad civilian support.612 Perón had 
managed to polarize public opinion. At the time, one either loved or hated Perón. 
Therefore, reactions in the non-peronist press were, for the most part, not merely 
supportive of the coup, but largely euphoric. El Mundo, for example, reported that when 
General Lonardi was sworn in as President, the Republic sang ―the hymn of liberty‖ and 
that ―popular exultation‖ had overflowed the Plaza de Mayo.613 It also applauded 
emphatically Lonardi‘s speech.614 La Nación stated that Lonardi had been sworn in 
                                                 
612 See, e.g., ―Apoya al nuevo gobierno el Partido Demócrata Progresista‖, Clarín, September, 25, 1955, at 7 
(reporting the statement of the Democratic Progressive party in support of the ―provisional‖ military 
government); ―Expresó el Socialismo su confianza en el gobierno del General Lonardi‖, Clarín, September, 
26, at 2 (reporting the statement of the Socialist Party in support of the military government); ―El Círculo 
de la Prensa expuso su adhesión al gobierno provisional‖, Clarín, September, 26, 1955, at 16 (reporting that 
an association of journalists had ―adhered‖ to the provisional government); ―En sendas declaraciones 
numerosas agrupaciones expresan su adhesión al gobierno revolucionario‖, Democracia, September, 27, at 3 
(reporting the expressions of support to the military government by a number of civil associations –e.g., 
Christian and commercial entities, and well as the Association of Professionals-); ―Numerosas entidades 
han hecho llegar su adhesión al Nuevo gobierno provisional‖, Democracia, September, 30, at 2 (same); 
―Expresan su solidaridad con los principios revolucionarios agrupaciones políticas‖, El Mundo, Setember, 
26, at 7(reporting messages of support of various political parties); ―Exhortan los dirigentes politicos a 
colaborar con el nuevo gobierno‖, El Mundo, September, 25, at 6 (reporting expressions of support by 
prominent politicians of the opposition); ―Todos los sectores de la ciudadanía se han adherido al Nuevo 
gobierno‖, La Razón, September, 23, at 8 (arguing that all sectors of the population adhered to the 
provisional government). 
 
613 Front page, El Mundo, September, 24, 1955. 
 
614 See ―Palabras que abren de par en par las puertas de la historia‖, El Mundo, September, 24, at 6. 
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―amidst the indescribable enthusiasm of the crowd‖615 and that it was the time for the 
reconstruction of the Nation.616La Razón ran a very eloquent headline in its front page, 
reporting on Lonardi‘s oath: ―apotheosis of freedom‖.617 Clarín asserted that it was 
―collaboration time‖ and that the ―great and magnificent principles of liberty and 
democracy‖ had been re-established after ten years.618 Hence, in its view the revolution 
let the sun of liberty shine on the country, and citizens enjoyed expressing their 
―irrepressible happiness‖.619 
 It is easy to guess that one of the first measures of such an epic military-political 
movement would be to repeal the legal structure mounted by Peronism, in particular, its 
constitutional text, and with it the new conception of property. The coup leaders 
abrogated the 1949 constitutional text and put back in force the old liberal Constitution 
of 1853, as long as it did not contradict the goals of the revolution, in early 1956. The 
official reason for this measure was that constitution-making is one of the most 
transcendental acts in the institutional life of a State, one that needs the most absolute 
observance of the principle of popular sovereignty in a context of freedom, and that the 
1949 reform had been imposed by illegal means that did not respect such fundamental 
principles. The reform, in short, had not been the outcome of a free and inclusive debate 
                                                 
615 See ―En medio del indescriptible entusiasmo de la muchedumbre juró ayer el Gral. Lonardi‖, La Nación, 
September, 24, at 1.  
 
616 See ―Palabras nuevas para un país renovado‖, La Nación, September, 24, at 6. 
 
617 Front page, La Razón, September, 23, 1955. 
 
618 See ―La hora de la colaboración‖, Clarín, September, 25, at 1. 
 
619 See ―El sol de la libertad‖, Clarín, September, 25, 1955, at 8-9 (calling the day a ―glorious Saturday‖ and 
reporting that the citizenship had taken the streets to express ―their irrepressible happiness for re-conquest 
of the light, after the long, seemingly endless, night‖). 
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by the people of the Nation as a whole.620 Of course, the means used by the government 
to re-establish the allegedly violated constitutional order were even more illegal than the 
procedures used by Perón, but that‘s a detail that wasn‘t likely to bother any 
revolutionary that took pride in being called one. 
 Did the abrogation of the Peronist Constitution imply the rejection of the new 
conception of property? Some have argued as much, including then-Supreme Court 
justice Luis M. Boffi Boggero, who —faced with a constitutional challenge to a law 
enacted pursuant to the 1949 constitutional text— held that: 
―It should be noted first that the law under review was enacted under the 1949 
reform. Whatever the value that can be recognized to delegates‘ opinions on 
[constitutional] interpretation, it is true that they influenced the legal sanction [of 
the text], both as to the concept of property, which acquired a "social function" 
attributed to the arts. 38, 39 and 40 of this reform, against the individualistic 
concept attributed to the no longer in force standards of 1853 […] The re-
establishment of the Constitution of 1853 […] must have an influence on the 
decision [of the instant case] by virtue of its different —better or worse— 
concept of property […] the Law No. 14,226, as many others which fitted 
comfortably within the constitutional scheme in those days, no longer enjoy the 
shelter of the Constitution in force, for it interferes with the rights protected by 
the constitutional text. This does not mean that under the current Constitution it 
is not possible to enact progressive legislation, protective of those economically 
most vulnerable, because the country's history exhibits many decrees and laws 
that would show otherwise, and because many judgments of this Court would 
prove the same point categorically. It just means that laws or decrees, be them 
progressive or regressive, which are not in conformity with existing constitutional 
rules cannot be enacted or issued‖621 
 
Ricardo Zorraquín Becú, a catholic law professor, argued that the revolution‘s 
proclaimed goal of re-establishing the rule of law in the country necessarily implied 
recovering from the ―declination‖ that the content of the laws suffered during the 1945-
                                                 
620 See, e.g., ―Proclamóse con fuerza obligatoria la vigencia de la Carta de 1853‖, Clarín, May, 2, 1956, at   
(transcribing in full the text of the executive decree re-establishing the Constitution of 1853 without the 
reform of 1949 and the accompanying message of the de facto president Aramburu). See also ―Dióse el 
decreto proclamando la vigencia de la Constitución del 53‖, La Época, May, 2, 1956, at 2 (same); ―Texto de 
la proclama que pone en vigor la Constitución del 53‖, La Nación, May, 2, at 1 (same). 
 
621 CS, Cine Callao, 241 Fallos 121 (1960) (Boffi Boggero, J., dissenting, §10-11). 
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1955 decade, and to do so the revolution would need to heed such fundamental 
principles as ―the fulfillment of the obligations of contracts‖ and ―the respect for private 
property‖.622 
The truth of the matter is that the Peronist Constitution, despite being short-
lived, left an unwritten mark on the conception of property rights in Argentina, and it 
could not have been otherwise, as the constitutional change had already occurred outside 
the text and was merely codified —perhaps somewhat unfaithfully, perhaps overstating 
the social overtones of the new conception of constitutional property—623 by the formal 
reform process. Justice Boffi Boggero conceded as much in the quoted fragment, by 
acknowledging that both the legislative and judicial history of the country showed a 
record that allowed progressive legislation.  
When the old constitutional text was put back in force in 1956, Clarín celebrated 
the occasion, but emphasized that  
―[…] nobody should sensibly aspire to cling to dated concepts of absolute 
property and unbridled capitalism, entities that —it is worth reaffirming— have 
expired in almost all latitudes of the civilized world […]‖624 
 
The military government had taken eight months to resolve the constitutional 
question of what to do with a constitution that embodied the very regime the military 
had set out to erase, because even in the committee that was advising the military 
government, some politicians had argued to keep the social and economic principles 
                                                 
622 Ricardo Zorraquin Becú, ―Declinación y resurgimiento del derecho‖, Criterio, April, 26, 1956, at 291. 
 
623 One should not forget that the main opposition party, the Unión Cívica Radical , had left the sessions and, 
therefore, the enacted text does not reflect any sort of compromise between different sectors of the 
population, but it was the unanimous imposition of the governing part. See above n. 583. 
 
624 See ―La cuestión constitucional‖, Clarín, May, 3, 1956, at 5. 
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incorporated in the 1949 text.625 And the conservative magazine Criterio criticized the 
1949 reform because ―it was the last basic outline for the scenery of a dictatorship‖, but 
not so much because the statements and amendments introduced in the text, which the 
magazine deemed ―acceptable in many cases‖.626 The restoration of the old Constitution 
was met with a large measure of support,627 but virtually all media accepted that the 
venerable text needed updating,628 and social and economic justice were prominent 
among the candidates for the renewal of the Constitution.629 
                                                 
625 Id. 
 
626 See ―Comentarios: La Constitución del 53‖, Criterio, May, 10, 1956, at 334. 
 
627 See, e.g., ―Elogia la Intransigencia Radical la vigencia de la Carta del 53‖, Crítica, May, 4, at 5 
(transcribing an official statement from the sector intransigente of the Radical party, expressing support for 
the restoration of the 1853 Constitution); ―Partidos y gremios libres aplauden a la revolución‖, Crítica, May, 
4, at 2 (calling the restoration of the most ―outstanding deeds of the Revolution‖ and reporting the support 
of various sectors of the population); ―Argentina Returns to Constitution of 1853‖, The Buenos Aires Herald, 
May 2, front page (subtitling the headline: ―Last Shackles of Perón‘s Despotic Rule Cast Aside‖); ―La 
vigencia de la Constitución del año 1853‖, La Nación, May, 4, at 5 (reporting that the Teachers‘ 
Confederation had decided to give away copies of the Constitution, as a sign of support for the 
restoration); ―La vigencia de la Constitución del año 1853‖, La Nación, May, 5, at 2 (reporting the support 
of the Rotary Club and of the Rural Confederations); ―Restablecimiento de la Constitución‖, La Prensa, 
May, 2, at 8 (calling the restoration a ―redress to the People‖, in the face of the ―arbitrary imposition‖ of 
the 1949 Constitution); ―La vigencia de la Constitución de 1853 tiene más adhesiones‖, La Prensa, May, 6, 
at 3 (reporting expressions of support by numerous political and civil entities); ―Unánime adhesión 
ciudadana a la vigencia de la Carta Magna del 53‖, La Razón, May, 5, at 3 (same). 
 
628 Perhaps one exception may have been The Buenos Aires Herald which argued that the Constitution of 
1853 was as good for the mid-1950s as it had been for the past, that under its ―freedoms and protective 
clauses […] Argentina advanced to the vanguard of the Latin American nations and its people acquired and 
economic and cultural status which distinguished them wherever they had contact […] with foreign 
friends‖, and that there was ―no political or economic emergency with which it cannot cope if the 
authorities and people are sincerely minded‖. See ―The Sure Foundation‖, The Buenos Aires Herald, May, 3, 
1956. 
 
629 See, e.g., ―El retorno a la Constitución del 53‖, La Nación, May, 2, 1956, at 6 (arguing that the 
restoration was extremely important, and that its principles had not impeded any social improvements, but 
admitting that the passage of time might make some amendments advisable); ―La vigencia de la 
Constitución del año 1853‖, La Nación, May, 5, at 2 (reporting that the Democratic Christian Movement 
applauded the restoration, without denying the need for amendments that attuned the text now back in 
force to ―the new social and economic demands, without altering its fundamental bases‖); ―La vigencia de 
la Constitución de 1853 motiva más adhesiones‖, La Prensa, May, 8, at 6 (reporting that the Democratic 
Party had issued a statement applauding the restoration, which had been a part of its political program 
since 1951, regardless of the need for a reform ―through legal means that reaffirms its progressive 
leanings‖); ―En la ruta luminosa de Mayo y Caseros‖, La Razón, May, 2, at 3 (arguing that the restoration 
assured the rule of law and that a new constitutional convention could implement the necessary reforms 
regarding all problems that could not be foreseen by the forefathers of the Nation). 
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The constitutional politics of the 1940s, then, had an important influence on the 
way property was generally understood, an influence that, while initially plausible, has not 
been adequately integrated into the larger constitutional picture by the Court, whose later 
jurisprudence has often treated property as if the popular conception was purely 
Peronist. Today, as I will try to show, it is not.  
Justice Boffi Boggero was exactly right in one point: even if the popular 
conception were entirely social-oriented, judicial rulings could not go beyond the 
―semantic resistance‖ of the text in order to accommodate popular aspirations; not, at 
least, without risking their authority and sociological legitimacy. Someone might argue 
that, if sociological legitimacy means that the relevant public deems the decision 
appropriate, it doesn‘t really matter whether it can be squared with the text it is 
supposedly based upon.630 The problem is that then constitutional texts risk becoming 
largely meaningless and courts that are not credibly constrained by those texts, however 
vague and capacious, are bound to suffer capture attempts by the political branches, as 
they become too unpredictable and, hence, dangerous.631 The risk is, then, of both 
constitutions and courts becoming irrelevant. The U.S. Supreme Court seems to have 
dodged this risk fairly well, as diffuse public support for it seems high,632 perhaps because 
it enjoys charismatic authority.633 But this is clearly not the case of the Argentine 
Supreme Court. More on this later. 
                                                 
630 See, e.g., Michael L. Wells, ―Sociological Legitimacy in Supreme Court Opinions‖, above n. 107, at 1033 
(2007) (arguing that ―[s]ociological legitimacy turns on whether ‗the relevant public regards [a decision] as 
justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support‘ or at least acquiesces in it‖). 
 
631 Jonathan M. Miller, above n. 75, at 154-155.  
 
632 See Barry Friedman, above n. 81, at 2616-2629 (using the evidence gathered by Caldeira & Gibson to 
argue that the U.S. Supreme Court enjoys a reservoir of public support that transcends the opinion on 
what the Court is doing at the time). 
 
633 Jonathan M. Miller, above n. 75, at 167 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court is a ―charismatic yet 
cautious Court‖). See also Paul W. Kahn POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON 
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One of the very first announcements of the Lonardi de facto administration had 
been that the social conquests of the workers would be respected and consolidated, and 
the idea was also expressed publicly by Lonardi‘s successor, General Aramburu.634 The 
coup was about getting rid of Perón, but many of the features of the Peronist state were 
there to stay. Interventionism in the economic realm, for one, would be retained. For the 
many who thought that achieving social justice should be one of the main goals of the 
government, interventionism was probably seen as an appropriate tool for the task. 
Writing from the left, Rodolfo Pandolfi suggested that democracy had to assimilate the 
Peronist experience;635 going back to pre-peronism was not an option for the military, for 
many of the civilians who applauded them for overthrowing Perón, also approved of the 
social conquests. Peronism, in that sense, was an irreversible fact,636 with or without the 
leader. The public support for social and workers‘ rights received constitutional 
entrenchment through the short-lived and largely failed Constitutional Convention of 
1957, called by the revolutionary government. It only managed to add a new article, 14 
bis, establishing a number of important social rights,637 and to add a small part to an 
                                                                                                                                            
THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 13 (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011) (arguing that the 
U.S. Supreme Court ―[…] relies on charisma —mystery and awe— as much as on argument‖). 
 
634 See, e.g., ―Respetará el Gobierno las conquistas sociales‖, Clarín, September, 25, 1955, at 1 (reporting a 
public speech by President Lonardi where he stressed that social conquests would be respected); ―El 
Gobierno respetará la Constitución de 1853‖, Clarín, May, 2, 1956, at 8 (reporting a public speech by 
President Aramburu where he emphasized that ―the worker‘s conquests and rights will be respected and 
even enlarged‖) 
 




637 The article reads: ―Labor in its several forms shall be protected by law, which shall ensure to workers: 
dignified and equitable working conditions; limited working hours; paid rest and vacations; fair 
remuneration; minimum vital and adjustable wage; equal pay for equal work; participation in the profits of 
enterprises, with control of production and collaboration in the management; protection against arbitrary 
dismissal; stability of the civil servant; free and democratic labor union organizations recognized by the 
mere registration in a special record. Trade unions are hereby guaranteed: the right to enter into collective 
labor bargains; to resort to conciliation and arbitration; the right to strike. Union representatives shall have 
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article dealing with Congress‘ legislative powers. Still, it was proof of the mood of the 
times. 
The so-called Revolución Libertadora and the practical abrogation, by a de facto 
decree, of the 1949 Constitution opened the times of permanent emergency in 
Argentina.638 The emergency situation became permanent in two different, although 
related, senses: politically, the country entered a phase where civilian, democratically 
elected, governments were interrupted by military coups, in a seemingly never-ending 
cycle; legally, several emergency regimes remained in force during long years, kept alive 
by successive extensions issued by both civilian and military governments, or were 
replaced by other regimes. 
The permanent political emergency makes the exploration of property rights 
regulations relatively uninteresting. Certainly there were several interventions in the scope 
of property rights, some of them of undoubted importance, such as the reform of the 
Civil Code in 1968 which altered the philosophical underpinnings of the country‘s private 
law, but in a context where institutional stability is far from assured, where civilian 
factions see resort to weapons as a way to solve political problems, and where the armed 
forces see themselves as charged with guarding the Nation from its own politics, it is 
understandable that property rights occupied a very minor place in the public‘s eyes. 
                                                                                                                                            
the guarantees necessary for carrying out their union tasks and those related to the stability of their 
employment. The State shall grant the benefits of social security, which shall be of an integral nature and 
may not be waived. In particular, the laws shall establish: compulsory social insurance, which shall be in 
charge of national or provincial entities with financial and economic autonomy, administered by the 
interested parties with State participation, with no overlapping of contributions; adjustable retirements and 
pensions; full family protection; protection of homestead; family allowances and access to dignified 
housing‖. 
 
638 Some commentators, while embracing the idea of a permanent emergency regime, find its beginning in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. See, e.g., Horacio Ricardo González, ESTADO DE NO DERECHO: 
EMERGENCIA Y DERECHOS CONSTITUCIONALES 58-59 (Buenos Aires, Del Puerto, 2007) 
(arguing that a qualitative change in the kind of emergency regulations occured in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
that what initially was used to protect weak sectors of the population became a tool for trying to remedy 
the many problems of the State itself). 
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From 1955 on, Argentina suffered from institutional discontinuity, with no single civilian 
government able to finish its mandate. It also underwent a terrible phase of political 
violence, with armed groups of both extremes of the political spectrum turning politics 
into war, a phase that ended with the infamous military dictatorship of 1976-1983, where 
thousands of people were ―disappeared‖. The Constitution, while formally in force, was 
routinely subordinated to the great goals of the revolution of the time —we had 
Revolución Libertadora (1955-1958), Revolución Argentina (1966-1973), and Proceso de 
Reorganización Nacional (1976-1983)—. In such a context, which under the most charitable 
light can be considered as one of partial constitutionalism,639 it is certainly naïve to expect 
that courts can protect constitutional rights against governmental decisions. To expect 
the general public to be paying close attention to regulations of property rights would 
border on blind fanaticism.  
Legally speaking, emergency became ubiquitous, in a trend not too different from 
what can be observed in many western democracies during the twentieth century.640 The 
housing crisis, for instance, had begun in the very first decades of the century, and had 
furnished the occasion for the rise of the economic emergency doctrine, in Ercolano.641 
The problem lingered on,642 and prior to the constitutional reform, Perón‘s government 
                                                 
639 See Robert Barros, ―Courts Out of Context: Authoritarian Sources of Judicial Failure in Chile (1973–
1990) and Argentina (1976–1983)‖ in Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa (Editors), RULE BY LAW: THE 
POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 156 (New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) (describing ―partial constitutionalism‖ as ―the idea that a judiciary, as structured by a given 
constitution, ought to uphold and defend another part of the constitution, its guarantees of rights, even 
after the core institutions of that constitution —elected legislative and executive institutions— have been 
suppressed and displaced by an autocratic centralization of power‖). 
 
640 See William E. Scheuerman, ―The Economic State of Emergency‖, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1869, 1870-1874 
(1999-2000) (explaining the proliferation, in the twentieth century, of economic emergency regulations in 
liberal democratic regimes). 
 
641 See 136 Fallos 161 (1922). 
 
642 See, e.g., ―El problema de la vivienda‖, La Vanguardia, September, 17, 1933, at 1 (arguing that the 
housing problem was still important for the working class); ―El problema de la vivienda popular‖, Criterio, 
November, 21, 1940, at 277-280 (arguing that the housing problem for the working class was extremely 
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extended the emergency regime then in force,643 a problem that would haunt his de facto 
successors,644 and that in the 1960s would still be there, showing no signs of being 
resolved.645 Many other economic emergency interventions would take place. 
Compulsory hiring of entertainers,646 prohibitions to harvest crops,647 forcible payments 
of pensions and wages with state bonds,648 reductions of pensions, consolidations of state 
debts into long term bonds,649 forced savings,650 not to mention devaluations and other 
                                                                                                                                            
worrisome); ―Es excesivamente elevado el costo de los alquileres‖, Cabildo, June, 9, 1943, at 8-9 (arguing 
that rent prices were excessively high and claiming for emergency measures to attack the problem); 
―Adquiere proyecciones de inusitada gravedad en el país el problema de la vivienda popular‖, La Fronda, 
November, 30, 1944, at 7 (arguing that the housing issue was a formidable social problem).  
 
643 See, e.g., ―Síntesis de los principales sucesos ocurridos en las últimas semanas‖, La Nación, March, 4, 
1949, at 4 (reporting that the Executive had issued a decree expanding the scope of the emergency rent 
regime, according to which landlords were forced to rent their property within thirty days of being 
vacated). 
 
644 See, e.g., ―Estúdiase la prórroga de la ley de alquileres‖, Clarín, September, 25, 1955, at 3 (reporting that 
the new government studied what to do with the extension of the emergency rent law); ―La ley de 
alquileres‖, Democracia, September, 28, 1955, at 3 (arguing that it was undoubted that the provisional 
government would take the emergency measures demanded by the situation of ―countless tenants‖, 
measures that ―Congress would have taken, had it not been dissolved‖); ―El Gobierno prorrogó la ley de 
alquileres‖, Clarín, September, 28, 1955, front page (headline stating that the government had extended the 
emergency rent law). 
 
645 264 Fallos 344, 348 (1966), (Boffi Boggero, J., dissenting, §11 and 13) (summarizing the emergency 
regime for leases of both urban and rural property since 1943 and emphasizing that it had lasted for more 
than 22 years). 
 
646 See Emergency Law 14,226 (forcing owners of cinemas to include live numbers between the showing of 
movies and forcing hiring of entertainment artists to ameliorate the unemployment the varieties‘ actors 
guild was undergoing). 
 
647 See ―Yerba Mate: Prohibió el Gobierno levantar la cosecha‖, Clarín, March, 19, 1966, at 8 (reporting 
that the Executive had issued a decree forbidding the harvest of yerba mate crop, for it was estimated that 
then current stock would cover the demand for two years). 
 
648 The so-called ―9 de julio‖ bonds, in reference to the national independence day. The bonds were issued 
with an original term of 25 years and a 7% annual interest rate. The maturity term was later shortened to 10 
years, and the bonds were paid in full in 1972. For a brief summary of these bonds‘ cycle, see 
http://www.billetesargentinos.com.ar/articulos/bonos9dejulio.htm (last visited 04/15/2013). 
 
649 See Emergency Laws 23,982 (available at: http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-
4999/381/norma.htm; last visited 02/01/2012) and 25,344 (available at: 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/65000-69999/65053/norma.htm; last visited 
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measures of economic and monetary policy that imposed severe restrictions to property 
rights in the name of the common good. The list is almost endless, and it is not possible 
to cover them all here. Moreover, many of those measures may not be adequate to get a 
glimpse of a popular conception of constitutional property, due to their limited scope.   
I have chosen to focus, then, in the two last great economic crisis and the 
measures taken by democratic governments in their attempts to tame the crisis. I will 
analyze the hyperinflation crisis of 1988-1990, and the economic meltdown of 2001-
2002. Both events were tremendously salient, with pervasive effects, and the measures 
taken to attack the crises had a broad reach. Therefore, they are very good candidates to 
survey popular opinions on property rights, for everybody was affected one way or 
another by the crises and the emergency regimes aimed at controlling them. I will not 
cover every emergency measure in each cycle, but only those that had a larger social 
impact. 
This last cycle of economic crisis-emergency measures shows yet another change 
of conception of constitutional property. Large popular majorities ceased to be 
impressed by the unrestrained interventionist state and were claiming for a return to a 
situation of more respect for individual property. This can be seen clearly in the popular 
reactions to emergency measures taken in the late 1980‘s and early 2000‘s, both of which 
will be analyzed in-depth shortly. Moreover, such change of popular ideas regarding 
constitutional property was ratified by the 1994 constitutional amendments under 
Menem, which despite attempting a modernization of the rights part of the Constitution, 
left untouched the venerable property clauses, which date back to 1853. In this context, 
                                                                                                                                            
02/01/2012) (both establishing the consolidation of public debt and its restructuring through state bonds 
with maturities between 10 and 16 years). 
 
650 See, e.g., Emergency Law 23,549 (available at: 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/15000-19999/16090/norma.htm; last visited 
02/01/2012) (establishing a system of forced savings, where individuals and legal entities had to pay certain 
amounts and the State would pay them back in sixty months with a variable, but negative, interest rate). 
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deferential judicial decisions, upholding the emergency regimes, became increasingly 
countermajoritarian, in the sense that they were contrary to popular ideas on the topics 
informing the understanding of the inviolability of property.  
At the same time, a new, different kind of difficulty began to surface: the 
regressive redistribution systematically produced as a consequence of the emergency 
measures eroded the perception of fairness in public burdens sharing and, by doing so, 
undermined the legitimacy of courts who were purportedly applying constitutional rules 
that mandated otherwise.651 Two parallel difficulties plagued the activities of elected 
branches and courts during these episodes: an upside-down version of the classic 
countermajoritarian difficulty, where courts act in a countermajoritarian fashion by 
deferring to Congress and the Executive,652 and the regressive redistribution difficulty. The 
latter could end up being yet another version of the former, insofar as a perception of 
unfairness in the distribution of the cost of the crises became widespread. But, of course, 
both difficulties need not coincide: a large majority could support regressive 
redistributions, e.g. from an insular and poor minority towards the richer majority, and 
normatively-speaking we would still face a difficulty, although not one based on the 
opposition to majoritarian preferences or judgments. In the case of Argentina, where the 
Constitution mandates that equality is the basis for the allocation of public burdens 
                                                 
651 Article 16 of the Constitution prescribes that ― […] Equality is the basis of taxation and public 
burdens‖. 
 
652 Corina Barrett Lain has recently defended a slightly different ―upside-down‖ theory of judicial review, 
based upon the U.S. experience. In her version, courts sometimes act in a pro-majoritarian way by striking 
down laws. In my version, courts frequently act in a countermajoritarian way by deferring to political 
branches. See Corinna Barrett Lain, ―Upside-Down Judicial Review‖, 101 Geo. L. J. 113, 168 (2012) 
(arguing that ―[w]hen widespread attitudes change but the law does not, pressure builds to effectuate that 
change—to give force of law to the transformation of attitudes, values, and policy preferences occurring in 
larger society. Sometimes the Supreme Court is the most conducive outlet through which this change can 
occur. Free of the legislative logjams that stymie the representative branches, and moved by majoritarian 




(article 16), the difficulty is not merely philosophical or political, but constitutional as 
well. Let us examine the historical facts that support my story. 
 
b. The Attempts to Tame Hyperinflation and Their Impact on Property Rights.  
During the 1980s, Argentina suffered recurrent inflationary crises that ended up 
in hyperinflation in 1989.653 Alfonsín‘s administration took a few emergency measures 
that interfered with property rights in the constitutional sense. The first took place in 
1985, when Alfonsín tried to tame inflation with his ―Austral Plan‖. The plan comprised 
a diverse set of measures, including the momentous decision to replace the monetary 
sign in force (peso argentino) with a new one (australes), but an important part of it was 
trying to eliminate inflationary expectations, which were believed to play an important 
role in the skyrocketing spiral of prices.654 Many, if not most, contractual obligations 
included clauses that attempted to save the agreement from the erosive effects of the 
expected inflation —basically, indexation clauses—. Such clauses were to be nullified, in 
accordance with the economic policy. Therefore, all pending obligations were subject to 
desagio —de-indexation—. They were to be paid in the new currency, in accordance with 
a conversion rate established by the same emergency decree that eliminated indexation in 
contracts. The administration‘s argument was that the unforeseen and abrupt elimination 
                                                 
653 See, e.g., Peter Bernholz, ―Monetary Constitution, Political-Economic Regime, and Long-Term 
Inflation‖, 12 Const. Polit. Econ. 3, 4 (2001) (listing Argentina‘s inflationary crisis of 1989/1990 among the 
20th century‘s hyperinflations). 
 
654 See Introductory presidential message to Emergency Decree 1096/86 (arguing that obligations ―contain 
strong inflationary expectations, as evidenced by high nominal interest rates and the strong existing 
premiums over cash transactions‖) (available at 
http://digesto.smandes.gov.ar/digesto.nsf/f937dc853f70ff5e0325676e0001a15c/9a01337025c144d4c1256
7e400172cf8?OpenDocument; last visited 02/01/2012).  
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of inflation to be brought about by the ―Austral plan‖ would make such clauses the 
instrument for unjust transferences of wealth from debtors to creditors.655  
The economic plan was initially successful, but its effects did not last long.656 In 
1986, inflation was again a huge social problem that haunted the Alfonsín administration. 
Still, there was not much litigation over the constitutionality of desagio,657 and when the 
Court finally upheld it, in April, 1989,658 it was almost yesterday‘s news. Cortés Conde 
speculates that people reacted favorably due to ―the drama of the circumstances, the 
novelty of the instruments, especially desagio […] and the promise that the Central Bank 
would not issue money‖.659 Moreover, the Court had left open the possibility of 
excluding obligations from desagio if it was proved that they did not contain inflationary 
expectations.660 Hence, the people may have perceived less of an interference with their 
property rights, and at all events, a sort of interference that did not contradict the 
popular understanding of the inviolability of property. Contracts were modified by law in 
order to adjust them to the new non-inflationary situation. If the no-inflation assumption 
                                                 
655 Id. 
 
656 Roberto Cortés Conde above n. 396, at 276-283 (explaining the inicial success and posterior failure of 
the aconomic plan); Pablo Gerchunoff & Lucas Llach, EL CICLO DE LA ILUSIÓN Y EL 
DESENCANTO: UN SIGLO DE POLÍTICAS ECONÓMICAS ARGENTINAS 399-405 (Buenos 
Aires, Ariel, 1998) (same). See also Mario Rapoport, HISTORIA ECONÓMICA POLÍTICA Y SOCIAL 
DE LA ARGENTINA (1880-2003) 742-750 (Buenos Aires, Ariel, 2006) (same). 
 
657 See Alberto B. Bianchi, above n. 579, at 106, esp. fn 75-76 (arguing that the desagio did not give rise to 
many questions of constitutionality, and that the large majority of lawsuits involving its application did not 
present constitutional challenges to the emergency decree). 
 
658 CSJN, Porcelli, Luis v. Banco de la Nación Argentina, 312 Fallos 555 (1989) (upholding the de-indexation 
mechanism established by the Emergency Decree 1096/85 insofar as it was not proved that the purchasing 
power of the amount converted in accordance to the decree was inferior to the purchasing power of the 
originally agreed interests, had inflation remained in levels similar to the one existing at the celebration of 
the contract). 
 
659 Roberto Cortés Conde above n. 396, at 278. 
 
660 See, e.g., CSJN, Cantarelli, 311 Fallos 1144 (1988). 
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obtained, there was going to be no actual encroachment of rights, but their effective 
realization in a new context. Theoretically, at least, no actual reduction of capital was to 
be involved, and therefore, inviolability would be preserved. 
Alfonsín also implemented a system of forced savings to attack inflation, the idea 
being that the administration could avoid issuing money if it had access to the additional 
resources generated by the forced savings scheme. People and companies whose income 
was above a certain threshold were obliged to pay the State a percentage of the income 
tax, and the State would pay it back in 60 months time, with a low interest rate that 
ended up being clearly negative in the face of the persistent inflation. Thus, the supposed 
forced savers ended up with much less purchasing power than what they had given the 
State. The system had a few editions. The last one, in 1988, had a very low threshold: 
those who paid more than 500 australes of income tax had to pay an additional 40 percent 
over their income taxes.661 When the bill was debated in Congress, Senator Aguirre 
Lanari, among others, objected that the forced saving would be unconstitutional, because 
there were no circumstances of emergency that justified the exceptional measure and 
because it was sure to be a confiscation of funds, as ―a nominal capital, eroded by the 
increasing inflation, will be given back, and the interests, due to their meager amount, in 
no way can represent an adequate compensation that preserves the capital‖.662 He 
insisted on the old conception of constitutional property, according to which while 
temporary restrictions, and the ensuing deprivations of gains, are permissible under 
certain circumstances, losses of capital could not be constitutionally imposed: 
                                                 
661 See, e.g., ―Las aristas del paquete impositivo. Alfonsín promulgará esta semana los nuevos impuestos‖, 
Ámbito Financiero, January, 11, 1988, at 6 (arguing that ―it was a very low tax base‖). 
 
662 ―La polémica en el Senado al debatir la reforma fiscal‖, Ámbito Financiero, January, 11, at 6 (quoting 
Senator Juan Ramón Aguirre Lanari). 
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―A requisition of money cannot be done unless certain inexcusable conditions are 
met: i.e., to give back the exact amount, without inflicting any economic harm to 
the citizens‖663 
 
Other representatives defended the same view. Deputy Carlos Zaffore, for 
instance, argued that the forced savings could not be really considered a saving at all 
because ―the capital is not indexated and [the regime‘s conditions] are light-years away 
from the conditions of the financial market‖.664 
Senator Solari Yrigoyen, a member of the governing party, defended the 
measures as unavoidable to control inflation, but admitted that the forced savings were 
not ―beneficial to the savers‖.665 There was popular tension as Congress debated the law, 
due to the ―notorious lack of disposition‖ of the population to accept the fiscal package, 
which was to be especially hard on middle-income individuals.666 Businesses were also 
affected and the Coordinadora de Actividades Mercantiles Empresarias, a business organization, 
complained that ―the State appropriates the regressive income distribution carried out, plus an 
additional portion of the gains of companies and individuals‖.667 Similar criticisms were 
                                                 
663 Id. 
 
664 Carlos Zaffore, ―La reforma impositiva y la desactivación de la bomba‖, Ámbito Financiero, January, 14, 
at 11. 
 
665 ―La polémica en el Senado al debatir la reforma fiscal‖, Ámbito Financiero, January, 11, at 6 (quoting 
Senator Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen). 
 
666 Pablo Kandel, ―Tensión por mayores impuestos‖, Clarín, January, 9, at 10. 
 
667 ―Documento de empresarios mercantiles. Es el descontrol fiscal‖, January, 11, 1988, at 9 (citing a 
statement issued by the Coordinadora de Actividades Mercantiles Empresarias). But see ―Para entender la guerra 
impositiva‖, Página 12, January, 10, 1988, at 12-13 (denouncing a strong lobby of the business chambers to 
prevent tax raises from happening and citing off-the-record legislative advisors in the Peronist party saying 
that most of the approved measures did not have distributively regressive effects). 
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advanced by other social actors, mainly businesses and farmer‘s associations who had 
higher stakes than individuals in passage of the comprehensive tax legislation.668 
Ultimately, the Peronists —who controlled the majority of the provinces and had 
an interest in getting funds for them—669 and the Radicals —who had to support 
Alfonsín‘s administration‘s need for funding— reached an agreement and the debate was 
ended.670 There were attempts to enforce strict party discipline on the vote, and the law 
was passed over the protests of many representatives who voted for it.671 The majority 
had their way, the pressing necessities of the administration and the conveniences of the 
opposition prevailed, and the forced savings regime was enacted for one last time. 
Still, and as much as they were disliked by the population, forced savings were 
probably perceived as an additional income tax and, hence, were not limited by the idea 
that reductions of capital are impermissible. People are used to all sort of taxes that do 
                                                 
668 See, e.g., ―Dura crítica de la CIMT a las leyes impositivas‖, Crónica, January, 13, 1988, at 15 (reporting 
the attack by Chamber of Steel Industry of Tucumán, which considered a problem of forced savings that 
the capital would be diminished by the time of the restitution); ―Desagrado de Carbap por la mayor 
presión tributaria‖, La Nación, January, 14, 1988, at 18 (reporting that the Confederación de Asociaciones Rurales 
de Buenos Aires y La Pampa considered the forced savings regime unconstitutional and that the Confederaciones 
Rurales Argentinas would analyze the subject in detail). 
 
669 Congress had at the same time enacted a new law regulating the distribution of federally-collected taxes 
and forced savings were a part of the fiscal federal deal. See ―Un avance para cortar el deficit‖, January, 9, 
1988, at 1, 7 (interviewing Secretary of Finances Mario Brodersohn who explained that the new measures 
represented funds for 4,35% of the GDP, and that 1,03% -some 23.67% of the funds- would be destined 
to the provinces). 
 
670 See, e.g., Carlos Zaffore, above n. 664, at 11 (arguing that as a Deputy he had been prevented from 
presenting his views on the bill as a consequence of the agreement reached by Deputies Jaroslavsky —
U.C.R.— and Manzano —Peronism—). See also ―Una aprobación con muchos reparos‖, Clarín, January, 
9, at 5 (quoting Deputy Manuel Vidal, saying that ―it is not healthy for the life of the democracy‖ that 
representatives are forced to act on such important matters under the pressure of urgency and depending 
on agreements —presumably, the Jaroslavsky-Manzano agreement- of which ―we have been neither a part 
of, nor have been consulted on‖—); ―Alsogaray: las leyes impositivas son un esfuerzo sin esperanza‖, La 
Nación, January, 14, 1988, at 14 (quoting Álvaro Alsogaray, president of the political party Unión de Centro 
Democrático, accused Peronists and Radicales of agreeing in ―this exaction‖) 
 
 
671 See, e.g., ―Una aprobación con muchos reparos‖, Clarín, January, 9, at 5.  
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reduce the value of their holdings. This was, in the end, the argument used by the 
Supreme Court to uphold the forced saving laws many years later:672 
―[…] there was a widespread perception in the community [that forced savings 
were] a tax figure, in the understanding that, as legislated, the regime not only 
implied a temporary curtailment of a portion of the individuals‘ wealth, but also 
the high probability that such a restriction had a definitive nature, because of the 
insufficiency of the interest set by the legislature to compensate deterioration of 
the monetary unit's purchasing power. This overall perception eventually 
coincided with the undeniable reality […]‖673 
 
Justice Boggiano went as far as to argue that  
―[…] the community did not trust the claims some of their representatives in the 
sense that the system of forced savings sanctioned integral restitution […] several 
of the views held in Congress were only an illusion that failed to convince the 
large majority of its recipients‖674 
 
Forced savings were a tax, and a benevolent one at that, since the regime 
provided for the restitution of part of the taxes paid, and the only constitutional limit was 
that the tax could not be ―confiscatory‖ —i.e., could not absorb a ―substantial part‖ of 
the taxed capital or profit—.675 
This measure was not very successful at controlling inflation either, and 
Alfonsin‘s government entered a free-fall phase, with inflation turning into hyperinflation 
and social problems on the rise. 
Shackled by the deep economic crisis and the ensuing social unrest, Alfonsín was 
forced to turn over power to elected president Menem six months in advance, in July 
                                                 
672 CSJN, Horvath, 318 Fallos 676 (1995) (upholding the first forced savings law, Law #23,256) and CSJN, 
Indo, 318 Fallos 785 (1995) (upholding the second forced savings law, Law # 23,549). 
 
673 318 Fallos 676 (1995) (Belluscio, López, Bossert, JJ., plurality opinion, §12; Nazareno, Levene, JJ., 
concurring, §12; Boggiano, J. dissenting in part, §28). 
 
674 318 Fallos 676 (1995) (Boggiano, J., dissenting in part, §28). 
 
675 318 Fallos 676 (1995) (Belluscio, López, Bossert, JJ., plurality opinion, §25; Nazareno, Levene, JJ., 
concurring, §25; Moliné O‘Connor, J., dissenting in part, §24, 31-32; Boggiano, J. dissenting in part, §23). 
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1989. At first, Menem had difficulties controlling the crisis. Several measures were 
attempted unsuccessfully.676 In the high-inflation context of the time, people had 
basically two alternatives to preserve the value of their savings:677 to buy foreign currency 
(basically, U.S. dollars), or to find an ―investment‖ alternative that yielded a return rate 
higher than the inflation rate. Banks, in order to attract money to their vaults, offered 
increasingly high interest rates for very short-term deposits in australes, the national 
currency of the time. In the last weeks of 1989, interest rates on bank deposits reached a 
monthly 600%.678 Banks, in turn, were subject to Central Bank regulations that required 
them to deposit about 80% of the money they received from depositors in the Central 
Bank as cash reserves and non-disposable deposits.679  Such reserve accounts were paid 
even higher interest rates by the Central Bank,680 thus creating the so-called ―quasi-fiscal 
deficit‖, which at a point was larger than proper fiscal deficit.681 What was happening, in 
                                                 
676 See, e.g., Pablo Gerchunoff & Lucas Llach, above n. 656, 440-441 (arguing that in 1989 and 1990 there 
was scarcely any improvement in prices stabilization and that ―a year and a half into his mandate […] 
Menem had not achieved any lasting success‖ in controlling inflation). See also Mario Rapoport, above n. 
656, at 786-789 (describing the failure of Menem‘s first attempts at stabilizing the economy and controlling 
inflation). 
 
677 In such a context, the use of the word ―saving‖, while not technically imprecise, may be misleading: 
quite often people needed to preserve the value of their income from the tremendously rapid depreciation 
of the national currency, even if the money was intended to be used within a very short term (e.g, because 
it came from wages and it was destined to be used during the month. Thus, besides proper savings, 
destined for future consumption, there were short-term savings, to be used at a later moment in the same 
month.  
 
678 See, e.g., ―Año nuevo, plan Erman González nuevo‖, Clarín, Suplemento Económico, January, 7, 1990, 
at 12. 
 
679 See Alfredo Zaiat, ―Los cierres y despidos se pasean por la city‖, Página 12, January, 7, 1990, at 4-5 
(citing Central Bank figures for October 1989 according to which 82,1% of the deposits made in 
commercial banks were, in turn, deposited in the Central Bank). 
 
680 Needless to say, banks, in the meantime, were profiting from this policy, given the spread between the 
interest rates they paid depositors and the interest rates they received from the Central Bank. 
 
681 Roberto Cortés Conde above n. 396, at 276 (explaining quasi-fiscal deficit as ―the difference between 
interest payments that the Central Bank made on reserves and frozen deposits (depósitos indisponibles) and 
those that it received from rediscounts to the public sector or the financial system‖). 
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fact, was that the Government was funding itself with the depositors‘ money682 —at a 
very high interest rate. The situation was very problematic for the administration. 
Although it did not pay in cash a substantial portion of the interests it owed the banks, its 
nominal debt grew at a very fast pace. At the same time, the part of the interests that it 
did pay went to circulation, exacerbating the inflationary problem. Decisive action was 
necessary. 
In December, 18, the Menem administration announced a new economic team, 
headed by the new Minister of Economy, Antonio Erman González. The new 
authorities, including the Erman González himself and the President of the Central 
Bank, promised publicly that bank deposits would be respected as far as amounts, terms, 
and conditions were concerned.683 
 Barely ten days after, in December, 28, 1989, however, a bank holiday was 
declared.684 Shortly after, in January, 3, 1990, Menem issued emergency decree 36/90, 
declaring that all fixed-term deposits in excess of one million australes were to be repaid in 
national bonds nominated in dollars, subject to LIBOR interests over a 10-year maturity 
                                                 
682 See ―Coloring the Currency‖, The Economist, March, 24, 1990, at 71 (estimating that around four-fifths of 
the total 7-day bank deposits were borrowed by the Government); see also Guillermo Rozenwurcel & 
Leonardo Bleger, ―El sistema bancario argentino en los noventa: de la profundización financiera a la crisis 
sistémica‖, 37 Desarrollo Económico 163, 164 (1997) (arguing that deposits in the banking system at the time 
of the ―Bonex plan‖ were basically short-term financing for the Government due to the high minimum 
cash positions mandated by the Central Bank). 
 
683 See, e.g., Daniel Artana & Enrique Szewach, ―La gran estafa de no bajar el gasto‖, Cronista, January, 4, 
1990, at 4 (stating that both the Minister of Economy and the President of the Central Bank announced 
that bank deposits would be respected in their amounts, terms of restitution, and other contractual 
conditions); Luis García Martínez, ―El camino de la desintegración social‖, La Nación, January, 7, 1990, at 3 
(arguing that the new authorities ―promised […] the respect of fixed-term deposits‖); Francisco A. 
Mezzadri, ―El futuro es hoy‖, La Nación, January, 14, at 3 (quoting the authorities‘ speech of December, 18, 
1989, according to which ―the maturities of time-deposits, [the amounts in] savings accounts, as well as 
other banking operations will be respected, and no reduction of capital, de-indexation, or restriction to the 
disposability of such funds will be imposed‖). 
 
684 The banks would not re-open until the ―Bonex plan‖ was firmly in place. See Pablo Kandel, ―Los 
lamentos que más se escucharon‖, Clarín, January, 5, 1990, at 4 (reporting on the situation in banks after 
―three days of forced banking holidays‖). 
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term and with a 3-year grace period in which no payments of capital were to be made.685 
Moreover, a de-indexation mechanism was applied to bank deposits, but not to bank 
credits. Basically, it meant that deposits were to be frozen at their December, 28, amount, 
without any further interest during the bank holiday, while banks would be able to charge 
interests during the same period. It was called asymmetric desagio. It might impress as 
fairly irrelevant, as it comprised only seven days, but once one takes into account that 
time-deposit interest-rates were as high as 600% a month (and banks charged as much as 
1,200% in their loans),686 the picture changes radically. Clarín estimated that banks would 
save some 230 million dollars in unpaid interest to depositors.687 
The measures were popularly known as ―Bonex Plan‖, due to the centrality of the 
national bonds called ―Bonos Externos‖ (external bonds). It must be noticed that only 
extremely small deposits would be paid back in cash: the one million australes 
encompassed in the exception clause amounted to less than six hundred dollars.688 The 
plan had two main goals. First, to cut off the quasi-fiscal deficit,689 by substituting the 
                                                 
685 Other sorts of accounts and banking operations were included in the swap, but they are not relevant to 
the argument here. See articles 1 and 2, Decree 1427/89 (available at 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-4999/2212/norma.htm; last visited 01/06/2012), 
and article 1, Emergency Decree 36/90 (summary available at: 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=2559; last visited 01/09/2012; full text 
available at http://www.puntoprofesional.com/P/0650D/DECRETO_036-90.HTM; last visited 
01/09/2012).  
 
686 See ―Un esquema financiero que busca afianzarse‖, La Nación, January, 5, at 16 (reporting that, due to 
asymmetric desagio, banks were able to charge 1,200% to their debtors during the bank holiday while 
denying any interest for bank deposits after December 28, 1989). 
 
687 See Alejandro Matvejczuk, ―Aportan algunos detalles del desagio‖, Clarín, January, 4, at 4 (estimating 
the total amount in 460,000 million australes, roughly equivalent to 230 million dollars at a 2,000 australes per 
dollar exchange rate, corresponding to the last week of December, 1989) 
 
688 The deposits in australes were converted to bonds in dollars at a parity of 1,800 australes per dollar (see 
article 4, Emergency Decree 36/90), which reflected fairly closely the market value of the dollar at the time 
the bank holiday was declared, in December, 28, 1989. Therefore, 1,000,000 australes were roughly 
equivalent to 555 dollars.  
 
689 When announcing the measures to the population, Minister of Economy Erman González said that the 
State would reduce its deficit from 600 million dollars a month to roughly the same amount per year. See 
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LIBOR interest rate that the State would pay on the bonds for the extremely high 
interest rate it was paying on reserve accounts in the Central Bank. Second, to dry up the 
market, by making australes extremely scarce and, thus, preventing the fly to the dollar 
and making the national currency more valuable, in the hope of controlling inflation.690 
 Popular reactions to the measures hint at a reinstatement of the more traditional 
conception of constitutional property that had gained acceptance after the 1920s 
decisions on the constitutionality of the rent laws. They also point in another direction: 
the question of the distributive fairness of the measures begins to gain force here. The 
emergency regime was perceived as an attempt to tackle a very real and pressing necessity 
and, in that sense, as legitimate. It was expected that the administration did something. 
But the particular measures taken with deposits were largely deemed as unconstitutional, 
because they were perceived as inflicting losses on depositors and because they were 
thought to distribute unfairly the cost of the crisis. Let us see. 
Clarín reported that newspapers received  
―[…] multiple calls from savers outraged by what they described as a confiscation of 
savings, in some cases savings of a lifetime, and inquired about the chances [of 
success]  if they went to courts by writ of amparo‖691 
 
An article by a columnist in the same newspaper stressed that ―under the pretext 
of ending with the patria financiera, the State appropriated 1,800 million dollars from the 
savers‖.692 Another columnist argued that the ―the alleged attack on the patria financiera 
                                                                                                                                            
―Pagarán los plazos fijos con Bonos Externos 1989‖, El Cronista, January, 4, 1990, at 4 (citing Erman 
González); see also ―Después de un fin de año angustioso‖, La Nación, January, 3, 1990, at 11 (same). 
 
690 See, e.g., ―El Banco Central mantiene la aguda escasez de australes‖, Clarín, January, 8, 1990, at 3 
(explaining the intention of the monetary authority to keep australes scarce to control hyperinflation). 
 
691 ―Ahorristas preocupados‖, Clarín, Suplemento Económico, January, 6, at 4.  
 
692 Alejandro Matvejczuk, ―Ajetreo para la banca y la empresa‖, Clarín, January, 7, at 4. 
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has turned into a ‗boomerang‘ for all citizens who did any kind of operations in the 
financial system‖.693 
La Nación reported that the plan displayed a ―strong dose of authoritarianism on 
the part of the Central Bank‖, deciding on the ―benefits and losses of the citizens‖.694 It 
also emphasized that ―most financial analysts acknowledge that the freezing of interest 
accrual in December 28 implies a confiscation for savers in australes‖,695 and expressed its 
own view saying that  
―[w]hile the Minister‘s argument is that the banking system [inflation] 
expectations were excessive, which led to an increase in interest rates that made 
them unaffordable, it does not seem fair that savers are to bear the burden of such 
overvaluation‖696 
 
In the same newspaper, one commentator emphasized that the State had 
―expropriated a substantial part of the savings of millions of people (and not of a few 
speculators)‖ and that ―such an attack on the legitimate rights of many people is not the 
right path to restablish confidence in the legal order‖.697 Another one decried that ―an ad 
hoc technocracy did not hesitate to ignore […] property rights‖.698 
Another commentator had a different perception of the same phenomenon, and 
argued that the immediate loss that depositors suffered was nothing more than the 
                                                 
693 Daniel Muchnik, ―El sistema, con fragilidad‖, Clarín, Januar, 6, at 3. 
 
694 ―Un esquema financiero que busca afianzarse‖, La Nación, January, 5, at 16. 
 
695 Id. The italics are mine. 
 
696 Id. The italics are mine. 
 
697 Luis García Martínez, ―El camino de la desintegración social‖, La Nación, Suplemento Economía, 
January, 7, at 3. 
 
698 Francisco A. Mezzadri, ―El futuro es hoy‖, La Nación, Suplemento Económico, January, 14, at 3. 
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absorption of the ―violent interest rates‖ of the last week of 1989, and that once the 
people noticed that, a new scenario of stability might come into view.699 It was a 
distinctly minority position, and apparently, most people agreed with La Nación that such 
a distribution of burdens was not fair. Diario Popular, for instance, reported that savers 
expressed their outrage at the Menem administration measures and that they thought 
them to be ―a government‘s scam‖.700 
The Radical leader in the Chamber of Deputies, César Jaroslavsky, argued that the 
Administration was ―sucking up people‘s money‖.701 Socialist Deputy Silvia Mas 
complained bitterly that the plan was ―brutally recessive‖ and ―a massive confiscation of 
the middle class‖.702 Guillermo Francos, of the Federal Party, criticized severely the 
―confiscatory measures‖ over bank deposits in australes.703 The local Committee of the 
Unión Cívica Radical, the main opposition party, argued that the plan harmed ―small and 
medium savers‖ and that it was a violent and unjust measure.704 The people felt as if, 
literally, they were being stolen by what could be described as the ―pickpocket State‖.705 
                                                 
699 Raúl Clauso, ―Un plan audaz para observar atentamente‖, Cronista, January, 3, at 10. See also Horacio 
Verbitsky, ―Cuentos asombrosos‖, Página/12, January, 14, at 8-9 (arguing that the relative passivity of 
savers in the face of the clear confiscation might be explained by their perception that it was a risk 
accepted when they received astronomically-high interest rateson their deposits). 
 
700 See ―Con tensión y sin australes, el dólar bajó a 1.310‖, Diario Popular, January, 5, at 2 (quoting various 
depositors who were protesting in the Banks). 
 
701 See ―Nuevas reacciones por las medidas económicas‖, Clarín, January, 8, at 5 (quoting César 
Jaroslavsky). 
 
702 See ―Dispares opiniones sobre el plan‖, Clarín, January, 6, at 5 (quoting Silvia Mas). 
 
703 See ―Opiniones encontradas sobre el plan‖, Clarín, January, 7, at 21 (quoting Guillermo Francos). 
 
704 See ―Siguen las reacciones a las nuevas medidas económicas‖, Clarín, January, 8, at 5 (quoting the 
Committee). 
 
705 See ―De la histeria a la confusión‖, La Nación, Suplemento Económico, January, 7, at 2. 
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Even banks were worried about the likelihood of facing lawsuits by savers who 
understood that the compulsory swap violated their property rights.706 Average 
depositors must have perceived the plan as imposing on them a reduction of capital, as 
the long-term bonds were bound to sell way below par during considerable periods of 
time. And, remember, according to the conception of constitutional property that, I am 
arguing, had gained hold again, reductions of capital were impermissible. That this must 
have been an extended belief is further proved by the fact that presidential advisor 
Álvaro Alsogaray made an explicit appeal to the distinction between reductions of capital 
and deferments of maturities when he defended the plan publicly: 
―What has [the State] said to the savers who had their money in banks that, in 
turn, took it to the Central Bank? Gentlemen, we are bankrupt, we cannot pay, 
we have no resources to do it. Hence, we ask you to accept a deferment […] we 
guarantee it with Bonex. Your capital is now safe, but you will have to wait for a 
while‖707 
 
To make matters worse, large companies and the banks lobbied ferociously to get 
special benefits in the height of the crisis, which may have deepened the perception of 
distributive unfairness in the minds of many people. Large businesses attempted to 
liquefy their debts to the financial system by pushing for the possibility of paying the 
banks with bonex at their face value. They enjoyed the help of then-Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (and soon-to-be Minister of Finance) Domingo Cavallo. The plan ultimately 
failed, due to the strong opposition of the financial sector.708 The banks, in turn, 
managed to free themselves from paying interest on bank deposits during the bank 
                                                 
706 See ―Bancos: temor por acciones legales‖, Cronista, January, 3, at 4. 
 
707 ―Alsogaray: estamos abandonando el estatismo y el intervencionismo‖, La Nación, January, 3, at 1, 12 
(interviewing Alsogaray). The italics are mine. 
 
708 Alejandro Matvejczuk, ―Ajetreo para la banca y la empresa‖, Clarín Suplemento Económico, January, 7, at 4. 
See also ―No podrán cancelarse deudas con bónex‖, Clarín, January, 10, at 6 (explaining the lobbies and the 
outcome of the power struggle); ―No habrá pago de deudas con Bónex‖, Cronista, January, 9, at 5 (same). 
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holiday —no interest accrued during those days— while at the same time retained their 
legal ability to collect interest on their loans. Since the State decided not to pay interests 
on cash reserves and depósitos indisponibles either, the banks and the State made a good 
profit of about 350 million dollars that was split in roughly similar portions.709 
Popular humor also reflected the idea that the government was acting in 
impermissible ways. Taking advantage of the proximity of a popular Christian tradition 
for children, called the night of the Three Wise Men, in which children leave their shoes 
by the door at night and they receive gifts the next morning, an extremely well-known 
comic character, Clemente, explained 
―-There are people who bought dollars at 2000 and some [australes] last week, and 
just in case, deposited the rest of their money in time-deposits, and they got 
Bonex instead. Tonight they don‘t want to even leave their shoes because they 
are afraid that the Three Wise Men will come and take them‖.710 
 
La Nación printed a comic by Almeida where two men are having a heated 
argument in the street, each with a time-deposit certificate in their hand, and while they 
argue two long arms, coming from each side of the cartoon, are stealing from the men‘s 
pockets.711 The idea is that while people were seeing what to do with their monies, they 
were stolen.  
In a decidedly more grotesque fashion, Página/12 ran a comic that may have well 
depicted how the most vulnerable of bank depositors felt about the Bonex plan:712  
―Retiree: -Do you have suppositories?‖ 
                                                 
709 See ―Aportan algunos detalles del desagio‖, Clarín, January, 4, 1990, at 4 (providing slighlty lower figures 
in nacional currency). See also Alejandro Matvejczuk, ―Ajetreo para la banca y la empresa‖, Clarín 
Suplemento Económico, January, 7, at 4 (providing figures in U.S. dollars). 
 
710 Caloi, ―Clemente‖, Clarín, January, 5, 1990, at 44. 
 
711 Almeida, untitled comic, La Nación, January, 5, at 16. 
 
712 See Daniel Paz & Rudy, untitled comic in Página/12, January, 5, at 1. 
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―Pharmacist: -No, sorry, sir, all we have are bonex.‖ 
―Retiree:-Bonex? And how do you use them?‖ 
―Pharmacist:-In the same way suppositories are used.‖ 
 
Other comics in the same newspaper appealed to similar ideas. In one of them, a 
man has just made a deposit and he is telling a friend that he is not sure that it had been a 
wise decision. When the friend asks why, the man —holding the fixed-term deposit 
certificate with both hands— replies: ―Look what the small letter says: Foolish is he who 
deposits‖. At the same time, other two men are in the background, commenting on the 
situation of the depositor and the talk with his friend, which these two men have just 
witnessed. One of them, referring to the fixed-term deposit the depositors was holding in 
his hands, comments: ―And in the nights of full moon it [the deposit] becomes a bonex‖. 
The bank teller is depicted as a naughty fellow, laughing as having just conned the 
depositor.713 In another political satire story, two kids are having a conversation on the 
Three Wise Men‘s tradition: 
―Kid 1:-I‘m telling you, there are no Three Wise Men, it‘s the parents…‖ 
―Kid 2:-However, Carlitos‘ and Zulemita‘s dad [note: they were President 
Menem‘s children] is a president and a Magician-King [as the Three Wise Men are 
considered in the tradition]‖ 
―Kid 1:-Who told you that?‖ 
―Kid 2:-My dad. He says the Government reached into his pocket and took all of 
his money without his noticing it‖ 
―Kid 1:-Did Government return the money later?‖ 




―Kid 2:-Yes, but the trick does not end there. The most magical thing is that my dad 
had the same amount of money as before, but it was worth only half [of its previous value]‖ 
―Kid 1:-Awesome!‖ 
―Kid 2:-And he‘s not the only one. My dad told that there was once a minister-
magician who turned the peso into poop.‖ 
―Kid 1:-And now there‘s another one who turned the australes into Bonex.‖ 
―Kid 2:-Another one? My dad told me that it‘s the same guy. That‘s another 
magical skill ministers have: they look different, but they are all the same.‖ 
―Kid 1:-I insist: the parents are the Three Wise Men.‖ 
―Kid 2:-No, sir, the Three Wise Men [in the Spanish tradition, they are Magician-
Kings, with kings being important in this part of the story] are the Government […]‖714 
 
Many people felt that their savings were exchanged for bonds that weren‘t worth 
the paper they were printed on,715 at the same time that bigger players, wealthier 
individuals and companies were spared the burdens of trying to control inflation and 
were even benefitted by the measures. 
A comic by Carlos Basurto, printed in La Nación, depicted both presidential 
advisor Álvaro Alsogaray —who was thought to be one of the masterminds behind the 
Bonex plan and had been involved in another bond-based emergency plan in the early 
1960s— and Minister of Foreign Relations Domingo Cavallo —who was about the 
become Minister of Finance and had antecedents in instances of nationalization of 
private debt as a former President of the Central Bank— as peeling fresh fruits with their 
hands, with a couple of blenders in sight. A sign above their heads read ―Especialidad en 
                                                 
714 Rudy, ―Privilegiados‖, Página/12, January, 6, frontpage of section Sátira/12. The italics are mine. 
 
715 Although time would eventually prove them wrong on this score. 
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licuados‖ —translated, ―We specialize in smoothies‖, but the word play in Spanish also 
means ―We specialize in liquefaction‖, pointing towards debt liquefaction—.716 The 
public perceived that big players were, once again, attempting to make a profit out of the 
crisis situation. 
Even though the effects of the compulsory conversion of deposits into long-term 
bonds reached even the most modest sectors of the population,717 the emergency 
discourse sang a different song: the plan had been an attack on speculation,718 the end of 
the patria financiera,719 and a novelty in that ―for the first time in forty years the 
contribution to overcome the crisis will be made by the well-to-do‖.720 As it was to be 
                                                 
716 See Carlos Basurto, ―Deuda interna‖, La Nación, January, 8, at 8. 
 
717 Notice that even those who did not have any sort of savings were hit by the measures. People in the 
informal economy (street vendors, people performing services for a tip, etc.) depend centrally on the 
availability of national currency and, thus, they suffered an indirect, yet strong, blow when those who 
usually bought goods or services from them did not have australes to spend. On the immediate shortage of 
currency caused by the ―Bonex plan‖, see, e.g., ―El Banco Central mantiene la aguda escasez de australes‖, 
Clarín, January, 8, 1990, at 3 (explaining the intention of the monetary authority to keep australes scarce to 
control hyperinflation). 
 
718 See, among others, ―Respaldo empresarial a las medidas‖, Clarín, January, 2, 1990, at 5 (quoting Alberto 
Iribarne, then president of the National Congress of the Small and Medium Size Firms saying that the plan 
made the speculative sectors bear the costs of the measures, and quoting Deputy Eduardo Varela Cid, in 
the same line of thought); ―El nuevo plan hará pagar el ajuste a los especuladores‖, La Prensa, January, 3, 
1990, at 5 (quoting Alberto Iribarne, same statements as Clarín). 
 
719 The expression patria financiera was used to refer to a sector of the population that, allegedly, lived on the 
rents produced by speculative financial devices, instead of working or engaging in productive investments. 
One of the most used speculative operations was to ―jump‖ between short-term deposits in national 
currency and purchases of U.S. dollars: ―With seven day or shorter interest periods, customers would cash 
in their investments, buy more dollars with their profit, and force the value of the dollar higher, requiring 
the banks to offer even higher interest rates to attract depositors. Prices were, all the while, rising, as the 
value of the local currency deteriorated‖, William C. Banks & Alejandro D. Carrió, ―Presidential Systems 
Under Stress: Emergency Powers in Argentina and the United Syates‖, 15 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1, 40 (1993). For 
statements that the measures aimed at ending the opportunities for the patria financiera, see ―Ahora hay que 
pasar el verano‖, Página/12, January, 3, 1990, at 2-3 (quoting presidential advisor Álvaro Alsogaray). See 
also ―Cautela de políticos y empresarios frente a los anuncios de Erman González‖, La Prensa, January, 2, 
1990, at 4 (quoting right-wing deputy Federico Zamora saying that ―it seems that once and for all a 
decision has been made to exterminate the rats that inhabit the caves of the patria financiera‖).  
 
720 Statements of Roberto Azaretto, then a member of the Alianza de Centro, a coalition that supported the 
neoliberal orientation of President Menem‘s reforms. See ―Nuevas repercusiones acerca de las medidas 
económicas‖, La Nación, January, 3, 1990, at 10 (quoting Azaretto); see also ―Respaldo empresarial a las 
medidas‖, Clarín, January, 2, at 5 (same). Interestingly enough, Azaretto‘s statements were an open 
admission of the distributively-regressive character of previous emergency plans. 
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expected, the rhetoric of the ―common good‖ and the ―general interest‖ had a significant 
place in the discourse. The President of the Sociedad Rural Argentina, an important center 
of lobby on behalf of large farmers, took up the flag of the ―general interest‖, stating that 
while ―very respectable individual interests may feel harmed, it is inevitable to put the 
general interest first‖.721 A similar line of argument was advanced by the intellectual 
leaders of the Partido Justicialista, who argued that the Administration had acted ―to the 
detriment of individuals, but in defense of the public good‖.722 What is most interesting is 
the emphasis on the supposedly egalitarian, and even progressive, character of the 
measures, which was trumpeted by figures standing in different points of the political 
spectrum. Minister of Labor Jorge Triaca claimed that ―this time, everybody contributes 
in the fight against hyperinflation […] It was time that the adjustments variables moved 
from salaries to speculation‖.723 The then governing party, Partido Justicialista, gave full 
public support to the measures through a message by one the leaders of the party in 
Congress, Deputy José Luis Manzano, who took the opportunity to stress that the 
measures would be ―resisted by the privileged few‖724 and that 
―[t]hose who have nothing to eat, those who face grave difficulties, they have 
already made contributions to social peace […] Those who had large deposits, 
                                                                                                                                            
 
721 See ―Opiniones de empresarios‖, La Nación, January, 2, at 12 (quoting Guillermo Alchourrón). 
 
722 See ―El Parlamento busca rol en el Plan Bónex‖, Cronista, January, 8, at 4 (citing unnamed ―Peronist 
theorists‖). 
 
723 ―Esta vez todos aportan contra la hiperinflación‖, La Prensa, January, 7, 1990, at 5 (quoting Jorge 
Triaca). 
 




the big savers, and the banks will have to show the same behavior as the rest of 
the community‖725 
 
But was it really so? Was it really the case that large depositors, banks, and —in 
short— the well-off were the ones to bear the weight of the emergency plan? It seems 
fairly obvious that the relatively weak and poor, as well as the less-informed, would be 
the ones to bear the heaviest burden. For some time, the bonds were sold in the 
secondary market at a heavy discount, equivalent to the present value of the credit.726 
Initially, they traded at 40% of their nominal value, reaching an all-time low of 29% 
during March 1990,727 and slowly regaining their value over time.728 By definition, those 
with fewer resources were more likely to sell their bonds to provide for needs and 
expenses they could not afford otherwise. Relatively poor or needy depositors were 
unlikely to be able to wait ten years (or even three years, until amortization of capital 
began). The likely purchasers of those bonds had to be, again almost by definition, 
                                                 
725 ―El PJ dio un aval completo a la gestión económica del gobierno‖, La Prensa, January, 4, 1990, at 4 
(quoting José Luis Manzano). 
 
726 See Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 16-21, 669-
699 (New York, The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2000) (explaining the concepts of present value, net 
present value, the opportunity cost of capital, and the general mechanics of debt valuation). 
 
727 See ―De todo en 30 días‖, Clarín, Suplemento Económico, March, 31, 1990, at 10 (describing the ups-
and-downs in the prices of Bonex during March and mentioning the price at which they were traded 
initially). 
 
728 By mid-1991, the bonds had reached a respectable price, nearing 70% of their nominal value. However, 
the capital loss to the depositors was still quite large, as the accummulated inflation for the January, 1990-
June, 1991 period reached 2,514% and the Convertibility Plan (April, 1991) had established a fixed parity 
of 10,000 australes per dollar. Therefore, someone with an original deposit of 5 million australes received 
bonds for some 2,777 dollars, which if sold at the time (at 70% of their face value) would have 
commanded something close to 1,944 dollars (or 19,444,444 australes, according to the Convertibility Plan). 
Considering the accummulated inflation, the purchasing power the original deposit had in January, 1990, 
was equivalent to 125,700,000 australes (5,000,000 australes adjusted by an inflation rate of 2,514%). A 
depositor who had to sell at the time recovered something close to the 15.46% of the purchasing power of 
her original deposit. The loss was, thus, close to an 85% even a year and a half into the plan. The Bonex 
prices and the accummulated inflation are taken from Luis García Martínez, in Germán J. Bidart Campos, 
Néstor P. Sagués, Luis García Martínez & Horacio A. García Belsunce, ―El plan Bonex y los derechos 
adquiridos (causa ‗Peralta, Luis A. y otro c/Estado Nacional‘)‖, XXVI Anales de la Academia Nacional de 
Derecho y Ciencias Sociales de Buenos Aires 113, 125 (1991) (making a similar example). 
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people with enough spare resources to invest, wait, and make a profit. Therefore, the 
relatively worse-off bore the capital losses, while the well-to-do enjoyed the 
corresponding gains.729  
In order to see how the measures burdened especially the lower middle class and, 
in general, more vulnerable savers, consider the profile of the average depositor caught 
by the ―Bonex plan‖. The average deposit in the banking system must have been 
somewhere around 1,965 dollars.730 Hardly enough to make its owner qualify, per se, as a 
                                                 
729 See, e.g., Héctor Juan Rubini, ―Encajes fraccionarios remunerados por el Banco Central. La experiencia 
argentina (1977-1989)‖, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad del 
Salvador Documento de Investigación #2 1, 35 (Dec., 2010) (available at 
http://www.usalvador.com.ar/fce/informes/doc2.pdf; last visited 01/12/2012) (arguing that the 
certificates for BONEX that the savers received in the beginning were frequently purchased by the banks 
at 20% of their face value, therefore savers sustained losses of up to 80% of their capital).  
 
730 Unfortunately, Central Bank figures for different segments of deposits, according to their amounts, are 
available only from 1995 on. So I have had to dig into other sources to attempt a reconstruction of the 
average depositor caught by the emergency measures. According to these sources, at the moment of the 
emergency decree 36/90, there were about 4,600,000,000,000 australes in deposits reached by the 
compulsory swap. Of them, 1,300,000,000,000 would be repaid in cash, which means that they consisted of 
deposits of 1,000,000 or less australes. A simple mathematical operation shows that there were some 
1,300,000 deposits (1,300,000,000,000 total australes to be paid back in cash divided by 1,000,000 australes —
the top limit for restitution of deposits in cash—). If the total amount of australes was 4,600,000,000,000 
and the maximum number of deposits was 1,300,000, then the average deposit was 3,538,461 australes 
(4,600,000,000,000 divided by 1,300,000), which amounted to 1,965 dollars (3,538,461 divided by 1,800 —
the conversion rate set by article 4 of the Emergency Decree 36/90—, see above n. 688). For simplicity‘s 
sake, I have considered that every austral to be repaid in cash corresponded to a deposit of 1,000,000 
australes or more. It is clear that there may have been many deposits of less than 1,000,000 australes, which 
should have been completely repaid in cash, thus making the number of total deposits reached by the 
measures larger. However, this would only make my argument stronger, as the average deposit would be 
smaller than the 1,965 dollars I have considered in the text. Also, I have not considered in the calculations 
the amount to be repaid in cash in excess of 1,000,000 australes per deposit, corresponding to amounts 
destined to payments of employees‘ salaries or social securitiy‘s contributions corresponding to December 
1989 and other exceptions such as judicially-mandated deposits (article 1, Emergency Decree 36/90). I 
have not found any estimates as to what proportion these exempted deposites represented over the total 
amount to be repaid in cash. Still, I think the calculation made above holds even when considering this lack 
of information, if one assumes these exemptions of over 1,000,000 australes are canceled out by considering 
both the deposits of less than 1,000,000 australes and the joint deposits mentioned by presidential advisor 
Álvaro Alsogaray (where each individual‘s contribution may have been of less than 1,000,000 australes) as 
deposits of 1,000,000 australes or more (see below n. 732). For the figures used in these calculations, see 
―Los números del plan Cavallo. Duras pugnas financieras‖, Clarín, January, 9, 1990, at 7 (stating that a 
proposal by then-Foreign Relations Minister and soon-to-be Minister of Economy Domingo Cavallo, 
being considered by the Central Bank at the time, relied on there being a total amount of 4,600,000,000,000 
australes to be converted in bonds and 1,300,000,000,000 to be repaid in cash). For other, probably less 
precise, estimates that do not alter substantially the calculations, see ―Abren la temporada del Bónex 89‖, 
Página 12, January, 4, 1990, at 2 (early speculation that the total amount to be repaid in cash would be about 
1,000,000,000,000 australes, which in turn would have been close to one-third of the total deposits reached 
by the emergency measure) (this figures would imply an even lower average deposit, of some 3,000,000 
australes, equalling 1,666 dollars); see also ―Respaldan el programa económico‖, Clarín, January, 31, 1990, 
at 16 (citing versions that Minister Erman González would have told the Senate that in December 28, 
1990, the total amount in fixed-term deposits reached some 4,000,000,000,000 australes).   
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member of the wealthy classes.731 Not only that, but also many people —usually co-
workers— made joint deposits, meaning that some deposits represented the even smaller 
savings of a larger number of people.732 People who had received sums of money as 
redresses for, say, physical injuries suffered in accidents, or severance payments became 
subject to a long-term credit restructuring.733 Those with better information and 
resources were either rescued by their own banks though illegal means in the middle of 
the chaos of the emergency,734 or were not exposed to the risk because, e.g., they had 
purchased dollars and kept them in foreign accounts or private vaults.735   
                                                                                                                                            
 
731 Minister of Economy Erman González went to the Senate on January, 30, 1990, to search for legislative 
support of the emergency decree. When Senator Conrado Storani, concerned about the injustice the decree 
caused to smaller depositors, asked González whether he knew what proportion of the total deposits 
belonged to small and medium savers and what proportion belonged to large savers, González replied that 
such information could not be obtained, as many large investors had resorted to making a large number of 
small amount fixed-term deposits. See ―Respaldan el programa económico‖, Clarín, January, 31, 1990, at 16 
(citing versions that reported González‘s interaction with the senators). González‘s explanation is 
implausible. It is hard to believe that the Central Bank could not gather, from each bank, the number of 
deposits that each individual had in each banking institution. Moreover, it is unlikely that someone with, 
say, 1,800,000,000 australes —about 1,000,000 dollars— made, for instance, 100 different deposits 
equivalent to 10,000 dollars each.  
 
732 In a discourse defending the measures, presidential advisor Álvaro Alsogaray acknowledged that ―there 
are many people in companies that joined their small deposits and deposited them together [in one single 
deposit]. That exceeds one million [australes] and now they only get one million. Maybe it can be 
corrected‖. See ―Alsogaray: estamos abandonando el estatismo y el intervencionismo‖, La Nación, January, 
3, 1990, at 1, 12 (quoting Álvaro Alsogaray). 
 
733 Those who had been fired on or after December, 1, 1989 were later exempted from the compulsory 
conversion, as were those who needed surgical interventions (up to a maximum of 10,000,000 australes). See 
Emergency Decree 591/1990. Of course, many people who had been fired before that date also had 
deposited their severance pay money, and were affected by the sudden freezing of their support money. 
 
734 See ―Respaldan el programa económico‖, Clarín, January, 31, 1990, at 16 (citing Minister of Economy 
Erman González acknowledging the problem of the allegedly hard-to-prove case of some banks that, 
during the banking holiday, had moved the fixed-term deposits of some ―special clients‖ to checking 
accounts –which were exempted from the compulsory conversion- thus benefitting such clients). 
 
735 According to then presidential advisor Álvaro Alsogaray, collectively argentine private citizens had 
about 40,000,000,000 dollars abroad and only 5,000,000,000 in the country. See ―Alsogaray: estamos 
abandonando el estatismo y el intervencionismo‖, La Nación, January, 3, 1990, at 1, 12 (quoting Álvaro 
Alsogaray). See also William C. Banks & Alejandro D. Carrió, above n. 719, at 40 (arguing that ―only 
Argentines who maintained their savings in local currency were harshly affected by the decree; the wealthy 
kept their savings in dollars‖). 
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Even though some pensioners and retirees were later exempted from the 
compulsory conversion of their bank deposits,736 they were subject to equally rough 
treatment when their judicially-recognized credits for readjustment of their pensions737 
were consolidated and substituted for yet other bonds (this time called ―BOCONES‖, 
short for ―consolidation bonds‖), also with a 10-year maturity term and no amortizations 
during the first six years.738 The elderly were undoubtedly hurt, as they are a population 
with a greater need for liquidity.  Elders have higher health payments and are in a phase 
of life where they spend more than they earn, so they were likely candidates to sell the 
bonds in the short-term. The regressive redistribution mechanism was even clearer in 
this case, as the Consolidation Law 23,982, allowed any holder of the bond to pay their 
debts to the social security system with bonds at their face value.739 Big companies were, 
then, likely purchasers of the bonds in the secondary market, thus profitting from the 
elderly‘s losses.740 
                                                 
736 Depositors who were 75 or older were exempted from the ―Bonex plan‖ after a well-known tango 
composer, Enrique Cadícamo, sent a personal letter to president Menem, complaining about the injustice 
of applying the compulsory conversion to the elderly. Cadícamo was 91 years old at the time. Menem 
exempted Cadícamo from the plan, and later issued Emergency Decree 591/1990 (April, 4, 1990), 
generalizing the exemption. See, e.g., ―No les devolvieron ayer a los ancianos los plazos fijos‖, Clarín, April, 
17, 1990, at 10 (explaining the contents of Emergency Decree 591/1990); ―La bronca de Menem y 
González no alcanzó para cobrar la plata‖, Página/12, April, 19, 1990, at 4 (same). 
 
737 Article 14 bis of the Argentine Constitution mandates that the laws shall establish adjustable retirements 
and pensions (English version available at: 
http://www.senado.gov.ar/web/interes/constitucion/english.php; last visited 01/06/2012), and retirees 
and pensiones routinely have to litigate to obtain adjustments that compensate the erosive effects of 
inflation.  
 
738 See articles 1, 2, 3, 10, and 14, Law 23,982 (available at: 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-4999/381/norma.htm; last visited 01/06/2012). 
 
739 See article 14, ¶2, Law 23,982. 
 
740 Arguably, this option to use the bonds at face value may have made them more attractive and, hence, 
may have increased their price in the secondary market by creating more demand for BOCONES. While 
this is true, it remains the case that, at least during a few years, the bonds had to be sold below par in order 
to be attractive for potential buyers. Therefore, a capital loss must have been endured by pensioners and 
retirees who sold during that period of time, with a corresponding profit made by investors. Moreover, the 
fact that BOCONES did not yield any return during 6 years must have created additional pressure to sell in 
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The emergency discourse, then, tried to disguise the true distributive 
consequences of the emergency plan, which were almost certainly regressive.741 The 
Supreme Court followed suit when it upheld the Bonex plan in the much-maligned 
Peralta case.742 Among the arguments supporting the ruling, the justices held that: 
―[t]he sector that would be, in principle […], harmed does not appear to have 
been chosen unreasonably […] for the ownership of such deposits […] is a 
signal, in the majority of the cases, of a corresponding economic capacity, which 
excludes the possibility of an unfair selection […]‖743 
 
If the measures were largely deemed as a violation of constitutional property and 
as a harsh blow on relatively poor depositors and other involuntary bondholders, as I 
have argued before, how could one make an argument that the emergency discourse 
played any significant role in hiding the true nature of the measures? Surely, it must have 
been nothing but an ineffective attempt by the Administration and its supporters. The 
truth of the matter is a bit more complicated. Although the people largely thought the 
measures were an encroachment on property rights and an unfair distribution of the 
costs of controlling the crisis, they were also convinced that something had to be done.744 
                                                                                                                                            
the case of needy original holders and, thus, it must have led to a decrease in the bond‘s value due to the 
increased supply.  
 
741 One cannot rule out offhand that, all things considered, those at the very bottom of the social ladder 
benefitted from the measures, even if those at the top also did at the expense of the lower-middle class. I 
will deal with such scenario in the second part of the dissertation. See below chapter VII.b. 
 
742 313 Fallos 1513 (1990). For a quick summary of the case and some criticisms of it, see William C. Banks 
& Alejandro D. Carrió, above n. 719, at 41-43.  For extensive criticism of the arguments of the decision, 
see Alberto B. Bianchi, ―La Corte Suprema ha establecido su tesis oficial sobre la emergencia económica‖, 
1991-C La Ley 141; see also Germán J. Bidart Campos, ―El fallo de la Corte sobre el "plan bonex" (El 
amparo: airoso; la propiedad: desprotegida; la constitución: entre paréntesis)‖, 141 El Derecho 519 (1991); 
Gustavo Ariel Kaufman, ―Constitutionalidad del avasallamiento consumado: el caso ‗Peralta‘‖, 146 El 
Derecho 666 (1992); Germán J. Bidart Campos, Néstor P. Sagués, Luis García Martínez & Horacio A. 
García Belsunce, above n. 728. 
 
743 313 Fallos 1513 (1990), §58. 
 
744 See, e.g., ―Martes clave de un verano fatídico‖, Diario Popular, January, 7, at 4 (arguing that social 
discontent with the measures was not the same as impopularity of the emergency plan, as savers would 
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Measures were to be taken. The alternative was, the Administration warned, ―truly 
dramatic‖.745 The emergency plea served, first, to reinforce the feeling of inevitability of 
painful measures and, second, to try to divide the opposition against the plan. By 
emphasizing the need to take some rough measures, lest the worst happen, the 
government‘s supporters helped the lay folks be convinced that their sacrifice was 
inevitable. By arguing that the ―privileged few‖ were bearing the costs, the Menem 
administration and its allies attempted to enlist the support of the lowest classes —which 
were affected by the plan only indirectly—746 against the claims of socially-adjacent 
groups (lower middle and middle class) that were hit hard by the plan. Moreover, the 
discourse deflected the attention from the disquieting fact that the wealthy and influential 
were largely spared the sacrifices and were given precious opportunities to become even 
richer.  
How was the Peralta decision received by the public? In truth, the decision was 
unsurprising. The public seems to have been largely resigned to a Court that would 
basically uphold any measures taken by the Administration. There were hardly any 
grounds to expect otherwise. President Menem had packed the Supreme Court with 
political allies to sustain his ambitions for neoliberal reform.747 In April 1990, Congress 
                                                                                                                                            
have ―reluctantly agree[d] that ‗something had to be done‘ to control the unstoppable race between the 
dollar and the interest rates‖). 
 
745 See ―Opiniones encontradas sobre el plan‖, Clarín, January, 7, at 21 (quoting presidential advisor Álvaro 
Alsogaray). 
 
746 Street vendors, other small merchants, those who performed services for small fees (such as people who 
offered to watch your car parked in the street for a small tip, those who offered to wash your car for small 
amounts of money), and even beggars, were affected indirectly for their customers and people they got 
their money from were suffering from a severe shortage of currency and, thus, extremely reluctanct to 
engage in their usual transactions and to give money to beggars. 
 
747 For a detailed account of the ―packing‖ of the Court by then President Menem, see Arturo Pellet Lastra, 




enlarged the Court‘s membership from 5 to 9, with the convalidation of the emergency 
measures as one of the main goals in sight.748 Given the one justice had resigned in 
protest for the Executive‘s blatant attempt to capture the Court, Menem got to appoint 
five justices, thereby constituting an effective majority. But even in the strictly legal 
terrain, the hopes for meaningful constitutional review of emergency measures were thin. 
Even if Peralta was in fact quite a stretch of the precedents, the record of the Supreme 
Court after the 1930s did not provide grounds for hope that the Court would strike 
down the emergency regulation.749 One unnamed legislator reflected on the likelihood of 
a judicial invalidation of the plan in the following terms: 
―Why would the Judiciary worry over the procedure [used to enact the plan]? 
Hasn‘t there been, throughout the years, dollar bank deposits [which were] paid 
in pesos, salaries and wages paid with government securities, desagio, freezing of 
foreign currency deposits, forced savings, freezing of the rights of pensioners, 
rent laws, mandatory refinancing schemes?‖750 
 
While everybody knew that the Court had to resort to ―legal juggling‖ to reject 
the claims of those who felt ―cheated and swindled‖ by the compulsory swap,751 the 
media did not reflect public outrage over the Peralta decision, nor were there any 
                                                 
748 See, e.g., ―Amplían de cinco a nueve los miembros de la Corte‖, Clarín, April, 6, 1990, at 3 (reporting 
that President Menem had the bill that he needed to ―sustain the constitutionality of the laws that are most 
important for his administration‖ and that it was ―expected that the new composition of the Court‖ 
granted constitutional validity to the decree that force the conversion of bank deposits into bonds).  
 
749 For an excellent and provokative analysis of the Supreme Court economic emergency caselaw, although 
one I partially disagree with, see Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, ―Constitutional Emergencies in Argentina: The 
Romans (not the Judges) Have the Solution‖, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 1557 (2011); see also Horacio Spector, ―Don‘t 
Cry for Me Argentina: Economic Crisis and the Restructuring of Financial Property‖, 14 Fordham J. Corp. 
& Fin. L. 771 (2009). For my own take on these issues, see José Sebastián Elias, ―‘Massa‘ y la saga de la 
pesificación: lo bueno, lo malo y lo feo‖, 2008-II Jurisprudencia Argentina 1326. 
 
750 See Eduardo Luis Bonelli, ―De la histeria a la confusión‖, La Nación, Suplemento Económico, January, 
7, at 2 (citing an unnamed legislator). 
 
751 See ―Plan Bónex: un año sin ley‖, Página/12, December, 28, at 4. 
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significant protests. The major newspapers limited themselves to publishing excerpts of 
the decision.752  
This does not mean that the Court‘s attitude did not have a cost in terms of its 
sociological legitimacy. Quite the contrary. The unrelenting judicial support of emergency 
measures that encroached upon the property rights of increasingly larger sectors of the 
population played a significant role in the steady decline of the Court‘s public image and 
legitimacy.753 After the Peralta decision, the Court suffered a peak in its negative public 
image. Arturo Pellet Lastra argues that ―the negative image of the Supreme Court went 
from 62,5% up to 69,6%‖, a rise ―undoubtedly driven by the decision handed down in 
the Peralta case‖.754 Other surveys support the same conclusion: between July, 1990 —
immediately after the enlargement of the Court‘s membership— and April, 1991 —in the 
aftermath of the Peralta decision—, the image of the Court deteriorated, with an increase 
of its negative public image from 70,3% to 73,4%.755 
                                                 
752 See, e.g., ―La conversión de depósitos a Bonex convalidó la Corte‖, Clarín, December, 30, 1990, at 23; 
―No devuelven depósitos convertidos en Bónex‖, Crónica, December, 29, at 3; ―La Corte Suprema de 
Justicia convalidó el llamado Plan Bónex‖, La Nación, December, 29, at 12; ―La Corte convalidó el pago de 
plazos fijos con Bónex‖, La Prensa, December, 29, at 3. 
 
753 See Jonathan M. Miller, above n. 75, at 131-151 (explaining the changes in the Supreme Court caselaw 
regarding the protection of property and arguing that ―unlike the United States, where a ‗responsive‘ 
approach toward law has not seriously undermined judicial authority, in Argentina the consequences for 
judicial authority have been catastrophic‖). 
 
754 See Arturo Pellet Lastra, above n. 576, at 26. Pellet Lastra bases his statement on the fact that from 
December, 1991, to March, 1992, the Court‘s negative image rose some 7.4 percentual points. This change  
in the public perception of the Supreme Court cannot possibly be attributed to the Peralta decision, which 
was handed down on December, 27, 1990, and therefore, was already in the books in December, 1991. 
Still, while Pellet Lastra‘s grounds for such an assertion are questionable, the assertion itself is much less so, 
as proven by the studies cited below n. 755 and n. 757.  
 
755 Id., at 27 (citing a study by Rosendo Fraga that compared the evolution of the negative public image of 
the Court). It is important to highlight that half of the most publicly salient cases of the period between 
July, 1990 and April, 1991, were economic emergency decisions. Four decisions stand out in the period: the 
Peralta decision —already analyzed in the text—, the Videla Cuello decision (313 Fallos 1638) —a decision 
handed down on the same day as Peralta that basically upheld the economic emergency law 23,696 insofar 
as it suspended for two years of the judicial procedures to collect debts from the State—, the Montalvo 
decision (313 Fallos 1333) —a decision the overruled Bazterrica, a 1986 decision that had held 
unconstitutional the Narcotics Act insofar as it punished the possession of illegal drugs for personal use—, 
and the Riveros decision (313 Fallos 1392) —upholding presidential pardon of perpetrators of grave 
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Of course, there were other factors at play, besides the countermajoritarian 
character of its economic emergency decisions. The fact that the Court‘s personnel had 
been manipulated to suit President Menem‘s plans, along with a perceived alignment 
with the Administration in the politically sensitive cases,756 also played a role in the 
decline of the Court‘s sociological legitimacy.757 But economic emergency decisions were 
very salient, and they were basically contrary to the popular conception of constitutional 
property. 
As previously noted, this popular return to a more traditional conception of 
constitutional property, one that embraced the protection of capital as the core of the 
inviolability promised by the text and abandoned the strong social overtones brought to 
the jurisprudential landscape by the Peronist movement in the 1940‘s, was ratified by the 
constitutional politics of the early 1990‘s. When Menem undertook his project of 
modifying the 1853 Constitution in order to be able to run for re-election, he agreed with 
Alfonsín —still the leader of the main opposition party— on a package of 
comprenhensive amendments to the traditional text, popularly known as the ―Olivos 
Pact‖. This political agreement provided for the modernization of the ―Bill of Rights‖ of 
the Constitution, by the inclusion of new rights (consumers‘ rights, environmental rights, 
                                                                                                                                            
violations to human rights—. The Montalvo decision, controversial as it was among liberal law professors 
and lawyers, seems less likely to have been strictly countermajoritarian, as it merely upheld a law passed by 
Congress basically contradicting the Bazterrica decision, and was not out of sync with the mood of the times 
regarding consumption of illegal drugs. Riveros, in turn, was a decision that upheld a largely impopular, 
although arguably constitutionally-valid, decision. 
 
756 See Jorge Bercholc, LA INDEPENDENCIA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA A TRAVÉS DEL 
CONTROL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD 144-145 (Buenos Aires, EDIAR, 2004) (acknowledging that 
the public opinion had the intuition of there being an ―automatic majority‖ in favor of the Administration, 
despite the fact that most decisions in the period after the Court‘s enlargement were unanimous, and 
leaving open the possibility of qualitative criticism of the Court). 
 
757 See Christopher Larkins, ―The Judiciary and Delegative Democracy in Argentina‖, 30 Comp. Polit. 423, 
429-430 (1998) (describing the performance of the Court after the successful packing plan by President 
Menem and citing polls that show the very negative public image of the Supreme Court). 
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etc.). However, the plan —incarnated in Law 24,309 that called for the Convention— 
explicitly provided for the preservation of the traditional liberal rights, including the 
property clauses in Articles 14 and 17 of the Constitution. The first 35 articles of the 
Constitution were to be left untouched by the Convention, under penalty of nullification 
of any ultra vires reform (Articles 6 and 7, Law 24,309). While it would be easy to argue 
that leaving property rights out of the topics open for amendment was consistent with 
the then-expanding ―Washington Consensus‖, which fostered neoliberal reforms around 
the world and was followed closely by the Menem administration, the decision not to 
tamper with property —and other traditional— rights reflected a deeper consensus in 
Argentina‘s society. Popular fear of a substantial alteration of the 1853 ―Bill of Rights‖ 
could have been a significant obstacle to reformist plans, and it was sidestepped by 
shielding those rights. Therefore, insofar as it embodies a conscious decision to keep in 
place the old property clauses of the 1853 text —even if suitably adapted through 
interpretive glosses—, the 1994 process of constitutional reform ratified the rejection of 
the conception of property embraced by the Peronist movement in the 1940‘s (codified 
in the 1949 Constitution). Old understandings had regained a central place in the popular 
conception of constitutional property and they would be firmly in place when the next 
episode of economic emergency struck the country. 
It happened in the early 2000s. The Administration was faced with an economic 
and monetary system that did not seemed sustainable any longer, and the time came to 
make decisions about who should bear the costs of coming out of a fixed-rate exchange 
system. But this is a story that takes us back to Menem‘s first attempts at economic 
stabilization and the Bonex Plan. Let us go there for a while. 
 
c. Coming In and Out of a Fixed-Rate Monetary System: The Triumphs and 
Miseries of the Convertibility Plan. 
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Unfortunately, and despite the Administration‘s aspirations, the ―Bonex plan‖ 
was not successful in controlling the hyperinflation that had thrown Alfonsín out of 
office and was threatening Menem as well.758 It was the ―Convertibility Plan‖ that finally 
tamed the beast. Convertibility —enacted by Law 23,928 in April, 1991— was a currency 
board system759 that consisted, basically, in a one-for-one peg between the peso760 and the 
U.S. dollar and the full backing of the monetary base with international reserves.761 
Moreover, the national currency was to be freely convertible with the U.S. dollar.762 The 
plan was an immediate success: the monthly rate of inflation fell from 11% in March, 
1991, to only 1.3% in August and then to just 0.6% by December of that same year, 763 
reaching international levels in 1994.764 This led to stability,765 an investment-led boom 
                                                 
758 See, e.g., Alan Cibils & Rubén Lo Vuolo, above n. 62, at 757 (2007) (stating that there was another 
hyperinflationary episode toward the end of 1990); Luis García Martínez, in Germán J. Bidart Campos et 
al., above n. 728, at 125 (arguing that the Bonex plan failed in controlling inflation and stabilizing the 
exchange rate); and Jorge C. Ávila, ―Internacionalización monetaria y bancaria‖, Documento de Trabajo, 
Universidad del CEMA 1, 13 (2004) (available at: http://cdi.mecon.gov.ar/doc/cema/doctrab/285.pdf; 
last visited 01/12/2012) (arguing that monetary stabilization would not be reached until the Convertibility 
Plan and that in towards the end of 1990 there was another inflationary surge, reaching a 50% monthly 
rate). But see Roberto Cortés Conde, above n. 396, at 291 (arguing that the conversion of deposits would 
be the beginning ―of what later became a convertibility system‖). One could argue that the abrupt 
reduction of the australes in circulation, due to the confiscation carried out by the ―Bonex plan‖, afforded 
the Menem administration the opportunity to establish convertibility. See Pamela K. Starr, ―Government 
Coalitions and the Viability of Currency Boards: Argentina under the Cavallo Plan‖, 39 J. Interam. Stud. 
World Aff. 83, 90 (1997). 
 
759 For the differences between a ―pure‖ currency board system and Argentina‘s ―Convertibility Plan‖ 
system, see Pamela K. Starr, above n. 758, at 87-89. 
 
760 The name austral would be subtituted by peso shortly after, in January, 1992, and the parity would 10,000 
australes per peso, the same parity established between the australes and the U.S. dollar by article 1 of the 
―Convertibility Law‖ 23,928 (available at 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/04999/328/norma.htm; last visited 01/11/2012). 
 
761 Domingo F. Cavallo & Joaquin A. Cottani, ―Argentina's Convertibility Plan and the IMF‖, 87 Am. Econ. 
Rev.17 (1997). See also article 4, Law 23,928. 
 
762 See articles 1, 2, and 3, Law 23,928. 
 
763 Pamela K. Starr, above n. 758, at 83-84. 
 
764 Domingo F. Cavallo & Joaquin A. Cottani, above n. 761, at 17.  
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and strong economic growth,766 arguably without producing regressive income 
redistribution.767 No wonder that ―from a political point of view, convertibility was a 
smashing success‖.768 
By the mid-1990s, convertibility had become an acquired taste for Argentineans, 
and a political trap for politicians. Menem won a second term in office, riding on the 
success of his monetary stabilization program. In 1999, the Alliance769 presidential 
candidate Fernando De la Rua had campaigned on the maintenance of the convertibility 
regime, while Peronist candidate Eduardo Duhalde had talked about a ―model‖ that was 
exhausted and had to be replaced.770 Despite being a member of the governing party, as 
well as governor of Argentina‘s most populated province, and despite the lack of 
charisma of De la Rua, Duhalde‘s talk of abandoning convertibility scared many 
                                                                                                                                            
 
765 See Pablo Gerchunoff & Lucas Llach, above n. 656, at 442 (the Convertibility Plan was an ―unusual 
success regarding its specific goal of abating inflation‖). 
 
 
766 See, e.g., Jerome Booth, ―Argentina: The Case for a Permanent End to Fiscal Transfers‖, 15 Camb. Rev. 
Int.Aff. 483, 484 (2002).  
 
767 Domingo F. Cavallo & Joaquin A. Cottani, above n. 761, at 17. See also Pablo Gerchunoff & Lucas 
Llach, above n. 656, at 443 (the virtual elimination of the ―inflationary tax‖ had a progressive distributive 
effect). 
 
768 Id.  
 
769 The Alliance encompassed, basically, the Radical Party structure and the FREPASO —a new party that 
in the 1995 elections had come in second to Menem, with 30% of the total votes—. Its main reason d’etre 
was to cut short Menem‘s search for an unconstitutional third term, and to prevent the Peronist Party from 
retaining the presidency. 
 
770 This very rough depiction of the 1999 electoral rhetoric shows how much the ―convertibility‖ 
conditioned Argentine politics during the 1990s. The Radical candidate committed himself publicly to 
maintaining Menem‘s trademark economic policy —the very same policy the party had criticized during a 
few years and the backbone of Menem‘s political capital—, which at the same time, the Radical Party had 
to criticize to get the Peronists out of power. Meanwhile, the Peronist candidate Eduardo Duhalde, who 
was Menem‘s former vice-president and, by that time, his already declared political enemy, was criticizing 
official economic policy.  
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Argentineans, and De la Rua became president with about 48.50% of the total votes, 
against Duhalde‘s 38.09%.771 
The politically successful ―Convertibility plan‖ came, however, with problems of 
its own. From the standpoint of economic policymaking, it was extremely rigid:  
―[...] a government constrained by a currency board can increase spending for 
unemployment insurance, anti-poverty programs, increased credit availability, or 
to shore up a weak financial system only if  —and this is a big ‗if‘— it can finance 
this deficit spending in private capital markets, or if spending is reduced in other 
areas‖772 
  
A significant real appreciation of the peso, due partly at least to a differential 
between domestic and international inflation rates,773 progressively complicated the 
country‘s competitiveness in international markets and, along with other limitations 
inherent to the ―Convertibility plan‖,774 led to a profound recession.775 Sticking to the 
―Convertibility plan‖ meant severely limiting the Government‘s options to tackle the 
crisis. 
Moreover, from the perspective of the financial system, the convertibility policy 
led to a large dollarization that created high risks. Savers generally chose the seeming 
                                                 
771 Electoral data available at http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Arg/Pres99.html (last visited 
01/11/2012). 
 
772 Pamela K. Starr, above n. 758, at 89. 
 
773 Id., at 96. 
 
774 See Jerome Booth, above n. 766, at 485 (arguing that ―the discipline of the currency board, which 
procyclically shrinks the money supply as reserves dwindle, constrained domestic demand at exactly the 
time stimulus was needed. Consequent low growth led to low tax revenues, hence more difficulty in 
meeting fiscal targets and the need for greater fiscal austerity, which, in turn, again hampered growth. With 
a large external debt, low growth also worsened the debt ratios and their projections, damaging 
international confidence‖). 
 
775 See, e.g., Daniel F. Sotelsek, ―Crisis bancaria en un esquema de currency board: la experiencia 
argentina‖, 39 Desarrollo Económico 213, 215 (1999) (arguing that in system of fixed exchange rate with free 
mobility of capitals recessive effects are to be expected in the long-term, if the national currency is 
overvalued –which is a fairly common situation- or if public deficit undermines credibility). 
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safety of dollar deposits over the higher-interest yielded by deposits in national 
currency,776 and banks aggresively offered —and sold— loans denominated in dollars,777 
mostly to people whose income was not in hard currency, but in pesos. While interest 
rates were generally higher in Argentina than in international markets, banks operating in 
the country enjoyed an exceptionally high spread during those years.778 Still, the high 
exposure of the system was obvious.779 On the one hand, without any lender of last 
resort of real magnitude (the Central Bank cannot print dollars) the risk that banks could 
not repay deposits in the event of a run were significant. On the other hand, in case of a 
                                                 
776 In 1991 the banking system had deposits for 8,000,000,000 pesos and 6,500,000,000 dollars; in 1994, 
dollar deposits outdid pesos deposits by a small margin (23,000,000,000 to 22,400,000,000) (see Daniel F. 
Sotelsek, above n. 775, at 219 (showing a table)). The trend continued the following years, to the point that 
in January, 31, 2002, the banking system had some 26,088,000,000 pesos deposits and some 39,888,000,000 
dollar deposits (see Brief for Defendant Central Bank of the Argentine Republic in case S.173.XXXVIII, 
Provincia de San Luis v. Estado Nacional et al., on file with author, ruling on the merits in 326 Fallos 417 
(2003)). 
 
777 Mortgages denominated in dollars went up from 31,7% of the total mortgages in June, 1993, to 63% in 
June, 1996. The proportion of dollar-denominated secured loans on personal property remained steadily 
high between 1993 and 1996, around 90%. The total proportion of dollar loans in the system, vis-a-vis 
loans in national currency, raised from 48% in 1993 to 60% in 1996. See Francisco Buera & Juan Pablo 
Nicolini, ―Los spreads de tasas de interes en la Argentina‖, 38 Desarrollo Económico 231, 234 (1998) (showing 
a table). By December, 2001, about 80% of the loans in the system were nominated in dollars 
(60,144,000,000 dollars vs. 15,478,000,000 pesos). See Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, 
―Información diaria sobre principales activos de las entidades financieras (préstamos y otros)‖, Year 2001, 
available at: http://www.bcra.gov.ar/estadis/es020200.asp (selecting ―2001‖ in the field ―Período‖) (last 
visited 02/01/2012) 
 
778 See Francisco Buera & Juan Pablo Nicolini, above n. 777, at 232 (arguing that by the end of 1996 the 
passive interest rate —the rate paid by banks to depositors— had fallen to international levels, the spread 
was clearly high by international standards); see also Guillermo Rozenwurcel & Leonardo Bleger, above n. 
682, at 175 (noting the ―persistence of extremely high spreads‖). 
 
779 See Gerardo Della Paolera & Alan Taylor, ―Gaucho Banking Redux‖, 3 Economia 1, 17-18 (2003) 
(arguing that ―the potential inconsistency between a dollar exchange standard and a banking system that 
―creates‖ money‖ was a central flaw of the convertibility system and the ground for the violation of the 
most basic property rights); Guillermo Rozenwurcel & Leonardo Bleger, above n. 682, at 190-191 (arguing 
that the risks posed by such an extensive dollarization of the financial system were very high due to: first, 
the possibility of a sudden divergence between the evolution of  the income of a significant proportion of 
debtors and of the exchange rate, either because of a nominal devaluation or of deflation, with the ensuing 
impact of the solvency of the banks; and, second, the lack of an adequate safety net to deal with bank 
runs); see also Jorge C. Ávila, above n. 758, at 17-18 (arguing that while the financial system was very 
strong in 2001 and political mismanagement played a central role in unleashing the crisis, Convertibility and 
fractional bank reserves created an important problem). 
 
 241 
devaluation of even moderate proportions most small and medium debtors, who did not 
have access to dollarized assets or income, would strain to repay their debts. 
In 2001, the progressive decrease of confidence in the country‘s ability to keep 
financing the convertibility system led to capital flight. Bank deposits dropped steadily 
beginning in February,780 falling from some 88,000,000,000 dollars to barely 
69,000,000,000 in November.781 In an attempt to stop the outflow, Congress passed Law 
25,466, the so-called ―Intangibility of Deposits Act‖. The Act declared that money 
deposits in nationally regulated banks were ―intangible.‖ Then, it defined ―intangibility‖ 
as the express prohibition on altering deposits in any form.  Specifically, the law forbade 
the State from changing the currency of the deposits, from altering interest rates or 
maturities, and from exchanging deposits for national bonds. The rights arising from 
such deposit operations were explicitly deemed as ‗vested-rights‘ under the protection of 
the property clause of the Constitution.782  
But the flow of money did not stop. So in December, 2001, the Executive Brach 
issued emergency decree 1570/2001, basically forbidding all but small cash withdrawals 
from banks (up to 250 pesos or dollars per week). Money could be used within the 
banking system, though.783 The measure was tremendously unpopular. The middle-class 
felt that its money was just steps away from being confiscated, despite the emphatic 
assurances given by Congress, and the lower class suffered from the sudden shortage of 
                                                 
780 See Presidential Introduction to Emergency Decree 1570/2001, available at 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-74999/70355/norma.htm (last visited 
11/01/2012) (acknowledging the steady drop in the level of deposits since February 2001). 
 
781 See Jorge C. Ávila, above n. 758, at 18. 
 
782 See articles 1, 2, and 3, Law 25,466 (available at 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/65000-69999/69026/norma.htm; last visited 
01/12/2012).  
 
783 See articles 2, 4, and 5, Emergency Decree 1570/2001. 
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money. Argentina had, at the time, a fairly large informal economy784 that provided some 
opportunities to the worse-off.785 The deepest and most perturbing crisis in Argentina‘s 
history was about to unleash in full,786 and large scale regressive redistributions were 
about to take place, once again, under the benign rhetoric of economic emergency. 
President De la Rúa resigned in the face of massive social unrest, and Argentina 
had the so-called ―week of the five presidents‖. Eduardo Duhalde was eventually 
appointed president by Legislative Assembly (both Houses of Congress in joint session) 
on January, 1, 2002. Meanwhile, Congress enacted Emergency Law 25,561 on January, 6, 
2002, delegating to the Executive branch, among other powers, the power to set the 
value of the national currency against foreign currencies —basically, the power to take 
the country out of the convertibility system that had reigned almost untouched for ten 
                                                 
784 According to Rodolfo Díaz, in Argentina, more than half of the GDP was not ―in the books‖, and that 
this ―second economy‖, which contained more than half of the work, of the production, and of the trade 
in the country, was an extraordinary source of political and economic energy. See Rodolfo Diaz, ―Como 
aprovechar la segunda economia‖, Clarín, Seccion Opinion, 10/24/2001 (on file with author, formerly 
available at http://www.clarin.com/diario/2001/10/24/o-02702.htm; last visited 05/15/2007). 
 
785 See George L. Priest, ―The Ambiguous Moral Foundations of Underground Economy‖, 103 Yale L. J. 
2259, 2280 (1994) (arguing that informal economies may prove very successful in promoting the ―Rawlsian 
value of protecting those least advantaged in society‖). See also Rodolfo Díaz THE REFORMS IN 
ARGENTINA DURING THE 1990s, English version of his book LAS REFORMAS DE LOS 90 EN 
ARGENTINA: PROSPERIDAD O ILUSION (Buenos Aires, Abaco, 2002), on file with the author, 
Chapter 7, (remembering his own intervention in the Congressional debate over the Labor Reform Law, in 
the 1990s: "This situation of the black labor is not the result of employers' perversity or workers' 
carelessness, but simply of fifteen years of crises in the Argentine economy. In order to survive as such, 
productive units in our country had to find countless survival strategies: one of them was the generation of 
this situation"). 
 
786 The crisis of 2001-2002 was an extremely complex phenomenon and the analysis of its multiple causes 
far exceeds the scope of this dissertation. For different hypothesis on the causes of the crisis, see, among 
others, Laura Tedesco, above, n. 59 (analyzing the role of the ―politics of informality‖ in the crisis); Carlos 
Escudé, above n. 62 (linking the crisis to with ―an unprecedented and financially unsustainable level of 
indebtedness); Jorge C. Ávila, above n. 758, at 18 (emphasizing political mismanagement as a cause of the 
crisis); Gerardo Della Paolera & Alan M. Taylor, above n. 779, at 18-21 (analyzing multiple economic 
causes for the crisis); Alan Cibils & Rubén Lo Vuolo, above n. 62, at 768-773 (analyzing the role of the 
IMF and of Argentina‘s indebtedness in the crisis); Jerome Booth, above n. 766, at 485-488 (analyzing the 
role of the ―fiscal problem‖); Robert Boyer, ―La crisis argentina: un análisis desde la teoría de la 
regulación‖, 192 Realidad Económica (2002) (arguing that internal contradictions of the currency board, and 
not an allegedly relaxed attitude towards public spending, caused the crisis) (available at: 
http://www.iade.org.ar/modules/noticias/article.php?storyid=706; last visited 04/09/2012); see also, 
generally, Pamela K. Starr, above n. 758 (analyzing the role of political coalitions in the exit of the 
Convertibility Plan and foreseeing some possible difficulties). 
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years—.787 Congress, however, was mindful that any devaluation would create problems 
for some debtors to repay their debts and for the banks to repay dollar deposits. Hence, 
it provided for the partial ―pesification‖ of the dollar-denominated debts: small bank 
debtors could pay back in pesos at a one-to-one parity.788 Obligations arising from 
contracts between private individuals, not related to the financial system, were put under 
a system of negotiation, where the parties had a period of six months to reach an 
agreement that split the differences generated by the new exchange rate in accordance 
with a spirit of ―shared sacrifice‖.789 Finally, and regarding bank deposits, Congress 
instructed the Executive to take measures to protect depositors‘ capital, including 
deposits in foreign currency, and to restructure maturities in a way that would facilitate 
the solvency of the financial system.790 However, shortly after, president Eduardo 
Duhalde issued a sweeping emergency decree that completely ―pesified‖ the economy: 
bank deposits were repaid at a rate of 1,40 pesos per dollar, while all other dollar-
                                                 
787 See article 2, Emergency Law 25,561 (available at 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-74999/71477/norma.htm; last visited 
01/12/2012). 
 
788The law provided that all dollar-denominated loans where a bank was the creditor would be restructured 
by the Executive branch and would be payable in pesos in lieu of dollars, at a one-to-one parity, if the 
following conditions where met: 1) the original amount did not exceed 100,000 dollars; 2) the loan was 
either a mortgage-secured loan destined to the purchase, building, or refurbishing of a house, a personal 
credit, a secured loan destined to the purchase of motor vehicles, or a credit given to a person meeting the 
micro, small and medium businesses regime.  See article 6, ¶2, Emergency Law 25,561. This provision was 
later abrogated by Law 25,820, in December 2003, consolidating the general ―pesification‖ of the economy 
carried out by Emergency Decree 214/2002. The text of the Law 25,561 with the modifications introduced 
by Law 25,820 is available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-
74999/71477/texact.htm (last visited 01/12/2012).  
 
789 See article 11, Law 25,561 (later modified by Law 25,820, in December, 2003, to establish a general 
―pesification‖ at the one-to-one parity plus C.E.R. (an adjustment index that followed inflation and aimed 
at ameliorating erosion of ―pesified‖ obligations due to inflation) or C.V.S. (an adjustment index that 
followed raises in salaries). 
 
790 See article 6, ¶5, Law 25.561 (later modified by Law 25,820, in December, 2003, which added a sentence 




denominated obligations were repaid at a one-to-one parity.791 At the same time, the 
government defaulted on its sovereign debt and several national and provincial bonds —
generally, all bonds that were not subject to foreign law— were ―pesified‖ at a 1,40 pesos 
per dollar rate.792 
The problem for depositors was that the official conversion rate established by 
the emergency decree was far from the free market value of the dollar, which reached 
four-to-one during the height of the crisis. At some points, there was a difference of 
more than 100%, and an ensuing capital loss of over 50% for depositors. At the same 
time, many goods and services followed the evolution of the dollar price and, hence, the 
―pesified‖ deposits lost value even if measured only in relation to goods and services in 
the domestic market.793 Dollar debtors, in turn, were relieved by ―pesification‖. 
How were the measures received by the people? Was the combination of 
―pesification‖ and deferment of maturities of bank deposits considered a violation of 
property rights? Was the alteration of non-financial, dollar-denominated contracts 
considered constitutionally impermissible from the popular standpoint? What can the 
2001-2002 economic crises tell us about the popular conception of constitutional 
property? Let us see. 
Depositors were enraged and violent riots took place, and tens of thousands filed 
suits in federal courts, claiming the unconstitutionality, first of the ―corralito‖, and later 
                                                 
791 In both cases, an adjustment index was added. Optional long-term dollar-denominated national bonds 
were also offered ot bank depositors. See articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, and 9, Emergency Decree 214/2002 
(available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-74999/72017/norma.htm; last 
visited 01/13/2012). 
 
792 See article 1, Emergency Decree 471/2002 (available at 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-74999/72885/norma.htm; last visited 
01/14/2012). 
 
793 See, e.g., 329 Fallos 5913 (2006) (Argibay, J., concurring in the judgment, §8) (arguing that some goods, 
notably real estate property, had maintained their prices in U.S. dollars).  
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of the restructuring and forced conversion.794 The first round of restrictive measures, the 
so-called ―corralito‖, spurred a very peculiar form of protest: ―pan-and-pot‖ banging, 
popularly known in Spanish as ―cacerolazo‖. Other forms of protests, such as picketing 
and the so-called ―escraches‖ against politicians, also spread. The protests eventually led 
to President De la Rúa‘s resignation, and to a succession of provisory presidents, that 
ended up with Duhalde‘s appointment as president. But the change of presidents did not 
modify the people‘s views on the restrictions to property rights. 
In early March, 2002, Clarín reported that ―marches, picketing, and escraches 
against banks are impossible to count‖.795 A CEOP poll cited by the same newspaper 
concluded that there was a ―high degree of [popular] identification‖ with the 
―cacerolazo‖ protest movement, with 64,1 percent of the respondents reporting having a 
―positive image‖ of the protest.796 Importantly, a significant portion of the people 
thought the protestors to be motivated exclusively by the desire to ―get their dollars 
back, not because of the 14 million poor people [that there were] in the country‖, but 
this conclusion did not prevent the movement from enjoying wide support.797 Almost 45 
percent of the people chose the rejection of the economic policy of the government as 
                                                 
794 In December, 2002, there were more that 30,000 lawsuits only in the competent federal chamber of 
appeals in Buenos Aires. See Acordada 46/2002, Cámara Nacional en lo Contencioso Administrativo 
Federal, cited by Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, Acordada 1/2003 (available at 
http://www.csjn.gov.ar/docus/documentos/cons_tipo.jsp; last visited 01/13/2012). The phenomenon 
was replicated throughout the country, and The Economist had an estimate, as of March, 2003, of some 
180,000 lawsuits. See 366 The Economist 38-39 (March, 8, 2003). Pablo Gallegos Fedriani, a judge in the 
Federal Court of Appeals, recalls receiving some 200,000 lawsuits in the first trimester of 2002. See "El 
corralito fue una locura pero como Poder evitamos una situación absolutamente caótica", Diario Judicial, 
December, 12, 2011 (http://www.diariojudicial.com/reportajes/El-corralito-fue-una-locura-pero-como-
Poder-evitamos-una-situacion-absolutamente-caotica-20111212-0002.html; last visited 01/14/2012). 
 
795 See ―El cacerolazo, con más aceptación que participación‖, Clarín, March, 10, 2002 (available at 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2002/03/10/p-00402.htm; last visited 04/16/2012). 
 
796 Id. (citing a C.E.O.P. —Centro de Estudios de Opinión Pública— poll). 
 
797 Id., (citing the C.E.O.P. poll according to which 60,6 percent of the people thought the protestors‘ main 
motivation to be the protection of their dollar deposits, not the complaint about extended poverty). 
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the main cause of social protest, and some 17 percent singled out one particular cause: 
the rejection of ―corralito‖.798 And while Duhalde enjoyed some 43 percent of ―positive 
image‖ among the public in late February, only 20 percent approved of his economic 
policies, which were basically devaluation and ―pesification‖.799 
La Nación also printed surveys and polls that showed a high degree of popular 
identification with the protest movement by the savers knowns as ―cacerolazo‖800 and a 
similarly high rejection of the restrictions on property rights.801 Some 66 percent of the 
people rejected the ―pesification‖ of bank deposits.802  
Página/12 concluded that ―most Argentines disapprove of the devaluation and 
forced restructuring of savings accounts and time deposits‖, even if they supported some 
                                                 
798 Id. 
 
799 See ―El cacerolazo crece en una encuesta‖, Clarín, February, 24, 2002 (available at: 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2002/02/24/p-01902.htm; last visited 04/16/2012) (citing a poll by 
Analogias).  
 
800 See ―El 90 por ciento de la gente se identifica con los cacerolazos‖, La Nación, January, 13, 2002 
(available at: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=366311&high=encuesta%20pol%EDticos; 
last visited 04/24/2012) (citing a poll according to which 65,8% of the respondents felt ―identified with 
the cacerolazo‖). 
 
801 See ―El 83% de los argentinos no aprueba el corralito financiero‖, La Nación, January, 17, 2002 
(available at: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=367292&high=encuesta%20justicia; last 
visited 04/24/2012) (citing a Gallup according to which 83% of the respondents rejected the so-called 
―corralito‖; 73% rejected devaluation, and 57% rejected the restructuring of maturities for bank deposits 
set by the Minister of Economy, which at the time extended up to three years and nine months). 
 
802 See ―La mayoría rechaza dolarizar y prefiere la pesificación‖, La Nación, February, 24, 2002 (available at: 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=376411&high=encuesta%20corralito; last visited 
04/24/2012) (citing a Gallup poll, requested by La Nación, according to which two out of every three 
Argentines disapproved of the ―new economic measures‖, which meant ―without a doubt, the 
reinforcement of corralito‖). It is important to note that the main new economic measure taken between 
the poll cited by the paper in its January 17 edition (above n. 801) and this new poll was the complete 
―pesification‖ of the economy, including bank deposits, in accordance with Emergency Decree 214/2002 
of February, 3, 2002. The ―pesification‖ had been anticipated by President Duhalde on January, 20. See, 
e.g., ―En los hogares argentinos, la pesificación no fue bienvenida‖, La Nación, January, 21, 2002 (available 
at:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=368226&high=protesta%20pesificaci%F3n%20dep%F3
sitos; last visited 04/24/2012). 
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iniatives taken by the Duhalde administration.803 An study by Ibope concluded that there 
was a significant level of popular identification with the depositors‘ cause: 
―‘As the people‘s savings were seized, let them protest against the banks as they 
prefer, even if that implies that there‘s some violence‘. That could be a summary 
of the opinion of four out of every ten Argentines. There is another, significantly 
smaller, segment [of opinion] that also seems to identify itself with the protest, 
although from a more legalistic standpoint: protests, yes; escraches, no […] ‗People 
think that banks effectively kept the savers' money‘ and, therefore, say ‗let them 
protest as much as they please‘, ‗it is only fair‘ […] a large part of the respondents, no 
less than 71 percent, say they feel identified with the cacerolazos‖804 
 
And violence indeed there was. But it was limited, and seemed to serve a cathartic 
function. Banks were generally covered with metal sheets to protect them from the rage 
of savers. Some protestors painted the bank‘s facades; others hammered on cash 
transporter trucks and banks‘ windows; yet others threw stones or eggs against the 
banks.805  
Earlier on, on February, 1st, when the total pesification of the economy had not 
been decreed yet, Página/12 believed that the proposal to ―pesify‖ all bank deposits at a 
one-to-one parity —a proposal that a group of banks plus the productive sector was to 
                                                 
803 See ―Una de cal y una de arena‖, Página/12, January, 13, 2002 (available at: 
http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-792-2002-01-13.html; last visited 04/24/2012) (citing a poll 
by Analogías).  
 
804 ―Los ahorristas, con consenso‖, Página/12, March, 13, 2002 (available at: 
http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-2835-2002-03-13.html; last visited 04/19/2012). The italics 
are mine. 
 
805 See, e.g., ―La furia de los ahorristas en la City es cada vez más violenta‖, La Nación, February, 19, 2002 
(available at: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=375174&high=escrache; last visited 
04/24/2012) (reporting on the increase of violence in the savers‘ protests, but transcribing testimonies of 
non-violent savers who also protested); see also ―Un día a los martillazos en el corazón de la City‖, Clarín, 
February, 16, 2002 (available at: http://www.clarin.com/diario/2002/02/16/e-01402.htm; last visited 
04/24/2012) (reporting on the protests). 
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present to president Duhalde that same day, in order to ease the ―pesification‖ of all 
debts— seemed ―delirious, in the face of the cacerolozos‖.806  
An international-award winning writer, Marcos Aguinis, captured a well-extended 
popular sentiment when he asserted in his best-selling political pamphlet ¡Pobre Patria 
Mía! that the ―corralito‖ had been ―the most brutish offense to private property ever 
committed‖ in Argentina.807 
Popular arts also paid attention to the phenomenon. A new movie sub-genre 
appeared, the ―cine corralito‖, which encompasses ―the films of the crisis‖, those 
pertaining exclusively to the ―[social] class battered by the banks, post 2001‖.808 Other 
forms of art expression also relied on the ―cacerolazos‖ and ―corralito‖, and a novel 
literary sub-genre focused on those topics.809 Social Genocide —original title, Memorias del 
Saqueo, literally ―memories of the looting‖— is a documentary that purports to show the 
broad crisis, with a focus on the vanishing of savings deposited in banks and the 
generalized poverty.810 Verano Amargo, a recently-released movie starring a number of 
                                                 
806 ―Renació la Santa Alianza de los ‗90‖, Página/12, February, 1, 2002 (available at: 
http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/economia/2-1428-2002-02-01.html; last visited 04/24/2012). The 
italics are mine. 
 
807 Marcos Aguinis, ¡POBRE PATRIA MÍA! 104 (Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 2009). In only five months, 
the book got to its tenth edition, with more than 100,000 copies sold, an important number for the 
Argentine book market. In 2009, the book sold 130,000 copies, and it ended up the third most-read title in 
the country, after Stephanie Meyer‘s Twilight series and Isabel Allende‘s La isla bajo el mar. For the stats, see 
―Análisis filosófico del fenómeno Crepúsculo‖, La Gaceta Literaria, Octobr, 10, 2010 (available at: 
http://www.lagaceta.com.ar/nota/402469/LA-GACETA-Literaria/Analisis-filosofico-del-fenomeno-
Crepusculo.html; last visited 04/16/2012). 
 
808 See ―Entre éxitos y fracasos‖, Clarín, April, 13, 2004 (available at: 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2004/04/13/c-00301.htm; last visited 04/16/2012). 
 
809 See ―Las manifestaciones culturales inspiradas en los cacerolazos‖, Clarín, June, 18, 2002 (available at 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2002/06/18/s-02415.htm; last visited 04/16/2012) (analyzing different 
forms of art inspired by the 2001-2002 protests). 
 
810 See ―Plor Summary for Social Genocide (2004)‖, available at 




well-known Argentine actors, is based upon the real case of a retired man who got to the 
point of threatening to use a grenade, in a desperate attempt to get his money back.811  
In January, 2002, Norberto Roglich, a 62-year old diabetic retiree, went into the 
local bank manager‘s office holding a grenade in his hand and got his 22,000 dollars back. 
When apprehended by the police, Roglich stated: ―Did I rob the bank? No…I only took 
what‘s mine‖.812  
Other individuals resorted to less extreme, but equally explicit, actions. In a 
protest in front of a foreign capital bank, a saver was tied to a crux and raised to a height 
of three meters, with a sign that read ―crucified and pesified‖.813 The symbolism is clear: 
the savers were being sacrificed to expiate the sins of the big economic players, who 
lobbied for ―pesification‖ and benefitted tremendously from it.  
Despite the intense July cold, a 40-year old man marched naked through Buenos 
Aires City, claiming for the restitution of his deposits and as a part of a multitudinary 
three-times-a-week marches campaign to reject the ―pesification‖ of bank deposits. The 
naked protestor wore only a small sign that covered his genitals and read: ―Justice.  They 
left us buttnaked‖.814 The idea being that due to the emergency measures, savers were 
stripped of their property. Another frustrated saver chained himself to the building of a 
                                                 
811 See, e.g., ―En rodaje‖, Clarín, June, 1, 2007 (available at  
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2007/06/01/espectaculos/c-01305.htm; last visited 04/16/2012) (giving a 
brief description of the movie‘s script); ―Acorralados (2011)‖, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0426566/ 
(last visited 04/16/2012) (providing a description of the film). 
 
812 See ―Amenazó con una Granada y logró que le devolvieran la plata‖, La Nación, January, 24, 2002 
(available at: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/369005-amenazo-con-una-granada-y-logro-que-le-devolvieran-
la-plata; last visited 04/16/2012). 
 
813 See ―Mar del Plata: un ahorrista se crucificó simbólicamente‖, La Nación, March, 14, 2002 (available at: 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=380838&high=protesta%20pesificaci%F3n%20dep%F3sit
os; last visited 04/24/2012). 
 
814 ―Un hombre desnudo participó de la protesta de ahorristas‖, La Nación, July, 10, 2002 (available at: 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=412663&high=protesta%20pesificaci%F3n%20dep%F3sit
os; lst visited 04/24/2012). 
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bank‘s branch.815 In another march, the protestors carried on a coffin and a funeral 
wreath, representing the money they thought lost in the hands of the banks.816 Four 
mountaineers climed to the top of El Paso mountain, in Mendoza, at 5,600 meters above 
the sea, and staked a flag claiming for the resignation of the Supreme Court justices.817 A 
group of savers entered into a hunger strike in front of the Court‘s building.818 Other 
people, who trusted the ―Intangibility of Deposits Act‖, felt they had been ―raped‖ by 
the emergency regime, which was ―a robbery‖.819 The cases and examples one could cite 
are endless. 
Perhaps none of this should be surprising. Perhaps it is nothing but a 
reaffirmation that, as Blackstone famously said, ―[t]here is nothing which so generally 
                                                 
815 See ―Ahorrista encadenado‖, La Nación, May, 8, 2002 (available at 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=394896&high=ahorrista%20encadenado; last visited 
04/24/2012). It is important to note, however, that the saver in this case was a customer of Scotiabank 
Quilmes, the only foreign-owned bank that fell during the crisis, and that due to the intervention by the 
Central Bank was not paying any monies, whatever their origin, to its depositors. The outraged chained 
saver was not able to get the money from his salary, which was a special (and more urgent) circumstance 
than that of the average depositor. 
 
816 See ―Escrache a los bancos en la City‖, Clarín, February, 7, 2002 (available at: 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2002/02/07/e-00701.htm; last visited 04/24/2012) (reporting on the 
protest marches in various provinces of the country). 
 
817 See ―Siguen las protestas, desde Tribunales al Aconcagua‖, Clarín, February, 8, 2002 (available at:  
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2002/02/08/p-02103.htm; last visited 04/24/2012) (telling the story of the 
mountaineers). 
 
818 See ―Ahorristas ayunan en Tribunales‖, Clarín, December, 10, 2002 (available at: 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2002/12/10/e-00602.htm; last visited 04/24/2012) (reporting on the 
savers‘ hunger strike to exert pressure on the Court to rule against ―pesification‖).  
 
819 See ―Desventuras de una ahorrista que confió en la ley y quedó atrapada en el corralito‖, Clarín, May, 14, 
2002 (available at http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2002/05/14/e-00401.htm; last visited 01/03/2013) 
(quoting Miriam Luna, a 42-year old woman, who reported that she had trusted Congress and left her 
money in the bank and now she felt ―raped; there is no better word to sum up what I feel‖). 
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strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of 
property‖.820 
In any case, the prevailing feeling was that the people were being deprived of 
what was legitimately theirs, and depositors were mobilized.821 A number of associations 
of defrauded savers were created across the country,822 and in July, 2002, marches still 
gathered substantial numbers of participants. Resignation did not settle in. Some 20,000 
people gathered for a protest meeting in Buenos Aires, on July, 9, Independence Day in 
Argentina.823  
A judicial fight of unprecedented proportions was launched. I cannot go into its 
development in any detail here, and the events lend themselves to a number of equally 
interesting inquiries, each of which might be the topic of a doctoral dissertation.  
Every time the Supreme Court handed down an important decision on the topic, 
whatever the legal merits of their reasoning, some or all of the justices were accused of 
acting out of (mostly spurious) political, not legal, motives.824 In most instances, perhaps 
                                                 
820 William Blackstone, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (available at:: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk2ch1.asp; last visited 04/24/2012). 
 
821 See, e.g., ―Los ahorristas se juntan para compartir su desesperación‖, La Nación, February, 25, 2002 
(available at: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=376604&high=corralito%20protesta; last 
visited 04/24/2012) (transcribing the reasons given by many protestors as to why they protested actively). 
 
822 Among others, the ―Movimiento de Ahorristas Bancarios Argentinos Estafados‖ (Defrauded Argentine 
Savers Movement) (see www.ahorristasestafados.com.ar/; last visited 04/01/2013), ―Asociación de 
Ahorristas Damnificados por la Pesificación y el Default‖ (Association of Savers Harmed by the 
―Pesification‖ and Default) (see Anabella Quiroga, ―Hay ahorristas que quieren pedir el lucro cesante‖, 
Clarín, December, 28, 2006 (available at http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/12/28/elpais/p-00503.htm; 
last visited 01/17/2013) (quoting the secretary of the association)), ―Movimiento Independiente de 
Ahorristas Argentinos‖ (Independent Movement of Argentine Savers), ―Ahorristas Platenses‖ (Savers from 
La Plata City) (see http://www.ahorristasplatenses.8m.net/Encuentro2.htm; last visited 04/01/2013).  
 
823 ―Nueva protesta contra el corralito y los bonos‖, La Nación, July, 9, (available at: 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=412292&high=protesta%20pesificaci%F3n%20dep%F3sit
os; last visited 04/24/2012). 
 
824 The majority in Smith and San Luis, with the exception of Justice Fayt, was formed by justices who were 
thought to be too close to former president Menem, who was at the time running for a third term in the 
office and who was a political enemy of then-president Duhalde (Menem‘s former vice president). Thus, 
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with the possible exception of the Massa court in 2006, there were good grounds for such 
speculations. This must be born in mind when assessing reactions to the rulings. Still, a 
quick survey of popular reactions to the different rulings may help to further clarify what 
conception of constitutional property was most extended.  
In Smith, a 6-to-0 decision, the Court struck down the initial restrictions on 
money withdrawals, in light of the ―Intangibility of Deposits Act‖.825 The decision was 
not enough to reinstate credibility for the Court, as it was perceived as part of a political 
maneuver amidst the Court‘s face-off with Duhalde. Still, along with the then-
forthcoming San Luis ruling, the Smith decision likely served a useful social role, as lower 
courts started granting injuctions in favor of savers, who could thus recover part of their 
                                                                                                                                            
the Court was accused of attempting to de-stabilize Duhalde to favor Menem‘s electoral chances in the 
upcoming 2003 presidential election. In a rather politically-unsavy move, Duhalde accused the Court 
publicly of blackmailing him with the Smith ruling. He then promoted the impeachment of all nine justices, 
which eventually failed. The plurality in Bustos was formed by one Duhalde appointee and two Kirchner 
(initially, Duhalde‘s candidate) appointees, plus a former member of the ―Menem majority‖ (Justice 
Boggiano) who was accused of switching to favor Kirchner‘s preferred positions in order to save himself 
from the impeachment procedures that Congress was carrying out against Menem-appointed justices. 
Thus, it was also suspected of acting on the desires of the Minister of Economy. See, e.g., Laura Zommer, 
―La decisión que sonó a declaración de Guerra‖, La Nación, February, 2 (available at 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/371182-la-decision-que-sono-a-declaracion-de-guerra; last visited 
01/03/2013) (reporting on the Administration‘s reactions to the Smith ruling and its interpretation as a 
decision unduly motivated by non-legal reasons); ―La crisis. Sondeo del Gobierno. La encuesta‖, Clarín, 
February, 5, 2002, (available at http://www.clarin.com/diario/2002/02/05/p-02003.htm; last visited 
01/03/2013) (reporting that a poll requested by the Administration showed that some 56.3% of the people 
thought the Smith decision aimed at boycotting the Duhalde administration, and only about 6% thought it 
aimed at defending the savers); ―La Corte Suprema continúa en crisis‖, La Nación, October, 30, 2004 
(available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=667199&high=bustos%20fallo; last visited 
01/03/2013) (arguing that the Bustos decision had been handed down ―under the undeniable pressure‖ of 
the Administration); Joaquín Morales Solá, ―Una gran victoria para Lavagna‖, La Nación, October, 27, 2004 
(available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/archivo/nota.asp?nota_id=648631&origen=relacionadas; last 
visited 09/15/2007) (pointing out that the validation of ―pesification‖ had been the great worry of then-
Minister of Economy Lavagna, in regard to the restructuring of the defaulted public debt, and that Lavagna 
lobbied furiously to obtain such a decision from the Court, talking to the Justices and making promises to 
Justice Boggiano in regard to the impeachment procedure he was undergoing at the time); Silvana Boschi, 
―Pesificación: otro capítulo en la Corte‖, Clarín, November, 3, 2004 (available at 
http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2004/11/03/elpais/p-00701.htm; last visited 01/08/2013) (stating that 
―According to judicial sources […] the Court worked against the clock to get ready drafts of the [Bustos] 
decision so urgently expected in the Government and the Ministry of Economy, to accompany the 
presentation of the official offer to the United States for a way out of  the debt default‖); Pablo Abiad & 
Mariano Thieberger JUSTICIA ERA KIRCHNER 11, 43-57, 128-130 (Buenos Aires, Editorial Marea, 
2005) (telling the story of the administration‘s role in the renewal of the Court‘s personnel and the 
importance of the ―pesification‖ issue in the process, as well as the lobby for a decision upholding it). 
 
825 325 Fallos 28 (2002). 
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savings, and channeled social tension through institutional, pacific means.826 Future 
Supreme Court justice, Ricardo Lorenzetti praised the federal judiciary in the following 
terms: 
―[m]any have criticized the judges, and have done so even in law journals. On the 
contrary, we think that it is necessary to attempt a ‗praise of the judges‘. In the 
terrible months we have lived in 2002, we faced the greatest crisis in our history, 
and we did it in Democracy. This is not usual in Argentine history, and we owe it 
[this change], to a large extent, to the citizens and the judges. The citizens did not 
resort to the [military] barracks, but to the streets, first, and the courts, later. The 
judges were not indifferent; they attended to the claims, worked tirelessly 
throughout the country, and were an extremely important check to the abuses of 
the other branches. I don’t think there is an example in the world of a Judiciary that has 
been able to channel so much accumulated social demand, that has declared so many 
unconstitutionalities, and that has generated such a solid groundswell of public opinion in defense 
of individual rights‖827 
 
La Nación criticized Congress‘ attempt to stop judicial injunctions that allowed 
depositors to recover part of their funds arguing that, as the depositors‘ right to their 
monies was indisputable, the legislation had left judges with few options but to grant the 
injunctions.828 It also emphasized that 
―[...] the combination of the devaluation of the currency with the prohibition of 
the withdrawals of funds and their forced restructuring, in addition to the 
‗pesification‘ of foreign currency deposits, amounted to a plain and simple 
violation of the property rights guaranted by the Constitution. These are the 
grounds of the amparos that are being filed and also of the injunctions that judges 
are granting [...] any steps towards a reasonable and gradual return of the deposits 
that remain trapped in the financial system will be an invaluable contribution to 
recovering the political and institutional normalcy of the country and the social 
peace, as well as to overcoming the crisis that tears the country apart‖829 
 
                                                 
826 See, e.g., Pablo Gallegos Fedriani, above n. 794 (recalling the situation that lower courts faced in the 
early years of the crisis and passing judgment on courts having played a valuable social role). 
 
827 Ricardo L. Lorenzetti, ―Contratos en la emergencia económica: Pesificación - Obligaciones en mora - 
Un modelo de interpretación‖, 2002-F L.L. 1086. Emphasis added. 
 
828 ―La ‗ley tapón‘ y sus debilidades‖, La Nación, May, 3, 2002 (available at 





In San Luis,830 the first decision on the merits of the compulsory conversion of 
dollar deposits, a 5-to-3 majority of the Supreme Court ruled ―pesification‖ 
unconstitutional, on both formal and substantial grounds, and argued that depositors had 
relied on the ―Intangibility of Deposits Act‖ and that a fifty percent loss of capital, as 
produced by the emergency regime conversion formula at the time of the decision, ran 
afoul of the property clause of the Constitution. The justices emphasized that the breach 
of the promises of the ―Intangibility of Deposits Act‖ was ―an ambush‖ for the 
depositors and that the State had not acted in good faith.831 They also pointed out that 
the emergency regime had ―plainly obliterated the constitutional guarantee of 
property‖.832 By diminishing the value of the savers‘ deposits in approximately fifty 
percent, it had become ―irredeemably confiscatory‖.833 
The decision was received exultantly by the savers,834 and was not subject to 
severe criticism, except by those who thought that, regardless of the soundness of its 
reasoning, the decision had been motivated by spurious reasons or those who thought its 
economic effects to be deleterious. But even people in this latter group could not object 
to the ruling in legal terms.  
                                                 
830 326 Fallos 417 (2003). 
 
831 Id. (Fayt, J., concurring, §20; similarly, Moliné O‘Connor, López, JJ., concurring, §49; Vázquez, J., 
concurring, §23; Nazareno, J., §34-36). 
 
832




 Id. (Fayt, J., concurring, §39; similarly, Vázquez, J., concurring, §19) 
 
834 See, e.g., ―Los ahorristas celebraron frente al Palacio de Justicia‖, La Nación, March, 5, 2003 (available at 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=478553&high=fallo%20provincia%20san%20luis; last 
visited 01/03/2013) (reporting that savers celebrated in front of the Court‘s building with signs and pan-
and-pot banging, chanting ―now there is justice‖); ―Corte: piden a bancos que negocien con ahorristas‖, 
Clarín, March, 8, 2003 (available at http://www.clarin.com/diario/2003/03/08/e-00301.htm; last visited 
04/25/2013) (reporting that the San Luis ruling, striking down ―pesification‖ of bank deposits, had had a 
―favorable effect upon the public‖). 
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Clarín, a newspaper often accused of having benefited tremendously with 
―pesification‖ of its debt,835 polled its readers on the San Luis decision. The question was 
―What do you think of the Supreme Court decision the re-dollarized the term deposit of 
San Luis?‖. The answers vary, and some respondents explicitly accused the Court of 
acting politically,836 but most of them coincided in praising the legal merits and, often, the 
intrinsic justice of the decision. Let us see. 
One reader stated that ―all the Court did was to maintain the force of the right of 
property in the event of an emergency of the state. If we analyze the effects of the 
decision, in principle they seem optimal‖.837 Another one opined that the ruling was 
―extremely correct, because it re-establishes the right of property guaranteed in Article 17 
of the Constitution‖.838 Another reader, a biologist who criticized the justices heavily for 
allegedly deciding in order to further Menem‘s electoral interests, claimed that ―the ruling 
is legally correct. And just, as it would have been to nullify the corralito in the proper 
time‖.839 
                                                 
835 See, e.g., ―Al Grupo Clarín nunca le gustó perder‖, América Noticias, May, 6, 2007 (available at 
http://www.americanoticias.com/?action=displayNote&id_noticia=107; last visited 01/09/2013) (arguing 
that Clarín benefitted from ―pesification‖); ―Clarín, el gran negociante argentino‖ (available at 
http://comunicacionpopular.com.ar/clarin-el-gran-negociante-argentino-2/; last visited 01/09/2013) 
(accusing Clarín of having gotten tremendous benefits from ―pesification‖ and other measures of the 
Duhalde administration, such as the reform to the Bankruptcy Law); ―Las medidas de devaluación y 
pesificación perjudicaron al Grupo Clarín‖ (available at http://www.grupoclarin.com/content/10-las-
medidas-de-devaluacion-y-pesificacion-perjudicaron-al-grupo-clarin: last visited 01/09/2013) (official 
version of Clarín, attacking the ―official rhetoric‖, according to which, Clarín would have benefitted from 
―pesification‖);  
 
836 See ―¿Qué opina del fallo de la Corte Suprema que redolarizó el plazo fijo de la provincia de San Luis?‖, 
Clarín, March, 16, 2003 (available at http://www.clarin.com/diario/2003/03/16/o-531042.htm; last visited 
01/03/2013) (stating that there was a generalized suspicion among its readers that a political move 
underlied the ruling and that although the Court defended the savers‘ property rights, they wouldn‘t get 
their dollars back). 
 
837 Id. (quoting one reader by the name of Alejandro Matías Actis, lawyer). 
 
838 Id. (quoting one reader by the name of Fidel Améndola; judging by the reader‘s ID number, 25.690.050, 
he might have been around 25-years old at the time of the statement). 
 
839 Id. (quoting one reader by the name of Guillermo Enrique Haut). 
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Of course, it could be argued that such a small sample cannot be taken as 
representative of public opinion. True. But the approval of the ruling‘s legal stance, and 
of the need to respect the savers‘ capital, must have been very widely held, indeed, if one 
is to judge the issue by the then-presidential candidates‘ positions on the topic, barely 
three weeks before election day. La Nación reported that  
―[a]lthough presidential candidates adopted different postures when evaluating 
the Supreme Court ruling in favor of the ‗re-dollarization‘ of the province of San 
Luis term deposit, they all agreed on the need to repay the deposits in the original 
currency‖840 
 
Presidential candidate Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, from one branch of the Peronist 
party, declared that the banks ―must take responsibility and return the dollars they 
received‖.841 Néstor Kirchner, also from the Peronist party and Duhalde‘s candidate, 
declared very eloquently that savers should ―rest assured that with him [as president] they 
will never get stuck with the bill‖842 and that his position had always been ―to respect the 
original currency [of the deposits]‖.843 Leopoldo Moreau, from the Radical party, 
criticized the decision for he considered it of impossible implementation and motivated 
by the political necessities of Carlos Menem, but he acknowledged ―the rights of the 
savers that have been cheated‖.844 Elisa Carrió, from the opposition party ARI, held that  
                                                                                                                                            
 






842 Id. The expression in Spanish is ―que los ahorristas se queden tranquilos, que conmigo jamás van a ser el 
pato de la boda‖. 
 





―[w]e must respect the Constitution and the law for the small and medium savers 
who believed in the country and did not [participate] in capital flight, and 
contemplate the situation of millions of debtors and savers who, along with all 
the people, are the ultimate victims of this phase [of the country]‖845 
 
The same trend is observed when the electoral platforms for the 2003 
presidential election are analyzed. No single platform offered the electorate a solution to 
the economic crisis that consisted in anything like the ―restitution of dollar bank deposits 
in pesos, at a conversion rate that did not reflect the free market value of the dollar‖. A 
quick review of the platforms of the five slates that gathered the most votes846 show that 
the proposals put forward to the electorate were: to take measures to return the bank 
deposits in the currency originally agreed (Menem847 and López Murphy);848 to resolve 
―the confiscation of the deposits and the asymmetric pesification […] Acknowledging the legal 
limitations, a revision of the indiscriminate measures that favored the liquefaction of the liabilities of 
solvent debtors will be carried out and all remaining restrictions to the use of funds by 
depositors will be lifted‖ (Carrió);849  ―to create a framework that allowed banks and savers 




 Taken together, they amount to the 91.22% of the votes in the 2003 presidential election (data available 
at http://www.towsa.com/andy/index.html; last visited 01/08/2013). 
 
847
 In Menem‘s proposal, the State would compensate the banks for the differences paid to the savers. A 
trust funded with the banks‘ assets would be set up, to back up the restitituion of dollar deposits (electoral 
platform available at 
http://www.pjn.gov.ar/cne/download/Partidos%20Nacionales/Alianza%20frente%20por%20la%20lealta
d/Alianza%20frente%20por%20la%20lealtad.pdf; last visited 09/24/2007). 
 
848
 López Murphy proposed a compensation system between the State and the banks, allowing each bank a 
quicker restitution of its clients‘ deposits depending on the quality of its assets and the recovery of the 
public‘s trust in the financial system. The final goal was restitution in the original currency (platform 
available at 
http://www.pjn.gov.ar/cne/download/alianza%20movimiento%20federal%20para%20recrear%20el%20c
recimiento.pdf; last visited 09/24/2007). 
 
849
 Even if the platform does not explicitly state that deposits would be returned in the original currency, it 
does speak of ―confiscation‖, of ―acknowledging the legal limitations‖ (among which the Smith and San 
Luis Supreme Court precedents were especially relevant), of ―lifting all remaining restrictions‖, and of 
―revising the indiscriminate measures that favored liquefaction of the liabilities of solvent debtors‖ (which, 
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to negotiate the mode of restitution of the deposits‖ (Kirchner);850 and, finally, to 
establish ―a financial system that regenerates the savers‘ confidence‖ (Rodríguez Saá).851 
Notice that even the candidate who had Duhalde‘s support in those elections, 
Néstor Kirchner, went only as far as proposing a negotiated process where banks and 
savers should agree on how the deposits should be returned. And the proposals that 
most clearly spoke of restitution in the original currency got, together, nearly 55% of the 
votes. It is evident that the candidates‘ support for restitution in dollars or, at least and 
for some, their extreme reluctance to show any signs of supporting ―pesification‖, must 
have been based on the resonance of respecting the savers‘ capital in the general public. 
The popular conception of constitutional property did not tolerate ―pesification‖, 
however convenient from the economic standpoint it might have been.  
                                                                                                                                            
presumably, refers to the ―generalized pesification‖ of the emergency decree 214/02, as opposed to the 
―limited pesification‖ of Law 25.561). On top of that, Carrió criticized the Bustos decision very harshly. 
(see, e.g., ―Carrió, Cruciani, y un nuevo capítulo de Política y Justicia‖, Diario Judicial, October, 29, 2004, 
available at http://www.diariojudicial.com/nota.asp?IDNoticia=23411; last visited 01/09/2013). All this 
allows the inference that the platform aimed at resolving the problem by fulfilling bank contracts in terms 
as close to the original as possible (platform available at 
http://www.pjn.gov.ar/cne/download/Alianza%20Afirmacion%20para%20una%20Republica%20Igualita
ria.pdf; last visited 09/24/2007). Emphasis added. 
 
850
 This platform is silent regarding the currency of restitution. However, it suggested that the issue should 
be resolved through negotiated agreements between banks and depositors, with the State‘s role limited to 
creating a framework that fostered such negotiations. With the Supreme Court's rulings Smith and San Luis 
in the books, and the large masses of savers who had gone to the courts in search of justice, it does not 
seem reasonable to infer that a negotiated settlement would include the compulsory ―pesification‖ at an 
arbitrary parity, as a form of restitution (platform available at 
http://www.pjn.gov.ar/cne/download/Partidos%20Nacionales/Alianza%20Frente%20para%20la%20vict
oria/Alianza%20frente%20para%20la%20victoria.pdf; last visited 09/24/2007). Moreover, Kirchner had 
declared publicly that his position ―had always been restitution in the original currency‖. See ―Dispar 





 This platform is surely the most vague and succinct of all the registered platforms. There are no 
references to how the deposits would be returned, nor to any concrete mechanism for that purpose, at all 
(platform available at 
http://www.pjn.gov.ar/cne/download/Partidos%20Nacionales/alianza%20frente%20movimiento%20po
pular.pdf; last visited 09/24/2007). 
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Contradicting public opinion, and despite his previous strong public assurances 
to the contrary, president Kirchner sought a decision that upheld ―pesification‖ as it 
helped his political plans.852 Through a combination of resignations and impeachments, 
Kirchner was eventually able to appoint a new majority to the Court; validating 
―pesification‖ was one of his main objectives.853 In Bustos,854 a plurality of the Court 
reversed its immediate prior decisions and upheld ―pesification‖ as applied to a 1.3 
million dollar deposit. However, in dicta in a concuring opinion Justice Zaffaroni stated 
his opinion that ―pesification‖ of small deposits would be ―dysfunctional to social 
progress‖,855 and that other cases (elderly savers, depositors who were sick, and even 
                                                 
852 There were many reasons why Kirchner had become a silent supporter of ―pesification‖ by 2004.  I can 
only mention a few here. One of the main political and economic reasons for Kirchner‘s change of mind 
was that he was trying to restructure the national debt that had been defaulted in 2001 and it was going to 
be harder to convince the external creditors that they should accept a substantial haircut when national 
depositors were acknowledged the right to collect 100 percent of their dollar credits. It‘s true that 
depositors were not the State‘s creditors (they were creditors of the banks), but the State was already 
formally into the equation, as it had committed itself to compensante the banks for the difference between 
the 1-to-1 ―pesification‖ of their credits and the 1.40-to-1 ―pesification‖ of their debts (the deposits) (see 
Article 6, Law 25,561). Moreover, the banks argued that since they couldn‘t afford to repay their deposits 
in dollars if forced to collect their loans in pesos, if the deposits were to be repaid in dollars, the State 
would have to subsidize the cost of the operation. If the State issued money to compensate the savers (or 
the banks), the inflation problem would just exacerbate. Moreover, this would alter the delicate fiscal 
equilibrium needed to afford fulfilling the proposal to foreign holders of defaulted bonds. In the external 
front, Argentina was facing several lawsuits in the ICSID, in which ―pesification‖ was at stake, and a ruling 
by the national Supreme Court striking down ―pesification‖ would hardly help the Administration‘s cause 
before the ICSID. Last, but not least, the unconstitutionality of ―pesification‖ was stuck to the old, 
Menem-appointed, Court, whose majority members Kirchner had managed to remove by impeachment 
procedures. 
 
853 See Pablo Abiad & Mariano Thieberger, above n. 824, at 11, 43-57, 128-130 (telling the story of the 
administration‘s role in the renewal of the Court‘s personnel and the importance of the ―pesification‖ issue 
in the process, as well as the lobby for a decision upholding it). A similar argument, regarding an alleged 
packing of the U.S. Supreme Court to overrule the first legal tender decision, Hepburn v. Griswold (75 U.S. 
603 (1870)), has been made frequently. See Gerard N. Magliocca, ―A New Approach to Congressional 
Power: Revisiting the Legal Tender Cases‖, 95 Geo. L. J. 119, 145-149 (2004) (presenting the criticism but 
arguing that Knox was an act of interpretation rather than a crude attempt to achieve a specific result and, 
thus, that the view that it was a political act is incorrect). 
 
854 327 Fallos 4495 (2004). The decision was handed down by a ―transition‖ Court, made up of two new 
appointees, two justices appointed by Alfonsín in the early 1980s, and one justice appointed by ―transition‖ 
president Duhalde in 2002. Two seats were still vacant, and one justice had recused himself. 
 
855 Id. (Zaffaroni, J., concurring, §8). 
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people who had already been paid in dollars due to injunctions)856 also deserved to be 
excluded from the ―general rule of pesification‖, thus preventing a majority from 
upholding the emergency regime.  
An unprecedented rebellion took place among lower courts, which refused to 
follow the decision,857 and took advantage of the loopholes created by Justice Zaffaroni‘s 
concurring opinion to continue ruling the ―pesification‖ regime unconstitutional.  
A large number of federal appellate judges issued the Declaración de Comodoro 
Rivadavia, a statement in which, citing the words of then-Supreme Court nominee 
                                                 
856 Id. (Zaffaroni, J., concurring, §13-14) 
 
857
 See, among countless other decisions, Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de La Plata, en pleno, 
06/26/2006, Abalde, Jorge y otros c. Banco Río, 2006 L.L.B.A. 797 (Bustos was deemed inapplicable in all cases 
involving special individual situations, as per the same emergency regime, and one of the judges, 
Compaired, held that ―given that the Court‘s thesis [in Bustos] can hardly be reconciled either with reality or 
with the applicable rules‘ values and contents, there arises the duty for all other courts in the Republic not to 
follow such position‖; emphasis added); Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de La Plara, sala II, 03/01/2007, 
G., I.G. c. PEN, opinion of judges Schifrin and Fleicher, 2007-B L.L. 248 (which although referred 
centrally to the Massa decision, imply the absolute rejection of the Bustos decision); Cámara de Apelaciones 
en lo Civil y Comercial de Corrientes, sala II, 06/01/2006, Olivi, Mirta c. Bank Boston, 2007 L.L. Litoral 130 
(rules ―pesification‖ unconstitucional and cites to Justice Fayt‘s dissent in Bustos); Cámara de Apelaciones en 
lo Civil y Comercial de Corrientes, sala IV, 04/28/2006, Castello, Julio E. c. Banco Río de la Plata, 2006 L.L. 
Litoral 1057 (considers Bustos as not binding and cites to Smith and San Luis); Cámara Nacional de 
Apelaciones en lo Civil y Comercial Federal, sala III, 05/23/2006, Bogomolny, Estela c. Poder Ejecutivo 
Nacional, L.L.O. (the court denied the recurso extraordinario federal –an extraordinary appeal similar to the writ 
of certiorari in the U.S. federal system, but whose formal admissibility is adjudicated by the same court 
whose decision is appealed- filed against its decision ruling ―pesification‖ unconstitutional against Bustos 
and citing to its own previous decision in Mauri, where the court had given ―sufficiente reasons to ground 
the decision not to follow Bustos‖); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil, Sala D, 06/30/2005, 
Carballido, Laura c. BNL, 2005-F L.L. 44 (the court held that Bustos was largely based upon ―arguments of a 
political, controversial tint, which do not provide enough normative grounds to set aside a decision [San 
Luis] that aims at protecting the right of property of the creditor, whose constitutional protection [had 
been] reinforced by Law 25,466‖); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil, sala B, 06/30/2005, 
Carrillo, María del Carmen c. BBVA, L.L. O. (declared ―pesification‖ unconstitutional and, regarding Bustos, 
held that it was not possible to ―sidestep the various criticisms levelled against said ruling, which justify our 
not following it. The emergency regime […] deprived the savers of the disposition of their credits, 
encroaching upon vested rights and the right to property‖); Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo 
Contenciosoadministrativo Federal, sala II, 21/06/2005, Salas, Mirtha R. c. Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, L.L.O. 
(ruled ―pesification‖ unconstitutional, and judge Herrera, concurring, pointed out that ―the Supreme Court 
decision in the B. 139 XXXIX Bustos, Alberto Roque y otros c. Estado Nacional y otros s/Amparo case, of 
October, 26, 2004, that rejected an amparo action analogous to the one in this case, cannot alter the 
reasoning of this court in the Pape, Mariela Susana c. PEN - dtos. 1570/01 - M° E Resol. 9/02 s/amparo ley 
16.986 case, of August, 28, 2002 […] Therefore, I maintain the same solution I adhered to in countless 
precedents of this court‖); Cámara Federal de Apelaciones de Mendoza, Sala A, 03/12/2004, Lavado, 
Roberto, 2005 L.L.G.C. 274 (struck down ―pesification‖ as unconstitutional and justified at length the 
court‘s refusal to follow Bustos). 
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Ricardo Lorenzetti,858 they defended their own rulings strinking down ―pesification‖ 
from the rough criticisms of Justices Belluscio and Maqueda in the Bustos decision.859 
Many judges criticized the Court‘s decision heavily,860 and one federal district 
court judge, Martín Silva Garretón, went as far as to say, in writing, that the Bustos 
decision contained ―staggering contradictions‖, ―hasty statements‖ and a ―blatant 
disregard of law‖.861 Silva Garretón also criticized the justices‘ individual concurring 
opinions, one by one, and had no problem in claiming that Justice Highton‘s 
concurrence exhibited an evident ignorance of the principles governing legislative 
delegation.862 
Another lower court judge, Julio Cruciani, criticized his superiors and said 
publicly that the ruling ―brings about a lack of credibility and hope in the new Supreme 
Court‖.863 Echoing the now-widespread ―regressive redistribution difficulty‖, judge 
                                                 
858 See above n. 827 and accompanying text. 
 
859 See, e.g., ―Camaristas federales replicaron a la Corte‖, La Nación, October, 27, 2004 (available at 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/657811-camaristas-federales-replicaron-a-la-corte; last visited 01/17/2013) 
(quoting Declaración de Comodoro Rivadavia); ―Pesificación: replica de jueces a la Corte‖, El Día, October, 27, 
2004 (available at http://www.eldia.com.ar/ediciones/20041127/economia1.asp; last visited 01/17/2013) 
(same). 
 
860 See, e.g., Juan Carlos Vaca, ―Más fallos en Córdoba contra la pesificación‖, La Nación, November, 23, 
2004 (available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=656559&high=bustos%20fallo; last 
visited 01/07/2013) (reporting that four decisions in the federal courts in the province of Córdoba held 
that the Bustos decision was unconstitutional and not binding). 
 
861 See Pablo Abiad, ―Un juez critica a la Corte y declara inconstitucional la pesificación‖, Clarín, 
November, 10, 2004 (available at http://www.clarin.com/diario/2004/11/10/elpais/p-00801.htm; last 
visited 01/07/2013) (transcribing parts of Silva Garretón‘s ruling in the Killian case). 
 
862 See Gabriel Sued, ―Un juez invalidó la pesificación en un caso mayor a U$S70.000‖, La Nación, 
November, 10, 2004 (available at 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=652721&high=bustos%20fallo; last visited 01/08/2013) 
(transcribing parts of Silva Garretón‘s ruling in the Killian case). 
 
863 See, e.g., ―Carrió, Cruciani y un nuevo capítulo de Política y Justicia‖, Diario Judicial, October, 28, 2004 
(available at http://www.diariojudicial.com/contenidos/2004/10/29/noticia_0009.html; last visited 
01/08/2013) (quoting judge Julio Cruciani). 
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Cruciani pointed out that ―as always, the injured party is Doña Rosa and Don José, and 
the beneficiaries are the banks‖.864 
The judges were reacting to the more than dubious legal bases of the Court‘s 
decision, but they were also reflecting the public outrage at the ruling. They knew most 
of the citizens were with them, not with the Bustos plurality. There were violent protests 
when the ruling was made public,865 and the savers kept protesting in front of the 
Supreme Court building weeks after the ruling.866 Some justices who voted to uphold 
―pesification‖ in Bustos suffered violent demonstrations and pickets in front of their 
homes.867 One of them, Juan Carlos Maqueda, even suffered physical aggression and had 
to spend one night in a hospital.868 His wife was also a victim of the savers‘ rage.869 
                                                 
864 Id. Emphasis added. ―Doña Rosa‖ and ―Don José‖ are equivalents of ―Jane Doe‖ or ―John Smith‖, 
which convey the idea of the ―regular guy on the street‖, the layfolk. 
 
865 See, e.g., ―La Corte convalidó la ley de pesificación‖, La Nación, October, 26, 2004 (available at 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=648407&high=bustos%20fallo; last visited 01/03/2013) 
(reporting that, right after the decision was made known, a group of outraged savers gathered in front of 
the Solicitor General office —who had submitted a brief in support of ―pesification‖—, painted it and 
lighted bonfires, and that another such group did the same inside the Court‘s building and were repressed 
by the police); Carolina Keve, ―Enfrentamientos frente a Tribunales‖, Página/12, October, 27, 2004 
(available at http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/subnotas/42853-14663-2004-10-27.html; last 
visited 01/07/2013) (reporting that when the Bustos decision was known, the courthouse was submerged in 
chaos, as savers attempted to break into the justices‘ conference room, throwing trash cans and lighting 
fire, and they confronted the police; similar incidents occurred in front of the Solicitor General office); ―A 
poca distancia de los jueces, los ahorristas hicieron sentir su queja‖, La Nación, October, 27, 2004 (available 
at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=648609&high=protesta%20fallo; last visited 
01/07/2013) (same). 
 
866 See ―La Corte, empantanada con las causas sobre pesificación‖, Clarín, November, 17, 2004 (available at 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2004/11/17/elpais/p-01205.htm; last visited 01/07/2013) (reported that 
the previous day there had been yet another protest by savers affected by ―pesification‖, who ―loudly 
demanded the restitution of their deposits in dollars and criticized the ruling that upheld their 
―pesification‖‖). 
 
867 See Victoria Ginzberg, ―La agresión resulta inadmisible‖, Página/12, November, 10, 2004 (available at 
http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/economia/2-43427-2004-11-10.html; last visited 01/07/2013) 
(reporting that Justices Boggiano and Maqueda had suffered savers‘ demonstrations in their homes). 
 
868 Id. (reporting that Maqueda was approached by a woman who asked him ―how is it going?‖ and when 
the justice said ―I‘m fine‖, she replied ―I‘m not‖, and between 40 and 50 people threw him against a shop 
windows and hit him in the head with the signs they were carrying). 
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 Maqueda, who had been appointed by Duhalde and had been a member of the 
Senate that passed Emergency Law 25,561, had been the target of the savers‘ indignation 
since his appointment. When he took office, more than two hundred demonstrators 
broke the windows of the entrance doors to the Court‘s building and threw tomatoes, 
eggs and firecrackers towards the inside.870 He had also suffered a demonstration in his 
natal province of Córdoba.871 
Elisa Carrió, an important opposition leader, reacted vehemently to the ruling. 
She accused then-Minister of Economy Roberto Lavagna of ―having celebrated the 
scam‖, of ―having spoken with the Court‖ which was ―an insult to millions of 
Argentines‖, and she said that she supported ―the renegotiation of the debt, but not the 
immorality of an Administration that celebrates immorality‖.872 Regarding the ruling 
itself, she claimed that its arguments were of ―an unacceptable rusticity‖, and requested 
the impeachment of Justices Belluscio, Maqueda, and Boggiano.873 
                                                                                                                                            
869 Id. 
 
870 See ―El juez Maqueda tuvo que ser internado tras un escrache‖, Clarín, November, 6, 2004 (available at 




872 See ―Carrió acusó a Lavagna de haber festejado la estafa de la pesificación‖, La Nación, October, 30, 
2004 (available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/649726-carrio-acuso-a-lavagna-de-haber-festejado-la-
estafa-de-la-pesificacion; last visited 01/08/2013). 
 
873 See, e.g., Silvana Saldisuri, ―Carrió pedirá el juicio politico a Belluscio por su fallo a favor de la 
pesificación‖, Cronista, October, 28, 2004 (available at http://www.cronista.com/impresageneral/Carrio-
pedira-el-juicio-politico-de-Belluscio-por-su-fallo-a-favor-de-la-pesificacion-20041029-0088.html; last 
visited 01/08/2013); ―Carrió acusó a Lavagna de haber festejado la estafa de la pesificación‖, La Nación, 
October, 30, 2004 (available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/649726-carrio-acuso-a-lavagna-de-haber-
festejado-la-estafa-de-la-pesificacion; last visited 01/08/2013). Unsurprisingly, a Congress dominated by 
the Kirchners rejected Carrió‘s request. 
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Ricardo López Murphy, leader of the opposition party Recrear, opined that the 
Bustos ruling was a ―legal scandal‖ and that ―clearly‖ there was ―a serious problem with 
this ruling because it confirmed the possibility of confiscating savings‖.874 
Another piece of important evidence in this inquiry is the fact that Congress had 
refused to ratify Duhalde‘s emergency decree that ―pesified‖ bank deposits not once but 
twice,875 probably mindful of extreme impopularity of the measures. It was only after the 
Court had validated the emergency regime —taking the corresponding heat— in Bustos 
that Congress finally ratified the measures.876 
The Bustos decision was met with extended popular, as well as judicial, 
disapproval, and the Court wasn‘t able to gather consensus among the justices to rule 
―pesification‖ constitutional in all cases.  
Two new justices took the bench, and more than two years later, in Massa,877 a 
definitive solution was reached: ―pesification‖ was ruled constitutional,878 but only insofar 
                                                 
874 See ―Pesificación: duro debate tras el fallo de la Corte‖, El Día, October, 31, 2004 (available at 
http://www.eldia.com.ar/ediciones/20041031/elpais3.asp; last visited 01/08/2013). 
 
875 The Executive branch sent budget bills (which were true omnibus bills) containing provisions that 
ratified the emergency decree 214/02 (the one that had established the ―pesification‖ of bank deposits), 
among various other emergency decrees, two years in a row. Congress, however, explicitly excluded 
emergency decree 214/02 from ratification in the corresponding enacted laws (see Laws 25,725 and 
25,827). See also Emilio A. Ibarlucía, LA EMERGENCIA FINANCIERA Y CONTROL JUDICIAL DE 
CONSTITUCIONALIDAD 144-145 (Buenos Aires, Ábaco, 2004). Congress also legislated on the very 
same economic emergency topic, without ratifiying the decree (see Laws 25,587 and 25,820). 
 




878 Technically, there is no majority upholding ―pesification‖, as only three justices out of the five-justice 
plurality explicitly declared ―pesification‖ constitutional, and as of 2006 when the Court was shrunk from 9 
to 7 (and, in the future, 5) seats, a majority is constituted by four votes. Justice Fayt, who had previously 
voted for the unconstitutionality of the regime, stated that the Court need not decide the constitutional 
issue as there was no harm without a reduction of capital while Justice Argibay, a Kirchner appointee, 
concurred in the judgment but only insofar as the economic outcome was equivalent to declaring the 
emergency regime unconstitutional, as she thought it to be.  
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as the conversion formula, with a few judicial twists,879 no longer resulted in a reduction 
of capital. Savers would be paid in pesos an amount equivalent to the free market value of 
the dollars originally deposited, thus reinforcing, as a practical matter, the well-extended 
idea was that capital could not be reduced, while maturities and interest rates could be 
altered.  
Justices Lorenzetti, Highton de Nolasco and Zaffaroni signed a dry, succinct 
plurality opinion that ruled ―pesification‖ constitutional for lack of harm to the savers‘ 
property rights, with Lorenzetti adding a separate concurrence giving further 
explanations for his position that depositors suffered no harm under the ruling. Justice 
Fayt considered that the Court need not address the question of the constitutionality of 
―pesification‖, given that the savers would receive an equivalent amount, even if in 
pesos,880 although he reiterated ―the view held in previous opinions‖,881 where he voted to 
strike down ―pesification‖. Justice Argibay, herself a Kirchner appointee, wrote what is 
basically a dissent, arguing the unconstitutionality of the compulsory conversion, but 
concurring in the judgment as, in her opinion, it led to the very same economic result as 
the plurality‘s tweaked conversion formula.882 Justice Maqueda, a supporter of the 
constitutionality of the emergency regime, decided to take no part in the decision. 
The Massa decision aimed at bringing the long judicial struggle to an end, 
regardless of legal orthodoxies. Although it succeeded in its own terms, as lower courts 
                                                 
879 The decision doubled the interest rate set by the emergency regime and extended the application of the 
inflation-adjustment mechanism (C.E.R.) until the date of effective payment, thus eliminating losses of 
capital. The Court took advantage of a happy coincidence: the dollar price has remained stable for quite 
some time, while inflation had kept a steady rising march, therefore making converted pesos converge with 
the dollar price.  
 




882 Id. (Argibay, J., concurring in the judgment, §11) 
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largely adhered to the ruling and both parties accepted it, it was obvious that decision 
would not leave everyone content. As one journalist put it, it was an unjust ending for 
the crisis, but one far less tragic than one could have predicted five years before.883 Savers 
would receive the equivalent to the capital they had deposited, bearing the opportunity 
costs of a 5-year deprivation of the money.884 They protested the decision, albeit to a 
much lesser extent than they had done with the previous Bustos case.885 They never 
completely accepted the fact that the Court had not ruled ―pesification‖ unconstitutional. 
Symbolisms do matter. 
Bank depositors were not the only victims of ―pesification‖, nor the only ones 
who were vocal about their rejection of such way of dealing with the emergency. There 
were a fairly large number of small private lenders. Quite frequently, they were 
unemployed middle-aged individuals who had received a severage payment and who, in 
the face of the unlikelihood of getting a new job, had lent the money to people that could 
not have access to formal banking credit. These creditors, by far the most prejudiced by 
the emergency regime established by the Duhalde administration, as they were to be 
repaid one peso per each dollar lent, plus an inflation-adjustment index, also adhered to 
                                                 
883 Mario Wainfeld, ―Qué verde era mi banco‖, Página/12, December, 28, 2006 (available at 
http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/subnotas/78339-25281-2006-12-28.html; last visited 
01/17/2013).  
 
884 The Massa decision did not contemplate the possibility of further compensations for the savers, except 
for Justice Fayt, who explicitly left open the possibility of new lawsuits where the savers could sue for the 
harms suffered due the protracted impossibility of using the money. See 329 Fallos 5913 (2006) (Fayt, J., 
concurring, §20). 
 
885 When the decision was handed down, a group of about 70 savers were protesting in front of the 
Supreme Court, with signs, drums and pans. Many wore stickers with the phrases ―Remember. The banks 
stole from you, and they will do it again‖. They complained bitterly that Court upheld Emergency Decree 
214/02. See ―Los ahorristas, de la esperanza al llanto‖, La Nación, December, 28, 2006 (available at 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=870900&high=fallo%20ahorristas; last visited 
01/17/2013). Some of them considered the decision ―insufficient‖ as it did not provide for compensation 
of the lucrum cessans. See see Anabella Quiroga, ―Hay ahorristas que quieren pedir el lucro cesante‖, Clarín, 
December, 28, 2006 (available at http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/12/28/elpais/p-00503.htm; last 
visited 01/17/2013) (reporting the complaints of many of the savers protesting the Court‘s decision). 
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the idea that property rights could be modified for emergency reasons, but not to the 
extent the administration had gone. One of them stated to Clarín that 
"[u]ntil a fortnight ago, the situation was governed by Article 11 of Law 25,561 
and the private mortgagees were negotiating with debtors, we did not lose hope 
for a solution. But Decree 214 pesified us 1-1 and deprived us of all hope"886 
 
Interestingly, and contrary to the situation between depositors and banks, the 
dispute private creditors and debtors was not one of total and irreconcilable opposition. 
Perhaps it was so because both parties could empathize with each other. As Clarín 
reported, ―these investors say it is not a fight between debtors and creditors‖.887 ―Here all 
contracts were broken. No one intends to take the house of another [person]. It is simply 
about giving the possibility of a reasonable renegotiation between creditors and debtors"888 
The movement against the economic emergency measures even had its own 
apparent contradictions. Indeed, many people were against the ―pesification‖ of bank 
deposits, even when they supported the ―pesification‖ of debts. Depositors who argued 
against ―pesification‖ and small debtors who claimed for it were sometimes together in 
their fights. Neighborhood assemblies proliferated in those days, and a document against 
Duhalde‘s economic policies was issued by ―the indebted, the acorralados [those whose 
money was kept within the ―corralito‖], the ungoverned, the ‗un-pesified‘ debtors, the 
lethargic, the hopeless, the bankrupt‖.889 According to Ibope, fifty percent of the people 
                                                 
886 See ―Quejas de algunos pesificados‖, Clarín, February, 13, 2002 (available at 
http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2002/02/13/e-346489.htm; last visited 01/03/2013) (quoting one 




888 Id. Emphasis added. 
 
889 See ―La popular y la platea, todos mojados por la misma lluvia‖, Clarín, January, 29, 2002 (available at: 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2002/01/29/p-340386.htm; last visited 04/26/2012) (citing the document 




thought that the ―pesification‖ of bank deposits did not contribute to overcoming the 
crisis,890 while exactly the same percentage supported the one-to-one ―pesification‖ of 
debts.891 But that cannot be a plausible position: banks cannot repay dollar deposits if 
they are not allowed to collect their dollar credits. You cannot have it both ways. Or can 
you?  
The dominant emergency discourse was that in order to save families who were 
indebted in dollars from losing their homes, it was unavoidable to ―pesify‖ bank 
deposits.892 Therefore, savers who rejected ―pesification‖ exhibited an unacceptably 
individualistic attitude and were trying to obtain unjust advantages, establishing 
themselves as a privileged class. Accordingly, the Central Bank argued to the Supreme 
Court that, if paid back in dollars, depositors would be enriched in a way ―incompatible 
with the situation of the rest of the depositors and with the acute situation of economic 
and financial crises faced by the Nation‖.893 Powerful media, with stakes in the 
―pesification‖ of debts, pushed forward the emergency discourse, and tied up the destiny 
of dollar deposits in the financial system with that of dollar contracts between private 
individuals, thus instilling fear in the large group of small debtors who could not afford 
                                                 
890 According to the evidence in the text, many more people seemed to have thought that ―pesification‖ of 
bank deposits was impermissible, whether it contributed to improving the situation or not. 
 
891 See Raúl Kollmann, ―La gente aún no percibe resultados‖, Página/12, February, 10, 2002 (available at: 
http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/subnotas/1736-979-2002-02-10.html; last visited 04/26/2012) 
(citing an Ibope poll). Of course, to think that any measure is not a solution to a certain problem is not the 
same as to support any given measure, so it is possible to think that the two questions were posed in too 
different terms in order for the answers to them to be comparable.   
 
892 See Brief for Defendant Central Bank of the Argentine Republic in case S.173.XXXVIII, Provincia de San 
Luis v. Estado Nacional et al., on file with author, ruling on the merits in 326 Fallos 417 (2003) (arguing that it 
was necessary to ―pesify‖ all bank deposits in order to allow the also necessary ―pesification‖ of debts). 
 
893 See Brief for Defendant Central Bank of the Argentine Republic in case S.173.XXXVIII, Provincia de San 
Luis v. Estado Nacional et al., on file with author, ruling on the merits in 326 Fallos 417 (2003)). 
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to repay in dollars.894 Spokesmen for the Minister of Economy sought to install the idea 
that returning the dollars trapped in the corralito was an economically unfeasible idea, 
something financially irrational.895 
Former President of the Central Bank, Javier González Fraga, was adamantly 
opposed to any de-―pesification‖ of deposits, and declared publicly that 
―It would be very bad if [depositors] were given a national bond […] A country 
where there is famine and three million people are marginalized cannot spend 
resources, neither now nor in the future, to compensante savers who did not lose 
purchasing power‖896 
 
In his view, due to the higher interest rates that were paid in Argentina, a typical 
saver would not have done better, had he deposited the money in, say, Miami.897  And 
                                                 
894 ―Deudores piden que se ratifique el alcance del fallo‖, La Nación, March, 6, 2003 (available at 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/478788-deudores-piden-que-se-ratifique-el-alcance-del-fallo; last visited 
01/02/2013) (citing the president of Fedecámaras, the federation of chambers and centers of commerce, 
who filed a petition in the Supreme Court to get the justices to ratify that the ruling declaring the 
unconstitutionality of ―pesification‖ only reached bank deposits and not other types of dollar-denominated 
obligations). 
 
895 Lorena Cobe LA SALIDA DE LA CONVERTIBILIDAD. LOS BANCOS Y LA PESIFICACION 
69 (Buenos Aires, Capital Intelectual, 2009). 
 
896 ―Para Fraga, es un engaño‖, Página/12, December, 4, 2002 (available at 
http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/subnotas/1-5535-2002-12-04.html; last visited 01/14/2012). 
 
897 See ―Defaulter of Last Resort‖, 366 The Economist 38-39 (March, 8, 2003) (quoting Javier González 
Fraga). The full argument goes like this: since the average deposit was 5-year long, the high interest rates 
paid in Argentina would have compensated depositors by putting them, after the reduction of capital 
brought about by ―pesification‖, in the same situation they would have been, had they had their money 
deposited in Miami during the same 5 years. There are several problems in this argument, which I can only 
mention here. First, by 1996 the interest rate paid to depositors had fallen to international levels (see 
Francisco Buera & Juan Pablo Nicolini, above n. 777, at 232 (arguing that by the end of 1996 the passive 
interest rate —the rate paid by banks to depositors— had fallen to international levels)), therefore 
falsifying the assumption of González Fraga‘s argument; second, even if it were true that a depositor in 
Miami would have been paid a lower interest, his money would have been exposed to far fewer risks —
including risks other than conversion of the currency, devaluation, etc.—; third, the argument overlooks 
the fact that depositors in Argentina did sustain a loss, thus suffering in their legitimate expectations, due 
to ―endowment effect‖ (see, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knestch & Richard H. Thaler, ―The 
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias‖, 5 J. Econ. Perspect. 193 (1991)) and WTP-WTP 
divergence —basically, what Frank Michelman has called ―demoralization costs‖ (Frank I. Michelman, 
―Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ―Just Compensation‖ Law‖, 80 
Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1214 (1967))—; fourth, most small and medium savers did not have access to foreign 
accounts, had they preferred a lower interest rate with a correspondingly lower risk; last, but not least, the 
argument overlooks that banks had also enjoyed —throughout the ten years that convertibility lasted— of 
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the Administration did not miss an opportunity to stress that the savers did not really 
lose with the ―pesification‖ of their deposits.898 
Justices Belluscio and Maqueda followed trend, emphasizing that 
―[F]rom the 2001 crisis nobody has come out unharmed. Without considering 
that there were even people who lost their lives in the street riots, many 
inhabitants of the country lost their patrimony or saw it diminished as a 
consequence of the crisis […] in such a situation, to allow that depositors get, without 
further delay, the same amount of foreign currency in which their deposits were registered would 
imply the creation of a privileged class […]‖899 
 
Justice Highton de Nolasco noted that: 
―[…] the norms impose the necessity that the consequences of the emergency are 
distributed fairly among all inhabitants, so that no citizen benefits from another […] 
Within a constitutional scheme where human rights have primacy, and where 
large sectors of the population remain with unfulfilled basic needs and are 
situated below the poverty line, it is not possible to validate an individualistic claim 
[…]‖900 
 
Once again, the question arises: were the burdens of the crisis distributed fairly? 
As with the ―Bonex plan‖, those caught by the emergency trap were mostly small and 
medium savers. It is not hard to imagine that those who withdrew some 22,000,000,000 
dollars from the banks throughout 2001 were depositors with better access to 
information and more sophisticated strategies of risk management. These qualities are 
usually correlated with the well-off. The ―Intangibility of Deposits Act‖ must have been, 
for those versed in investment matters, the final signal needed to take their deposits out 
                                                                                                                                            
a spread substantially higher than the one they would have had, if they had lent money in Miami (see above 
n. 778). 
 
898 See, e.g., Jorge Remes Lenicov, ―Pesificación, equidad para deudores y ahorristas‖, La Nación, October, 
11, 2002 (available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/439561-pesificacion-equidad-para-deudores-y-
ahorristas; last visited 02/15/2012) (stating that ―pesification has protected savers‖ and there was no 
―confiscation of savings‖). Remes Lenicov was the Minister of Economy who implemented ―pesification‖.  
 
899 327 Fallos 4495 (2004), (Belluscio, Maqueda, JJ., concurring, §13). The italics are mine. 
 
900 327 Fallos 4495 (2004), (Highton de Nolasco, J., concurring, §29). 
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of the Argentine banking system. On the other hand, laymen were probably reassured by 
Congress‘s formal declaration that deposits would be respected. Therefore, it should not 
be surprising that the profile of the average saver caught by the emergency regime be that 
of a small, relatively poor and politically-unconnected, depositor. Let us see what we find 
by looking at the numbers. 
Of 1,137,682 dollar-denominated accounts that were caught in the restructuring 
and ―pesification‖ established by Emergency Law 25,561 and Emergency Decree 
214/2002, 1,030,333 accounts corresponded to amounts of 30,000 or less dollars.901 That 
means a 90.56% of all accounts. If one considers only deposits of up to 5,000 dollars, 
they reach 48% of all deposits trapped in the emergency regime, which made up only 
25% of the total deposits in December 2000.902 Hardly enough to consider the holders 
part of the well-off. Even more importantly, the capital flight figures show that, 
predictably, the largest investors and foreign residents took their capitals out of the banks 
well before the emergency regime was in place. From December, 2000 to March, 2001, a 
significant decrease in dollar deposits is seen only in accounts of over 500,000 dollars and 
those owned by foreign residents.903 Between March 2001 and November 2001, what one 
sees is the following: very small depositors converted their savings from pesos to dollars, 
as deposits of less than 5,000 pesos fell 11.3% while dollar deposits up to the same 
amount increased by 16.9%; small and medium savers took some of their deposits out of 
                                                 
901 ―Información sobre tramos de depósitos‖, Estadísticas e Indicadores Monetarios y Financieros, Central 
Bank of the Argentine Republic, information as of July, 31, 2002 (available at: 
http://www.bcra.gov.ar/estadis/es020200.asp; selecting "Otras Informaciones sobre la actividad 
financiera"/"Tramos de Depósitos (serie trimestral)"; last visited 02/10/2012). 
 
902 Id. See also Marina Halac & Sergio L. Schmukler, ―Distributional Effects of Crises: The Role of 
Financial Transfers‖, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3173 at 35 (see figure 5) (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=408100; last visited 01/20/2012) 
 
903 Accounts between 100,000 and 500,000 dollars also show a very slight decrease of 0.9%. Accounts over 




the system, as deposits of up to 20,000 dollars dropped by 3.9% and those of up to 
100,000 dollars decreased by 6%; large savers and investors incurred in heavy cash 
withdrawals, with a 15.2% drop in deposits between 100,000 and 500,000 dollars, a 23% 
drop in those over 500,000, and an impressive 62% fall in deposits owned by foreign 
residents.904 At the same time, a similar trend is seen in pesos deposits, as large depositors 
—as well as foreign residents— rapidly abandoned their positions in national currency,905 
with the possibility that they converted them into dollars under the still-in-force 
convertibility regime and kept them in private vaults or sent them abroad. Between the 
third and fourth trimesters of 2001, when the ―Intangibility of Deposits Act‖ was 
enacted,906 there was a small but steady increase in the percentage of small fixed-term 
deposits (up to 10,000 dollars), over the total number of accounts.907 There was a similar 
increase in the percentage the small acounts represent over the total stock, with accounts 
of up to 30,000 dollars increasing their relative portion of the pie.908 Although the 
increases are small, they hint that the law instilled a greater degree of confidence in 
smaller savers. At the same time, it is significant that the number of transferences of 
money to foreign accounts made by individuals, as well as the total amounts they sent 
abroad, dropped significantly immediately after the enactment of the ―Intangibility of 
                                                 
904 Id. 
 
905 Between March and November, 2001, pesos deposits fell by a 28.2% in the segment between 100,000 
and 500,000 pesos, 49.4% in the segment of over 500,000 pesos, and 94.5% in the case of foreign-holder‘s 
accounts. See Marina Halac & Sergio L. Schmukler, above n. 902, at 34 (figure 4). 
 
906 The law was enacted on August, 29, 2001. 
 
907 They rose 3.58%. See above n. 901. 
 
908 They rose 1.51%. See above n. 901. 
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Deposits Act‖.909 The phenomenon does not repeat if one observes transferences made 
by companies, which remained at a steady level, both in regard to the number of 
operations and to the amounts taken out of the country, before and after Congress 
passed the law.910 This suggests, again, the possibility that people with less information 
and worse strategies to manage financial risks tended to believe Congress to a greater 
extent than those with better resouces.    
Moreover, large debtors lobbied furiously to get the Executive to expand 
―pesification‖ of debts way beyond the initial limited protection granted to small and 
medium debtors by Congress, and they got it.911 A large percentage of debtors were large 
                                                 
909 During September and October, 2001, there were 2,205 operations (for a total of 123,930,552 dollars) 
and 3,238 operations (for a total of 328,145,852 dollars), respectively. In contrast, during July and August, 
the two months prior to the enactment of the Law #25,466, the system registered 6,989 operations (for a 
total of 683,055,353 dollars) and 6,734 operations (for a total of 555,877,753 dollars). See Comisión 
Especial Investigadora de la Cámara de Diputados FUGA DE DIVISAS EN ARGENTINA: INFORME 




911 See Mario Rapoport, above n. 656, at 945 (arguing that ―in order to join the beneficiaries [of 
pesification] large debtors reacted quickly and managed to exert an effective lobby together with the 
banking sector: powerful industrialists and bankers argued that debts could not be paid. An alliance led by 
the Productive Group, privatized utilities and foreign banks achieved the elimination of limits on the 
pesification of loans‖). For a complete account of the lobby behind the ―pesification‖ of the economy, see 
generally Lorena Cobe, above n. 895 (arguing that a joint lobby by the financial sector and the so-called 
―Grupo Productivo‖, formed largely by industrial and farmer groups, determined the asymmetric 
―pesification‖). See also ―Las nuevas medidas apuntan hacia la pesificación total de los depósitos‖, La 
Nación, January, 18, 2002 (available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/367550-las-nuevas-medidas-apuntan-
hacia-la-pesificacion-total-de-los-depositos; last visited 01/14/2012) (arguing that, as of January, 18, before 
the total ―pesification‖ of debts, the official plan consisted in giving the savers the option to be paid in pesos 
at the official exchange rate or to keep their savings in dollars subject to a restructuring of maturities that 
defered total recovery of the money for 3.75 years); Julio Nudler, ―Cuando Remes desembucha‖, 
Página/12, August, 17, 2002 (available at: http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/economia/2-9007-2002-08-
17.html; last visited 01/14/2012) (arguing that then-Minister of Economy Jorge Remes Lenicov had 
admitted that generalized asymmetric ―pesification‖ was a decision pushed by banks and large companies 
together); Alfredo Zaiat, ―Macri, el visionario‖, Página/12, February, 5, 2002 (available at 
http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-1559-2002-02-05.html; last visited 01/14/2012) (arguing 
that a Francisco Macri, a large businessman, had claimed for the nationalization of private debts and that 
―pesification‖ was the answer); Horacio Verbitsky, ―El Clon‖, Página/12, February, 17, 2002 (available at 
http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-1961-2002-02-17.html; last visited 01/1/4/2012) (listing the 
largest companies that benefitted from ―pesification‖); Horacio Verbitsky, ―El primer licuador‖, Página/12, 
February, 10, 2002 (available at http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/subnotas/1724-968-2002-02-
10.html; last visited 01/14/2012) (arguing that the single largest debtors of the financial system, and main 
beneficiary of ―pesification‖ was energy company Pecom Energy S.A.); Héctor Muller, ―El camino de la 
pesificación‖, La Nación, January, 26, 2002 (available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/196047-el-camino-de-
la-pesificacion; last visited 01/14/2012) (reporting the demands of the agricultural sector for the 
―pesification‖ of their debts).  
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companies or relatively wealthy individuals,912 who in many cases had access either to 
dollarized income913 or to dollarized assets,914 due to a process of concentration of credit 
that was noted by economists in the years prior to the crisis.915 Thus, the general 
―pesification‖ of all dollar-denominated obligations was, to a significant degree, a large 
transference of resources from small and medium savers to medium and large debtors916 
                                                                                                                                            
 
912 See Eduardo Basualdo, Claudio Lozano & Martín Schorr, ―Las transferencias de recursos a la cúpula 
económica durante la presidencia Duhalde. El nuevo plan social del gobierno‖, 186 Realidad Económica   
(2002) (digital version available at http://www.iade.org.ar/modules/noticias/article.php?storyid=695; last 
visited 03/12/2012) (arguing that 1,221 debtors accounted for almost half of the total credits and that 
loans of 200,000 or less dollars accounted for only 5.9 percent of the total). See also Raúl Dellatorre, ―El 
plan no es sólo para los grandes grupos‖, Página/12, February, 5, 2002 (available at 
http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/economia/2-1561-2002-02-05.html; last visited 01/14/2012) 
(interviewing vice-Minister of Economy Jorge Tedesca, who was defending the plan, and arguing that a 
small group of 1,220 debtors represented almost 48% of the total stock of dollarized-debt that was 
―pesified‖). The total loans to the private sector that were ―pesified‖ reached 36,466,000,000 dollars (see 
Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, ―Información diaria sobre principales activos de las entidades 
financieras (préstamos y otros)‖, Year 2001, available at: http://www.bcra.gov.ar/estadis/es020200.asp; 
last visited 02/14/2012). Assuming that Dellatorre was referring only to loans to the private sector, the 
average debtor in the universe of 1,220 large debtors that accounted for almost half of the total stock of 
dollar-denominated debt, owed some 14.34 million dollars. The public sector, in turn, owed the banks 
21,018,000,000 dollars (Id.). The one hundred largest private debtors of the financial system were 
companies that owed between 41 and 315 million dollars each, and there were 28 companies who owed 
100 or more million dollars each. Together, these one hundred companies represented almost 10% of the 
total loans to the private sector (see Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, ―Información de entidades 
financieras‖, December, 2001, at 2-3, available at: http://www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/entfinan/200112c.pdf; 
last visited 02/10/2012). 
 
913 Sectors that regained external competitiveness due to the large devaluation, e.g. the agricultural sector, 
enjoyed a decade of high income in dollars at the same time that their dollar-denominated debts were 
―pesified‖. See, e.g., Marina Halac & Sergio Shmukler, above n. 902, at 13 (mentioning the export firms as 
one of the main beneficiaries because ―[w]hile the pesification converted their debts at par, the devaluation 
created strong income effects arising from their exports‖). 
 
914 See, e.g., 330 Fallos 5345 (2007) (Lorenzetti, J., dissenting, §16) (arguing that a corporation that has a 
debt of 450,000 dollars does not need any special protection). Id, at §17 (arguing that the market value of 
the mortgaged building had already exceeded that total amount of the dollarized debt); 331 Fallos 1040 
(2008) (Lorenzetti, J., dissenting, §16-17) (arguing that a person who took a 180,000 dollars loan and 
bought a luxury apartment in one of the most expensive neighborhoods in Buenos Aires, whose price had 
already exceeded the value of the dollarized debt does not need special protection from the laws). 
 
915 See, e.g., Guillermo Rozenwurcel & Leonardo Bleger, above n. 682, at 171 (arguing in 1997 that during 
the preceding 5 years, the so-called ―main debtors‖, who had loans of over 250,000 dollars or among the 
50 largest of any financial institution, concentrated in average 60% of the total loans in the system). 
 
916 See Marina Halac & Sergio Shmukler, above n. 902, at 13 (arguing that ―[t]hose who ended with 
significant capital gains were probably high-income households with access to large credits, and also firms 
with substantial bank loans‖). See also Carlos Escudé, above n. 59, at 142 (2006) (―As always, debtors thrived 
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who, on top of that, frequently got to keep in their power goods —frequently used as a 
collateral for the loan but also often purchased with the money of the loan— whose 
dollar value exceeded the amount of the debt in dollars or, directly, kept their dollars in 
foreign accounts.  
A significant number of goods retained —or recovered— their prices in dollars 
even after devaluation.917 This had an impact both on the impoverishment of ―pesified‖ 
savers and the enrichment of many ―pesified‖ debtors. It is hard to see how ―pesified‖ 
savers who were claiming for the protection of the property rights may have been a 
privileged class. Especially, in light of who were the main direct beneficiaries of 
―pesification‖. To see how regressive redistribution was and who were the real privileged, 
notice that 48% of restructured and ―pesified‖ deposits were of 5,000 or less dollars, 
while 48% of the stock of ―pesified‖ private debt averaged 14.34 millon dollars per 
loan.918 
                                                                                                                                            
while the savings of depositors were looted. Thus, the nationalization of private debts, massively orchestrated to an extent 
that not even De la Rúa had dreamed of, became the law of the realm. In an instant, two billion pesos were 
transferred to 25 privatized (formerly state-run) firms, which were among the 50 most indebted private businesses in the 
country‖; emphasis added). 
 
917 In February, 2004, dollar prices of real estate had largely returned to their pre-devaluation levels. See 
―Casi no hay referencia‖ (reproducing a note from La Nación and stating that in some areas of Buenos 
Aires real property had almost reached pre-devaluation dollar prices and that prices were generally tied to 
the dollar) (available at: 
http://propiedades.com.ar/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82:casi-no-hay-valores-
dereferencia&catid=13:inversiones&Itemid=18; last visited 02/14/2012). In 2006 and 2007, the trend was 
even clearer, as reported by Justices Argibay and Lorenzetti. See above n. 793 and 914. By December, 
2009, the dollar price had largely converged with the consumer prices index (measured by food and 
beverages prices). See Domingo Cavallo, ―Los precios del dólar y del promedio de los bienes convergieron, 
pero…‖, December, 26, 2009, at http://www.cavallo.com.ar/?p=467 (last visited 02/14/2012) (stating 
that in December 2009 the 3,82 pesos per dollar exchange rate represented a rise of the dollar, with respect 
to Convertibility levels, that coincided exactly with the rise in consumer prices for the same period; in both 
cases a 282% rise was observed). See also Orlando J. Ferreres (director), above n. 307, at 567  (reporting a 
similar magnitude for the index of consumer prices —beverages and food—, with a rise of 262.2 points 
when comparing 2009 prices with 2001, pre-devaluation prices).  
 
918 See above n. 901 and 912. 
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One should also point out that the largest debtor of the financial system, the 
company Pecom Energía S.A., was also the player who transferred abroad the single 
largest amount of money during 2001. Pecom Energía S.A. owed the Argentine banks 
some 315 million dollars, as of the entry into force of the emergency regime.919 It also 
sent abroad almost 1,900 million dollars during the prior 12 months.920 YPF S.A., in turn, 
was the second largest debtor of the system, with some 306 million dollars,921 and 
transferred abroad the third largest amount of money, almost 1,060 million dollars.922 
Telecom Argentina Stet France Telecom owed some 218 million dollars,923 and 
transferred abroad almost 1,000 million dollars.924 Nidera S.A. owed almost 50 million 
dollars,925 and had no problem becoming responsible for the fifth largest outflow, of 
some 863 million dollars.926  
These are just a few examples. The same phenomenon repeats itself with 
countless large companies. It is easy to see how the combination of capital flight and 
―pesification‖ benefitted these large players tremendously: they put their dollars safely 
                                                 
919 See Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, ―Información de entidades financieras‖, December, 2001, 
at 2 (available at: http://www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/entfinan/200112c.pdf; last visited 02/10/2012). 
 
920 See Comisión Especial Investigadora de la Cámara de Diputados, above n. 909, at 111 (table 45). 
 
921 See Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, ―Información de entidades financieras‖, December, 2001, 
at 2 (available at: http://www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/entfinan/200112c.pdf; last visited 02/10/2012). 
 
922 See Comisión Especial Investigadora de la Cámara de Diputados, above n. 909, at 111 (table 45). 
 
923 See Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, ―Información de entidades financieras‖, December, 2001, 
at 2 (available at: http://www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/entfinan/200112c.pdf; last visited 02/10/2012). 
 
924 See Comisión Especial Investigadora de la Cámara de Diputados, above n. 909, at 111 (table 45). 
 
925 See Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, ―Información de entidades financieras‖, December, 2001, 
at 3 (available at: http://www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/entfinan/200112c.pdf; last visited 02/10/2012). 
 
926 See Comisión Especial Investigadora de la Cámara de Diputados, above n. 909, at 111 (table 45). 
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abroad and then lobbied for the ―pesification‖ that would liquefy their debts. Once 
―pesified‖, their debts could be paid at three or more times less with the currency they 
had sent abroad before. Subsidies would come from the small and medium savers 
trapped by the emergency regime.  
All large companies played this game, and companies in general account for the 
87.35% of the money outflow.927 It could be argued that they were just remitting profits 
and, where appropriate, paying dividends. It was not the case. They were actively engaged 
in a process of capital flight that would eventually be completed with the ―pesification‖ 
of their dollarized debt.928 As the special investigative commission appointed by the 
Chamber of Deputies of Congress points out 
―The first ten companies that transferred the largest amounts accumulated net 
earnings in 2001 for 2,020 million dollars […] transfers abroad amount to 9,085 
million dollars, more than four times the net earnings for the year‖929 
 
Although they refused to accept any responsibility for overcoming the crisis, 
banks had a lot to do with its causation and made huge profits out of the conduct that 
fostered the crisis. Many private banks took low-interest rate loans in international 
markets, only to lend the same money (dollars) to the public and private sectors in 
Argentina at much higher rates.930 This practice entailed enormous potential risks, as the 
borrowers were for the most part governments, companies and individuals whose 
                                                 
927  See Comisión Especial Investigadora de la Cámara de Diputados, above n. 909, at 57. 
 
928 See also Lorena Cobe, above n. 895, at 79 (arguing that, by presenting ―pesification‖ not as a mere 
economic policy, but as the pillar of a new model of economic relations, the Minister of Economy 
―justified the pesification of the debts of large companies and high income sectors, i.e., the liquefaction of 
the liabilities of the most dynamic agents in the capital flight process‖). 
 
929 See Comisión Especial Investigadora de la Cámara de Diputados, above n. 909, at 113. The commission 
used the published balances of the companies for the corresponding year (see 113, fn 17). 
 
 
930 Lorena Cobe above n. 895, at 27. 
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income was in pesos. Moreover, they carried out a policy of systematic preference for 
lending in dollars, despite the fact that there was a consistent flow of deposits in pesos. 
From November, 1996, on, the deposits in pesos exceeded the loans in pesos, with a 
maximum difference, in June-July, 1999, of 10,000 million pesos.931 They did not lower 
interest rates in pesos nor gave more loans in pesos. This may show a regulatory deficit 
on the Central Bank‘s part, but it also points towards reasons that might have supported 
charging a substantial part of the costs of forcing banks to repay deposits in dollars, 
while collecting loans in pesos, on the banks themselves. 
 Plus, a significant portion of the dollar debts in Argentina could have been repaid 
in dollars, by debtors who had access to dollarized assets, in the country or abroad, and 
thus the economic reasons to ―pesify‖ bank deposits are far weaker than what the official 
discourse would have us believe. It is far from evident that, once devaluation had been 
decreed, there was no other option but to fully ―pesify‖ all bank deposits. To keep some 
sorts of debt ―dollarized‖ was an economically, if not politically, feasible option. 
But even in the context of complete ―pesification‖ of bank credits, deposits could 
have been repaid in the original currency. In 2003, banks could afford to repay at least 
67% of the total dollar amount of every deposit in the system, as acknowledged by the 
Emergency Decree 739/03.932 Massa itself is an irrebuttable proof that, in 2006, deposits 
could be repaid in dollars (or, more precisely, the equivalent value). Other late Supreme 
Court rulings also acknowledged that other dollar-nominated contracts could be fulfilled 
                                                 
931 See Comisión Especial Investigadora de la Cámara de Diputados, above n. 909, at 123. 
 
932 Emergency Decree 739/03, issued right after the San Luis decision by the Supreme Court, offered the 
holders of term deposits forcibly restructured and ―pesified‖ the option of receiving a new, free short-term 
deposit in pesos equivalent to roughly the 67% of the then-current free market value of the original dollar 
deposit, plus a 10-year maturity State bond in dollars to cover for the additional 33%. Therefore, the decree 
acknowledged that the financial system was capable of restituting about two thirds of the total deposits in 
dollars. The text of the decree, in Spanish, is available at 




in accordance to their original terms.933 Still, by and large, the system was ―pesified‖ and 
there were winners and losers in that reshuffling of economic cards. 
There cannot be any doubts that, once more, the distributive effects of the 
emergency regime were largely regressive, despite the cover up attempted through official 
discourse. Once again, one could wonder why is, then, important official discourse, if no 
one actually believes it. There are several reasons why it is important, despite the fact that 
at some point it may be largely inverosimile. First, official discourse implements a policy 
of ―divide and conquer‖. By presenting the claims of a particular sector of society, 
however extended such sector may be, as contrary to the ―common good‖ or as deeply 
selfish, it poses sectors not directly affected by the emergency measures (perhaps 
unaffected, too, by the supposed ―common good‖ whose achivement the other sector‘s 
claims are allegedly hindering) against those affected by the regulations, thus helping cut 
any ties between social sectors that might oppose the Administration. Second, it occupies 
significant space in the public debate, aspiring to ultimately prevail when the regulated 
sector‘s interest in the topic start to dim due to, e.g., the passage of time. This may help 
politicians in office in a later run for re-election. Third, as I said before, it helps deflect 
the attention from the fact that emergency regulations create opportunities for further 
enrichment of those already rich, at the expense of middle and lower classes. 
Alternatively, it may present such phenomenon as an unintended, yet inevitable, collateral 
effect of the only solution to the crisis. Fourth, it may help convince some of those who 
are left to bear the heaviest burdens that their sacrifice was inevitable. 
                                                 
933 See, e.g., Benedetti, 331 Fallos 2006 (2008) (holding that ―pesification‖ of dollar-denominated social 
security annuities was unconstitutional); Álvarez, 332 Fallos 253 (2009) (holding that ―pesification‖ of 




The True Countermajoritarian Difficulty and the Regressive Redistribution 
Difficulty. 
So far, I have shown that many economic emergency decisions taken by the political 
branches have been very impopular and have contradicted the most widespread 
conception of what the inviolability of property means. In line with the post-New Deal 
case law of the U.S. Supreme Court on economic matters, the Argentine Supreme 
Court‘s stance towards such regulations has been mostly lenient, giving the political 
branches substantial leeway for regulating property under emergency situation. Judges 
have occasionally tried to enforce a plausible common understanding of constitutional 
property, but when they have done so, they have been criticized by their peers934 or by 
elected politicians935 as unduly interfering with governmental tasks reserved to other 
branches. The ―countermajoritarian difficulty‖ has been a common theme in the 
criticisms, even if it hasn‘t been put in those precise terms too often. The ―technocratic 
objection‖ has also been present, although to a lesser extent.  
 What my historic survey shows is that, for the most part, ―countermajoritarian‖ 
criticism has been misdirected: judges —and especially the Supreme Court— have often 
acted in a countermajoritarian fashion not by striking down economic emergency 
regulations, but by upholding them instead. When courts have stood up and made good 
on the constitutional promise of inviolability of private property, they have not 
contradicted popular will, but rather upheld it against the true countermajoritarian actors: 
                                                 
934 See above n. 76 and accompanying text. 
 
935 See, e.g., ―Dura crítica del Gobierno al fallo contra la pesificación‖, Los Andes, September, 15, 2002 
(available at http://www.losandes.com.ar/notas/2002/9/15/economia-49928.asp; last visited 
04/12/2013) (citing then-President Duhalde criticizing a decision by the Federal Chamber of Appeals that 
had struck down the ―pesification‖ of bank deposits, arguing that ―it is everybody‘s duty to help overcome 
the crisis‖); ―Duhalde le mete presión a la Corte‖, Página/12, September, 16, 2002 (available at 
http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-10238-2002-09-16.html; last visited 04/12/2013) (citing 
then-President Duhalde criticizing judicial decisions striking down ―pesification‖ and arguing that ―if the 
measures taken by the Executive branch are not accompanied by the other two branches of government, 
there is no chance to get over [the crisis]‖).  
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the elected branches. The classic argument for attacking judicial review loses much of its 
bite in the Argentine context of economic emergencies, once proper attention is paid to 
what the people, as opposed to their representatives‘, think about what it means to treat 
property with the inviolability promised by the Constitution, in each of the circumstances 
the country has gone through. 
 Perhaps there is nothing surprising about the Court‘s failure to stand up for 
popular constitutional meaning against elected branches‘ occasional-yet-momentous 
contradictions of popular will.936 What may be more interesting to analyze is the effect 
this attitude of utmost judicial deference has had on the Judiciary‘s standing on the 
Argentine political system, how the legitimacy of the judges‘ has not been reinforced, but 
heavily undermined by the position advocated by today‘s conventional wisdom on the 
topic. I outlined the reasons for this phenomenon in the beginning of Part One of the 
dissertation, so there is no need for a lengthy restatement of my argument here. I will, 
however, probe a bit deeper into this topic and provide some empirical evidence to 
substantiate my claims.  
 One might wonder why is it that legitimacy is tied to the respect of certain 
understandings of one particular constitutional text. If would be easy to present 
convincing alternative conceptions of political legitimacy (and, of course, of the narrower 
idea of judicial legitimacy). What if the people at large agree that any particular phrase in 
the Constitution means ―X‖, but still wants to do ―Y‖, because they think it is a wiser 
option, all things considered? Why isn‘t a system that enforces such an option at least as 
legitimate as one that insists on sticking to an understanding of a text? 
                                                 
936 See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, ―Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy 
Maker‖, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 284-285 (1957) (―Under any reasonable assumptions about the nature of the 
political process, it would appear to be somewhat naïve to assume that the Supreme Court either would or 
could play the role of Galahad […] The fact is, then, that the policy views dominant on the Court are never 
for long out of line with the dominant views among the lawmaking majorities‖). Even if Dahl is talking 
about the United States Supreme Court, much of his argument —which is based on the frequency with 
which Presidents appoint Justices and, thus, contribute to shaping the Court— can be made with equal 
force in the case of Argentina. 
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 Argentine history has much to say on the point. For all its shortcomings, the 
1853 constitutional text has been the country‘s political safety net throughout its 
existence. When, contrarily to its own prescriptions, the Constitution was modified in 
1860 to allow for the re-entering of Buenos Aires into the Republic, nobody would admit 
it was a violation of the Constitution, much less the exercise of a different constituent 
power. The rescue came from the idea that it was an open constitutional process that 
lasted for seven years, between 1853 and 1860.937 During the twentieth century, early de 
facto presidents swore to uphold the Constitution.938 When the Peronist Constitution of 
1949 was illegally abrogated by the coup d’etat, the 1853 text was put back in force. When 
the bloody dictatorship that began in 1976 came to an end in 1983, once again we 
resorted to the venerable text.  
I have said elsewhere that much in the same way standard commercial contracts 
are used to make transactions easier by reducing transaction costs, the 1853 Constitution 
helped make the transition from dictatorship to democracy simpler.939 We just had to 
sign the "new social contract," without having to negotiate what it would contain. The 
venerable historic Constitution provided an acceptable framework that people could 
subscribe to without much of a discussion —interpretive adaptations of certain clauses, 
                                                 
937 See, e.g., Germán José Bidart Campos, I HISTORIA POLÍTICA Y CONSTITUCIONAL 
ARGENTINA 312-319 (Buenos Aires, EDIAR, 1976) (explaining the idea of an open constituent power 
and holding that the original constituent power of 1853 remained open until 1860 with the incorporation 
of Buenos Aires to the Republic); Gregorio Badeni, I TRATADO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 
128-129 (Buenos Aires, La Ley, 2004) (explaining that while the 1853 constitutional text expressly provided 
that it could not be amended for ten years, the 1860 reform –carried out to allow for the incorporation of 
Buenos Aires- could hardly be regarded as unconstitutional because the definitive organization of the 
Argentine state only concluded in 1860, closing the constituent cycle that had begun in 1853, all of which 
explains that the national constitution is commonly referred to as ―the 1853/1860 Constitution‖). 
 
938 See, e.g., CSJN, Acordada sobre reconocimiento del Gobierno Provisional de la Nación, 158 Fallos 290 (1930) 
(acknowledging the de facto government of General Uriburu for, among other reasons, having demonstrated 
by means of public acts its disposition to uphold the Constitution and having sworn to enforce and abide 
by the Constitution). 
 
939 José Sebastián Elias, ―Constitutional Changes, Transitional Justice, and Legitimacy: The Life and Death 
of Argentina‘s ‗Amnesty Laws‘‖, 31 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 587, 601-602 (2008). 
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to smooth out transitions to contemporary understandings of some problems, were 
always at hand—. For better or worse, the 1853 text had been the symbol to which 
Argentineans had resorted many times in the past even in the midst of institutional 
disruption. Every time there was discontent with the pending political and institutional 
situation, mainly because the power was held by the dictators, the people appealed to the 
1853 Constitution, and asked for a return to its full observance. In this way, the original 
Constitution has been the "political safety net" that we relied on when our democracy 
stumbled and fell.940 
 It is, then, a text that matters as a text and despite its inevitable imperfections and 
despite any debates that there may be about any given clause. At the same time, the 
people value very highly compliance with such constitutional text. According to one very 
comprehensive study on constitutional culture, carried out in November, 2004, some 
89% of the Argentine people consider the Constitution as either ―important‖ (37%) or 
―very important‖ (52%).941 The same study concluded that ―perception of the law as a 
universal abstract value is highly positive and its importance to the Argentine society is 
evident. There is a clear tendency of support for legality‖.942 A majority of the people 
(68%) prefers a leader respectful of the laws, even if not too strong, over a strong leader 
who was less respectful of the laws.943 Thus, ―perceptions about authority and its 
legitimacy are related to a rational view of power, attached to the norms, rather than with 
                                                 
940 Id. 
 
941 Antonio M. Hernández, Daniel Zovatto & Manuel Mora y Araujo, ARGENTINA:  UNA SOCIEDAD 
ANOMICA —ENCUESTA DE CULTURA CONSTITUCIONAL— 87 (México, Universidad 
Autónoma Nacional de México-Asociación Argentina de Derecho Constitucional-Idea Internacional, 
2005). See also id. at 135 (table 71). For the remaining of this chapter, I will draw heavily on the results 
presented by this study. 
 
942 Id., at 45. 
 
943 Id., at 66. 
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the charisma of a leader‖.944 When asked whether there are occasions in which laws 
should be disregarded, some 56% of the people replied negatively,945 which may hint at a 
negative historic experience with emergency regimes. When, in turn, people were asked 
about what kinds of measures would strengthen democracy —in itself, a highly 
supported form of government— some 40% replied that respect and adherence to the 
laws would bring about such a result —it was the most chosen option—.946 According to 
the authors of the study, ―there is a great demand for legality, the Constitution is highly 
valued, and there is a demand for leaders capable of acting with adherence to the 
laws‖.947 
 But there is also a very widespread perception of a generalized lack of compliance 
with the Constitution. Some 85% of the people think that there is ―little‖ or ―no 
compliance‖ with the constitutional text, a perception that cuts across all population 
groups polled.948 Another study, carried out in 2010, points out that, comparatively, 
Argentines exhibit a low degree of trust in the political system as guarantor of basic 
individual rights.949 These observations undermine, of course, the legitimacy of the whole 
political system and its actors. Still, it is interesting to notice that while politicians, police 
                                                 
944 Id. 
 
945 Id., at 84. See also id. at 126 (table 28). 
 
946 Id., at 144 (table 100). 
 
947 Id., at 98. 
 
948 Id., at 88. See also id. at 136 (table 73). 
 
949 See results of the Americas Barometers, by the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt 
University, for the year 2010. The results are presented in Germán Lodola & Mitchell Seligson CULTURA 
POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA EN ARGENTINA 2010 116 (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella-
Americas Barometer-LAPOP, 2011) (available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/argentina/2010-
culturapolitica.pdf, last visited 04/03/2013). 
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officers and public servants all come first in the list of those who violate the laws more 
often according to public perceptions, judges come in a comfortable fourth place, with 
41% of the people choosing them as the most frequent violators.950 Some 90% of the 
people believe that they are not adequately protected against abuses of authority by the 
State.951 Relatedly, people largely believe that it is the Defensor del Pueblo —ombudsman—, 
and not the judges, who is in charge of protecting individual rights.952 
 Admittedly, it is hard to establish a direct relationship between the judges‘ 
relatively low standing in the eyes of the population and their behaviour regarding 
property rights in emergency situations. Many other instances of perceived disregard of 
law by judges, i.e. their attitudes towards other important constitutional rights, must 
surely be at play here. Moreover, perceptions of cronism —especially, in the case of 
Supreme Court justices—, as explained above,953 and of corruption954 are very likely 
candidates for a prominent role in any causal explanation of this sort. But my aspiration 
is not (never was) to provide an explanation of the Judiciary‘s loss of legitimacy exclusively 
                                                 
950 See Antonio M. Hernández, Daniel Zovatto & Manuel Mora y Araujo, above n. 941, at 128 (table 42). 
 
951 Id., at 87. 
 
952 Some 63% of the respondents chose Defensor del Pueblo as the officer charged with protecting individual 
rights, while 22% chose the judges for that role. Id., at 72-73. 
 
953 See above n. 756 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Jonathan M. Miller, ―Evaluating the Argentine 
Supreme Court Under Presidents Alfonsín and Menem (1983-1999)‖, 7 Sw. J.L. & Trade Americas 369, 395-
396 (2001) (holding that ―Personal statements and conduct by the judges only worsened the Court's 
reputation. During his nomination hearings, one of President Menem's later appointees to the Court, Judge 
Adolfo Vazquez, openly described himself as "a friend of the President," and used the phrase "the 
functions are three, but the power is one" to describe his judicial philosophy —that all exercises of power 
are essentially political and must complement the government. Moreover, most of the other Menem 
appointments were also on the Court due to their personal connection to the President‖). 
 
954 See Jonathan M. Miller, above n. 953, at 398 (reporting the case of the ―stolen decision‖ as well as other 
well-founded instances of corruption in the Supreme Court during the Menem administration). See also 
Pablo Abiad & Mariano Thieberger, above n. 824, at 50, 130 (recounting clear attempts by the 
Administration to exercise undue influence on the Supreme Court and to get it to decide cases according 
to its wishes during the Kirchner administration). 
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in terms of the judges‘s stances towards property rights. All I set out to do was to prove 
that courts‘ behavior has often been paradoxically ―countermajoritarian‖ —when it 
upheld regulations— and that such behavior played some (I believe significant) role in 
undermining the Judiciary‘s legitimacy.955 That much, I think, can be proven in a fairly 
uncontroversial way with the evidence gathered so far. Let us see. 
 The people value the Constitution very highly, and they think that, by and large, it 
is not complied with. They have a cherished aspiration of constitutional compliance. 
When it comes to evaluating judges‘ performance, the people believe that they are not 
very good in upholding the Constitution, and that the main protector of individual rights 
is the ombudsman, not the courts. This belief may come, partially at least, from 
observing what courts have done in concrete instances, as the constitutional text does 
assign them —not the Defensor del Pueblo— a central role as enforcers of individual 
constitutional rights.956 In such concrete instances, as I have shown above, courts have 
often upheld regulations that contradicted the dominant popular conception of 
constitutional property. Either such judicial rulings or the economic emergency 
regulations whose validity they sustained have been met with extended popular criticism. 
Moreover, economic emergency regulations have also been perceived, often, as abuses of 
authority by the State —recall, for instance, the ―pickpocket State‖—. The people largely 
perceive that they are not well-protected against abuses of authority by the State. By 
                                                 
955 Id., at 395-396 (arguing that ―the Supreme Court packed by President Menem changed traditional 
Argentine doctrine to defer to the Executive and manipulate political situations to the Executive's 
advantage in extraordinarily blatant fashion […] sometimes the doctrinal shifts and scandals reported in the 
Press can be so blatant that conclusions about loss of legitimacy really do not require a sophisticated 
model‖); id., at 399 (distinguishing ―five categories of decisions that look sufficiently problematic in legal or 
social terms that they likely affected the Court's reputation‖ during the Menem years and mentioning 
prominently the expansion of presidential powers in the Peralta decision). 
 
956 The Defensor del Pueblo has constitutional duties of protection of human rights and constitutional rights, 
but its main tool for such protection is having standing before courts. Moreover, the Defensor del Pueblo has 
a more important role in the protection of collective constitutional rights (―derechos de incidencia 
colectiva‖). See articles 43 and 86, Const. Arg. 
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failing to uphold constitutional rights, as conceived by popular understandings of the 
text, judges are failing to fulfill their mission and, thus, are losing legitimacy.957 
 Additional evidence can be mustered to strengthen the argument. The last two 
great economic crises involved the exercise of legislative power by the Executive branch. 
Such exercises determined how and when savings deposited in banks would be returned 
to their owners. Some 57% of the people disagree with frequent delegations of legislative 
power to the Executive, and 53% of the people think it is not good that the President 
issues emergency decrees instead of sending bills to Congress.958 Another study, 
conducted in 2010, further reinforces the idea, as some 76% of the respondents rejected 
the idea that when Congress hinders the administration‘s work, presidents should govern 
alone, without Congress.959 And while other constitutional rights are considered to be 
                                                 
957 Jonathan Miller has suggested a partially different explanation for the Judiciary‘s loss of legitimacy 
following the abandonment of strict enforcement of economic liberties and property rights. The 
difference, however, is important. In his view, a shift from ―autonomous law‖ to ―responsive law‖ in the 
Supreme Court case law, starting in the 1930s, implied a turn away from a mode of ―rational authority‖, 
where courts could point towards clearly established constitutional rules as grounds for their decision, and 
towards a mode where courts ―responded‖ to social needs and pressures in a fairly open way and relatively 
unbounded by texts. In Miller‘s account, lacking ―charismatic authority‖ or other sources of authority, 
Argentine courts were left in the wilderness as regards to their authority. My work here, in addition to 
providing a wealth of evidence that supports Miller‘s conclusion about a noticeable decline in the 
legitimacy of courts, incorporates a degree of ―responsiveness‖ —in Miller‘s terms— into the analysis of 
what he would call ―autonomous law‖: it is not that ―responsiveness‖ per se undermined judicial authority; 
it is, if one wants to put it in such terms, the adoption of the wrong kind of ―responsiveness‖ that brought 
about such result. Interpretation necessarily implies some ―responsiveness‖: legal conceptions are shaped 
by social understandings that depend, partially, on needs and circumstances. Whatever any given 
constitutional clause says, what it means will be determined by the interpreter‘s conceptions of the 
concepts at stake. And the correctness of the interpreter‘s decision will hang on the acceptability of her 
own conceptions within the relevant interpretive community. Still, the problem is, as I have argued at 
length in this dissertation, that courts were often ―responsive‖ to political and economic elites‘ needs, and 
significantly less so to evolving text-based popular conceptions of constitutional rights. This led to the 
perception of illegitimate judicial behavior.  
 
958 See Antonio M. Hernández, Daniel Zovatto & Manuel Mora y Araujo, above n. 941, at 148-149 (tables 
135 and 136). 
 
959 See Germán Lodola & Mitchell Seligson, above n. 949, at 136-137. 
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violated more frequently, property rights and its close companion of the right to free 
exercise of commerce and lawful trades still feature prominently in the top five.960  
Moreover, the majority of the people (52%) consider the Supreme Court justices 
as enjoying ―little‖ (35%) or ―no independence‖ (17%) from the Administration.961 The 
perception did not change substantially when the question was narrowed to the level of 
independence of the ―new‖ Supreme Court, as reconstituted by President Kirchner. 
Some 30% of the respondents held that this Court enjoys little independence and some 
14% thought that it enjoys no independence at all.962 Additionally, 67% of the people 
think that the probabilities of prevailing in a lawsuit against the State are low or none at 
all.963 
It must be remembered that the poll was conducted in November, 2004, a few 
days after the Bustos decision, upholding ―pesification‖ of bank deposits, was handed 
down. The ruling received wide coverage in the media, so it is possible to infer that this 
particular decision had a substantial influence in the people‘s replies to the poll. 
Especially when Kirchner‘s appointments, as opposed to Menem‘s, had been generally 
praised as they fell on a number of prestigious lawyers, judges and law professors who 
                                                 
960 See Antonio M. Hernández, Daniel Zovatto & Manuel Mora y Araujo, above n. 941, at 88 and 114. 
Interestingly, property rights violations are not as frequent as they are deep. The question was framed in 
terms of frequency of violations. Some rights that ranked higher than property —e.g., the right to move 
freely and travel through the territory and the right to protest and petition— were in almost constant 
tension at the time the poll was conducted. Daily pickets made traffic in the cities (and in same freeways) 
very difficult, which accounts for the high ranking of the right to freely move and circulate. At the same 
time, occasional repression of pickets may account for the perception of frequent violations of the right to 
protest. One can only speculate what the responses could have been, and whether property would have 
ranked higher, had the question been framed in different terms —i.e., depth of encroachments—. 
 
961 Id., at 77. See also id. at 132 (table 64). 
 





were not perceived as cronies.964 Kirchner had made a point of increasing the 
transparency in the appointment process and had held publicly that ―we are not 
interested in shaping up an addicted Court‖.965 He even limited himself as regards his 
constitutional powers of appointment by issuing a decree that set a series of limits and 
established open procedures where citizens in general, civil society organizations, 
professional and academic associations can express their opinions about the nominees.966 
In this context, it is remarkable that the majoritarian position among the people was that 
the Court showed little or no independence and was, in this regard, no better than its 
predecessor. It is also noteworthy that almost 7 out of 10 argentines think that it is very 
hard to sue the State and win. The decision to uphold ―pesification‖ of bank deposits, 
which came after a long judicial struggle of the savers against the banks and the State and 
ended in the defeat of the weaker party, must have played a large role in shaping up the 
general opinion about the Court. 
It is hard to deny, then, that the ultradeferential stance often displayed by the 
Judiciary has backfired in terms of its own legitimacy and, ultimately, power.967 The Court 
                                                 
964 Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni was a highly regarded criminal law scholar and professor, as well as a former 
judge, and Elena Highton de Nolasco —the two appointees who had already taken their seats on the 
bench by the time of the Bustos ruling— was a respected appellate civil court judge with an expertise on 
Civil Code regulations on property. Carmen Argibay and Ricardo Lorenzetti —who would only take part 
in the Massa decision, and with positions largely against ―pesification‖— were one a former judge in a 
domestic criminal court and a judge in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoeslavia, and 
the other a successful practitioner and Civil Law treatise writer, respectively. See, e.g., Sebastián 
Schvartzman, ―La reducción de la Corte‖, La Mañana de Córdoba, June, 13, 2005 (available at 
http://www.lmcordoba.com.ar/ed_ant/2005/05-06-13/33_opinion_04.htm; last visited 01/1/5/2013) 
(stating that the appointment mechanism established by the Kirchner administration ―had helped the 
Court to regain some legitimacy‖). 
 
965 See, e.g., ―Kirchner limitó por decreto su facultad de nombrar nuevos jueces de la Corte‖, Clarín, June, 
19, 2003 (available at http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2003/06/19/um/m-576928.htm; last visited 
01/15/2013). 
 
966 Executive Decree 222/03 (available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/85000-
89999/86247/norma.htm; last visited 01/15/2013). 
 
967 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, above n. 108, at 377 (arguing that ―legitimacy is an additional form of power 
that enables authorities to shape the behavior of others‖). 
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has not been ―countermajoritarian‖ by striking down economic emergency legislation, 
but by upholding it. If we take ―countermajoritarianism‖ seriously, the Court has indeed 
fitted such bill quite often, although in the perhaps paradoxical sense noted above. If, on 
the other hand, one believes —as many scholars do— that ―the countermajoritarian 
difficulty‖ exists whenever unelected, life-tenured judges contradict what the 
representatives of the people have decided democratically, whatever the opinions of the 
people on the topic,968 then the judicial record shows that, at best, we have faced a ―not-
so-countermajoritarian‖ difficulty. That is, judges who have scarcely defied political 
majorities to uphold popular conceptions of constitutional property. They have done so 
at their own peril, indeed, as the evidence offered here shows.  
Interestingly enough, more than the courts‘ sociological legitimacy —and the 
ensuing political power than such popular perception of the courts entails— may be at 
stake here. The very idea of a binding Constitution and the general belief in the rule of 
law suffer as a consequence of the judicial reluctance to enforce the dominant 
conception of constitutional property. Carlos Rosenkrantz has held that in Argentina the 
normativity of law is closely related to the possibility of its enforcement through state 
coercion.969 In his view, legal norms that lack judicial enforceability lose part of its 
normative power, in a sort of sociological devaluation of the norm. At the same time, 
there is some empirical evidence that shows that Argentina is a country where citizens 
                                                                                                                                            
 
968 See, generally, Or Bassok, ―The Two Countermajoritarian Difficulties‖, 31 Saint Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 
333 (2012) (describing two senses of the ―countermajoritarian difficulty‖: a traditional one and a literal 
one). 
 
969 Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, ―La pobreza, la ley y la Constitución‖, SELA (Seminario en Latinoamérica de Teoría 




exhibit ―a high degree of tolerance and respect‖ for their fellow citizens‘ rights,970 at least 
as an aspiration, and where individuals actively demand the enforcement of their rights.971 
If both Rosenkrantz and the empirical studies I have just cited are right, then a 
paradoxical dynamic may be at play when courts adopt an ultra-deferential stance in 
economic matters.  
Given that the Constitution contains a very clear provision protecting property 
rights and that Argentine citizens seem to be eager to claim for the protection of their 
rights, and assuming that the political culture tends to regard as rights only those that are 
effectively enforced, clear underenforcement of the property clause may initially create 
more, rather than less, demand for judicial review of emergency measures. This paradox 
breaks at the point when the public no longer holds the hope that the Judiciary may be 
an effective and independent guardian of rights based on the constitutional text. Then, 
the demands on courts for the security of individual property should fall dramatically, but 
so should the symbolic power of the Constitution and the general belief in the rule of 
law.  
We are not quite there yet, but some evidence points in that direction. Some 62% 
of the people think that it is hard to abide by the law when many people do not abide by 
it,972 86% think that Argentina is country that ―lives outside the law most of the time‖,973 
88% believe that Argentines are ―rather disobedient of law‖,974 and courts are perceived 
                                                 
970 See Antonio M. Hernández, Daniel Zovatto & Manuel Mora y Araujo, above n. 941, at 53. 
 
971 According to Latinobarómetro, 7 out of 10 argentines demand the enforcement of their rights. See 
Corporación Latinobarómetro, INFORME 2011 53 (Santiago, Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2011) 
(available at http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATContenidos.jsp; last visited 01/15/2013). 
 
972 See Antonio M. Hernández, Daniel Zovatto & Manuel Mora y Araujo, above n. 941, at 127 (table 40). 
 
973 Id., at 133 (table 68). 
 
974 Id., at 134 (table 69). 
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as being among the most frequent violators of law.975 In such a context, the Supreme 
Court reluctance to protect individual property, despite the clear constitutional text and 
the popular conception of constitutional property, may be contributing to the perceived 
general lack of compliance with the laws and, worryingly, perhaps also with the widely 
spread self-justifying assertion that it is hard to comply with the law when many people 
do not do it. ―Why am I to abide by the Constitution, if the supposed guarantor of the 
individual rights, the self-proclaimed ―supreme guardian‖ of the constitutional rights,976 
does not abide by it?‖ might be a reasonable question for an individual to ask herself. 
Courts should have, then, one more reason to take protection of property rights 
seriously. 
But I have said before that courts have occasionally attempted to enforce a 
popular conception of constitutional property and that they have drawn from such 
conception when building its economic emergency jurisprudence. Surely, this should 
have had some positive impact, which is not readily apparent from the evidence surveyed 
in this chapter. Enter the ―regressive redistribution difficulty‖. 
People have perceived that, at least during the last few crises —the times of 
―permanent emergency‖—, economic emergency measures have often instantiated 
regressive redistributions. This is a matter of perceptions, not necessarily facts, although I 
think the evidence I have provided so far substantiates such perceptions. Hernández, 
Zovatto and Mora y Araujo‘s empirical study again provide some additional support to 
my claims. According to the study, individual economic situation is the main cause why 
                                                                                                                                            
 
975 See above n. 950 and accompanying text. 
 
976 See, e.g., 279 Fallos 40 (1971); 297 Fallos 238 (1977); 307 Fallos 2236 (1985); 310 Fallos 1771 (1987); 310 
Fallos 1979 (1987); 318 Fallos 978 (1995) (Fayt, J., concurring); 319 Fallos 3378 (1996) (Fayt, Belluscio, 
Bossert, Petracchi, JJ., dissenting); 327 Fallos 2669 (2004) (Vázquez, J., concurring); CS, 02/13/2007, L. 
733. XLII, Lavado, Diego Jorge y otros v. Mendoza. 
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citizens believe their rights are not respected.977 As I explained before, those with fewer 
resources were the large majority of those reached by the severe emergency regulations in 
both 1989-1990 and 2001-2002. The study shows that the people have been keenly aware 
of this fact.978  
Recent studies based upon empirical evidence suggest that judgments about the 
distributive justice of the economic system (considered as outcomes), as well as about the 
economic procedural justice (considered as procedures by which economic rewards are 
distributed), play a significant role in the construction of legitimacy.979 If that‘s true for 
Argentina, then the Supreme Court‘s emergency caselaw, which not only allowed 
regressive redistributions to take place but also allowed them to take place by mere 
Executive fiat, poses a double obstacle for the Court in its legitimacy-building enterprise. 
The interplay between what I have considered to be the ―true countermajoritarian 
difficulty‖ (the fact that judges have frequently contradicted the dominant popular 
conception of constitutional property) and the ―regressive redistribution difficulty‖ (the 
fact that the measures upheld by the Court had a regressive distributive effect) account 
                                                 
977 See Antonio M. Hernández, Daniel Zovatto & Manuel Mora y Araujo, above n. 941, at 53 (holding that 
economic situation —37%— and educational level —24%— are the two variables the citizens perceive as 
more explicative of situations of disrespect of their rights and citing, in addition to their own study‘s 
results, results from the 2002 document Aportes para el desarrollo humano de Argentina prepared by the United 
Nations Development Programme).  
 
978 Of course, the question in the study is general and encompasses violations of any constitutional right. 
Still, when these results are crossed with the evidence offered above regarding the impopularity of the 
measures and the public perception of their regressive character, it seems fair to assume that the people 
have been aware of the ―regressive redistribution difficulty‖ and the results offered by Hernández, Zovatto 
and Mora y Araujo reinforce such conclusion, whatever other constitutional rights are perceived to be 
disrespected on economic grounds. 
 
979 See, e.g., James R. Kluegel & David S. Mason, ―Fairness Matters: Social Justice and Political Legitimacy 
in Post-Communist Europe‖, 56 Eur. Asia Stud. 813 (2004) (arguing that evidence from East European 
countries supports the idea that perceptions of distributive justice and economic procedural justice are 
important components of political legitimacy). Id., at 817 (defining the measure of distributive justice as 
reflecting ―people's assessments of how fairly economic outcomes are allocated among groups in a society‖ 
and the measure of economic procedural justice as involving the people‘s ―perceptions of the process or 
mechanisms by which economic rewards are distributed in society and whether or not such rewards may 
be fairly achieved‖). 
 
 294 
for the puzzling lack of even partial positive effects of the Court‘s attempts to 
incorporate insights from the common understandings of constitutional property into its 
economic emergency caselaw. In order to understand the dynamic at play, we need to 
delve deeper into the Supreme Court‘s jurisprudential stances on economic emergency. 
What the Court has attempted to do, why it has done so, why the Court has not achieved 
greater success in its own terms and what implications its case law has for several 





















C. Part Two: Property and the Court. Walking a Fine Line? (The Supreme 
Court’s Theorization of Emergency Powers and Property Rights) 
The previous part of the dissertation dealt, mainly, with the common understandings of 
the Argentine Constitution‘s main property clause —what I have called the ―popular 
conception of constitutional property‖. Popular perceptions took the center of the stage, 
and the Court‘s deeds were seen under the light of their reception by the public. In this 
part, I will focus on the relevant caselaw from the Court‘s own perspective. I will analyze 
the theoretical underpinnings of the justices‘ stances on some of the central cases dealing 
with economic emergency. Building on the extensive historic narrative presented in Part 
One, this last part will, on the one hand, aim at making sense of what the Court has done 
in the second part of the Twentieth Century and early part of the Twenty-First Century, 
and, on the other hand, will expose the shortcomings on the judges‘ more usual 
positions. Such deficiencies have significant implications for a number of important 














Explaining the Unexplainable? The Court’s Attempt to Take the Perspective 
of the Ordinary Observer. 
 
a. Defining the “Inviolability of Property” Through the Ordinary Observer’s Eyes. 
In quite a few instances throughout its history, the Supreme Court has flirted with the 
idea of defining categorically the limits of permissible state interference with private 
contracts in times of economic emergency. In doing so, it has seemingly taken the stance 
of the Ordinary Observer, to borrow Bruce Ackerman‘s terminology once more, and has 
attempted to incorporate insights from the conception of constitutional property that 
gained more sustained support during the Twentieth Century. 
Early on, the justices embraced the somewhat ambiguous idea that it is 
constitutional to alter contracts or even judgments if their ―substance‖ is not altered. In 
Avico, a case decided in 1934, they said: 
―The Court has recognized, in emergency situations, the constitutionality of laws 
that temporarily suspend the effects of contracts freely agreed by the parties, as 
well as the effects of final judgments, provided that they do not alter the 
substance of either‖980 
 
  Such doctrinal assertion has been afterwards repeated tirelessly, whatever the 
effects caused by the decisions citing the doctrinal formula. The idea of a ―substance‖ of 
a contractual right seemed plausible at the time and was not too dissimilar to the old 
right/remedy distinction in contract clause doctrine in the U.S,981 going back to the 1819 
                                                 
980 See, e.g., CSJN, Ángel Russo v. C. de Delle Donne, 243 Fallos 467 (1959) (citing Avico, from 1934, and 
Ciarrapico, from 1946, as authorities supporting the assertion). 
 
981 For an account of the use of the distinction by U.S. courts during the nineteenth century, see James W. 
Ely, Jr., ―The Protection Of Contractual Rights: A Tale Of Two Constitutional Provisions‖, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& Liberty 370, 375-376 (2005) (arguing that ―[C]ourts amplified the right/remedy distinction throughout 
the nineteenth century‖ and that  ―The elusive rights/remedy gave courts a degree of flexibility in Contract 




case of Sturges v. Crowninshield.982 Some central ―core‖ of the right should be respected, 
while relatively less important aspects of it could be modified for emergency reasons. 
The trick, of course, lies in what is considered to be merely ―remedial‖, and not central to 
the right.983 The dividing line, as Justice Cardozo put it in Worthen v. Kavanaugh (1935), ―is 
at times obscure‖.984 In Avico merely a deferment of maturities and a reduction of interest 
rates were at stake. There was no ―haircut‖ or diminution of capital, and even in regard 
to interest rates, the Court argued that changed economic circumstances (i.e. deflation) 
made the lowered rate equivalent to the contractual rate, as measured in purchasing 
power terms,985 so that there was no actual reduction in this regard either. Although the 
trick was embedded in the lengthy quotation from the contemporary Blaisdell U.S. 
Supreme Court decision that made ―whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate 
end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end‖986 key to the test 
of constitutionality, Avico struggled to show that creditors suffered no reduction of 
capital and, thus, it attempted to echo the then-consolidating popular conception of 
constitutional property.  
                                                 
982 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819). 
 
983 For an analysis of the (lack of) centrality of certain aspects of contracts, see City of El Paso v. Simmons, 
379 U.S. 497, 514 (1965) (―We note at the outset that the promise of reinstatement, whether deemed 
remedial or substantive, was not the central undertaking of the seller, nor the primary consideration for the 
buyer's undertaking‖). See also id. at 529-530 (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority‘s assessment of 
the centrality of the obligation allegedly impaired by the legislation at stake in the case). 
 
984 295 U.S. 56, 60 (1935). 
 
985 See 172 Fallos 21 (1934) (arguing that if Congress had not provided for the reduction of interest rates, 
mortgage lenders that received their capital in a currency that, due to the emergency, had seen an 
extraordinary increase in value in the domestic market, would acquire a much higher purchasing power 
than the one they lent, and that the same would occur with amounts to be paid in interests, because –given 
the decrease in prices of goods and real estate- a 6% -the rate fixed by the emergency legislation challenged 
in the case- would be equivalent to a [rate of the] 9, 10 or more percent, in purchasing power). 
 
986 Id. (quoting from 290 U.S. 398, 438). 
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 Even in 1922, in Ercolano —the first national economic emergency case to ever 
reach the Supreme Court — the majority had made a conscious effort to argue that the 
rent freeze —which actually effected a reduction in rent prices back to their level a year 
and a half before the enactment of the emergency law— was not ―confiscatory‖ and, 
therefore, it did not violate property. To do so, the majority argued that it had not been 
proved that the rent set by the law did not correspond to the normal rental value of the 
property in question.987 It went on arguing that 
 ―Congress would not have [the power] to set an arbitrary price, a price that did 
not correspond to the rental value of the room, under normal conditions, for it 
would be tantamount to remedying an abuse with a larger and more disastrous 
contrary abuse, and above all, because it would amount to a confiscation of 
property‖988 
  
Much closer in time, in the 1990 case of Peralta, the Court insisted on Avico‘s 
rhetoric and held that the property clause of the Constitution is not violated when the 
State 
―[…] enacts, by reasons of necessity, a rule which does not divest the private 
individuals of lawfully recognized economic benefits nor does it deprive them of 
their property, but only limits temporarily the collection of such benefits or 
restricts the uses of such property‖989 
 
The majority struggled to square the decision with its precedents by arguing that 
the measure implied a robust deferment of maturities, but not a reduction of capital,990 as 
                                                 




989 313 Fallos 1513 (1990), §38 and §56. 
 
990 See, e.g., 329 Fallos 5913 (2006) (Argibay, J., concurring in the result, §5) (arguing that the Peralta 
majority struggled to make the decision fit within the ―traditional‖ emergency caselaw by insisting that the 
measure only implied a deferment of maturities). 
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a ―superficial analysis‖ might lead one to think.991 By doing so, the Court was, once again, 
at least pretending to embrace the basic idea that capital cannot be diminished by 
emergency measures.992 
 The same idea appears over and over again in different decisions. Thus, in San 
Luis the various concurring opinions emphasized the constitutional permissibility of 
establishing deferments of maturities,993 while recalling that ―haircuts‖ —diminutions of 
capital— are forbidden.994 Justice Fayt, declaring unconstitutional the compulsory 
conversion of dollar deposits into pesos, stated the doctrine clearly: 
 ―It cannot be disputed that the challenged legislation has operated a transformation 
in the substance of the right [of property] which makes it invalid before the 
Constitution. The conversion of bank deposits of foreign currency into pesos 
[…] allows the depositary […] to fulfill his obligation […] by returning roughly 
half the amount of currency that he received […] The ‗haircut‘ —borrowing the 
expression used in 313 Fallos 1513 [the Peralta decision]—, which reaches 
approximately 50% of the deposited dollars […] becomes, thus, irredeemably 
confiscatory. The facts of the case reveal a situation in which, paradigmatically, the 
State does not provide a remedy to alleviate an emergency situation, but decides 
to transform the substance or essence of the vested right; it decides, in sum, to 
take the assets of the depositors without any compensation whatsoever.‖995 
 
                                                 
991 313 Fallos 1513 (1990), §52. 
 
992 I use the word ―pretending‖ because Peralta seems to acknowledge the possibility of reductions of 
capital produced by mechanisms such as a compulsory conversion of bank deposits into long-term state 
bonds, by equating them to the effects of currency devaluations, which –arguably- have never been ruled 
unconstitutional. See 313 Fallos 1513 (1990), §55. 
 
993 See 326 Fallos 417 (2003) (Moliné O‘Connor, López, JJ., concurring, §53; Fayt, J., concurring, §31, 33, 
37) 
 
994 Id. (Moliné O‘Connor, López, JJ., concurring, §39, 41; Nazareno, J., concurring, §40-41; Fayt, J., 
concurring, §39; Vázquez, J., concurring, §6.c, 19). It must be born in mind, however, that the position of 
Justices Moliné O‘Connor, López and Nazareno does not seem to forbid the possibilities of ―haircuts‖ in 
an absolute way: they speak of ―inadmissible diminution‖ of the capital and they insist that while the State 
may limit the right to property, it may not diminish ―substantially‖ its value. 
  
995 Id. (Fayt, J., concurring, §39). Emphasis added. 
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Justice Fayt‘s position is instructive, as he signed Peralta‘s majority opinion and is 
often credited as its author.996 In Massa, the decision that closed the long judicial battle 
over the ―pesification‖ of bank deposits, Fayt argued that 
―By virtue of the result achieved, it must be concluded that the application of the 
emergency regime […] does not currently cause an injury to the property rights 
of the plaintiff, given that the substance of the purchasing power of its personal 
right has been preserved, regardless of the currency in which it has been 
expressed‖997 
 
In another case dealing with the latest round of emergency measures, where the 
―pesification‖ of judicial deposits was at stake, he insisted 
 ―Capital must —in this case too— remain intact, since any mandatory conversion —
insofar as it effects a ‘haircut’— would be confiscatory and, thus, it would become 
irredeemably unconstitutional‖998 
 
In Della Ghelfa, a precedent analyzing the constitutionality of ―pesification‖ as 
applied to dollar deposits made in voluntary mutual benefit organizations —in a way 
analogue to banks—, Justice Fayt summarized his jurisprudence on the topic: 
―It is true that extraordinary events call for extraordinary remedies; however, 
mechanisms designed to overcome the emergency are subject to a limit, and this 
is its reasonableness, with the resulting impossibility to alter or distort the economic 
significance of the rights of individuals. The restitution of property may be delayed until the 
emergency is over, but it must necessarily be returned to the owner, who is entitled 
to claim any damages suffered‖999 
 
While the question of the possibility of claiming damages suffered by the 
―freezing‖ of property is not settled and Justice Fayt‘s dicta on the issue was not shared 
                                                 
996 See, e.g., Horacio Verbitsky, HACER LA CORTE: LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DE UN PODER 
ABSOLUTO SIN JUSTICIA NI CONTROL 29 (Buenos Aires, Planeta, 1993) (arguing that Fayt wrote the 
opinion that upheld the freezing of bank deposits by decree). 
 
997 329 Fallos 5913 (2006) (Fayt, J., concurring, §20). 
 
998 330 Fallos 971 (2007) (Fayt, J., concurring, §12). Emphasis added. 
 
999 330 Fallos 2074 (2007) (Fayt, J., concurring, §6). Emphasis added. 
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by a majority of his colleagues, the references to the impossibility of altering or distorting 
―the economic significance‖ of the individual‘s rights clearly resonated with a majority of 
the justices, in different cases.  
Justice Argibay concluded in Massa that ―pesification‖ of bank deposits was 
unconstitutional, a position extended in E.M.M. and Della Ghelfa to different sorts of 
deposits in banks.1000 Justice Lorenzetti held in Massa that ―pesification‖ was 
constitutional because: a) the depositors could get an amount in pesos equivalent to the 
100% of the original amount in dollars; b) courts should not rule unconstitutional norms 
when a constitutional solution can be found within the applicable legal order; c) the 
emergency regime had been enacted pursuant to a long line of lenient Supreme Court 
precedents that could not be changed retroactively, even if they should be corrected for 
the future; d) the consequences of striking down ―pesification‖, after so many years of 
being in force, would be very negative.1001 The important point is that Lorenzetti 
emphasized the importance of the full restitution of the deposit and of the constitutional 
protection of property. In E.M.M., he —along with Justice Zaffaroni— held that the 
guarantee of property had to be respected in the case of judicial deposits and that ―no 
diminution of value of the good received in custody‖ should be accepted.1002  
But even those justices who fully supported ―pesification‖ of dollar-denominated 
obligations of different kinds felt obliged to argue that the value of the deposits had not 
been affected: 
―That the right to property is guaranteed by Art. 17 of the Constitution cannot 
be put into question, but what must be examined is whether the economic 
                                                 
1000 See 329 Fallos 5913 (2006) (Argibay, J., concurring in the judgment); 330 Fallos 971 (2007) (Argibay, J., 
concurring); 330 Fallos 2074 (2007) (Argibay, J., dissenting). 
 
1001 329 Fallos 5913 (2006) (Lorenzetti, J., concurring, §24). 
 
1002 330 Fallos 971 (2007) (Lorenzetti, Zaffaroni, JJ., plurality opinion; §11). 
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measures —in short, the suspension of the repayment of bank deposits and the 
option for depositors between the reimbursement in Argentine currency, within 
certain payment terms and with monetary correction, or in the original currency 
in longer payment terms and in marketable securities affects such right […] 
Pesification appears as reasonable, as long as the amount to be returned has equal or 
greater purchasing power than the original deposit had, as it causes no harm to the 
creditor‖1003 
 
One could argue that the ―pesified‖ sums to be returned to depositors did not 
have ―equal or greater purchasing power than the original deposit‖, and of course that 
the ―Intangibility of Deposits Act‖ had promised them that the State would not alter 
banking contracts in any way, but the interesting point is that supporters of 
―pesification‖ felt compelled to defend it in terms of the ―haircut‖ versus ―deferment‖ 
distinction. Such distincion has been an important part of the Court‘s doctrine on 
economic emergency. Justice Argibay has put the point in clear terms: 
―[…] this line of cases, either in the Argentine version or in the version followed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, despite all its meanderings and interruptions, has 
kept in place a continued limitation to the restrictions that the government can 
introduce, for emergency reasons, on the property of individuals, namely: any 
restriction must affect the terms for judicial enforcement of said rights and the 
agreed-upon returns or yields, but it must not affect the capital as such, i.e., the 
"substance" of the right […] So reads the corresponding cliché with the list of 
requirements that emergency laws must fulfill [to be considered constitutional]. 
Regarding, especially, the interference of contracts between private individuals, 
the vast majority of decisions upheld legislation that established delays in the 
enforceability of certain rights and limited rents [...] The noticeable effort that can 
be observed in the Peralta judgment (313 Fallos 1513, paragraphs 40 to 44 and 52) 
to present the restrictions under analysis as a mere ‗restructuring‘ and, thus, to 
keep their validation within the traditional framework, rests on the implicit premise 
that even an emergency measure may be unconstitutional, as a violation of property, if it affects 
rights in a ‘substantial’ and definitive manner‖1004 
 
                                                 
1003 327 Fallos 4495 (2004) (Belluscio, Maqueda, JJ., plurality opinion, §9). Emphasis added. Justice 
Belluscio retired shortly after the Bustos decision and took no part in the decisions that finally resolved the 
―pesification‖ question more generally. Justice Maqueda consistently voted for upholding ―pesification‖ as 
enacted by Congress or the President, respectively.  
 
1004 329 Fallos 5913 (2006), (Argibay, J., concurring in the result, §5). Emphasis added. 
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 The Court has embraced a distinction of broad popular appeal, one that —I have 
argued in the first part of this work— is the minimum core of the dominant popular 
conception of constitutional property. In doing so, it has stepped into the layfolks‘ shoes 
and has adopted their perspective. Rhetorically, at the very least least, the Court has 
looked at constitutional property through the Ordinary Observer‘s eyes. It has frequently 
elaborated the concepts of nonlegal conversation (―substance‖, ―distortion‖ of property, 
etc.) to illuminate the meaning of legal rules whose content was controversial (the 
property clause), reflecting —partially at least— social expectations regarding 
constitutional meaning.1005 But, does it make sense that is has taken such a step?  
 Several commentators have criticized the Court‘s jurisprudential stance as 
untenable. Carlos Rosenkrantz, for instance, has held such a position. In his view, given 
that any deferment implies a diminution in value of any credit, ―haircuts‖ and 
―deferments‖ are financially equivalent and, therefore, they should receive identical 
constitutional treatment.1006 The sound financial notion of present value is the foundation 
of Rosenkrantz‘s argument.1007 Carlos Azize, building his argument upon the same 
notion, holds that only in cases where the deferment includes sufficiently high interest 
rates, which compensated the lesser present value of the credit, a deferment might not be 
equivalent to a ―haircut‖.1008 Since such cases are indeed very rare, if they ever exist, one 
                                                 
1005 See Bruce A. Ackerman, above n. 28, at 15. 
 
1006 See Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, ―Prólogo. El derecho de propiedad según la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la 
Nación y la ADC‖, in Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (Buenos Aires, Argentina), LA CORTE Y LOS 
DERECHOS, 2005-2007: CÓMO IMPACTAN EN LA VIDA DE LOS CIUDADANOS, LAS 
DECISIONES DEL MÁXIMO TRIBUNAL 341, fn 2 (Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI Editores, 2008) (arguing 
that ―the constitutional distinction between a ‗haircut‘ and a deferment is untenable, for the simple reason 
that their effects are identical‖). 
 
1007 See Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, above n. 726, at 16-21, 669-699 (explaining the concepts of 
present value, net present value, the opportunity cost of capital, and the general mechanics of debt 
valuation). 
 
1008 See Carlos A. Azize, ―La espera como quita en el concurso preventivo‖, 2000-D L. L. 1269. 
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should assume that Rosenkrantz‘s argument holds well for the large majority of 
situations. 
Similarly, Juan Cianciardo and Pilar Zambrano have held that the judges‘ 
reluctance to admit the hypothetical possibility of a ―haircut‖ is not justified.1009 Their 
argument proceeds as follows: once the constitutional feasibility of deferment is 
admitted, it does not seem that a reduction of capital is, prima facie, more severe or 
harmful to the creditor than the former; in fact, it may perfectly be the case that a haircut 
be less harmful than a deferment. A basic understanding of the notion of opportunity 
costs provides some grounding to the argument.1010  
 What the critics are doing is, basically, attacking the justices for lack of 
sophistication in their reasoning. They are, in a way, aiming precisely at the heart of the 
jurisprudential notion of ―inviolability of property‖, as constructed by the Court from its 
Ordinary Observer‘s position. Why would the justices adopt a position that, once a few 
financial-economic insights are grasped, is hard to maintain? Surely, they are well-
educated lawyers who should know better than that. Indeed, as George Priest has argued, 
―The form of the change made by the state is less important than the extent to which the 
change raises or lowers the value of the contract right to the various parties‖.1011 But is 
there any way to save the Court from its critics? As the reader may have already guessed, 
I think there is. Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and other social scientists‘ work may 
come to the rescue and account for the Court‘s seemingly unexplainable position. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
1009 See Juan Cianciardo & Pilar Zambrano, ―El caso ‗Massa‘. La interpretación constitucional en casos 
difíciles y el derecho de propiedad‖, 2007-IV Jurisprudencia Argentina 1151. 
 
1010 See Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, above n. 726, at 15 (explaining the concept of opportunity 
cost as the return foregone by making one investment rather than another). 
 
1011 See George L. Priest, ―Law and Economic Distress: Sangamon County, Illinois, 1837-1844‖, 2 J. Legal 




b. Prospect Theory, Endowment Effect, and the Interaction Between the Court 
and the People: the “Haircut” vs. “Deferment of Maturities” Distinction. 
Resort to some basic insights provided by the prospect theory and, additionally, by its 
derivative endowment effect theory, goes a long way towards explaining the justices‘ 
behaviour throughout long decades of apparent contradiction of basic financial and 
economic notions. 
 Prospect theory, as advanced by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, is a 
theory that explains how people make decisions between alternatives that involve risk. It 
holds that the choice process has two stages: an editing phase, where individuals make 
preeliminary analysis of the offered prospects, and an evaluation phase, where individuals 
assess the prospects and choose whichever has a highest value.1012 The theory asserts that 
people normally perceive outcomes as gains and losses, rather than as final states of 
welfare or wealth, as referred to a neutral reference point which usually corresponds to 
the current asset position.1013 Thus, changes in wealth or welfare are the true carriers of 
value.1014 A distinctive characteristic of attitudes to changes in welfare (or wealth), 
according to Kahneman‘s and Tversky‘s findings, is that losses loom larger than gains.1015 
―The aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be greater 
than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount‖.1016 Additionally, people 
                                                 
1012 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, ―Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk‖, 47 




1014 Id., at 277. 
 





overweigh outcomes that are considered certain, relative to merely probable outcomes —
what Kahneman and Tversky called the ―certainty effect‖—.1017 
Endowment effect, a derivative theory initially proposed by Richard H. Thaler, 
holds that individuals perceive parting with an endowed good as a loss that is greater 
than a potential gain from acquiring another good of otherwise equal value.1018 The 
endowment would basically set the reference point according to which changes are 
perceived as losses or gains. Exchange asymmetries, where a divergence between the 
willing-to-pay and the willingness-to-accept a given amount of money for the same good 
is observed for the same individuals, is attributed to the ―endowment effect‖. The main 
effect of endowment is not to enhance the appeal of what one owns, only the pain of 
giving it up.1019 Accordingly, people often neglect opportunity costs, as foregone gains are 
less painful than perceived losses.1020 Perceptions of fairness regarding economic actions 
are strongly dependent on whether an issue is framed as a reduction in a gain or as an 
actual loss.1021  
Ideas such as the status quo bias —a preference for the current state of affairs— 
and loss aversion —the disutility of losing is greater than the utility of gaining— are 
central in this theoretical framework. 
                                                 
1017 Id., at 265. 
 
1018 See Richard Thaler, ―Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice‖, 1 J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 39, 44 
(1980). 
 
1019 See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, ―The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, 
and Status Quo Bias‖, 5 J. Econ. Perspect. 193, 197 (1991). For purposes of my argument, it does not matter 
whether the effect is caused by the mere parting up with a good (or losing it) or by the failure to anticipate 
the utility caused by owning another good as a replacement of the one given up (or lost). For a review of 
the different explanatory theories of the ―endowment effect‖, see Ivo Bischoff & Jurgen Meckl, 
―Endowment effect theory, public goods and welfare‖, 37 J. Socio-Econ. 1778 (2008). 
 





 While the endowment effect theory has been challenged,1022 and its explanatory 
power has been completed with more nuanced accounts,1023 it is now widely accepted 
that there is an asymmetry in the hedonic experience of gains and losses.1024 It has been 
argued that prospect theory preferences have an evolutionary origin, and therefore, they 
are hard-wired into our cognitive apparatuses.1025 Some lines of research in neuroscience 
have advanced a series of hypothesis regarding prospect theory‘s likely neural basis.1026 
                                                 
1022 See, e.g., Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, ―Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as 
Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory?‖, 97 Am. Econ. Rev. 1449, 1463 (2007) 
(―[…] endowment effect theory does not seem to explain observed exchange assymetries. While gaps 
occasionally are observed, our results demonstrate that observed gaps are inconsistent with endowment 
effect theory. Either no ‗endowment effect‘ of the sort predicted by prospect theory exists, or the effect is 
sufficiently weak that other phenomena easily swamp it‖); see also Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, 
―Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship‖, Georgetown Public Law and 
Legal Theory Research Paper No. 13-013 (2013) (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2224105; last visited 02/25/2013) (questioning the 
existence of the effect, based upon more recent studies, and explaining the spread of the theory in legal 
scholarship). 
 
1023 See, e.g., Guido Ortona & Francesco Scacciati, ―New experiments on the endowment effect‖, 13 J. 
Econ. Psychol. 277, 292 (1992) (arguing that although the endowment effect is supported by ―overwhelming 
experimental evidence‖, it may be displaced by rational behaviour if the gains are stake are worthwhile); 
Eric J. Johnson, Anat Keinan & Gerald Haubl, ―Aspects of Endowment: A Query Theory of Value 
Construction‖, 33 J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. 461, 471 (2007) (arguing that ―Despite its importance, empirical 
robustness,  and explanatory power, there is only a limited amount of research on, and little agreement 
about, the psychological mechanisms underlying the endowment effect, particularly as compared with the 
number of empirical demonstrations of the effect‖ and that ―[A]lthough significant incentives alone are not 
enough to diminish the endowment effect, a subtle manipulation —simply reversing the order of two 
questions about the possible exchange— does‖); Chien-Huang Lin, Shih-Chieh Chuang, Danny T. Kao & 
Chaang-Yung Kung, ―The role of emotions in the endowment effect‖, 27 J. Econ. Psychol. 589, 595 (2006) 
(arguing that ―a transient emotional state can affect the magnitude of the endowment effect‖). 
 
1024 See, e.g., Rose McDermott, James H. Fowley & Oleg Smirnov, ―On the Evolutionary Origin of 
Prospect Theory Preferences‖, 70 J. Polit. 335, 337 (2008) (―Several findings prove quite robust experimen- 
tally, including framing effects, shifts in risk propensity based on domain, and loss aversion, meaning that 
losses hurt more than equal gains please‖); Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, above n. 1022, at 1462 
(―While we challenge the general accuracy of endowment effect theory, we do not challenge prospect 
theory, which has been explored in different experiments‖). 
 
1025 See Rose McDermott, James H. Fowley & Oleg Smirnov, above n. 1024, at 336 (―Our particular 
evolutionary model provides a parsimonious explanation for why individuals may possess hard-wired 
tendencies to make choices consistent with the predictions of prospect theory. Although this model 
suggests that human cognitive architecture evolved to solve particular adaptive problems related to finding 
sufficient food resources to survive, we argue that this same architecture persist‖). 
 
1026 See, e.g., Christopher Trepel, Craig R. Fox & Russell A. Poldrack, ―Prospect theory on the brain? 
Toward a cognitive neuroscience of decision under risk‖, 23 Cognitive Brain Res. 34, 41-46 (2005) (outlining 
a set of ―preliminary hypothesis regarding the neural systems that may underlie some of the specific 
features of prospect theory‖). 
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 In a way, modern science has just confirmed what David Hume, Jeremy Bentham 
and other early liberals had observed a few centuries ago, with a less sophisticated toolkit 
but with impressive accuracy nonetheless: that liberal men (and women) ―are not so 
much obsessed by the quest for gain as […] frightened by the ever-present prospect of 
loss‖.1027 As the pains of deprivation weigh far more than the pleasures of acquisition, the 
liberal individual ―emerges as a being supremely sensitive to the specific form of pain 
produced by the loss of wealth‖.1028 
 The ―haircut‖-―deferment-of-maturities‖ distinction fits nicely within this 
framework. It echoes prospect theory‘s and endowment effects‘ basic insights. A 
reduction of capital is perceived as an actual loss,1029 and since losses loom larger than 
gains, the disutility it produces is greater than the utility any alternative use of the reduced 
capital may have. Therefore, the people are generally averse to ―haircuts‖ as remedies for 
emergency situations. Deferments of maturities, on the other hand, are not perceived as 
losses but, at most, as foregone gains, things that the owner could have done with her 
money while it was unavailable. Whatever the actual losses deferments may inflict on any 
given individual, the perceived disutility is lesser than the one caused by a reduction of 
capital. Hence, they are generally preferred over ―haircuts‖ as emergency tools. 
Moreover, due to a phenomenon called the isolation effect,1030 when comparing the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
1027 Sheldon S. Wolin, POLITICS AND VISION (EXPANDED EDITION) 294 (Princeton, Princeton 




1029 The reference point is usually the asset‘s current position.  
 
1030 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, above n. 1012, at 271 (―In order to simplify the choice 
between alternatives, people often disregard components that the alternatives share, and focus on the 
components that distinguish them‖). 
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alternatives of a ―haircut‖ and a deferment, individuals tend to focus on what 
distinguishes both alternatives and disregard what they have in common. Thus, while 
both alternatives may imply a decrease in the credit‘s worth, the individual focuses on 
what makes them different: in the case of the ―haircut‖, the loss is certain and definitive; 
in the case of deferments, it may be temporary. Since people are generally risk-seeking to 
avoid losses that are certain,1031 whatever risks of losses may be involved in the deferment 
option will be generally preferred over the certain and definitive loss imposed by the 
―haircut‖. Additionally, when comparing the alternatives, individuals tend to, first, 
strongly prefer to remain at the status quo1032 (where the capital remains untouched) and, 
second, amplify any differences favoring the ―deferment‖ due to the fact that both 
alternatives are perceived as disadvantages1033 (individuals are likely to perceive being 
subject to the emergency regime as a disadvantage).  
 But there is a question of fairness at stake, too. Not only are deferments 
preferred over reductions of capital, but they are also perceived as fairer as well, due to 
the fact that the former are thought to involve a reduction of gain, as opposed to the 
actual loss perceived in the latter.1034 Needless to say, a professional investor, or even a 
moderately sophisticated saver, endowed with the requisite financial savvy, surely does 
                                                 
1031 Id., at 268-269 (explaining that ―[I]n the positive domain, the certainty effect contributes to a risk-
averse preference for a sure gain over a larger gain that is merely probable‖ while ―[I]n the negative 
domain, the same effect leads to a risk seeking preference for a loss that is merely probable over a small 
loss that is certain‖). 
 
1032 See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, above n. 1019, at 197-198 (―One 
implication of loss aversion is that individuals have a strong tendency to remain at the status quo, because 
the disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than advantages. Samuelson and Zeckhauser have demonstrated 
this effect, which they term the status quo bias‖). 
 
1033 Id., at 200 (―In general, a given difference between two options will have greater impact if it is viewed 
as a difference between two disadvantages than if it is viewed as a difference between two advantages‖). 
 
1034 Id., at 203. 
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not experience ―haircuts‖ and deferments in this way.1035 But they do not constitute the 
bulk of the people. 
 For the same reasons stated above, alterations on expected profits —i.e., 
reductions of interest rates— may be also perceived as less severe, and thus more 
acceptable, than reductions of capital. 
 While it is true that the reference point for monetary outcomes is usually the 
status quo, the assets‘ current position,1036 it is also true that ―by varying the description 
of options, one can influence how they are perceived […] People may actively reframe 
prospects, adopting aspirations as reference points, or persisting in the adoption of old 
reference points‖.1037 Early on, Kahneman and Tversky emphasized that, although for 
most choice problems the reference point is the status quo, ―there are situations in which 
gains and losses are coded relative to an expectation or aspiration level that differs from 
the status quo‖.1038 Can this possibility affect the general explanatory power of my 
argument here? I think not. By embracing the ―haircut‖-―deferment of maturities‖ 
distinction, the justices have contributed to cement people‘s expectations of preservation 
of capital and, hence, to anchor the reference point in the status quo. In a way, there may 
                                                 
1035 Moreover, certain individuals, situated in specific circumstances, will be less likely to perceive 
―haircuts‖ and ―deferments‖ in the way suggested in the text. As Kahneman and Tversky noticed early on, 
―the derived value (utility) function of an individual does not always reflect ‗pure‘ attitudes to money, since 
it could be affected by additional consequences associated with specific amounts‖ –i.e., utility thresholds-. 
Therefore, not everybody will experience ―haircuts‖ and ―deferments‖ in the way I suggest in the text. See 
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, above n. 1012, at 278-279. 
 
1036 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, above n. 1012, at 274 (holding that ―[T]he reference point 
usually corresponds to the current asset position‖); see also Christopher Trepel, Craig R. Fox & Russell A. 
Poldrack, above n. 1026, at 34 (pointing out that ―For monetary outcomes, the status quo generally serves 
as the reference point distinguishing losses from gains‖). 
 
1037 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, above n. 1012, at 274 (arguing that ―the location of the 
reference point, and the consequent coding of outcomes as gains or losses, can be affected by the 
formulation of the offered prospects, and by the expectations of the decision maker‖; emphasis added); see also 
Christopher Trepel, Craig R. Fox & Russell A. Poldrack, above n. 1026, at 39 (citing various sources). 
 
1038 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, above n. 1012, at 286. 
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be a self-reinforcing dynamic at play: the Court builds its economic emergency 
jurisprudence upon some insights taken from the dominant popular conception of 
constitutional property, which in turn reflects prospect theory and endowment effect 
theory preferences for ―deferments‖ over ―haircuts‖, and its caselaw provides lay 
individuals with additional reasons to perceive ―deferments‖ as reductions of gains and 
―haircuts‖ as actual losses.  
 As may be already apparent, these social science tools play a dual explanatory role 
in my account: they explain why the people at large might have settled for a conception 
of constitutional property that makes the preservation of the owner‘s capital central as 
well as why the justices have adopted the Ordinary Observer‘s position and have tried to 
incorporate elements from the popular conception into their jurisprudence. 
Regarding the first explanatory function, these theories provide additional 
support for my argument about what the dominant conception of constitutional 
property, as per the first part of this dissertation, is. To the historical-sociological 
evidence I offered above, we can add solid psychological theorization that, based upon 
empirical observations, provides an explanation for the behaviour observed in Part One 
of this work. Thus, the ―haircut‖-―deferment of maturities‖ distinction, however 
untenable from the financial standpoint, makes perfect psychological sense.  
While the critics of the Court‘s jurisprudence may be quite right that, under 
certain (admittedly, not implausible) circumstances, reductions of capital and deferments 
of maturities are financially equivalent, it is a different thing altogether to say that they 
should be constitutional equivalents, as Rosenkrantz argues. The two things do not follow 
logically from each other. 
 Granted, someone might object that, whatever the soundness of the 
psychological hypothesis that grounds the distinction, there is no right to be treated in 
accordance to one‘s psychological perceptions of reality, however inaccurate they might 
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be. If what social sciences describe is nothing but ―mechanisms that cause nonrational or 
boundedly rational decisionmakers to afford weight to the way things are —weight that 
is arbitrary or excessive according to some background account of rational 
decisionmaking‖,1039 am I not giving a similarly undeserved weight to these findings and 
theories in attempting to account for the Argentine justices‘ jurisprudence? Why would 
the Court incorporate and defend the ―haircut‖-―deferment of maturities‖ distinction if it 
is financially untenable and,1040 surely, there is no right to be treated in ways one perceives 
as more satisfactory (or less unsatisfactory)? Why would the justices grant normative 
power to allegedly nonrational (or limitedly rational) psychological traits? The second 
explanatory role I have given to prospect theory and endowment effect seems harder to 
justify. 
 I will advance four arguments as to why the Supreme Court has frequently 
attempted to follow this path. They are the textualist argument, the broadly consequentialist 
argument (or the cultural cognition argument), the utilitarian argument, and the legitimacy argument. 
Notice that the last three arguments are consequentialist, while the first one is not. 
 The textualist argument is very straighforward, and I will not spend much time on 
it. Basically, it suggests that the justices have supported the distinction between 
reductions of capital and deferments of maturities because the latter squares much better 
with the relevant constitutional text. ―Property is inviolable‖, reads Article 17 of the 
Argentine Constitution. Deferments, insofar as they are perceived as mere deprivations 
of future gains, and therefore, not as actual losses, do not seem to encroach upon the 
inviolability of property. Constitutional property, as per the dominant common 
                                                 
1039 Adrian Vermeule, ―Connecting Positive and Normative Legal Theory‖, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 387, 393 
(2008) (describing in such a way status quo bias, opportunity-cost neglect, and endowment effect). 
 
1040 See George L. Priest, above n. 1011, at 492 (arguing that the similar, although not completely identical, 
distiction between obligation and remedy is untenable). 
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understanding, encompasses capital, not necessarily gains. Therefore, the ―semantic 
resistance of the text‖,1041 according to the relevant interpretive conventions of the 
Argentine community, accommodates deferments but not reductions of capital. This 
argument relies on an ―internalist‖ judicial attitude.1042 
 The broadly consequentialist argument (or cultural cognition argument) builds upon 
consequentialist canons of constitutional interpretation that are widespread among high 
courts charged with the task of constitutional review. In Argentina the Supreme Court 
has put it in clear terms: 
 ―[…] when interpreting and applying the law, judges cannot disregard the 
consequences that follow from each [possible interpretive] criterion, as they are 
one of the most reliable indicators to verify the reasonableness of [any given] 
norm as well as its consistency with the [normative] system it is enshrined in‖1043 
 
 Such interpretive mandate imposes on judges the duty to ponder over the likely 
consequences of adopting one or another interpretation of any constitutional clause, 
including the property clause. How does this relate to prospect theory, endowment effect 
theory, and the ―haircut‖-―deferment of maturities‖ distinction? The idea of ―cultural 
cognition‖ may help bridge the gap. Dan Kahan has explored, in a series of papers co-
authored with a number of social scientists,1044 such idea. According to their work, 
                                                 
1041 See 328 Fallos 2056 (2005) (Zaffaroni, J., concurring, §24) (using the idea to delimit what is properly an 
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1042 See John Ferejohn, ―Positive Theory and the Internal View of Law‖, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 273, 293 
(2008) (defining an internal judicial orientation to the law as the individual commitment of judges to 
answering the legal questions posed to them in ways that are maximally faithful to received legal norms and 
arguing that such an internalist attitude is owed to potential litigants). 
 
1043 See, e.g., 302 Fallos 284 (1980); 303 Fallos 917 (1981); 307 Fallos 1018 (1985); 310 Fallos 267 (1987); 315 
Fallos 158 (1992); 318 Fallos 79 (1995); 323 Fallos 1406 (2000); 326 Fallos 2095 (2003); 331 Fallos 1262 
(2008). 
 
1044 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, ―Cultural Cognition and Public Policy‖, 24 Yale L. & Pol'y 
Rev. 149 (2006); Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, & Donald Braman, ―Whose Eyes Are You Going to 
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism‖, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 837 (2009); Dan M. Kahan 
& Paul Slovic, ―Cultural Evaluations of Risk: "Values" or "Blunders"?‖, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1110 (2006). 
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cultural cognition is a ―psychological disposition of persons to conform their factual 
beliefs about the instrumental efficacy (or perversity) of law to their cultural evaluations 
of the activities subject to regulation‖.1045 
 If judges are to evaluate the likely consequences of possible interpretations of 
constitutional property, they may be hard-pressed to avoid following their fellow citizens‘ 
ideas regarding ―haircuts‖ and ―deferments‖, no matter how well they understand the 
likely equivalent financial effects of both types of measures. Here, the influences of 
prospect theory-endowment effect preferences operate at a different level. It is not that 
they make judges intuitively embrace the distinction in question. Rather, they are an 
important part of an extended cultural backgroud against which judges have to assess the 
consequences of adopting one or another constitutional interpretation. Sophisticated 
lawyers may well grasp the economic and financial insights that lie at the heart of 
Rosenkrantz‘s, or Cianciardo‘s and Zambrano‘s, criticisms of the distinction, and still 
find the distinction constitutionally compelling for consequentialist reasons. Such reasons 
may appear as persuasive, according to the consequentialist canon of interpretation, 
because of the cultural baggage that serves as a background for evaluating possible legal 
solutions.  
Take, for instance, the issue of whether protecting strong property rights is, all 
things considered, the best path for the country to follow due to its alleged fostering of 
investment and promotion of sustainable growth. Let‘s assume for a moment that 
protection of capital, as opposed to a moderate and transitory regulation of profit-
making potential, is considered to be instrumentally central to bringing about the 
beneficial effects in investment and growth. If the cultural background —in which judges 
                                                                                                                                            
 
1045 Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, above n. 1044, at 151-152. 
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are immersed— tends towards such a belief, it may well be that judges consider the 
consequences of allowing reductions of capital as deletereous in the long-term. Given 
that the most widespread popular conception about constitutional property values the 
protection of capital highly, it is not far-fetched to suppose that many people link such 
protection to systemic benefits. Or let‘s assume a slightly different, but equally feasible, 
cultural background: financial and banking activities are considered as low-risk ventures 
for bankers and brokers, as well as for skilfull investors, but risky for the layfolks who 
just need a bank to put their savings in to be kept and earn a small profit. Argentine 
history is plentiful of examples where bankers have come out relatively unharmed from 
emergency regulations, while small and medium savers have borne the heaviest burden in 
overcoming the crisis. In such a cultural background, judges may consider the 
preservation of the saver‘s capital as producing the best consequences (which can be, of 
course, just minimizing the damage). There are several examples of these kinds of 
arguments in the Court‘s caselaw.  
In San Luis, where the emergency measures, as applied to a bank deposit in 
dollars, effected a reduction of close to fifty percent of the plaitinff‘s capital, it was held 
that 
―[t]o circumvent the operation [of the property clause], whatever the reasons to 
enervate its proper content, would imply the withdrawal of the Republic from the 
concert of civilized nations that provide for [the protection of] property rights as 
one of the pillars of the protection of personal rights and as a formidable driving 
force for the progress of nations […]‖1046 
  
 It was also held that 
 ―[t]he country‘s progress was due, in large measure, to the lucid constitutional 
text that offered protection of their lives and property to nationals and foreigners 
alike, [thereby] attracting a migratory flow that contributed to the settling of the 
deserted territory and to the spreading of valuable investments all over it since 
                                                 
1046 326 Fallos 417 (2003) (Moliné O‘Connor, López, JJ., concurring, §41; Nazareno, J., concurring, §41; 
Vázquez, J., concurring, §19). 
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the late nineteenth century. The continuing permanence of such constitutional 
bases of progress and growth cannot be disregarded due to circumstantial 
setbacks that can only be overcome with the maturity of peoples respectful of 
their laws. The fracture of the constitutional order would only aggravate the 
crisis, affecting not only the rights herein injured, but all others protected by the 
Constitution, until the achievement of the goals of ‗establishing justice‘ and 
‗promoting the general welfare‘, upon which the institutional order rests, are 
rendered impossible‖1047  
 
 In Massa, where the same emergency regime was deemed constitutional as —after 
judicial tweaking— it no longer effected a reduction of capital for savers, Justice 
Lorenzetti, the president of the Supreme Court, offered his own reasons to explain such 
an unorthodox a decision. In order to support the decision to force banks to repay in 
pesos the equivalent to the full free-market value of the original amount deposited in 
dollars, he argued that 
―[…] The judges‘ interpretations of the constitutional protection of contracts and 
of property rights have very important effects on the future evolution of the 
[Argentine] institutions […] It is necessary to identify the principles governing 
our constitutional system, whose compliance must be the basis to avoid the 
future repetion of the grave events that the Republic lived and that affected its 
citizens […] contracts and property rights have constitutional protection in the 
Argentine legal order and any limitation upon them must be interpreted 
restrictively […] The study of the main precedents of this Court regarding the 
extension of admissible restrictions on contractual rights due to economic 
emergency reasons shows a clear predominance of an interpretation that admits 
broad restrictions […] It is necessary to establish criteria of correction for an 
stable interpretation, compatible with constitutional values and fit to become a 
solid foundation for the future of the Nation […] all inviduals are holders of 
fundamental rights with a minimum content that allows them to develop their 
eminent value as autonomous moral agents. Savings made by the citizens to 
guard themselves against [eventual] future hardships or to increase their assets 
must be protected by the judges, whatever the legitimate purposes of the 
depositor might be. This rule is the basis of the peace of mind that our people 
has the right to enjoy in an organized society, it is the foundation of mutual 
respect, and it is the main driving force of the economic growth that can only be 
achieved within a framework of stable institutions‖1048 
 
                                                 
1047 Id. (Moliné O‘Connor, López, JJ., concurring, §43; Nazareno, J., concurring, §43). 
 
1048 329 Fallos 5913 (2006) (Lorenzetti, J., concurring, §24-29). 
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 In Rinaldi, a case involving a mortgage loan between two private individuals, 
Justices Lorenzetti and Zaffaroni insisted that 
―[t]he strong protection of the creditor‘s contractual position strenghtens legal 
certainty and is a solid foundation for a market economy. The history of the 
precedents of this Court shows a stance that has been too lenient regarding the 
permissible restrictions [and] that needs to be corrected because its institutional 
effects have been devastating‖1049 
 
 One reading of these excerpts could be that they embrace the preservation of 
capital due to cultural cognitive biases in the evaluation of the consequences of 
alternative possible constitutional interpretations as well as of the kind of activity 
regulated by the challenged regimes. This is, of course, merely a tentative suggestion that, 
ultimately, may be impossible to prove. The legal decisionmaking environment may well 
be  
―[…] too complex —too poly-centric and multivalent— to support the 
Kahneman and Tversky research methodology, at least with the level of purity 
and clarity that those researchers were able to achieve with respect to the ultimate 
interpretation of results […] any attempt to replicate the Kahneman and Tversky 
research methodology within the context of realistic legal decision tasks may 
either fail to yield determinate cognitive inferences or fail to capture what is 
distinctively legal about the assigned tasks.‖1050 
 
Another, more cynical, reading of the transcribed passages would have the 
justices making grandiose statements about the importance of property rights only pour la 
gallerie, to appease the public regardless of the actual effects of the rulings on the 
protection of individual rights and independently of the justices‘ belief (or disbelief) in 
such principles. But even this reading is well-captured by the cultural cognition argument. 
                                                 
1049 330 Fallos 855 (2007) (Lorenzetti, Zaffaroni, JJ., concurring, §14). It must be noticed that in Rinaldi a 
―haircut‖ was admitted, as the creditor was to get one peso per original dollar, plus 30% of the exchange 
rate between the peso and the dollar, plus a legally-fixed interest rate. The argument, contradictory as it 
seems, was that although the emergency regime was in principle unconstitutional, it effected a re-
adjustment of the contract in terms that were not obviously unconstitutional. 
 
1050 Douglas A. Kysar, ―The Jurisprudence of Experimental Law and Economics‖, 163 J. Inst. Theor. Econ. 
187, 196 (2007). 
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Notice that this instrumental use of the ―haircut‖-―deferments‖ distinction would rely on 
the fact that the people believe in the distinction. In proper ―cultural cognitivist‖ fashion, 
the justices would be varnishing their decisions with social meanings congenial to the 
citizens‘ cultural values, in order to make them receptive to the decision‘s underlying 
policies.1051 
 A third sort of argument that can explain the justices‘ concern with keeping the 
―haircut‖-―deferment of maturities‖ distinction alive is the utilitarian argument. Utilitarian 
considerations are ubiquitious in property rights theorization,1052 so it shouldn‘t be 
surprising that they make a cameo in my explanation of the Argentine Supreme Court‘s 
jurisprudence on the topic. As the textualist argument, it is also very straightforward. It 
poses that the justices have tried to embrace the distinction because of its widespread 
appeal. Given that the popular conception of constitutional property seems to have been 
centered around the idea that reductions of capital are impermissible, while deferments 
are not, whatever the actual effects of the challenged emergency measures, the justices 
may have well thought that by defending (sometimes only the rhetoric of) the distinction, 
they would be maximizing utility. In short, according to this argument, even if the Court 
had thought that ―haircuts‖ and ―deferments‖ are financially equivalent and might well 
deserve equal constitutional treatment, it chose to treat them differently because the 
                                                 
1051 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, above n. 1044, at 171 (arguing that those interested in helping 
citizens to converge in support of empirically sound policies should focus ―less on facts and more on social 
meaning. It‘s only when they perceive that a policy bears a social meaning congenial to their cultural values 
that citizens become receptive to sound empirical evidence about what consequences that policy will 
have‖). 
 
1052 See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, above n. 6, at 57-74; Stephen R. Munzer, above n. 181, at 191-226 
(explaining the important role of considerations of utility and efficiency in the theory of property); Joseph 
Sax, ―Takings, Private Property and Public Rights‖, 81 Yale L. J. 149, 186 (1971) (arguing that ―rather than 
fumbling with doctrinal labels and legal accusations, we can put our energy into trying to determine what 
resolution of conflicting uses is likely to maximize total net benefits for us‖; emphasis added); Frank I. 
Michelman, above n. 897, at 1165 (analyzing the problem of compensation in takings from a standpoint 
incorporating important utilitarian elements); Bruce A. Ackerman, above n. 28, at 41-70 (explaining 
utilitarian adjucation of takings claims). 
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people perceive them as different. Such public perception leads to greater utility if capital 
is preserved. This is, undoubtedly, a highly-stylized argument, as carrying out an 
empirically-accurate utility calculation of this sort is extremely complex and, it might be 
argued, it is far from clear that, in each instance, the disutility arising from the violation 
of prospect theory-endowment effect theory preferences actually exceeded the potential 
utility that would have been brought about by accepting reductions of capital. But it is a 
potential explanation. 
 The last argument I want to offer is the legitimacy argument. In a nutshell, the idea is 
that justices have often defended the ―haircut‖-―deferment of maturities‖ distinction 
because they were engaged in the task of (re)building their own legitimacy and political 
power. Since the distinction is, I have argued, a central part of the dominant popular 
conception of constitutional property, embracing it should have helped the Court to 
build legitimacy in two closely-related ways. First, by interpreting the property clause in a 
way amenable to the layfolks‘ view, the Court could credibly argue that it was doing 
nothing but applying the constitutional text. Such attitude seems to have been an 
important part of the Court‘s success during its early years.1053 Second, even if the 
constitutional text were taken out of the picture completely, the fact that the Court‘s 
decisions aimed at satisfying the common intuitions regarding losses and gains, intuitions 
that are closely linked to perceptions of fairness,1054 should have increased its sociological 
legitimacy. Under this light, the Court should have appeared to be doing ―the right 
thing‖, in the layfolks‘ eyes, regardless of any knowledge (or lack of) the constitutional 
text. 
                                                 
1053 Jonathan M. Miller, above n. 75, at 79-80 (arguing that the main source of the Argentine Supreme 
Court‘s authority and independence and, at least, a partial explanation of its initial relative success, was its 
ability to point to clearly established constitutional rules as grounds for its decisions). 
 
1054 See above n. 979 and accompanying text. 
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The utilitarian, the cultural cognition and the legitimacy arguments are closely related. 
They are all consequentialist and, in one reading of the cultural cognition argument at 
least, each of them aims to please the audience by appealing to a distinction that is 
generally accepted. They differ, however, in their ultimate goals. While the cultural cognition 
story has the judges aiming to make citizens receptive to what they believe are sound 
policies, the utilitarian explanation puts judges in a position of trying to simply maximize 
utility by vindicating the layfolks‘ view, and the legitimacy argument shows them 
attempting to build their own legitimacy and increase their political capital. The textualist 
explanation, on the other hand, is non-consequentialist and appeals to a much more 
traditional view of the judges‘ role. It is, as I said before, an ―internalist‖ explanation.  
Which of them offers the most persuasive account of the Court‘s jurisprudence? 
It is very hard to say, and the best answer is likely to be that all of the arguments have 
played a role. If we could have more substantial evidence, we would probably find a 
rather untidy mix of reasons, perhaps with different justices, at different times, being 
guided for reasons of one or another sort (as well as for reasons beyond the ones I have 
roughly offered here). The textualist argument finds some support in our legal culture and 
historical experience. Argentina has a strong continental, civil law tradition, where texts 
are very important. Judges are socialized in such juridical culture. Moreover, Jonathan 
Miller has argued persuasively that some sort of textualism has been an important part of 
the Court‘s argumentative arsenal and that it has been instrumental to its initial success. 
A plausible case could be made that Argentine judges feel some level of textual 
constraint. A recent strand of empirical research on lay people‘s attitudes towards judicial 
decisionmaking lends support to all three consequentialist arguments. Dan Simon and 
Nicholas Schuric have found that the acceptability of the courts‘ decisions are generally 
highly contingent on whether the outcomes are congruent with the individual‘s preferred 
outcome. However, lay people seem to be especially sensitive to the kind of reasons 
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given by decisions with which they disagree on the merits.1055 If that‘s true, it makes sense 
to cover decisions that may be unacceptable on the merits with argumentative layers that 
show the Court‘s attentiveness to the lay folk‘s conception of constitutional property.1056 
This applies to utilitarian, cultural cognitivist and legitimacy approaches, as it satisfies either‘s 
goals. 
Additionally, and this time pointing mainly towards the legitimacy argument, courts 
are keenly aware of the fact that they possess ―neither force nor will, but merely 
judgment‖, as The Federalist 78 famously put it,1057 and thus, are very much interested in 
what the people at large think about their decisions.1058 Justices Petracchi and Bacqué 
have called our attention to the point in the Argentine context 
―The lasting effect of judicial decisions depends on the arguments they contain and on their 
acceptance by the public opinion, with which judges stand in a different dialectical 
relationship than the legislature. This relationship is also relevant because courts 
have no other means of imposing [their decisions] than the one that derives from 
the recognition of the argumentative and ethical authority of its judgments, as 
well as the propriety of their actions‖1059 
 
                                                 
1055 See Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, ―Lay Judgments of Judicial Decision-Making‖, 8 J. Empirical Legal 
Stud. 709, 715 (2011) (showing findings that ―when the participants‘ preferred outcome was congruent with 
the court‘s outcome, participants appeared to be insensitive to the type of reasons given by the court. Yet, 
when the court‘s outcome contradicted their preferred outcome, they were attentive to the reasoning 
offered‖). 
 
1056 For a defense of such strategic uses of legal arguments, see Michael L. Wells, above n. 107, at 1014 
(arguing that ―putting an attractive face on its rulings may serve the Court's vital institutional need for 
public confidence‖).  
 
1057 See Alexander Hamilton, ―The Federalist No. 78‖, in Jacob E. Cooke (editor), THE FEDERALIST 
523 (Middletown, Connecticut, Wesleyan University Press, 1961). 
 
1058 ―The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows 
itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means, and to 
declare what it demands‖, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (O‘Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ., plurality opinion). 
 
 
1059 See, e.g., 308 Fallos 2268 (1987) (Petracchi, J., concurring, §7); 311 Fallos 1499 (1988) (Petracchi, 
Bacqué, JJ., dissenting, §7). Emphasis added. 
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 It has been demonstrated that legitimacy is an effective influence strategy,1060 so 
the justices might well have resorted to the polemic distinction for legitimacy-building 
purposes. The fact that people believe the Judiciary is a credible independent guarantor 
of rights makes it more likely that it actually be so. By expanding the justices‘ political 
capital (and, thus, power), public belief in them puts the Court in a position where it can 
actually perform such expected role better (or where it has better chances of performing 
it). In order to be regarded as credible independent guardians of rights, courts need to 
appear as if they were defending the rights at stake, as perceived by the public. Whether 
true or not that the justices are defending the citizens‘ property by engaging in ―haircut‖-
―deferment‖ distinctions, it makes sense that they do. Assuming, somewhat simplistically, 
that this is a ―self-fulfilling prophecy‖ type of situation,1061 the potentially driving force of 
appearances to improve reality may justify appearances management.1062 
 In an excellent recent book, Diana Kapiszewski has argued that Argentina‘s 
Supreme Court never adopted a support-building approach to decision making in the 
economic emergency cases covered by her study. In her view, ―popular opinion 
regarding a case was never a decisive factor in its decision making‖.1063 While I readily 
accept that a complex host of factors have been at play in the Court‘s decisionmaking, I 
                                                 
1060 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, above n. 108, at 392. See also, from a different perspective, Douglass C. North, 
above n. 4, at 44 (arguing that ―the measurement costs of constraining behavior are so high that in the 
absence of ideological convictions to constrain individual maximizing, the viability of economic 
organization is threatened‖; thus, ―[i]nvestment in legitimacy is as much a cost of economic organization as 
are the measurement and enforcement costs [...]‖). 
 
1061 Adam M. Samaha, ―Regulation for the Sake of Appearance‖, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1565, 1578 (2012) 
(defining ―self-fulfilling prophecies‖ as ―situations in which a belief is the basis for behavior that pushes 
reality toward that belief over time‖). 
 
1062 Id., at 1593-1596 (arguing that under ―self-fulfilling prophecies‖ situations ―a good appearance/bad 
reality situation [...] becomes less urgent compared to a bad appearance/good reality situation [...]; the 
former is self-correcting while the latter threatens a downward spiral‖ and that causation questions about 
the likelihood of the ―self-fulfilling prophecies‖ assume a central role). 
 
1063 See Diana Kapiszewski, above n. 579, at 139. The italics are in the original. 
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still defend the position that acknowledges a significant space to the legitimacy argument as 
presented in this work, in shaping up the economic emergency case law. First of all, 
Kapiszewski‘s study covers only the period between 1986 and 2003 and, therefore, it 
leaves out a large number of prior and later important cases in which the Court has 
defended the ―haircut‖ vs. ―deferment of maturities‖ distinction and where the legitimacy 
argument cannot be discarded offhand.1064 My analysis, which covers almost one hundred 
years, points in a different direction than hers. Second, and of particular significance, her 
study does not cover any decisions of the Supreme Court under its current line-up. The 
current Supreme Court, in particular under the presidency of Justice Lorenzetti, has 
shown a very special interest in building up channels of communication with the public 
opinion: it has begun a practice of holding public hearings in very important cases; it has 
started to accept amicus curiae; it runs a website dedicated to the Court‘s, as well as lower 
courts‘, most important decisions and news; among other initiatives. Some of the 
economic emergency decisions handed down by the Court‘s current incarnation exhibit a 
clear interest in reaching a broader audience for their reasoning —see, e.g., Justice 
Lorenzetti‘s concurring opinion in Massa, where he explicitly invokes the need for the 
citizens to know the reasons of the judicial decisions that affect their rights as a rationale 
for his expanded opinion—. Such attitude on the Court‘s part seems hard to reconcile 
with the idea that public opinion about a case played no role at all in the justices‘ 
decisions. Third, Kapiszewski argues that the public opinion was not a decisive reason in 
any of the economic emergency cases actually decided by the Court. But here what the 
Court did not do is as important as what it did. Kapiszweski fails to recognize the 
importance of the instances in which the Court did not decide a case, based largely on 
                                                 
1064 Notice that Kapiszewski acknowledges a different role for a legitimacy argument. In her view, the 
Court‘s weak perceived legitimacy did play a role in shaping interbranch interactions. Specifically, the 
Court‘s lack of legitimacy led it to issue rulings that challenged the elected branches‘ preferred policies even 
absent an expectation of compliance. See Id. 
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public opinion and, likely, in order to build up support for itself. There existed quite a 
few important instances in which the Court, unable to decide cases in a way at least 
amenable to the popular conception of constitutional property, did not decide them at 
all. Bustos is a good example. Embraced enthusiastically by the Kirchner administration, 
in so far as it validated pesification, but strongly rejected by the public —and 
professional— opinion, the Court could not gather a majority to apply its doctrines to 
the hundreds of thousands of analogue cases that were pending at the time, even when a 
majority of the seating justices had been appointed by the same administration.1065 Last, 
but not least, even if, as a general matter, Kapiszewski‘s position were plausible, it would 
only undermine the legitimacy argument‘s value as an explanation of the Court‘s behaviour 
for the period covered in her study, but it would still be worth exploring the effects that 
such decisions had in the overall legitimacy of the Judiciary and, more generally, in its 
capacity to act as an independent guarantor of the Constitution. 
In any case, the Court does build constitutional meaning drawing upon the views 
of large segments of the (regulated) population. Sometimes it does it openly, sometimes 
in the shadows. But it does it.1066 Justices Lorenzetti and Zaffaroni have admitted as 
much in a fairly recent decision regarding economic emergency measures where they 
argued that 
                                                 
1065 Of course, a different reading of such cases is also plausible: the Court couldn‘t reach a majority, and 
thus it did not decide cases, not because it was mindful of public opinion, but because the justices couldn‘t 
reach an agreement on the merits, regardless of public opinion. For instance, one could argue that Bustos 
could not be generalized to the hundreds of thousands of pending cases, not because public opinion 
resisted the decision, but because some justices —Lorenzetti and Argibay— were not willing to endorse 
the Bustos doctrine for legal reasons. The evidence offered in this dissertation strongly points towards 
public opinion having a significant role in preventing the generalization of Bustos, regardless of any 
individual justice‘s legal stance in the issues at stake. 
 
1066 For an argument that the U.S. Supreme Court often resorts to majoritarian sources when it interprets 
the Constitution, see Barry Friedman, above n. 118, at 607 (arguing that an ―abbreviated tour through parts 
of the Bill of Rights demonstrates that the Court often defines those rights from a highly majoritarian 
perspective. The Court‘s decisions are hardly always majoritarian. But employment of majoritarian sources 
is unquestionably common‖). 
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[t]he real mission of the Tribunal in cases of institutional relevance is not to find 
the truth, nor to practice syllogisms, but to adopt a decision that, based on 
reasonable and verifiable constitutional arguments that take into account the prevailing social 
consensus, allows for the pacification of conflicts‖1067 
 
 We should not forget, either, that as early as 1944, the Court  cited as 
evidence of the reasonableness of an interventionist measure the broad support shown 
by large segments of the regulated sector.1068 
 Perhaps none of this should be surprising, given that  
 ―[t]he effort to create and maintain legitimacy […] leads institutions to have a 
focus upon those who are being led, and their conceptions of justice and fairness. 
Widespread legitimacy will exist only when the perspectives of everyday members 
are enshrined in institutions and in the actions of authorities‖1069  
 
 By attempting to incorporate elements from the Ordinary Observer‘s perspective 
into their jurisprudence, the justices may well have been making their decisions more 
―law-like‖,1070 and in that regard, more legitimate than by openly embracing a Scientific 
Policy-Maker stance.1071 
 Whether sound or not from a variety of theoretical perspectives, the ―haircut‖-
―deferment of maturities‖ distinction is very much ingrained in the common 
                                                 
1067 330 Fallos 855 (2007) (Lorenzetti, Zaffaroni, JJ., concurring, §13). Emphasis added. 
 
1068 199 Fallos 483 (1944), §7. 
 
1069 See Tom R. Tyler, above n. 108, at 392. 
 
1070 See, e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, above n. 83, at 238-239 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court ―seems to be 
using the means of the ‗policy maker‘, but guided by the ends of the layman: they are using the bundle of 
rights language and analytic exercises […] to bring their practices more in line with what the see as the ordinary 
understanding of property. And they enhancing the ‘law-like’ (as opposed to policymaking)  image of their decisions at the 
same time‖; emphasis added). 
 
1071 See Michael L. Wells, above n. 107, at 1045 (arguing that —in the U.S. context— sociological 
legitimacy demands arguments with ―straightforward and indisputable links to constitutional text, history 
and structure‖); see also Jonathan M. Miller, above n. 75, at 79-80 (arguing that poiting towards clearly 
established constitutional rules, which did not look like policymaking exercises by the Court, was an 
important part of the Argentine Supreme Court initial success in terms of legitimacy). 
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understanding of property, and as such, it is a fact judges need to deal with. Facticity has 
a normative power that judges would ignore at their own peril. 
 
c. The Failures of the Court’s Approach. 
Some attentive readers may be wondering whether I am not missing something in this 
story. I have mentioned throughout this dissertation that, on the one hand, the Judiciary 
has often contradicted majority‘s will as enshrined in what I have called the popular 
conception of constitutional property and, on the other hand, that it has built its 
economic emergency jurisprudence drawing upon some basic insights of such popular 
conception. Am I not incurring in a glaring contradiction by affirming both propositions 
at the same time? Furthermore, if the Court has aimed to please the People regarding the 
constitutional contours of property, how can it be that such attitude has had no apparent 
success in increasing the Court‘s legitimacy? I will explain why there is no such 
contradiction. Some additional nuances are needed to fully understand this seeming 
paradox.  
 It is convenient to treat the two questions separately. The Court has failed, at 
least partially, in its attempt to elaborate an economic emergency jurisprudence that is 
responsive to popular ideas because of three different reasons. First, it has been more 
consistent in the rhetoric than in the outcomes. Thus, the people have perceived, via the 
media and other intermediaries between the Court and the people,1072 much less 
responsiveness to their ideas about what it is just and fair to do in certain emergencies 
than the justices probably intended. Second, the ―haircut‖-―deferments of maturities‖ 
                                                 
1072 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, above n. 81, at 2632 (―[…] the public cannot possibly follow the actual 
content of opinions, and largely knows about opinions what the media or opinion leaders tell them‖); Dan 
M. Kahan, ―Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law‖, 125 
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (2011) (highlighting the role of the media and other cultural intermediaries in the public‘s 
knowledge of the Court‘s opinions). 
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distinction has some inherent limits beyond which it cannot hold. If the deferment 
conditions are too burdensome, the popular perception will likely be closer to the 
perception of a financially-educated person and tend to deem the deferment as 
unacceptable. Third, judgements about the fairness of economic emergency measures1073 
are often complicated by additional factors, such as the existence of explicit official 
promises regarding the respect for property that are ultimately ignored and the 
distributive effects of the emergency regimes. 
 Whatever the grandiose rhetoric of protection of capital, the truth of the matter is 
that the Court has often validated reductions of capital.1074 It has done so in a more open 
fashion in the case of contracts where the debtor was not a financial institution and in 
the case, which I do not analyze in-depth in this dissertation, of the restructuring of 
sovereign debt, while it has followed a more covert procedure in cases like Peralta. In 
doing so, the Court has acted in proper ―countermajoritarian‖ fashion, contradicting the 
popular conception. 
In Galli,1075 for instance, the Court upheld the emergency decree that ―pesified‖ 
—at an arbitrary rate which did not reflect the free-market value of the dollar sum 
originally owed— State bonds subject to Argentine law and reduced the interest yielded 
by the bonds. The ―haircut‖ for creditors of the State, many of whom had invested a 
                                                 
1073 Fairness perceptions, in economic matters, are closely related to the ―haircut‖-―deferments‖ distinction, 
as I have shown above. See above n. 979 and accompanying text. 
 
1074 This has also been the case in the U.S. Supreme Court caselaw. See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 
330 (1935); Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935). 
The prevention of unforeseen windfall benefits on the creditor‘s part has been considered a reasonable 
basis for sustaining legislation. See, e.g., 431 U.S. 1, 31 (1977). See also City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 
487, 515 (1965) (―Laws which restrict a party to those gains reasonably to be expected from the contract 
are not subject to attack under the Contract Clause, notwithstanding that they technicaly alter an obligation 
of a contract‖). For an argument framing the Gold Clause Cases as dealing with the elimination of windfall 
benefits, see Kenneth W. Dam, above n. 557, at 520-525. 
 
1075 328 Fallos 690 (2005). 
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lifetime‘s savings, severance payments and other substantially important personal 
resources in financing the State, was evident.1076 In Rinaldi,1077 a case involving mortgage 
loans of less than 100,000 dollars between private individuals and where the debtor was 
at risk of losing her only home, the Court validated an outcome that effected a reduction 
of about 65% of the contractually-owed sums (considering a diminished, international-
level, interest rate).1078 In Bezzi,1079 a case identical to Rinaldi, the Court improved a little 
bit the situation of the creditor, but still allowed a loss of close to 45% of the original 
credit plus reasonable interest.1080 In Fecred,1081 a case where the loan was larger than 
100,000 dollars and the debtor‘s only home was at risk, the Court tolerated a loss of 
about 37% to fall on the creditor‘s shoulders.1082 In Longobardi,1083 a case involving a loan 
                                                 
1076 See, e.g., Carlos Gustavo Liendo & Horacio Tomás Liendo (h), ―El ius variandi en los contratos de 
empréstito público. Del caso "Brunicardi" al caso "Galli"‖, 2005-E La Ley 189 (arguing that in Galli the 
Court upheld not a reasonable and temporary deferment in the exercise of the creditor‘s rights, but a 
definitive encroachment on the property rights of the bondholder). 
 
1077 330 Fallos 855 (2007). Justice Fayt did not participate in the decision, and there were no dissents. 
 
1078 See Emilio A. Ibarlucía, ―Pesificación de obligaciones no vinculadas al sistema financiero‖, 2008 La Ley 
Supl. Const. 19 (explaining that the Court‘s solution, for a hypothetical credit of 10,000 dollars, imposed the 
creditor a loss of about 65%, given that the ―pesification‖ and adjustment index —24% total, plus 2,5% of 
annual interest rate for 6 years— validated by the Court returned a result of 14,454 pesos, while the capital 
in dollars, plus a 6% annual interest rate, was 13,725 dollars which —converted at the then-current 
exchange rate of 3 pesos per dollar— amounted to some 41,175 pesos). 
 
1079 330 Fallos 4001 (2007). 
 
1080 See Emilio A. Ibarlucía, above n. 1078 (explaining the economic result of the Court‘s solution and its 
impact on the creditor‘s rights, which amounted roughly to 45% percent of their original value plus 
interests). 
 
1081 331 Fallos 1040 (2008).  
 
1082 See Emilio A. Ibarlucía, above n. 1078 (explaining the economic result of the Court‘s solution and its 
impact on the creditor‘s rights, which amounted roughly to 37% percent of their original value plus a 6% 
annual interest rate). 
 
1083 330 Fallos 5345 (2007). The case has three dissents, by Justices Lorenzetti, Fayt and Argibay. 
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of over 100,000 dollars where the unit to be foreclosed was not the debtor‘s only home, 
the Court validated a ―haircut‖ of about 30% of the capital plus reasonable interests.1084 
Significantly, in all cases the Court took pains to show that property had been protected, 
despite the overwhelming contrary evidence.1085  
 In some instances, the ―haircut‖-―deferments‖ distinction is less likely to play its 
role in accordance to the popular conception, because its limits are overstretched. 
Despite its inherent psychological appeal, the distiction is still subject to the economic 
laws, and the longer the deferment, the more likely that the people perceives it as unfair 
and even as a reduction of capital, an actual loss.1086 This is an objective limit, which 
depends partially on the conditions of the deferment (terms, interest rate, etc.) and on the 
surrounding economic circumstances (inflation rate, etc.). One notable example might be 
the Law 23,982 (―Public Debt Consolidation Law‖).1087 It provided for the payment of all 
public debt with long-term maturities bond that stretched full restitution over sixteen 
years, with no payments at all during the first six years. For retirees who were creditors of 
                                                 
1084 See Emilio A. Ibarlucía, above n. 1078 (explaining the economic result of the Court‘s solution and its 
impact on the creditor‘s rights, which amounted roughly to 30% percent of their original value plus a 6% 
annual interest). 
 
1085 Again, a reader might object that, according to what I have argued, future interests are not central to 
the popular conception of constitutional property, so they shouldn‘t be considered either to assess the 
Court‘s decisions in terms of their perception by the people. While this is true, two things must be taken 
into account. The first is that estimates of creditor‘s losses have used a modified, reduced interest rate (as 
per Avico). The second is that even if interest rates were eliminated from the estimates, and they were 
carried out considering only the original capital in dollars, the results produced by the Court‘s decisions 
would still imply a reduction of such capital (although of a lesser extent, obviously). See Emilio A. 
Ibarlucía, above n. 1078. 
 
1086 Such popular perception is sometimes reflected on judicial opinions as well. See, e.g., Worthen v. 
Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56, 62 (1935) (―A state is free to regulate the procedure in courts even with reference 
to contracts already made, and moderate extensions of the time for pleading or for trial will ordinarily fall 
within the power so reserved. A different situation is presented when extensions are so piled up as to make the remedy a 
shadow‖; internal citations omitted, emphasis added). 
 





the State due to judicially-recognized social security debts, the law provided for payments 
with a 10-year maturity bond which would not return any money during the first six 
years. Finally, there is also a subjective limit, which I will analyze in further detail in the 
next chapter, but which, in a nutshell, has to do with the personal circumstances of the 
group of creditors who see themselves subject to a deferment scheme. For some of them 
(sometimes for most of them), the deferment will be an effective definitive reduction that 
violates the popular conception. Such situation relates to what I have called the 
―regressive redistribution‖ difficulty.  
  The lack of success in building legitimacy is a complicated matter. As I explained 
before, presidential and congressional tampering with the Court‘s personnel has had a 
strong impact on the public image of the institution. A number of personal scandals, as 
well as founded perceptions of cronism, have certainly played an important role in 
undermining the Supreme Court‘s stance. After the enlargement of the Court in 1990, its 
public image was so bad that even rulings that were akin to the popular conception of 
constitutional property and that aligned with popular humor were received with 
skepticism and failed to make a substantial improvement on the Court‘s sociological 
legitimacy. Thus, while both very popular as far as outcomes were concerned, neither the 
Smith decision, handed down in the peak of the crisis and which meant for thousands of 
savers the possibility of getting a significant portion of their deposits back, nor the San 
Luis ruling, which cemented the position in favor of the savers, were enough to turn back 
the tide and improve the Court‘s image to a point where the people would defend it from 
the political branches. Not even the staunchest defenders of those trapped in the corralito 
ran to defend the now strangely solicitous Court. Simply one among many other 
examples, El Cacerolazo, a magazine that defended the cause of those affected by the 
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1088 ―Los jueces menemistas‖, El Cacerolazo, March, 2002, at 6-10 (chastising all nine justices for different 
reasons, and disbelieving in their motives). 
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The Redistribution Game at the Court. 
a. Fear of Property Rights: A Misplaced Concern for the Poor and the 
Jurisprudence of Regressive Redistribution. 
Constitutions are often concerned with distributive questions, to varying degrees. They 
run all the gamut, from texts explicitly aiming at achieving particular redistributions of 
resources1089 to texts bent on creating free competitive markets and preserving their 
outcomes.1090Argentina‘s text finds itself, after the 1994 Constitutional Convention, 
                                                 
1089 Section 25 of the South African Constitution, for instance, is a carefully worded provision that contains 
a broad permission for redistributive schemes. The text provides as follows: ―(1) No one may be deprived 
of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property. (2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application- a) for a public 
purpose or in the public interest; and (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which, and the time and 
manner of payment of which, have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a 
court. (3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and 
equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, 
having regard to all relevant circumstances, including- (a) the current use of the property; (b) the history of 
the acquisition and use of the property; (c) the market value of the property; (d) the extent of direct state 
investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and (e) the 
purpose of the expropriation. (4) For the purposes of this section- (a) the public interest includes the 
nation's commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's 
natural resources; and (b) property is not limited to land. (5) The state must take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to 
land on an equitable basis. (6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of 
past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, 
either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress. (7) A person or community dispossessed 
of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the 
extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress. (8) 
No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve 
land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, provided that 
any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of section 36 (1). (9) 
Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6)‖. See also Matthew Chaskalson, 
―Stumbling Towards Section 28: Negotiations Over The Protection of Property Rights in the Interim 
Constitution‖, 11 S. Afr. J. on Hmn. Rts. 222, 229 (1995) (arguing that during the negotiations over property 
rights in the Interim Constitution, ―Once the ANC recognised that the Bill of Rights would contain a 
clause to protect existing property rights, it identified two crucial objectives in respect of the property 
negotiations: the property clause should not be able to frustrate a programme of restitution of lands to the 
victims of forced removals under apartheid, and the state had to have the power to regulate property 
without incurring an obligation to compensate owners [...] Ultimately, the ANC was able to secure these 
objectives quite effectively‖). 
 
1090 See, e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, above n. 83, at 30-31 (explaining Madison‘s views, largely reflected in the 
U.S. Constitution, according to which ―unequal possessions were the natural result of liberty; the 
protection of liberty implied the protection of possessions […] redistributive schemes [were] iniquitious 
violations of both liberty and justice […] what seemed so clearly iniquitious […] was that their purpose was 
redistribution —and substantial redistribution— using the power of the state to change the terms of 
exchange and entitlement in order to take from some and give to others‖). Id. at 181 (―[T]he social 
consequence of a market economy is a ‗permanent division between dependent laborers and independent 
employers‘ […] The problem of the rights of persons, property, and participation was critical because that 
division was inevitable. The Constitution was designed to make republican government work and the 
market secure given that division‖; emphasis in the original). But see George L. Priest, ―Economic 
 333 
admitting various distributive concerns.1091 One could mention the promotion of general 
welfare,1092 and Congress‘s constitutional duty to provide for the ―prosperity of the 
country‖, ―the advance and welfare of all the provinces‖,1093 as well as for ―everything 
relevant to human development, economic progress with social justice, the growth of the 
national economy, the creation of jobs‖.1094 Equality is the basis for taxation and the 
distribution of public burdens.1095 But, at the same time, the Constitution has kept its 
firm commitment to the protection of private property.1096 Any judges charged with 
applying constitutional review on the basis of such provisions will find it hard to avoid 
distributive arguments. Even more so if the case at hand involves economic emergency, 
where scarcity is usually intensified and demands for redistribution of wealth are high. 
The Argentine Supreme Court‘s caselaw has often returned outcomes that arguably 
contradict constitutional commitments to both property and equality. 
 Admittedly, private property is a difficult right to deal with. To the extent that it 
provides control over material resources indispensable to human life, thereby stabilizing 
                                                                                                                                            
Rights…‖, above n. 26, at 8-9 (arguing that while the U.S. Constitution ―places some constraints on the 
ability of the states to impair the market‖, ―the federal majority is not constrained in exactly similar ways‖ 
and, thus, these federal constitutional restrictions pressupose, rather than create, a market). 
 
1091 See, generally, Lucas S. Grosman ESCASEZ E IGUALDAD: LOS DERECHOS SOCIALES EN 
LA CONSTITUCIÓN (Buenos Aires, Libraria, 2008) (arguing that the reformed constitutional text 
embodies the constitutional ideal of the structural equality of opportunities). 
 
1092 Preamble, Argentine Constitution. 
 
1093 Article 75.18, Argentine Constitution. 
 
1094 Article 75.19, Argentine Constitution.  
 
1095 Article 16, Argentine Constitution. 
 
1096 Articles 14, 17 and 28, Argentine Constitution. Neither of these provisions were modified in the 1994 
Constitutional Convention and, as a matter of fact, they were expressly excluded from the amendment 
process by Congress when, in accordance to Article 30 of the Constitution, it called for a constitutional 
convention (Law 24,309). 
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people‘s expectations, it is a bedrock of personal autonomy and, thus, a right that should 
be enjoyed by as many people as possible.1097 Under this light, property is undeniably an 
important right, deserving of a significant measure of respect, and therefore a suitable 
candidate for strong constitutional protection by judges. But insofar as private property 
gives individuals exclusive control over scarce resources, it spawns a series of well-
known, hard-to-solve problems. Resources may not be abundant enough to satisfy 
everyone‘s needs or even to allow everyone to have their share of resources,1098 regardless 
of the extent of their needs or of what share of resources we deem just. It is frequently 
argued that the possibility of excessive accummulation of property by individuals is 
problematic, even if everyone does have a share of social wealth, ―for a person‘s effective 
share depends on what he can do with what he has, and that depends not only on how 
much he has but on what others have and on how what others have is distributed‖.1099 
Control over items of social wealth means power,1100 and power can be exercised over 
others in unacceptable ways.1101 Moreover, property seems to display a peculiar 
―normative resiliency‖ that makes it difficult to re-arrange existing entitlements, even if 
they cannot be fully justified from a normative perspective.1102 These, along with other 
                                                 
1097 See Jeremy Waldron, above n. 2, at 131 (arguing that ―If private property rights are something that 
each person needs for the satisfactory development of his autonomy, then it should be a matter of deep 
concern if the distribution of these rights is such that some people end up with none‖). There are, of 
course, several strands of argument that aim at justifying private property. I will not enter this debate here.  
 
1098 Thus, the so-called ―lockean proviso‖. See John Locke, above n. 33, at § 27 (arguing that labor is a title 
for private property, ―at least where there is enough and as good left in common for others‖). 
 
1099 Gerald A. Cohen, above n. 18, at 12. 
 
1100 See J.W. Harris, above n. 180, at 4, 26, 31 (arguing that the capacity to dictate the use of resources 
endows owners with power over other individuals). 
 
1101 Gerald A. Cohen, above n. 18, at 10, 12-13. 
 
1102 See Jeremy Waldron, above n. 20, at 174 (arguing that ―there is a range of cases in which the 
condemnation of an open taking as dishonest does not depend on any judgment on the justification of the 
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features, have given private property a bad name among those worried by distributive 
concerns.1103 It has been called ―the fundamental right of the well-to-do‖,1104 and it has 
sparked claims that economic liberties should not be just for the rich.1105 
Modern left-leaning liberal thinkers, thus, are wary of property‘s potential for 
freezing entitlements, a quality they claim hinders the search for social justice.1106 There is 
a widespread view that the legislator —acting as a ―scientific policymaker‖—1107 should 
enjoy wide latitude in regulating property rights in accordance with appropriate standards 
                                                                                                                                            
property right in question‖ and calling such a phenomenon ―the normative resilience of property‖); see 
also Emily Sherwin, above n. 15,  at 1938-1941 (arguing that property rights‘ resistance to change is tied to 
their social functions, thus there is a connection between their prospectivity and their ―normative 
resilience‖ and stating that ―[E]xisting property rights may be morally unjust, as measured by a patterned 
standard of distributive justice or by historical standards of justice in acquisition and justice in transfer. At 
the same time, disruption of established legal property rights may be a moral wrong to those who have 
arranged their lives around them […]‖) 
 
1103 There are, of course, exceptions, and progressive property theorists are by no means an extinct species. 
See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph W. Singer & Laura S. Underkuffler, ―A 
Statement of Progressive Property‖, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 743 (2009). 
 
1104 Danny Nicol, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF CAPITALISM 128-151 (Oxford & 
Portland, Hart Publishing, 2010) (arguing that in the context of the European Union the language and 
concepts of human rights have been appropriated by neoliberalism to try to protect the privileges of the 
rich and the powerful from democratic redistribution). 
 
1105 Erwin Chemerinsky, ―Under the Bridges of Paris: Economic Liberties Should Not be Just for the 
Rich‖, 6 Chap. L. Rev. 31 (2003). 
 
1106 See, e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky above n. 83, at 262 (arguing that to the egalitarian vision ―`[t]he freedom to 
use and acquire property and the security of one‘s acquisitions are no longer defining elements of liberty 
and justice, but the potential objects of regulation and redistribution —aimed at assuring justice and liberty 
[…] Far from requiring respect for the boundaries defined by property, the egalitarian conception of liberty 
and justice requires incursions on traditional property rights‖); see also Gregory S. Alexander, above n. 3, at 
26 (arguing that progressives generally oppose the constitutional protection of property on the grounds 
that it may frustrate the realization of a just society as well as it may undermine some citizen‘s possibilities 
of practicing democratic citizenship due to lack of the required wherewithal); John Tomasi, above n. 71, at 
54-56 (explaining the position of ―high liberalism‖ as committed to a thin conception of economic liberties 
which should be subordinated to a conception of substantive justice based on a thick notion of equality).  
 
1107 See Bruce A. Ackerman, above n. 28, at 10-20 (defining the ―scientific policymaker‖ as someone who 
―manipulates technical legal concepts so as to illuminate the relationship between disputed legal rules and 
the Comprehensive View he understands to govern the legal system‖, as opposed to the ―ordinary 




of justice. The now standard deferential judicial position in U.S. property cases,1108 
epitomized by decisions like Ferguson v. Skrupa,1109 enjoys broad support.1110 These ideas 
                                                 
1108 See, e.g., George L. Priest, ―Economic Rights…‖, above n. 26, at 11-12 (describing the situation in the 
following terms: ―over the years, we have seen substantial manipulation of the structure of economic 
activity by various legislative majorities in the U.S [...] vast majoritarian adjustments to the structure of U.S. 
contract law‖ as well as a ―large range of direct economic regulation that majorities have implemented 
across the U.S. economy‖). See also James W. Ely, Jr. THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT  
133 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992) (explaining the constitutional shift occurred during the 
New Deal and arguing that, from then on, ―the Court gave great latitude to Congress and state legislatures 
to fashion economic policy, while expressing only perfunctory concern for the rights of individual property 
owners. After 1937 […] the justices routinely accepted legislative statements of policy, no matter how 
implausible, as a basis for upholding regulatory measures‖); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, LAW 
AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 63 (Chicago & London, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1991) (―Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has given Congress a free hand in 
economic regulation‖); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 61 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(―In more recent times, however, the Court wisely has come to embrace a coherent, unified interpretation 
of all such constitutional provisions, and has granted wide latitude to ‗a valid exercise of [the States‘] police 
powers, even if it results in severe violations of property rights‖). 
 
1109 372 U.S. 726, 729-730 (1963) (arguing that ―Under the system of government created by our 
Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation. There 
was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down laws which were thought 
unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some particular economic or social philosophy […] We 
have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and 
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws […] Legislative bodies 
have broad scope to experiment with economic problems, and this Court does not sit to "subject the state 
to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our government […]‖). 
 
1110 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION 90 (New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) (arguing that "Property and contract rights need to be defined before they can be 
protected […] With property rights needing to be defined, Congress, the state legislatures and city councils 
all have a role in defining them […] The enduring lesson of the Lochner debacle is that economic rights 
invite specification and adjustment by the political branches of government  […] and not merely 
interpretation by the courts‖); Cass R. Sunstein AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 167-168 
(Cambridge & London,  Harvard University Press, 1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court‘s post-New 
Deal‘s reluctance ―to use the Constitution‘s explicit protection of property and contract in a way that 
would significantly interfere with social and economic regulation‖ is due in part to the Court‘s 
―understanding that in the post-New Deal period interferences with private contract and private property 
have considerable popular support‖; emphasis added); Jonathan R. Macey, ―Some Causes and Consequnces 
of the Bifurcated Treatment of Economic Rights and ‗Other‘ Rights Under the United States 
Constitution‖, in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. & Jeffrey Paul ECONOMIC RIGHTS 141, 168-170 
(Cambridge-New York-Melbourne-Sydney-Ohio, Cambridge University Press & The Social Philosophy 
and Policy Foundation, 1992) (arguing that ―the best explanation for the dichotomous treatment of 
economic and noneconomic rights by the Supreme Court is that this dichotomous treatment best reflects 
the views of the legal culture from which these justices came […] the growing acceptance within the legal culture of the 
proposition that economic liberties were less worthy of protection than other sorts of liberties found its final and most 
complete expression in the twentieth century jurisprudence of the Supreme Court‖; emphasis added); 
David E. Bernstein REHABILITATING LOCHNER 122 (Chicago & London, The University of 
Chicago Press, 2011) (emphasizing that although some liberal scholars hold the view that the ―in 
completely abandoning liberty of contract, the Supreme Court has left important economic rights 
vulnerable to government overreaching‖, it is a ―distincly minority position‖); Stephen Macedo, ―Majority 
Power, Moral Skepticism, and the New Right‘s Constitution‖, in James A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne 
(editors) ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY 111, 132  (Fairfax, George Mason University 
Press, 1987) (arguing that ―Most commentators on the left applaud the Court‘s shift from protecting 
economic values to protecting noneconomic ones‖); John Rawls, above n. 4, at 174-176 (holding that  
economic regulation corresponds to the legislative, and not the constitutional, stage because ―on many 
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have also been accepted in Argentina‘s caselaw, at least when economic emergency is at 
stake.1111 
 While defenses of strong protection of economic liberties on the grounds that 
they benefit the least well-off are fairly common in the classical liberal and libertarian 
fronts,1112 my dissertation has provided additional empirical evidence that supports such 
claims and casts doubts on the wisdom of the dominant liberal position, at least in 
contexts of emergency.   
 The Argentine Supreme Court, I have argued, has frequently embraced the 
―haircut‖-―deferment of maturities‖ distinction in order to align its jurisprudence with 
some widespread conception of constitutional property. Still, it has failed to gather 
consistent public support, and some of its central decisions using the distinction have 
                                                                                                                                            
questions of […] economic policy we must fall back upon a notion of quasi-pure procedural justice: laws 
and policies are just provided that they lie within the allowed range, and the legislature, in ways authorized 
by the constitution, has in fact enacted them‖). Interestingly enough, conservatives have also come to hold 
the view that property rights should not enjoy much judicial protection. See, e.g., Macedo, above at 111 
(arguing that the New Right‘s constitutional vision implied a fundamental narrowing of judicial protections 
for individual rights generally); Antonin Scalia, ―Economic Affairs as Human Affairs‖, in Dorn & Manne 
supra at 32-34  (arguing that the Supreme Court‘s general refusal to grant substantive protection to 
economic liberties is ―good‖); Bernstein, above at 112-120 (describing the process by which conservatives 
came to reject a stronger role for Courts in the protection of economic rights). 
 
1111 See, e.g., 313 Fallos 1513 (1990) (majority opinion, §54)  (rejecting a constitutional challenge to 
economic emergency measures and arguing that such rejection ― […] does not mean that […] the rights of 
those who claim to have been affected […] should not be taken into account, but it must be accepted that 
[their scope] has been determined by the Government in accordance to the role such rights played in the 
economy‖); 327 Fallos 4495 (2004) (Zaffaroni, J., concurring, §3) (upholding economic emergency 
measures and arguing that ―[T]he republican principle prevents this Court from assuming functions 
reserved to other branches of Government and from interfering with their exercise, but the same principle 
imposes that this Court exercises review in cases of extreme irrationality or dysfunctional measures that result in 
unjustified injuries to rights guaranteed by the Constitution‖, emphasis added). 
 
1112 See, e.g., George L. Priest, ―Poverty…‖, above n. 26, at 12 (arguing that ―the promotion of economic 
growth and the removal of market impediments is the surest method of increasing the income and wealth 
of those citizens with the lowest skills‖); John Tomasi, above n. 71, at 125-140 (analyzing the works of 
several authors in the classical liberal and libertarian traditions and arguing that ―while rejecting the idea of 
distributive justice, they defend their preferred institutional forms by predicting that these institutions will 





been severely criticized by large segments of the population. Why has it been so? A major 
flaw in the Court‘s caselaw has been not giving enough weight to the profile of those 
affected by the measures whose validity it upheld. It has applied the distiction without 
regard to the particular situation of the large majority of the regulated population and, 
thus, it has permitted the imposition of actual, definitive losses on them, with 
corresponding gains going to the well-off. It has, in sum, incurred in the ―regressive 
redistribution difficulty‖. 
 During the last two great economic crisis (1989-1990 and 2001-2002), the profile 
of the bank depositor trapped by the emergency regimes has been clear. Small and 
medium savers have been, by and large, the sector affected by the measures. Remember 
that in 1989, the median depositor must have had somewhere about 2,000 dollars, while 
in 2001 almost half of the savers caught by ―pesification‖ had deposits of 5,000 or less 
dollars. This data from 2001-2002 mirrors closely the information available from judicial 
sources regarding savers who actually litigated against the measures. Anecdotal evidence, 
taken from sources at the Supreme Court, points towards a 70 percent of the lawsuits 
involving deposits of 30,000 or less dollars,1113 a result that is supported by a survey of 
244 cases decided by the Supreme Court in 2010 and 2011, which return a 62% of cases 
involving deposits of 30,000 or less dollars.1114 And a very similar proportion of the 
lawsuits —61.88%— involved cases where the life or physical integrity of a person was 
at risk or depositors were older than 75 years.1115 Even more importantly, a substantial 
                                                 
1113 Off-the-record interview with judicial sources. 
 
1114 The sample is made up of 244 cases where the issue had been decided on the merits after December, 
2006, and where issues of attorneys‘ fees had been raised afterwards and were decided between 2010 and 
2011.  
 
1115 151 out of 244 cases were decided by the Supreme Court by a short citation of the precedent Rodríguez, 
Ramona, 331 Fallos 901 (2008), which was applicable for people who faced a true necessity and generally 
fitted into the categories of: 1) depositor older than 75; 2) depositor or close relative in need of the money 
for serious health reasons; 3) small amounts. One should be cautious, though, due to the fact that Rodriguez 
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part of the lawsuits involving larger amounts of money also fell in the category of needy 
depositors: 45% of cases involving deposits between 30,000 and 100,000 dollars, and 
50% of cases involving more than 200,000 dollars. Therefore, the Court‘s jurisprudence, 
despite its emphasis on deferments and its apparent rejection of ―haircuts‖, has the 
inherent potential to impose reductions of capital on small (or otherwise needy) players 
who are, in turn, the bulk of the regulated population. This reduction of capital might be 
(and frequently is) accompanied by a corresponding gain by a well-off player. Let us 
analyze Peralta, perhaps the landmark case on the topic, briefly. 
The gist of the majority‘s decision, as far as property rights are concerned, is that 
the property clause of the Constitution is not violated when the State 
―[...] enacts, by reasons of necessity, a rule which does not divest private 
individuals of lawfully recognized economic benefits nor does it deprive them of 
their property, but only limits temporarily the collection of such benefits or 
restricts the uses of such property‖1116 
 
As previously stated, the majority struggled to square the decision with its 
precedents by arguing that the measure implied a robust deferment of maturities, but not 
a reduction of capital,1117 as a ―superficial analysis‖ might lead one to think.1118 The Court 
                                                                                                                                            
was decided some sixteen months after Massa (the precedent applicable to standard cases which did not 
involve needy or elderly depositors), which may account partially for an overrepresentation of this sort of 
cases in the sample (cases similar to Massa had been coming out of the Supreme Court for a while when 
cases similar to Rodriguez began to be decided). 
 
1116 313 Fallos 1513 (1990), §38 and §56. 
 
1117 See, e.g., 329 Fallos 5913 (2006) (Argibay, J., concurring in the result, §5) (arguing that the Peralta 
majority struggled to make the decision fit within the ―traditional‖ emergency caselaw by insisting that the 
measure only implied a deferment of maturities). 
 
1118 313 Fallos 1513 (1990), §52. 
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argued that the plaintiffs would not suffer any losses, because hyperinflation was rapidly 
eroding the value of their australes, a crisis that the measure aimed to control.1119  
This part of the Court‘s reasoning may be understood as containing two different 
arguments. One is a counterfactual argument, aiming at denying that the plaintiffs had 
sustained any losses: what would have happened if the australes of Luis Arcenio Peralta 
had been subject to further erosion by hyperinflation?1120 Would that money be less than 
what Mr. Peralta could get at the time of the decision by selling his bonds below par? 
From the perspective of the individual rights at stake, the argument does not really work 
because if Mr. Peralta and his fellow right-holders had been paid their deposits at the 
original maturity date, they could have resorted to the proper devices to avoid erosion of 
their capital, i.e., they could have bought dollars. Of course, one could adopt a different, 
more society-oriented standpoint, and argue that such individual conduct would have 
pushed the dollar‘s price higher, therefore fueling inflation, with the ensuing harm to the 
community. But if one is making this sort of utilitarian calculations, then it is fairly 
irrelevant whether depositors suffered any losses of capital. All that matters is whether 
those losses are justified by counteravailing greater gains. So this counterfactual argument 
about the merely apparent character of the depositor‘s losses does not do any real work.  
A more plausible argument is that capital losses are allowed as long as they are 
temporary and not definitive. In other words, deferments of maturities may be allowed, 
while reductions of capital are not. As any postponement of payments implies a 
reduction of the present value of a credit, they are equal to a temporary reduction of 
capital, which is permissible. But this argument does not work when applied to needy 
unvoluntary bondholders: if forced to sell, they undergo a loss of capital, not a mere 
                                                 
1119 Id. 
 
1120 Id., §54. 
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deferment of maturities. In other words, they sustain a definitive, as opposed to a merely 
temporary, loss. And this is forbidden by the same argument. Problematically, a 
substantial majority of the individuals affected by the measures are usually relatively poor 
and needy1121 and, hence, likely candidates for early, well-below-par sales of their 
bonds.1122 Almost by definition, purchasers must be subjects with enough spare resources 
to invest and bear the wait. So the Court‘s argument, by allowing re-structuring of 
maturities without any attention to the particular situation of the affected, opens the door 
for very regressive redistributions in the wake of economic emergency regulations. 
 
b. And So What? Distributive Justice in Emergency Contexts. 
Someone might argue that even if I am right that economic emergency measures often 
instantiate regressive redistributions, they may well be justified nonetheless.1123 The 
debates over the justification of property rights normally display a fair amount of 
utilitarian arguments,1124 so it should come as no surprise that such considerations 
                                                 
1121 For additional empirical evidence confirming this common sense intuition as well as my own findings, 
see Marina Halac & Sergio L. Shmukler, ―Distributional Effects of Crises: The Financial Channel‖, 5 
Economia 1, 45-48 (2004) (showing statistics that prove that ―while richer households are more likely to 
have savings, the poorer households with savings have a higher probability of being harmed from the crisis 
and its resolution‖). 
 
1122 The Court was well-aware of this fact in Peralta, where it rejected the claims of two retirees who were 
demanding the equivalent of 1,400 dollars, and closed the doors to claims based upon the neediness of the 
plaintiffs by saying that while the Court was aware of the ―[...] regrettable situation in which many of those 
affected [by the decree] may find themselves. It would seem, however, that if the problem has any solution 
at all, it must be sought in the future, rather than attempting to find it in the past through the demand, at 
any cost, of formerly recognized rights‖, see 313 Fallos 1513 (1990), §59.  
 
1123 See, e.g., Eldar Sarajlic, ―Distributive Justice in Crisis‖, 6 C.E.U. Political Science Journal 458, 462-463 
(2011) (arguing that there is a distinct normative principle that, under conditions of crisis, prescribes that 
―the distribution of resources […] prioritize actors that are essential for the recovery of the economic 
system‖, even if they are the richer part of the population). 
 
1124 See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker above n. 6, at 57-74 (analyzing the role of utility arguments in the 
justification of property rights); Stephen R. Munzer above n. 181, at  191-226 (explaining the important 
role of considerations of utility and efficiency in the theory of property). 
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assume a central role in emergency debates, where consequences generally displace, at 
least partially, other considerations.1125  
Someone might say, for instance, that in a situation of the ―too-big-to-fail‖ type, 
like a banking system bail-out, the relatively weak and poor receive in-kind 
compensation1126 by the continued existence of businesses owned for the most part by 
wealthy people —i.e., banks. Or, along the same lines, that in high inflation contexts, the 
worse-off are benefitted, perhaps more than others, by the abatement of inflation.1127 
There are a number of possible versions of this argument. All of them can be gathered 
under the in-kind compensation banner.  
Another possible line of argument is that re-arrangements of property rights 
sometimes foster economic growth1128 which, all other things being equal, seems to be a 
pretty compelling prospect from the standpoint of society. This argument can have, at 
least, two versions. One focuses strictly on the effects of encroachments upon existing 
                                                 
1125 See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, JUSTICE 13 (Farrar, Straux & Giraux, New York, 2009) (arguing that in 
the recent financial crisis in the U.S. ―the welfare of the economy as a whole seemed to outweigh 
considerations of fairness‖). 
 
1126 Frank I. Michelman, above n. 897, at 1225 (analyzing the practice of compensation as a whole, 
including non-compensable harms, and arguing that ―it seems we are pleased to believe that we can arrive 
at an acceptable level of assurance that over time the burdens associated with collectively determined 
improvements will have been distributed ―evenly‖ enough so that everyone will be a net gainer‖); Richard 
A. Epstein, above n. 98, at 195-215 (developing a theory of when implicit in-kind compensation satisfies 
the requirement of ―just compensation‖ under the U.S. Constitution). 
 
1127 See, e.g., Pablo Gerchunoff & Lucas Llach, above n. 656, at 443 (arguing that the virtual elimination of 
the ―inflationary tax‖ by the 1991 ―Convertibility Plan‖ had a progressive distributive effect). 
 
1128 See, e.g., Douglass C. North, above n. 4, at 172 (arguing that, in the context of the transition between 
the First and the Second Economic Revolutions, a society‘s ability to realize its productive potential 
required a basic restructuring of property rights). See also Jennifer Nedelsky, above n. 83, at 226 (arguing 
that during the nineteenth century, judges in the U.S. changed the rules of property, contract and tort, and 
destroyed vested rights in the process, all ―in the name of progress, economic development, and the 
common good‖); James W. Ely, Jr., above n. 1108, at 6 (arguing that ―[e]conomic development was a 
primary objective of Americans in the nineteenth century, but steps to promote growth frequently clashed 
with the interests of particular property owners [...] As a consequence, legislators and courts have often 




property entitlements on promoting growth, without any explicit distributive concerns. 
In this reading, strong property rights, at least in some instances, can be formalistic 
hindrances to the pursuit of the general welfare.1129 Given that after the 1989 compulsory 
swap of bank deposits into long-term bonds, and after the general ―pesification‖ of all 
contracts in 2002, there followed phases of significant growth,1130 the argument justifies a 
weak protection for property rights, whatever the seeming distributive effects of the 
emergency measures. This version of the argument, at least as roughly described, could 
be considered, somewhat loosely, as utilitarian. Another version of this argument has a 
more explicit concern for distributive outcomes and pays close attention to the situation 
of the poor: economic growth benefits the least well-off by diminishing absolute 
poverty.1131  
                                                 
1129 See, e.g., Jean Baechler, ―Liberty, Property, and Equality‖, in J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, 
above n. 6, at 276-277 (arguing that in a capitalist environment individual property is problematic, and that, 
occasionally, it may become a hindrance to economic development). Such an argument may find support in 
certain revisionistic strands in the Law and Development literature that call into question the conventional 
wisdom regarding the importance of property rights in fostering economic growth. See, e.g., Frank B. 
Upham, ―Chinese Property Rights and Economic Growth‖, 39 Hong Kong L. J. 611, 619 (2009) (arguing 
that ―[...] no one is enforcing property rights, and yet China continues to grow faster than any other 
significant economy in the world. Would China grow faster if property rights were enforced? No one can 
answer that question, but it seems unlikely. Indeed, the lack of property rights arguably accelerates the 
process‖). But see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. 
LAW: PROPERTY 232-233 (New York, Oxford University Press, 2010) (―[…] notwithstanding the weak 
legal and political checks on government interference with property rights, China has had little difficulty in 
recent years attracting large amounts of capital from foreign investors […] The best answer would seem to 
be that Chinese administrators in the post-Mao era have developed a strong norm against interfering with 
the expectations of foreign investors […] Whatever the explanation, the recent history of China suggests 
that caution is in order before concluding that strong legal rights enforced by courts are a necessary 
precondition for creating the degree of government forbearance needed for investment in property to 
flourish‖). 
 
1130 See, e.g., Jerome Booth, above n. 766, at 484 (arguing that the stabilization that followed the so-called 
―Convertibility Plan‖ of 1991 led to an investment-led boom and strong economic growth in Argentina); 
Christopher Wylde, ―Post Crisis Recovery and Developmentalism: Argentina and Malaysia in Comparative 
Perspective‖ (arguing that ―after the crisis of 2001-02 [Argentina] experienced a dramatic and sustained 
recovery, with growth rates of 8-9 percent‖) (available at 
www.csetranspennine.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/wylde.pdf ;  last visited 04/01/2013); Vicky Baker, 
―Ten years after economic collapse, Argentina is still in recovery‖, The Guardian, December, 14, 2011 
(available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/dec/14/10-years-argentina-economic-
collapse; last visited 04/12/2013) (arguing that the Argentine ―[…] economy appears to be booming, with 
a real GDP growth of 9.1%. Unemployment is down to a 20-year low. Some have been holding it up as an 
example for Greece […]‖). 
 
1131 See George L. Priest, ―Poverty…‖, above n.. 26, at 1 (arguing that ―there is increasing acceptance of 
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It could be argued, in a more crudely utilitarian fashion, that even if the 
vulnerable are not compensated in kind, the mere fact that their enduring losses does not 
cause great social (or ―systemic‖) harm, as opposed to the losses that big players would 
otherwise suffer, justifies a distributively-regressive policy.1132 
The first two arguments have an apparent Rawlsian flavor: one might argue that 
the redistribution caused by emergency measures —let‘s call this state-of-affairs ―C‖, 
where the worse-off have ―x minus y percent‖ wealth— is objectionable only if 
compared to state-of-affairs ―A‖, which is prior to the crisis and where the worse-off 
have an ―x‖ amount of wealth, but not when compared to state ―B‖ —a hypothesis 
where the emergency measures are not taken and the crisis is let run its course—  where 
the worse-off are left with less than in ―C‖. So, no matter how much richer the wealthy 
and powerful are made by the emergency measures, the situation still satifies the 
difference principle, insofar as it puts the worse-off in a better situation than they would 
otherwise be.1133  
                                                                                                                                            
the proposition that economic growth is closely related to the reduction of absolute poverty‖). The 
argument can be understood in broadly utilitarian terms, where the sum of utility —including the poor‘s 
utility— is greater when economic growth is achieved, or in non-utilitarian, Rawlsian terms, as I explain 
below. 
 
1132 See, e.g., Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, ―Restrictions to Property Rights in Circumstances of Scarcity‖, SELA 
papers 2008, at 6-8 (justifying ―pesification‖ of bank deposits and, at the same time rejecting ―pesification‖ 
of loans between private individuals, on grounds that in the former, but not the latter, case restrictions on 
property rights of creditors brought about large systemic benefits) (available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/sela/Rosenkrantz.pdf; last visited 01/17/2012). Spanish version 
in Paola Bergallo (editor) DERECHO Y PROPIEDAD 38-50 (Buenos Aires, Libraria, 2009). ―Systemic‖ 
benefits, in Rosenkrantz‘s theory, are benefits to the ―system of acquisition, protection and distribution of 
resources‖ and, if large enough, they may compensate restrictions on individuals‘ property rights. For a 
slightly different argument, see David A. Strauss, ―Why Was Lochner Wrong?‖, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 373, 385 
(2003) (arguing that whatever its merits as a matter of social policy, ―the legislature might be warranted in 
concluding that despite the regressive effect of the minimum wage, the gains to those who benefit from it 
outweigh the harm to those who lose out‖).  
 
1133 For one such reading of Rawls‘ difference principle and an application to a similar case, see Eldar 
Sarajlic, above n. 1123, at 469-470. Of course, the Rawlsian scheme may impose some limits to how much 
richer the wealthy can be made by any given measure, despite its contributing to the improvement of the 
situation of the worse-off, due to the priority of liberty. See, e.g., John Rawls, above n. 4, at 70 (arguing 
that ―[…] there is a maximum gain permitted to the most favored on the assumption that, even if the 
difference principle would allow it, there would be unjust effects on the political system and the like 
excluded by the priority of liberty‖). 
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The economic growth argument is also susceptible of a Rawlsian reading: by reducing 
absolute poverty, economic growth improves the life prospects of the worst-off in 
myriad ways that include, but exceed, their income.1134 Whatever inequalities in income 
exist, the argument might go, are justified under the difference principle, as they work to 
the benefit of the worst-off.1135 
The utilitarian arguments, instead, have a built-in bias towards favoring the rich: 
given that they usually own important resources, whose proper functioning often has a 
large social impact, it is likely that a crisis principle that prioritizes ―systemic‖ gains (or 
short term overall growth, in the economic growth argument) will point in the direction of 
regressive redistributions. 
One could tackle all four arguments on their own terms. The Rawlsian variants 
must be contextualized. The difference principle ―dictates that social and economic 
policies be aimed at maximizing the long-term expectations of the least advantaged‖.1136 So 
even if a committed Rawlsian needs not be particularly worried by the fact that members 
of a relatively worse-off class  —as small (or otherwise needy) savers— are harmed by 
emergency regulations, insofar as those at the very bottom are benefitted,1137 in cases 
where regressive redistributions for emergency reasons are a repeated phenomenon, the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
1134 See George L. Priest, ―Poverty…‖, above n. 26, at 3 (arguing that economic growth leads to a general 
increase in life expectancy, which should be embraced by every moral system); id., at 12 (arguing that the 
promotion of economic growth and the removal of markets impediments are ―the surest method of 
increasing the income and wealth of those citizens with the lowest skills‖). 
 
1135 The limits set by the priority of liberty in the Rawlsian scheme are, of course, also applicable to the 
economic growth argument. 
 
1136 John Rawls, above n. 4, at 175. The italics are mine. 
 
1137 Id., at 70-71 (explaining ―chain connection‖ as the situation where any rise in the expectations of those 
at the very bottom of the social scale is accompanied by a corresponding rise in the expectations of groups 
situated in the middle of the social scale and arguing that ―[t]he difference principle is not contigent on 
these relations being satisfied‖). 
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long-term expectations of the worse-off are diminished.1138 And this would violate the 
difference principle.  
Moreover, there is the undeniable fact that, at least during the two most recent 
crises, the universe of individuals directly affected by the emergency regulations has been 
very similar, with a clear, repetitive pattern of affecting small, medium or otherwise needy 
savers. Even if my rough empirics cannot show that any given individual was affected, 
and turned out to be a loser, in both the 1989 bank deposits freeze and in the 2002 
―pesificacion‖, the fact that the profile of the affected was extremely similar in both 
crises is significant. The same people, although surely not all the same individuals, were 
to bear the heaviest burden of controlling the crisis. In such a context, Michelman‘s 
argument about a long-term even distribution of burdens that makes everyone a net 
gainer simply does not hold.1139   
The utility (―systemic gains‖) argument, as well as the economic growth argument 
in any of its versions, need to take into account the effects of recurrent disruptions of 
property rights in the larger scheme of things. While drastic re-arrangements of property 
rights may well be instrumental in establishing economic policies that allow for the 
taming of the crises, and even for the beginning of a process of growth,1140 they come at 
                                                 
1138 The general point was made early on by Allen Buchanan. See Allen Buchanan, ―Distributive Justice and 
Legitimate Expectations‖, 28 Philos. Stud. 419, 424 (1975) (arguing that ―the prospects of the worst off 
include their prospects of ascending to higher positions, of enjoying the benefits of those positions, and of 
being able to continue to enjoy those benefits. Maximizing their expectations, then, will require taking into 
account the stability of institutional arrangements, since liability to future disruptions decreases their 
present expectations, other things being equal‖). 
 
1139 See Frank I. Michelman, above n. 897, at 1225. 
 
1140 Arguably, the ―Bonex Plan‖ —in itself a failure in its claimed objective of taming inflation— paved the 
way for the ―Convertibility Plan‖ that ultimately controlled inflation and led to a phase of growth. See 
above n. 758. 
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a high cost. A long-term view is needed to assess this kind of arguments fairly, as 
sustainable growth seems to require strong property rights.1141 
Some literature describes property rights functioning ―at their best‖ when, among 
other conditions, they are not readily reconfigured by a judge or other government 
decision-maker.1142 Contrarily, they are ―at their worst‖, among other situations, when 
―their contours can be changed either only at the discretion of government actors or too 
easily at the discretion of government actors‖.1143 When ―at their best‖, property rights 
―promote economic growth, competition, and jobs‖.1144 Empirical evidence backs up 
such claims. 
―Countries with greater constraints on politicians and elites and more protection 
against expropriation by these powerful groups have substantially higher income 
per capita (i.e., higher long-run growth rates), greater investment rates, more 
credit to the private sector relative to gross domestic product, and more 
developed stock markets‖1145 
 
When property rights are subject to recurrent attacks in the name of emergency 
(and/or the general welfare, the ultimate actual or rhetorical reason for the emergency 
regulation) the players perceive the opportunities for redistribution via the political 
                                                 
1141 See Douglass C. North, above n. 4, at 23 (highlighting the ―widespread tendency of states to produce 
inefficient property rights and hence fail to achieve sustained growth‖; emphasis added). Id., at 148 (finding 
in the nature of the property rights developed in each emerging nation-state in Europe during the 
seventeenth century the reason for their differential growth rates). See also Daron Acemoglu & Simon 
Johnson, ―Unbundling Institutions‖, 113 J. Polit. Econ. 949, 988 (2005) (finding ―robust evidence that 
property rights institutions have a major influence on long-run economic growth, investment, and financial 
development‖; emphasis added). 
 
1142 See, e.g., Stephen H. Haber, F. Scott Kieff  & Troy A. Paredes, ―On the Importance to Economic 






1145 Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, above n. 1141, at 953. 
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process. The structures of incentives promote investment in rent-seeking activities.1146 
Rent-seeking is harmful for economic growth, as it is a wasteful, unproductive activity.1147 
As one economist scholar explains:  
―[t]here are three basic negative consequences for economic growth as a result of 
weak protection of property rights. First, private protection wastes resources 
because it is an unproductive activity. Second, the threat of expropriation distorts 
the economic environment and leads to suboptimal paths of capital accumulation 
and production. Third, extensive rent-seeking and improper public protection of 
property rights are associated with substantial income inequality‖1148 
 
Historically, the security of property rights has been ―a critical determinant of the 
rate of saving and capital formation‖.1149 By compromising property rights on savings 
invested in the banking system, the Argentine Court‘s jurisprudence on economic 
emergency, far from fostering economic growth, has hindered it. 
In Argentina, long-term lending —essential for productive investments or for 
more personal, but equally important, projects like purchasing a house— is, 
unsurprisingly, very scarce. It depends crucially on savings and capital formation. But, 
consistent with the structure of incentives created by the economic emergency 
                                                 
1146 James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 156 (Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 2004) 
(arguing that, under simple majority voting, there will be a net transfer of income from the minority to the 
majority and where such direct transfers are forbidden, the majority will resort to financing special benefits 
through levying general taxes or through financing general benefits through special taxes). 
 
1147 See, e.g., Konstantin Sonin, Private Protection Of Property Rights, Inequality, and Economic Growth 
in Transition Economies‖, EERC Working Paper Series 4 (2001) (available at 
https://eerc.ru/default/download/creater/working_papers/file/ba271fad501a1f4f4a6e8a496c23f7470c27
5c89.pdf; last visited 02/13/2013) (arguing that ―[T]here is substantial empirical and theoretical evidence 
that rent-seeking is harmful for growth‖ and providing evidence from the Russian economy). See also 
Richard Posner, ―The Constitution as an Economic Document‖, 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 4, 10 (1987-1988) 
(―A purely redistributive statute by definition does not increase the size of the social pie, but actually 
shrinks it because resources will be expended on obtaining and resisting the enactment of the statute‖). 
 
1148 Konstantin Sonin, ―Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights‖, 31 J. Comp. Econ. 715, 
717 (2003). 
 
1149 See Douglass C. North, above n. 4, at 6. 
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jurisprudence, depositors do not trust the system or the government and prefer 
flexibility. Whatever their short-term benefits, the Bonex Plan and the Peralta decision 
took their toll by discouraging stable, long-term investments. By 1997, six years after the 
Supreme Court ruling, depositors were still extremely averse to risk and preferred to 
maintain ―extremely flexible financial positions‖.1150 Something similar happened with the 
―pesification‖ of bank deposits and the Bustos decision, validating it. Over half of the 
total deposits in Argentina in 2008 were demand deposits.1151 Being largely devoted to 
short-term operations, it‘s virtually impossible for the Argentine financial system to fulfill 
its fundamental role of channeling savings into investments.1152 Moreover, Argentines 
who have access to offshore banking put their savings abroad, thus detracting large 
amounts of money from the national productive circuit.1153 Our history of economic 
emergency has undeniably played an important role in creating such undesirable state of 
affairs.1154 In fact, recent studies show that poor enforcement of contracts and property 
                                                 
1150 See Guillermo Rosenwurcel & Leonardo Bleger, above n. 682, at 175 (arguing that, by 1997, depositors 
were still strongly averse to risk and, therefore, they preferred to maintain extremely flexible financial 
positions). 
 
1151 Agustina Leonardi, Fernando Staffieri & Adriano Mandolesi, ―El Sistema Bancario en Argentina‖, 
Instituto de Estudios Económicos, Fundación Libertad, March, 2009, at 7 (available at: 
http://www.iee.org.ar/analisismarzo.pdf; last visited 02/15/2012). 
 
1152 Id., at 9. 
 
1153 It is estimated that, by 2004, Argentineans held about one hundred thousand million dollars abroad. 
See ―Becoming a serious country‖, The Economist, June, 5, 2004, at 70 (available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/2704457; lasti visited 02/18/2013). Even some provincial governments 
preferred off shore banking for their revenue. Most notably, the province of Santa Cruz, under Governor 
Kirchner (who, remember, would go on to become president of the Nation and to pressure the Court to 
uphold ―pesification‖), deposited abroad some 500,000,000 dollars. See, e.g., ―Confirmation there was a 
request on Kirchner's financial transactions‖ (available at http://www.atfa.org/confirmation-there-was-a-
request-on-kirchners-financial-transactions/; last visited 04/01/2013). 
 
1154 Agustina Leonardi, Fernando Staffieri & Adriano Mandolesi, above n. 1151, at 9 (mentioning among 
the causes of the problem ―the confiscation of deposits and the assymetric pesification‖ and the ―recurrent 
inflationary processes and expropriations in the Argentine history‖).  
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rights, especially from the 1940‘s on, has been a determinant factor of Argentina‘s 
economic stagnation.1155  
In light of the aforementioned evidence, a utilitarian-minded policymaker would 
do well to take seriously the long-term effects of emergency redistributions on the 
possibilities of economic and personal development. So would anyone interested in 
fostering sustainable economic growth. 
 But even if the arguments analyzed above are partly true and justify taking 
emergency measures such as the ones discussed throughout this dissertation, they leave 
out the crucial question of explicit compensation: if benefits are so general, as economic 
emergency regulations usually presuppose, why should a particular sector of the 
population bear the whole burden?1156 Even more, why should we let the burden fall on 
those relatively disfavored to the particular benefit of the already rich and powerful? 
Economic emergency measures as the ones analyzed here usually take a ―photographic‖ 
                                                 
1155 See Leandro Prados de la Escosura & Isabel Sanz-Vilarroya, ―Contract enforcement, capital 
accumulation, and Argentina‘s long-run decline‖, 3 Cliometrica 1, 2, 13 (2009) (using Clague et al‘s notion of 
―contract intensive money‖ [CIM], as a measure of compliance with contracts and of the security of 
property rights, and finding that ―until the 1960s, poor contract enforcement played a major role in 
Argentina‘s unique historical experience of economic decline. Later, between the early 1970s and 1990s, 
hyperinflation reduced CIMs ability to capture the compliance of contracts‖ and that ―[a]ll in all, the results 
of the estimated system of equations suggest that, in Argentina, contract enforcement and the security of 
property rights, as measured by CIM, would lead to higher rates of human and physical capital 
accumulation and, thus, [would result] in higher per capita GDP‖). 
 
1156 This common sense intuition is reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of the Fifth 
Amendment. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (arguing that ―[t]he Fifth Amendment's 
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed 
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole‖); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 
621, 656 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that ―[w]hen one person is asked to assume more than a 
fair share of the public burden, the payment of just compensation operates to redistribute that economic 
cost from the individual to the public at large‖); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 
(1935) (―[...] the Fifth Amendment commands that, however great the nation's need, private property shall 
not be thus taken even for a wholly public use without just compensation. If the public interest requires, 
and permits, the taking of property of individual mortgagees in order to relieve the necessities of individual 
mortgagors, resort must be had to proceedings by eminent domain; so that, through taxation, the burden 
of the relief afforded in the public interest may be borne by the public‖). Remarkably, this interpretation of 
the Fifth Amendment is shared by justices of all ideological stripes, including some who were not staunch 
defenders of private property. The Radford opinion was authored by Justice Brandeis and the San Diego Gas 
& Elec. Co. dissent cited before was written by Justice Brennan. 
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approach to the distribution of crises‘ costs.  They freeze their focus on the moment a 
solution is badly needed and look no further. But it is not implausible to think that as 
soon as the worst is over, compensation (or more complete compensation) should be 
forthcoming.1157 Let me borrow an example to state my case more clearly:1158 if a ship is 
threatened by a storm, to the point of risking wreckage, and the technically correct 
solution is to lose weight in a certain sector of the vessel, it may be justifiable (indeed, it 
may be required) to throw away the baggage that is closest to that sector. All passengers 
of the boat, including the owners of the discarded baggages, benefit from the measure. 
Still, it would not be acceptable to hold that owners of discarded baggages have no 
legitimate claim to compensation as they would have been compensated implicitly by 
their taking advantage of the ship‘s safe arrival in port. Or, similarly, that they would have 
been worse in the alternative scenario where no action is taken and the ship sinks, so the 
measures were to their advantage and their regressive distributive effects are justified. 
One would think it is only fair that all those who benefitted from the measure 
countribute in equal proportions to the sacrifices incurred. Compensation, hence, is 
warranted. 
                                                 
1157 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, above n. 28, at 72-73 (modeling an ideal ―restrained Kantian‖ approach 
to takings‘ claims which would find it easy to order compensation in cases where one group‘s property is 
taken for the benefit of the larger community and such benefits have accrued, because ―[b]y placing the 
loosers in as good a position as they were at Time one, it has been made clear that [they] are not conceived 
merely as means to the greater satisfaction of social utility‖); Eldar Sarajlic, above n. 1123, at 477 (arguing 
that ―once the economy is stabilized, the actors that have received resources under the pretext of their 
essential importance for stabilization have an obligation to redress the inequality of crisis distribution 
through priority measures aimed at the least advantaged members of society who would, had the crisis not 
occurred, have received more resources in absolute terms, or alternatively, aimed at bringing the crisis-
deepened inequalities at the pre-crisis levels‖). My argument is slightly different from Sarajlic‘s, as he 
assumes that redress should be directed at the least advantaged members of society. While I wholeheartedly 
endorse the idea that those at the bottom are entitled to priority measures that tend to improve their 
situation, my idea of compensation aims at the fair allocation of the burdens of controlling the crisis. The 
relatively vulnerable sectors that were forced to bear disproportionate burdens at the height of the crisis 
should be compensated. This sector may, or may not, coincide with the absolute worse-off. 
 
1158 I borrow this example from Lucas Grosman, Revised Opinion in Peralta, in José Sebastián Elias, Julio 
C. Rivera, Jr., & Damián Azrak (editors), CÓMO PODRÍA HABER SIDO DECIDIDO EL CASO 
PERALTA: REPENSANDO LA JURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA CORTE 
SUPREMA 124 (Buenos Aires, Del Puerto, 2013). 
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This is the only way to recognize that there is an individual (property) right that is 
(perhaps justifiedly) restricted for the general welfare‘s sake. As Joel Feinberg has 
famously argued in the context of a similar hypothetical, there would be no duty of 
compensation if no right had been infringed in the first place.1159 But as there was a right, 
there must be compensation: ―[o]ne owes compensation here for the same reason one 
must repay a debt or return what one has borrowed‖.1160 Jules Coleman has argued, 
similarly,1161 that  
―[...] some actions that are contrary to the demands rights impose on us are at 
fault or otherwise wrongful [...] Other actions, however, can be both contrary to 
the demands of rights and not at fault [...] In those cases of permissible invasions, 
that is, infringements, compensation derives from the invasion of the right, not 
from the wrongfulness or fault of the injurer‘s conduct1162 
 
For Coleman, while necessity may justify appropriating (infringing) the property 
right, it is the property right that grounds the claim to compensation.1163 
Someone might object that cases such as the ones posed by Feinberg and 
Coleman deal with private necessity, while my argument deals with public necessity. 
Destruction of property under public necessity does not, per se, generate a duty to 
                                                 
1159 Joel Feinberg, ―Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life‖, 7 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 93, 102 
(1978) (posing the case of a backpacker on a high mountain trip who runs into an unanticipated blizzard 
that imperils his life and thus, breaks into a cabin, consumes the food stocked therein, and burns some of 
the furniture to keep himself warm; while Feinberg finds the backpacker‘s actions to be justified, he also 




1161 See Jules Coleman, RISKS AND WRONGS 281-302 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992) 
(discussing several variations on the case of a diabetic whose insulin‘s supply was lost in an accident and 
who, before lapsing into a coma, rushes into another diabetic‘s house and, without her consent, takes the 
insulin he needs). 
 
1162 Id., at 283. 
 
1163 Id., at 298. 
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compensate. While there are numerous exceptions, the majority view is that no 
compensation is owed in such cases.1164 
Notice, however, that   
 ―[...] in the case of public necessity the explanation for not requiring 
compensation appears to rest on the idea that the actor who performs an act of 
public necessity thereby averts a public calamity; the actor as such gains no personal 
advantage from the situation, but the public at large does, while in situations of 
private necessity the actor or some other individual has benefited, not the public 
at large. Thus, it would be unfair to impose a duty of compensation on one who 
acts to avert a public disaster.‖1165 
          
 But once a few insights from public choice are grasped, it becomes clear that, in 
the sort of economic emergency cases I am dealing with, it is not true that the actor gains 
no personal advantage from the situation. Politicians deciding on the exception are 
subject to furious lobbying from powerful interest groups embarked on rent-seeking. 
Whatever the actual ―currency‖ in which emergency legal changes are bought,1166 the 
actors stand to gain from the decision (whether they end up with a net gain or a loss, all 
things considered, is a different matter). They are not public-spirited heroes who, with 
nothing to gain, run to destroy someone else‘s property (or their value) to avert a public 
calamity. The decision-making process itself is heavily influenced by those who might 
benefit from the destruction of other people‘s property rights. So the justification based 
                                                 
1164 See, e.g., John Alan Cohan, ―Private and Public Necessity and the Violation of Property Rights‖, 83 
N.D. L. Rev. 653, 691-731 (2007) (arguing that the majority view requires no compensation, although there 
are numerous exceptions, and analyzing the cases where compensation was denied and those where it was 
granted). See also George C. Christie, ―The Defense of Necessity Considered from the Legal and Moral 
Points of View‖, 48 Duke L. J. 975, 995 (1999) (―One should finally note that the public authorities also 
have a privilege to destroy property in order to save life or to deal with public emergencies, and are under 
no common law duty to pay compensation to the owner of the property when they exercise the priviege‖). 
 
1165 See John Alan Cohan, above n. 1164, at 733. 
 
1166 See Jonathan R. Macey, above n. 1110, at 156 (―The currency through which laws are bought and sold 




upon the supposed impartiality, lack of self-interest and public-regardingness of the 
emergency decision-maker trembles, if not falls altogether. 
 Moreover, the distinction between cases where property is taken for ―public use‖ 
and, thus, compensation is due, and cases where property is destroyed for ―public 
necessity‖, where there is no automatic duty to compensate, seems extremely artificial. It 
is even contradictory, as applied to the emergency rhetoric (at least in Argentina). If the 
justifications for economic emergency regulations are to be believed, it is hard to see 
what can be more constitutive of a ―public use‖ than controlling the crisis. And if 
property is taken for such reasons, then the only way to make (textual) sense of a takings 
clause such as the U.S. Constitution‘s Fifth Amendment, contrary U.S. Supreme Court 
caselaw notwithstanding, is to consider the clause applicable to such cases. The same 
happens with the Argentine Constitution‘s expropriations clause. 
An important detail that further reinforces the moral case for compensation is 
that sufferers from emergency decisions are usually small savers while beneficiaries are 
large companies and very wealthy individuals. The universe of bearers of the costs of 
controlling economic emergencies remains constant. It cannot be sound moral reasoning 
to hold that the relatively worst-off must repeatedly and exclusively bear the 
consequences of emergency regulation, to the benefit of powerful interest groups and, 
perhaps, of the community at large, and not be compensated.   
Finally, one must bear in mind that in cases of the sort I am analyzing in this 
dissertation, the State (who decides to destroy property, or its value) is often the direct 
beneficiary of the measures and, alternatively or cummulatively, an active part in the 
production of the emergency situation. Take the Peralta case, for instance. Let‘s recall the 
facts briefly. The State was indebted to the banks that, in turn, owed the deposits to their 
customers. The State had chosen to finance itself by forcibly borrowing the money of 
savers through banking regulations, thereby fuelling the mechanism that sent the so-
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called ―quasi-fiscal‖ deficit spiraling. The State bought itself time, and saved itself money, 
via the compulsory swap. Something similar occurred with the ―pesification‖ case. The 
State forcibly imposed some debt upon certain creditors.1167 The State promised bank 
depositors that their savings would be untouched, despite the ongoing crisis.1168 The State 
benefitted from the debasement —via ―pesification‖— of its dollar-denominated debt 
with the financial system as well as with other creditors.  
 To sum up, there are no good reasons to retain a judicial jurisprudence that fails 
to vindicate the Constitution‘s commitments to both property and equality. If measures 














                                                 
1167 See, e.g., Law 23,982 and 25,344 (―Debt Consolidation Laws‖) The full text of the Law 25,344 is 
available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/65000-69999/65053/texact.htm (last 
visited 02/15/2013).  
 




The Separation of Powers Game. 
 
a. The Deleterious Effects of the Economic Emergency Jurisprudence on 
Separation of Powers and Its Broader Implications. 
 The emergency powers doctrine is closely related to separation of powers 
concerns. Quite frequently, although not always, the doctrine relies on the exercise by the 
Executive Branch of powers reserved to the Legislative Branch by the Constitution.1169 
There is a general trend to expand Executive powers at the expense of Congressional 
powers. Although nothing particularly new, and in fact as old as constitutionalism 
itself,1170 this trend has gained considerable steam during the Twentieth Century.1171 
Constitutionalism in an age of speed, as William Scheuerman has aptly called it, puts the 
traditional separation of powers in tension.1172 
                                                 
1169 See, e.g., John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, above n. 31, at 210 (―In cases of an urgent threat to the 
state or regime, constitutions sometimes permit the delegation of powers to a president, or to some other 
constitutional authority, to issue decrees, to censor information, and to suspend legal processes and 
rights‖); Kanishka Jayasuriya, ―The Exception Becomes The Norm: Law and Regimes of Exception in 
East Asia‖, 2 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol'y J. 108, 109 (2001) (arguing that constitutional provisions in East Asia 
―give public authorities far-reaching power to suspend normal legal and political processes, in short, to 
exercise power through exceptional and executive prerogative power‖). 
 
1170  See, e.g., John Locke, above n. 33, at 74 (§159 and §160) (arguing for the exceptional executive 
prerogative to override the laws); Clement Fatovic, ―Constitutionalism and Presidential Prerogative: 
Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian Perspectives‖, 48 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 429, 431-433 (2004) (analyzing the ―theories 
of prerogative‖ before the enactment of the U.S. Constitution); John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, above 
n. 31, at 211 (2004) (―Emergency powers, exercised in this conservative way, have long been thought to be 
a vital and, perhaps, even an essential component of a liberal constitutional—that is, a rights-protecting—
government‖). 
 
1171 See William E. Scheuerman, above n. 640, at 1870 (―Politicians have probably always relied on the 
rhetoric of crisis to initiate legislative changes. In our century, however, they often have done so in order to 
abrogate, or even abandon, normal legislative procedures‖). Id., at 1890 (―[...] the growth of economic 
emergency powers is, fundamentally, a twentieth-century phenomenon‖). 
 
1172 See William E. Scheuerman, ―Liberal Democracy and the Empire of Speed‖, 34 Polity 41, 57 (2001) 
(―[...] legislatures are expected to do nothing less than react effectively to a multiplicity of rapid-fire changes 
in social and economic life while simultaneously maintaining fidelity to the traditional notion of its legitimacy 
as resting on wide-ranging forms of unhurried debate‖; emphasis in the original). 
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 The economic field is no exception to the trend. In fact, it may be especially 
susceptible to this tension.1173 It is a common feature of the past century that liberal 
democracies resorted to emergency institutions to control economic problems:1174 
 ―Although virtually unknown during the nineteenth century, the practice became 
a ubiquitous facet of political life during the interwar years in stable democracies 
[…] Most recently, emergency authority has served as an instrument to 
implement controversial neoliberal economic policies […] in many newly 
democratized countries‖1175 
 
 Argentina has been no exception to this worldwide trend, and the Supreme Court 
has moved from admitting emergency laws, under certain conditions, to allowing for 
emergency decrees. Perhaps the most salient feature of the decisions handed down during 
the period that I have called ―the times of permanent emergency‖ is the recognition of 
increasing presidential authority to control the successive economic crises1176 and, 
consequently, to redistribute as she sees fit. 
 In Peralta, the justices decided that emergency decrees are valid insofar as 
Congress, exercising its own constitutional powers, does not adopt a contrary position 
                                                 
1173 Id. (―[...] time-space compression means that legislatures increasingly operate in the context of a social 
and economic environment characterized by incessant change and innovation. The ever faster pace of 
social and economic life potentially conflicts with the conventional emphasis on the legislature's reliance on 
careful, wide-ranging, and time-consuming deliberative exchange. A misfit between the time and space 
horizons of legislative activity and of social and economic life may result‖). 
 
1174 See, e.g., Robert Higgs & Charlotte Twight, ―National Emergency and The Erosion of Private Property 
Rights‖, 6 Cato J. 747, 771 (1987) (arguing that ―[t]he history of the United States in the 20th century 
provides strong evidence that derogations from private property rights in a liberal democracy occur chiefly 
during national emergencies and that, once curtailed, private rights seldom regain their previous scope‖). 
 
1175 William E. Scheuerman, above n. 640, at 1870-1871. 
 
1176 See, e.g., Alejandro Pérez Hualde, ―‘Smith‘, o el final del sistema jurídico de la emergencia‖, 2002-B La 
Ley 969 (arguing that the period beginning in 1985 is characterized by the presidential management of the 
crises and the Court‘s validation of a ―system‖ of emergency norms). While Pérez Hualde characterizes the 
1980s as the decade of judicial transition to a state of ―permanent emergency‖, for reasons offered above, I 
argue that the ―times of permanent emergency‖ began at least two decades before. 
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on the economic policy issues at stake.1177 It thus equated Congressional silence to 
Congressional assent, subverting the constitutional procedure for enacting laws and 
displacing to Congress the burden of reaching consent to oppose the already-in-force 
decree.1178 Instead of the President being forced to gain consensus in the legislative 
branch in order to get his will enacted into law, Congress is forced to gain consensus to 
abrogate the President‘s will. As the 1994 Constitutional Convention explicitly rejected 
this aspect of Peralta‘s holding, the Court has thereafter adopted a very light test for 
legislative ratification of emergency decrees, admitting ―implicit‖ ratifications1179 and late 
ratifications through ―omnibus bills‖. 
 This judicial turn, modifying the Constitution‘s separation of powers, has had 
profound negative implications in three areas of constitutional concern: redistribution of 
wealth, democratic and republican transparency, and sociological legitimacy of courts and 
of legal norms.  
Arguably, the Supreme Court‘s current position has further reinforced already-
present tendencies to ―delegative democracy‖,1180 with its leanings towards monists 
conceptions of democracy1181 that are contrary to our constitutional text.1182 But, how 
                                                 
1177 313 Fallos 1513 (1990) (§24). 
 
1178 The Court‘s explicit admission of emergency decrees (decrees by reason of necessity and urgency) in 
Peralta sparkled the 1994 Constitutional Convention to reject explicitly some of the rulings‘ doctrines (i.e., 
the doctrine that equated Congressional silence to Congressional assent). However, by admitting 
emergency decrees without any explicit constitutional permission —and, arguably, against an implicit 
prohibition—, the Court likely enticed the Convention to regulate such decrees —instead of forbidding 
them or just not regulating them—. 
 
1179 327 Fallos 4495 (2004). 
 
1180 See Guillermo O‘Donnell, ―Delegative Democracy‖, 5 J. Democr. 59, 60-61 (1994) (characterizing 
delegative democracy as a system that rests on “the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is 
thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power 
relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office‖). 
 
1181
 For the distinction between ―monist‖ and ―dualist‖ democracies, See Bruce A. Ackerman, WE THE 
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 7-10 (Cambridge/London, Belknap/Harvard, 1991). 
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does this exactly affect redistributions? How come it distorts the republican and 
democratic value of transparency? By what mechanism can such jurisprudential stance 
affect the sociological legitimacy of courts? Shouldn‘t we be content with the fact that a 
democratically-accountable branch has the necessary authority to do whatever it takes to 
tame crises?  
Economic emergency often implies a situation of especially intense scarcity1183 
that puts pressure on existing entitlements and pushes towards some form of 
redistribution. Hence, it makes the concept of constitutionally-protected property 
contested and opens up legal space for re-arrangement of economic entitlements.1184 By 
unsettling the normal state of affairs as regards property, emergency opens a ―bubble‖ in 
the constitutional fabric and allows for a political re-shuffling of the ―economic 
cards‖.1185 These ―bubbles‖ are nothing but rent-seeking opportunities waiting to be 
taken by those in a position to do it. Naturally, relatively small groups with high stakes 
will be in a position to influence, sometimes decisively, the norm-production 
                                                                                                                                            
 
1182 Article 30 of the Constitution provides for a special amendment procedure, clearly different from the 
ordinary legislative process, Article 31 declares the Constitution to be the ―supreme law of the land‖, and 
Article 43 authorizes the judge deciding an amparo case to declare unconstitutional a law. Article 28, in turn, 
mandates that ―The principles, guarantees and rights recognized in the preceding articless shall not be 
altered by the laws that regulate their enforcement‖. 
 
1183 The Argentine Supreme Court defines the concept of emergency as an extraordinary situation that 
looms over the socio-economic order, disturbing it with an accumulated charge of scarcity, poverty, penury 
or indigence, and that creates a state of necessity that must be brought to an end. See, e.g., 313 Fallos 1513 
(1990) (§43). 
 
1184 See, e.g., Stephen R. Munzer, above n. 181, at 275 (arguing that there is an implicit constraint that 
follows property rights into the future: ―[w]hen plenty becomes scarcity, the rights can be diminished‖). 
 
1185 This re-shuffling of ―economic cards‖ should be limited, in principle, by the constitutional conception 
of property. Whether the results are consistent with such conception is irrelevant to the fact that there are 
opportunities for ―rent-seeking‖. As shown above with the example of the Peralta case, opportunities for 
redistribution may go well beyond what may be initially tolerable according to the popular conception of 
constitutional property.  
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process.1186Although it has been argued that the idea that special interest groups are 
generally decisive in the legislative process is ―a caricature‖,1187 my argument here does not 
need to make such a strong assertion. My claim is weaker: I only hold that in emergency 
situations special interest groups are very influential. The evidence I have provided points 
clearly in that direction. As emergencies raise the stakes, small, organized, and resourceful 
groups have stronger incentives to flex their muscles and give their all in the attempt to 
capture the benefits potentially provided by a favorable legislation.1188 In contrast, the 
politically-unorganized or unconnected, the relatively needy, the poor, are not in a good 
position to turn the legislative struggle in their favor. As a matter of fact, the rich and 
powerful may even have an interest in a jurisprudence that favors weak protection for 
property rights, as   
―[...] in many countries, rich agents are the main beneficiaries of weak protection 
of property rights, which allows them to gain from nonproductive activities such 
as rent-seeking or other redistributive activities by maintaining expropriation 
capabilities. In the absence of adequate public protection of property rights by 
the state, these rent-oriented agents can take control of a substantial share of the 
national economy‖1189 
 
                                                 
1186 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, above n. 79, at 19-20 (arguing that ―while any group can play the pluralist 
game, not all groups can organize and operate effectively [...] The groups that form, prosper, and wield 
significant political power are largely the traditional ‗special interests‘ that constantly seek legislative 
favor‖).  
 
1187 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, above n. 1108, at 68. 
 
1188 See, e.g., John Tomasi, above n. 71, at 252 (arguing that small variations in the way some important 
economic questions are settled sometimes have very great consequences for powerful businesses and 
special interest groups and that the more significant the economic issues that a regime places on the 
legislative agenda, the more significant the exposure of its citizens to political domination by such groups). 
See also Douglass C. North, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 87 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990) (arguing that ―To the degree that 
there are large payoffs to influencing the rules and their enforcement, it will pay to create intermediate 
associations (trade associations, lobbying groups, political action committees) between economic 
organizations and political bodies to realize the potential gains of political change. The larger the percentage of 
society’s resources influenced by government’s decisions (directly or via regulation), the more resources will be devoted to such 
offensive and defensive (to prevent being adversely affected) organizations‖; emphasis added). 
 
1189 Konstantin Sonin, above n. 1148, at 716 (2003) (using the case of the Russian oligarchs of the 1990s to 
prove the assertions in the text). 
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 James Buchanan‘s and Gordon Tullock‘s seminal work on what later came to be 
called ―public choice‖ provides some important guidance to keep building my argument. 
They put an emphasis on the fact that there is an inverse relationship between the costs 
of making a decision and the costs that such a decision could be expected to impose on 
individual members of the community.1190 The costlier to arrive at a decision, in 
accordance with the applicable decisionmaking rule, the lesser the costs an individual can 
expect from that decision. Such costs can be understood in terms of restrictions of rights 
through regulation. The basic idea is a very simple one: as the wills of more individuals 
are needed to take collective action, there are increasing chances that the interests of any 
given individual are represented, and her rights —or, more precisely, the interests 
protected by her rights— defended, by someone in the minimum effective coalition.1191  
Thus, more inclusive decisionmaking rules are better at protecting an individual‘s 
rights.1192 But they come at the cost of being more burdensome from the standpoint of 
taking collective action.1193 At the extreme, the rule that best protects an individual‘s 
rights is unanimity.1194 It is also extremely impractical, if the group making the decision is 
                                                 
1190 See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, above n. 1146, at 60-67 (introducing the external costs 
function and the decision-making costs function, and arguing that while the former decreases as the 
number of individuals required to agree increases, the opposite occurs with the latter). 
 
1191 Id., at 61 (―[...] as the number of individuals required to agree increases, the expected costs will 
decrease‖).  
 
1192 As a matter of fact, rights and votes (decisionmaking rules) are frequently understood as two often 
alternative —and sometimes complementary— ways of protecting the interests of a minority. See, e.g., 
Daryl J. Levinson, ―Righs and Votes‖, 121 Yale L. J. 1286, 1292-1293 (2012) (―Rights and votes appear as 
functional alternatives in a broad range of settings in which collective decisionmaking processes threaten 
the interests of minorities or other vulnerable groups‖). 
 
1193 James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, above n. 1146, at 65 (―As a collective decision-making rule is 
changed to include a larger and larger proportion of the total group, these costs may increase at an 
increasing rate‖). 
 
1194 Id., at 83 (―[...] if we assume that the total costs of organizing decision-making are absent, the external 
costs from collective action expected by the individual were shown to be minimized only when the rule of 
unanimity prevails —when all members of the group are required to agree prior to action‖). Other virtues 
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relatively sizeable, for any single person can veto any initiative.1195 Hence, the costs of 
arriving at a decision are potentially very high. At the other end of the spectrum, one 
finds the rule that allows any given individual to decide collective measures. Such a rule, 
which is highly unusual indeed,1196 can be expected to impose very high costs on 
individuals.1197 A less extreme decisionmaking rule grants one single individual, selected 
by any chosen procedure, the power to make collective decisions. We can call this ―the 
dictator‖ (or the ―monarch‖) rule.1198 Expected costs for individuals are, under such a 
rule, still very high.  
 Someone might well object that public choice does not really prove that more 
inclusive rules better protect individual rights: all it proves is that they better protect the 
status quo.1199 A well-meaning, unconstrained dictator, theoretically at least, could well 
                                                                                                                                            
are often attributed to unanimity as a voting rule. See Jules Coleman MARKETS, MORALS AND THE 
LAW 278 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988) (―Not without plausibility, advocates of 
unanimity have have argued that the unanimity rule is both efficient and strongly democratic‖); Robert A. 
Burt, above n. 64, at 45 (―Actual unanimity is, however, the only voting rule that consistently vindicates the 
democratic principles of equality and self-determination‖). 
 
1195 This entails, of course, significant problems. See, e.g., Jules Coleman, above n. 1194 at 284 (arguing that 
―[s]trategic behavior plagues unanimity and promotes inefficiency‖); James M. Buchanan & Gordon 
Tullock, above n. 1146, at 65 (―As unanimity is approached [...] Individual investment in strategic 
bargaining becomes highly rational‖); Roberto A. Burt, above n. 64, at 45 (―We know of course that 
unanimity as a formal voting rule is a paradoxically crippling requirement for social decisionmaking‖). 
 
1196 It is not easy to find examples of such a rule in the field of public law and, generally speaking, one 
should expect legislation to use it as means of discouraging undesirable situations. In the field of corporate 
law, Argentina has a regulation that resorts to such a rule: companies not regularly incorporated are subject 
to a regime where partners are bound by contracts entered into by any of them on behalf of the company 
(Articles 23 and 24, Law 19,550). As regards the specific field of public law, Buchanan and Tullock argue 
that a functional equivalent to such a rule operates when legislative bodies respond to popular demands for 
public services on the basis solely on ―needs‖ criteria as well as when governments provide divisible (or 
―private‖) goods and services to individuals without the use of pricing devices. See James M. Buchanan & 
Gordon Tullock, above n. 1146, at 63-64. 
 
1197 James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, above n. 1146, at 62-63. 
 
1198 Id., at 64. 
 
1199 See, e.g., Jules Coleman, above n. 1194, at 287 (arguing that unanimity rule, as a precondition of 
―constitutional contracts‖, depends ―on the justice or injustice of preconstitutional holdings‖ and thus ―we 
might remain agnostic about whether the conservative features of unanimity are a good or a bad thing‖). 
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improve upon a constrained legislature on the protection of individual rights. Depending 
on where the baseline for evaluating the level of protection of rights is drawn, more 
inclusive rules could be said to hinder improvements in the protection of rights. In fact, 
this is the core of a common argument left liberals frequently make against constitutional 
property rights. My rejoinder proceeds as follows.  
First, one should distinguish the discussion about what rights should receive 
constitutional protection from the discussion about what rules better protect rights we 
have previously decided to entrench in the Constitution. Whatever we think about 
property rights‘ merits to receive constitutional protection, once we have granted them 
such status, the argument about what rules better protect individual rights should not be 
affected by considerations regarding the, some would say, logically-prior discussion on 
the list of rights that should be included in a constitution. It might still be objected that 
arguments about the constitutional entrenchment of rights should not be all-or-nothing. 
There could be different levels of protection for different rights, according to which 
various decisionmaking rules would be better or worse at providing the adequate level of 
protection. For instance, it could be argued that mere rationality review is the appropriate 
level of constitutional protection for economic liberties generally. Notice that my general 
argument in this dissertation makes the case for rejecting a thin protection of property 
rights in emergency situations, from a variety of perspectives that should have broad 
ideological appeal. Those who care deeply about the popular will should give 
considerable weight to the evidence I have offered throughout Part One of this 
dissertation about the ―true countermajoritarian difficulty‖. Those concerned with long-
term economic growth per se should also be sympathetic to my claims. But even those 
                                                                                                                                            
See also Bruce Ackerman, ―Constitutional Economics—Constitutional Politics‖, 10 Const. Polit. Econ. 415, 
415 (1999) (arguing that ―[i]f preexisting power-holders do not have a just claim to their ‗entitlements‘, 
unanimity is no longer appropriate. To the contrary, it would be utterly wrong to allow the beneficiaries of 
injustice to veto any collective effort to stop them from enjoying the fruits of oppression‖). 
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concerned with the fate of the worst-off should be favorably disposed to my proposal of 
stronger judicial protection for constitutional property, for several reasons —some of 
which I have already discussed above. It is the relatively poor, needy, and politically 
disorganized or unconnected who have a lot at stake in the protection of property rights 
in emergency situations. Those at the very bottom (or the initial, lower steps) of the 
property ownership ladder are exposed to potentially large losses when emergency 
decisionmakers decide to distribute the costs of the crises. The rich and the wealthy can 
both influence the political process and diversify their risks so that whatever political 
outcomes are produced, they come out at least relatively unharmed, and frequently 
gainful.1200 This much, I think, has been shown by the evidence from the 1989 and 2001-
2002 crises. To borrow Charles Donahue, Jr.‘s terminology, ―property as power‖ plays 
the emergency game at the political level; it is ―property as security‖ that needs judicial 
solicitude.1201 
My second response is that the well-proved fact that people generally place a high 
value on the status quo, as discussed above in Chapter VI, provides firm grounds for 
preferring more inclusive rules when it comes to deciding how to protect individual 
rights. This is so, at least, in contexts where the status quo is not grossly unjust or 
                                                 
1200 For instance, companies and very wealthy individuals who made up almost half of the total stock of 
dollarized debt with the financial system in 2001 (see above n. 912) may have also been depositors in 
dollars in the Argentine banking system. While this is true, it is also true that they: 1) had access to 
international banking markets so they may have had substantial amounts of money in offshore banks (see 
above n. 1153); 2) had better access to information, so they could manage to take their deposits out of the 
system in time to avoid their ―pesification‖ (see above n. 901-905, 919-929 and accompanying text); 3) may 
have invested their dollar debt in assets that kept their value in dollars (see above n. 914, 917 and 
accompanying text); 4) may have invested their dollar debt in productive assets linked to the export sector, 
thus ensuring for themselves dollarized income in a context of devaluation of national currency and strong 
revaluation of the US dollar (see above n. 913); 5) even assuming that their deposits were ―pesified‖, they 
still benefited from the differential between ―pesification‖ of deposits (1,40 pesos, plus inflation adjustment, 
per dollar) and ―pesification‖ of loans (1 peso per dollar, plus inflation adjustment) (see above n. 791 and 
accompanying text). Even if some part of their assets were caught by the emergency measures, whatever 
losses they may have suffered are very likely to have been cancelled off by benefits reaped elsewhere in the 
emergency scheme. 
 
1201 See Charles Donahue, Jr., ―The Future of the Concept of Property Predicted from Its Past‖, in J. 
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, above n. 6, at 56-57. 
. 
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otherwise morally unbearable. Whatever the influences of interest groups in the process 
of arriving at the status quo,1202 once we are there, it has a value of its own.1203 People do 
not want to suffer losses. They want to make gains, but if given the choice between 
mathematically-equivalent alternative chances of losses and gains, they go for avoiding 
the potential losses at the expense of foregoing the prospective gains. In fact, 
constitutionalism is largely about ―slowing down‖ politics, and even the staunchest 
supporters of radical democracy acknowledge that, ―for the sake of politics, as well as for 
the sake of individual liberty, some things must be denied to politics‖.1204 What must be 
denied to politics, in this regard, is the substantial alteration of legitimate expectations 
formed around the rights of property. Hence, more inclusive rules, which will tend to 
protect the individual from potentially disturbing surprises derived from collective action 
in the sphere of economic rights, are justifiable from the standpoint of the individuals 
exposed to economic emergency regulations.1205  
                                                 
1202 See, e.g., Einer Elhague, ―Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Instrusive Judicial Review?‖, 101 
Yale L.J. 31, 93 (1991) (arguing against the justification of more intrusive judicial review on the basis that 
―[u]nder interest group theory, the laws embodied in the status quo are just as likely to reflect the past 
influence of organized interest groups as current legal changes are likely to reflect their present influence‖).  
 
1203 See Jeremy Waldron, above n. 20, at 174 (analyzing the moral value of the status quo as relates to 
property rights and claiming that property exhibits a particular ―normative resiliency‖ that is reflected in a 
―a range of cases in which the condemnation of an open taking as dishonest does not depend on any 
judgment on the justification of the property right in question‖). 
 
1204 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, above n. 12, at 168. Although not very specific as to what constitutes that 
some that must be denied to politics, Unger hints that ―they [the protected entitlements] should protect 
people against radical insecurities […] They should supply people with the economic and cultural 
equipment they need to define and execute their life projects‖, id., at 167. 
 
1205 See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, above n. 1146, at 78 (―The individual will anticipate 
greater possible damage from collective action the more closely the action amounts to the creation and 
confiscation of human and property rights. He will, therefore, tend to choose somewhat more restrictive 
rules for social choice-making in such areas of political activity [...] Constitutional prohibitions against 
many forms of collective intervention in the market economy have been abolished within the last three 
decades. As a result, legislative action may now produce severe capital losses or lucrative gains to separate 
individuals and groups. For the rational individual, unable to predict his future position, the imposition of 
some additional and renewed restraints on the exercise of such legislative power may be desirable‖). Id., at 
69-70 (―Property rights especially can never be defined once and for all, and there will always exist an area 
of quasi property rights, subject to change by action of the collective unit [...] the individual will foresee 
that collective action in this area may possibly impose very severe costs on him. In such cases, he will tend 
 366 
This does not mean that individuals may not choose to accept a redistribution of 
entitlements that impose costs on them. They might well do it,1206 and there is empirical 
evidence that individuals are frequently willing to enforce fairness at some personal 
cost.1207 My only point is that their rights will be better protected if more inclusive rules 
are in place, as there will be better chances that unwanted redistributions will not be 
forced upon them. They can always choose to accept them, if they regard the measures 
as fair.1208  
My last stepping-stone in the argument is that presidents have substantial 
incentives for encroaching upon individual rights during emergency situations. As Robert 
Higgs and Charlotte Twight have argued 
―[c]risis clearly alters the expected benefits and costs of curtailment of private 
rights on both sides of the political equation. A fearful public, ideologically 
                                                                                                                                            
to place a high value on the attainment of his consent, and he may be quite willing to undergo substantial 
decision-making costs in order to insure that he will, in fact, be reasonably protected against confiscation‖). 
 
1206 Id., at 279 (―Many collective projects are undertaken in whole or in part primarily because they do 
provide benefits to one groups of the people at the expense of other groups. These objectives may be quite 
legitimate ones, and they may be accepted as such by all, or nearly all, members of the community‖). See 
also Douglass C. North, above n. 4, at 85 (acknowledging that there are ―occasions in which people are 
willing to engage in substantial sacrifices for their ideas and ideals‖ and that ―the degree to which people 
feel strongly about their ideological views, may frequently lead them to engage in very substantial sacrifices, 
and such sacrifices have played a major role throughout history‖). 
 
1207 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler, ―Fairness and the Assumptions of 
Economics‖, 59 J. Bus. S285, S299 (1986) (studies ―demonstrate the willingness of people to enforce 
fairness at some cost to themselves‖).  Still, as the evidence I have provided in this dissertation shows, 
there seems to be a significant quantitative difference between the costs that individuals accept in 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler‘s studies and the costs that economic emergency measures frequently 
impose upon them. Furthermore, there seems to be a significant qualitative difference as well, as 
emergency measures often imply incredibly disruptive intrusions upon the lives of the regulated individuals 
(see above n. 811-891 and accompanying text). This is certainly not the case with the studies cited in this 
footnote. 
 
1208 Notice that the institutional form that the most inclusive rule I will deal with adopts, the one whose 
results approximate most the actual operation of the unanimity rule, is one that requires a majority of 
Congress to pass on legislation dealing with economic emergency and then subjects such legislative 
products to judicial review by independent courts not applying ultra deferential standards of review. As 
judicial review in Argentina, as in the U.S., is diffuse and with inter partes effects, any individual who 
believes that emergency measures, as enacted by Congress, are fair and should be applied, can opt not to 
litigate against the measures, thereby avoiding judicial review and settling, in her particular case, for a less 
inclusive decisionmaking rule. 
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predisposed to believe in the efficacy of governmental action, insists that the 
government ‗do something‘ to diminish the threat, perceiving the benefits of such 
action to be immediate and direct and the costs to be remote and largely external. 
This public perception is nurtured by those who, for material or ideological 
reasons, would use the occasion to further their economic or political aims. From 
a cost-benefit perspective, governmental officials experience reduced political 
costs and increased political benefits from curtailing private rights in crisis as 
compared to non-crisis conditions.‖1209 
 
 Summing up, we have a very basic theoretical framework that, first, finds that 
more inclusive decisionmaking rules will tend to protect rights better and, 
correspondingly, less inclusive rules will generally provide less protection; second, poses 
that emergencies create incentives for governments to regulate private property rights in 
especially intrusive ways; and, third, predicts that powerful special interest groups will be 
very active in lobbying the emergency decisionmaker, potentially producing regressive 
redistributions. 
 How does the Argentine Supreme Court case law come out after confronting 
these basic theoretical insights? Legislative procedures in Argentina, as per the 
Constitution, embody a bi-cameral majority rule. The Supreme Court‘s dominant stance, 
which admits the validity of emergency decrees without a clear legislative ratification and 
adopts a rather deferential approach when it comes to assessing the substance of the 
emergency norms, implies the adoption of the ―dictator‖ decisionmaking rule. Quod 
pricipii placuit, legis habet vigorem. What pleases the prince, it has the force of law. The theory 
predicts that such a position will impose substantial costs on the rights of individuals. It 
also predicts that a rule that demanded the intervention of Congress for any regulation of 
constitutional rights would provide a substantially higher level of protection to individual 
rights. Last, but not least, a rule that, in addition to Congress‘ intervention, allowed for 
                                                 
1209 See Robert Higgs & Charlotte Twight, above n. 1174, at 771. 
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judicial review granting no special deference to legislative enactments would likely 
provide higher protection. The evidence confirms the theoretical predictions. 
 Let us take the last two great economic crises as the focus of our attention. 
During the implementation of the ―Bonex Plan‖ there were ferocious struggles for more 
favorable portions of the pie that was being distributed (be it gains or losses). Large 
companies attempted to liquefy their debts by pressing the Executive to force the banks 
to take Bonex in payment of the companies‘ debts. Banks managed to get the Executive 
to rid them of their obligation to pay interest to their depositors during the banking 
holiday, thus saving a not inconsiderable amount of money, approximately 200 million 
dollars.1210 The average depositors had no one to lobby on their behalf. Still, it is 
interesting to notice that President Menem could not get Congress to ratify explicitly the 
compulsory conversion of bank deposits. Despite the fact that Congress had recently 
ratified two emergency decrees issued as part of the emergency legal scheme,1211 it did not 
ratify the decree 36/90. It was the Court that, adopting a very deferential stance,1212 
upheld the measure and closed any further discussion on the topic. 
The ―dictator‖ rule, validated by the Court in Peralta, imposed substantial costs 
on bank depositors, costs that Congress refused to impose itself. Arguably, Congress 
implicitly accepted the President‘s actions in regard to bank deposits, as it later passed a 
                                                 
1210 See above n. 686-687 and accompanying texts. 
 
1211 On September, 25, 1989, Congress passed the ―Economic Emergency Law‖ under the number 23,697. 
Article 38 ratified two then-recent emergency decrees dealing with internal public debt (emergency decrees 
377/1989 —which provided for an exchange of debt consolidation bonds for a new bond— and 
570/1989 —partially amending the former—). Full text of the Law 23,697 is available at 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-4999/15/norma.htm (last visited 02/21/2013). 
 
1212 313 Fallos 1513 (1990) (majority opinion, §54) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to economic 
emergency measures and arguing that such rejection ― […] does not mean that […] the rights of those who 
claim to have been affected […] should not be taken into account, but it must be accepted that [their 




law creating a tax exemption for holders of the bonds.1213 But there is a substantial 
difference between an explicit ratification of the Presidential decree and an implicit 
acceptance of a fait accompli. Especially, when the implicit acceptance comes in the form 
of a measure that aimed at ameliorating the situation of those affected by the emergency 
decree. It is one thing to say that a majority of both Chambers decided that the 
involuntary bondholders created by presidential decree would enjoy a tax exemption; and 
it is a different thing altogether to hold that a majority of Congress decided that bank 
depositors (and other creditors of the State) would be transformed into involuntary 
bondholders. One measure may have well received a majoritarian support that the other 
has not. For whatever reasons, the opposition in Congress did not muster the necessary 
majority to abrogate the emergency decree. But that is something very different thing 
from Congress approving of the measure by the same majorities. Obviously, one cannot 
conclude on the latter, simply because Congress decided to exempt those affected by the 
decree from certain taxes. We don‘t really know what Congress would have done 
regarding a bill with the same content of the emergency decree 36/90, had it been given 
the opportunity by, say, a Supreme Court minimalist ruling that rejected the decree on 
separation of powers grounds. Perhaps all those deputies and senators who came out 
criticizing the Bonex Plan1214 would have voted for it. But one thing is clear: depositors 
would have stood a better chance than they did at the hands of the sole decisionmaker, 
the president.  
Some low-profile instances of judicial review provided additional protection for 
certain especially vulnerable depositors. After the worst of the crisis had passed, the 
                                                 
1213 See, e.g., Alejandro Pérez Hualde, above n. 1176. Article 16 of the Law 23,871 exempted from the all 
taxes the first sale of Bonex 89 made by those who received them as a consequence of the compulsory 
conversion mandated by the Executive Branch.  The full text of the law is available at 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-4999/271/norma.htm (last visited 02/20/2013). 
 
1214 See above n. 701-704 and accompanying text.  
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justices denied review in a series of cases that basically expanded the universe of cases 
excluded from the compulsory swap,1215 protecting the property of the relatively weak 
and poor, even if the cases were —arguably— indistinguishable from Peralta and, clearly, 
were not included in the exemptions established by the emergency regime itself. In 
García1216 and Olivera,1217 a majority of seven justices denied review of decisions that had 
interpreted emergency decree 591/90 as establishing not strict and limited exemptions to 
the conversion but mere guiding principles that allowed for judicial creation of other 
causes of exclusion. Therefore, they affirmed decisions that exempted ―savings of a 
whole life, the fruits of the work and efforts of many years, destined to support‖ the 
plaintiff and her family,1218 and a severance payment received in July 1989 and destined to 
the purchase of a taxi vehicle that was to become the plaintiff‘s livelihood.1219 In Tisera1220 
the lower court had struck down emergency decree 591/90, on equality grounds, for 
                                                 
1215 Depositors who were 75 or older were exempted from the ―Bonex plan‖ after a well-known tango 
composer, Enrique Cadícamo, sent a personal letter to president Menem, complaining about the injustice 
of applying the compulsory conversion to the elderly. Cadícamo was 91 years old at the time. Menem 
exempted Cadícamo from the plan, and later issued Emergency Decree 591/1990 (April, 4, 1990), 
generalizing the exemption. The same decree provided for other exemptions, such as severance payments 
received after December, 1, 1989. See, e.g., ―No les devolvieron ayer a los ancianos los plazos fijos‖, Clarín, 
April, 17, 1990, at 10 (explaining the contents of Emergency Decree 591/1990); ―La bronca de Menem y 
González no alcanzó para cobrar la plata‖, Página/12, April, 19, 1990, at 4 (same). 
 
1216 316 Fallos 176 (1993). 
 
1217 316 Fallos 184 (1993). 
 
1218 316 Fallos 184 (1993) (Barra, Nazareno, JJ., dissenting from denial of review, §2) (explaining the facts of 
the case). 
 
1219 316 Fallos 176 (1993) (Barra, Nazareno, JJ., dissenting from denial of review, §2) (explaining the facts of 
the case). Emergency Decree 591/90 had exempted from the compulsory conversion severance payments 
received after December, 1, 1989, on the alleged basis that the short time until the conversion allowed to 
presume that the depositor had only resorted to the fixed-term deposit to protect himself from inflation 
and not to engage in speculative deals. See 319 Fallos 925 (1996) (Fayt, J., dissenting, §4) (summarizing the 
arguments of the State in the brief urging reversal of the decision). 
 
1220 319 Fallos 925 (1996). 
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limiting the exemption of the compulsory conversion only to amounts originated in 
severance payments that had been deposited on December, 1, 1989, or thereafter. The 
Court refused to review the decision. Finally, in Zuccotti,1221 a late unpublished 6-to-1 
decision, the Supreme Court let stand a decision that had excluded from conversion 
small deposits that exceeded 1,000,000 australes, by engaging —once again— in an 
expansive interpretation of the exemptions introduced by the emergency decree 591/90 
and disregarding the explicit limit set by emergency decree 36/90.1222 Although it is 
arguable that the effects of these decisions in the real world were marginal at best,1223 it 
remains true that more inclusive decisionmaking rules1224 provided (or would have 
provided) better protection. 
During the 2001-2002 crisis, there was another bloody battle over the 
distribution of the costs of coming out of the ―Convertibility‖ regime. This time the 
depositors were a more active and organized furious protests that, undoubtedly, must 
                                                 
1221 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, Z. 39. XXIII, 10/05/1995, Zuccotti, Marta Cristina et al. v. PEN, 
(available at http://www.csjn.gov.ar/cfal/fallos/cfal3/cons_fallos.jsp; last visited 01/10/2012; direct link: 
http://ar.vlex.com/vid/-39595392; last visited 01/12/2012). 
 
1222 See Zuccotti (Fayt, J., dissenting, §7) (attacking the lower court decision for disregarding the explicit limit 
set by the Emergency Decree 36/90). 
 
1223 It is hard to say how significant these judicial interventions were in the real world. There is a certain 
degree of endogenity in the whole set of actions: it is very likely that the Court was able to let lower court 
decisions stand because the number of similar cases actually litigated was not very high. Indeed, the Court 
itself had discouraged further litigation with its prompt and sweeping decision in Peralta. Otherwise, such 
an attitude on the Court‘s part would have undermined its own prior decision upholding the ―Bonex plan‖ 
and, depending on the timing of the decisions and other factors, could have compromised the viability of 
the emergency scheme. Unlikely as it may seem in the Argentine context, it is not impossible to think that 
the justices did that to defend some higher principles, such as equality in the share of public burdens. But 
at any rate such a move would have called for an explicit and well-argued decision, not just a series of mute 
(and mostly late) denials of review which, had it not been for the occasional dissent, would have likely been 
overlooked. Still, these decisions were significant for those who kept of litigating after Peralta and as a 
signal to lower courts that protecting small depositors would be tolerated. 
 
1224 A rule that provides for meaningful judicial review of either Congressional or Executive actions is, 
obviously, more inclusive than one which does not, as it requires gathering greater consensus in order for a 
legal norm to have actual effects in particular cases. The agreement of the judges sitting in the reviewing 
court must be secured before any measure under review has definitive effects on the parties. 
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have had some not insignificant political effect. Still, they had no direct channels to the 
authorities, who had their ears divided between the privatized utilities companies, the 
banks, the so-called ―Productive Group‖ (mainly, large industrials and farmers linked to 
the export sector, who pushed for ―pesification‖ of their dollar debts —which would 
liquefy the loans they had taken to modernize their productive structures— and a high 
exchange rate —which would multiply the domestic value of their prospective dollarized 
income—).1225 As Roberto Lavagna, a former Minister of Economy under both Duhalde 
and Kirchner, has publicly acknowledged the Executive Branch (and, in particular, the 
Ministry of Economy) routinely received highly-elaborated, ready-for-application decree 
projects from regulated sectors, which only needed signing to enter into force.1226 Such 
lobbies were pretty effective in getting the regular guy on the street that had small bank 
deposits to subsidize their enrichment in the after-crisis scenario.  
Notice, however, that while the Executive decided to simply ―pesify‖ bank 
deposits at an exchange rate that was very unlikely to keep the purchasing power of the 
funds,1227 and that at some points it deprived depositors of more than 50% of their 
wealth, Congress did not ―pesify‖ bank deposits and explicitly instructed the Executive 
to preserve the savers‘ capital, including savings in foreign currency.1228 In other words, 
the President went for a ―haircut‖ to small and medium bank depositors to subsidize 
(mostly) large debtors; Congress chose to embrace a ―deferment of maturities‖ scheme 
                                                 
1225 See above n. 911 and accompanying text. 
 
1226 María Angélica Gelli, CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA NACIÓN ARGENTINA COMENTADA Y 
CONCORDADA 84, fn. 41 (Buenos Aires, Editorial La Ley, 2004) (quoting former minister Roberto 
Lavagna). 
 
1227 Article 2, Executive Decree 214/02. 
 
1228 Article 6, Law 25,561. 
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and to subsidize only certain kinds of smaller debtors who, arguably, could not have 
possibly made payments in dollars. 
Despite the fact that Kirchner supported ―pesification‖ of bank deposits, and 
that he was a powerful president by 2004, Congress refused to ratify emergency decree 
214/02, not once but twice,1229 and only came to accept it as a fait accompli after a plurality 
of the Court had given ―pesification‖ its constitutional blessing in late 2004.1230 
Interestingly, it had indeed ratified all emergency decrees that had offered depositors 
dollarized state bonds in exchange for their ―pesified‖ deposits, but it had not come to 
terms with plain ―pesification‖.1231 
When debating the Emergency Law 25,561, the rapporteur of the Committee in 
the Chamber of Deputies, Deputy Jorge R. Matzkin put forward Congress‘ views:1232 
                                                 
1229 When the Executive sent to Congress the Budget Bills for 2003 and 2004, it included a provision by 
which Congress ratified the emergency decree that ―pesified‖ the economy (214/02). Significantly, in both 
cases Congress excluded decree 214/02 from the ratifying provision finally enacted (which, incidentally, 
did ratify other emergency decrees). See Article 62, Law 25,725 (available at 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/80000-84999/81258/norma.htm; last visited 
02/20/2013) and Article 71, Law 25,827 (available at 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/90000-94999/91229/norma.htm; last visited 
02/21/2013). 
 
1230 See Article 64, Law 25,967 (available at http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/100000-
104999/102049/norma.htm; last visited 02/21/2013). See also Emilio Ibarlucía, above n. 875, at 151-152. 
 
1231 See Article 71, Law 25,827 (available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/90000-
94999/91229/norma.htm; last visited 02/21/2013) (ratifying emergency decrees 905/02, 1836/02 and 
739/03). 
 
1232 There are a number of well-known problems in the idea of constructing the intentions or views of 
collective organisms into a single, unified intention or view. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, above n. 68, at 315-
316, 318-320. One way of avoiding such troubles is to assume that the considered views of one determined 
individual, as recorded on official transcripts, represents the view of Congress. The Argentine Supreme 
Court resorts to such an interpretive canon on occasion and gives the views of rapporteurs of Committees 
special weight. See, e.g., 333 Fallos 993 (2010) ("It must be assumed that the parliamentary committees 
study the issues that they deal with in a thorough and careful way, both as to their form and substance [...] 
their oral and written reports are more valuable than the general debates of Congress or the individual 
opinions of legislators [...] that is why in the face of differences of opinion [regarding a legislative or 
constitutional text] the will expressed by those who submitted the bill for consideration by the remaining 
members of Parliament must prevail‖); 319 Fallos 3208 (1996) (Petracchi, J., dissenting, §6) (when a legal 
text is ambiguous the interpreter should ―resort to the statements made by the reporting member when 
[she] explained [the text‘s] meaning to the legislature [...] This principle of interpretation is based on the 
least two reasons. On one hand, on the assumption that the opinions of the rapporteurs [of the 
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―[t]he last paragraph of Article 6, dealing with the situation of those who are 
[trapped] in the 'corralito', intends to say that there will be restructurings that it will 
be necessary to make, primarily of the time terms and, eventually, of the interest 
rates. The central objective the paragraph is to ratify, by law, the will of Congress 
in the sense that these deposits will be returned in the currency in which were 
made‖1233 
 
Opposition Deputy Leopoldo G. Moreau, among several other representatives, 
also put emphasis in the restitution of savings in dollars: 
―[s]urely these days we have all received the concerns and pleas from many savers 
who wonder what‘s going to happen to their savings. The truth is that with this 
regime [we are enacting] we have the chance of salvaging them. I say this because 
if we didn‘t take this path —that of partial ‗pesification‘ and the establishment of 
export duties on fuel— the difference arising from the ‗pesification‘ of dollar 
debts would have to be financed with other tools [...] we all know there aren‘t 
many tools available in the real economy. One of them could be a ‗haircut‘ on the 
amounts belonging to savers, in order to finance that difference. Thus, we would 
be benefitting debtors, but hurting savers. In addition, we would jeopardize the 
future return of deposits, because [such a measure] would make bank deposits 
disappear. But that‘s not what we are to do, because that would be unfair. So this 
is a step that strengthens the possibility that, in time, those savings can be 
returned in the currency originally agreed upon, as we are not putting them at risk 
with this proposal‖.1234 
 
Interestingly, the Economic Emergency bill that the Executive sent to Congress 
did have a provision such as the one included as part of article 6 of the enacted law, 
prescribing the protection of the savers‘ capital. However, when the bill was to be voted, 
that very important sentence had seemingly disappeared from the bill.1235 Deputy 
                                                                                                                                            
committees] are the result of a thorough and careful study of the issues they deal with and, on the other, on 
the assumption that such members represent the will of the legislators who passed such laws‖). 
 
1233 Deputy Matzkin was answering a question by Deputy (for Buenos Aires) Pascual Cappelleri, who asked 
him to clarify whether the projected text of article 6, which spoke of ―restructuring the original obligations 
in a way that is compatible with the evolution of the financial system‘s solvency‖, meant that total 
amounts, maturities, or interest rates could be modified. See Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados 
de la Nación, January, 5, 2002 (taquigraphic version available at 
http://www.diputados.gov.ar/secparl/dtaqui/versiones/; last visited 02/20/2013). 
 
1234 See Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, January, 5, 2002 (taquigraphic version 




Graciela Ocaña, along with other opposition deputies, demanded that the text in 
question was included in the bill to be voted: 
―We notice with concern the difference between the draft that we got yesterday 
and the version that was introduced into Parliament today, which does not 
include article 6. [Such provision] recognized, although in general terms, the 
return of bank deposits and the preservation of their value, both in dollars and in 
pesos. This promise is not present in the project entered this afternoon in the 
Chamber of Deputies. The ARI [political party] is proposing [...] that this 
statement is included again in the articles [...] We also want that savers have, if 
not a strict timetable for the repayment of their deposits, at least the certainty 
that such deposits will be returned to them‖1236 
 
Not even when the Kirchner administration controlled Congress, in late 2003,1237 
did it manage to have ―pesification‖ of bank deposits confirmed. Notice that Law 25,820, 
amending Emergency Law 25,561, stated that the protection of the saver‘s capital 
provided for by Article 6 of said Law could be implemented through voluntary 
conversions of deposits into state bonds.1238 Congress held fast to the idea of preserving 
the depositor‘s dollars, while the Executive went for the simple ―haircut‖ alternative, 
through ―pesification‖.  
Right after the San Luis ruling, striking down ―pesification‖ of bank deposits in 
2003, the Executive issued emergency decree 739/03, which offered the holders of term 
deposits forcibly restructured and ―pesified‖ the option of receiving a new, free short-
                                                                                                                                            
 
1236 Id. Later Deputy Rafael González replied Ocaña‘s accusation and held that the project under debate did 
include the provision in question. 
 
1237 See Mark P. Jones & Juan Pablo Micozzi, ―Control, concertación, crisis y cambio: cuatro C para dos K 
en el Congreso Nacional‖, in Andrés Malamud & Miguel De Luca (eds.), LA POLÍTICA EN TIEMPOS 
DE LOS KIRCHNER 52-53, 59-61 (Buenos Aires, Eudeba, 2011) (arguing that once Kirchner took office, 
the Peronist party‘s first minority in the Chamber of Deputies didn‘t take long to align with the 
administration —it already controlled 60% of the Senate— and that after the 2003 elections the 
administration effectively enjoyed an absolute majority in both Chambers —50% in Deputies and 57% in 
the Senate—). 
 
1238 See Article 2, Law 25,820 (full text available at 




term deposit in pesos equivalent to roughly the 67% of the then-current free market 
value of the original dollar deposit, plus a 10-year maturity State bond in dollars to cover 
for the additional 33%.1239  
This evidence hints that the theory is accurate. More inclusive rules provided 
higher levels of protection for property rights. We can sketch three very simple 
alternative decisionmaking rules, in increasing order of inclusiveness: a ―dictator‖-like 
rule, which would give the President the final say on the bank deposits‘ fate; a bi-cameral 
majority rule, which would put the final decision on Congress; and a non-deferential 
judicial review rule, which would require —in addition to the intervention of the elective 
branches— the constitutional validation of a Supreme Court not bent on adopting 
stances so deferential that amount to no review at all. Of course, the last rule admits of 
two variants: permissive legality review and stringent legality review. These alternatives 
differ on how seriously the reviewing court takes the task of enforcing separation of 
powers provisions. 
The least inclusive rule, which allowed for relatively unconstrained Executive 
decisionmaking, imposed on depositors an immediate and definitive loss that at some 
points reached 50% of their asset‘s value,1240 plus the harms derived from the temporary 
freezing of funds.1241 A noticeably more inclusive rule that demanded Congressional 
                                                 
1239 See above n. 932. 
 
1240 See above n. 995 and accompanying text. 
 
1241 After deciding the full ―pesification‖ of bank deposits through Emergency Decree 214/02, the 
Executive amended and kept in place a restructuring scheme for ―pesified‖ deposits, extending complete 
restitution of deposits over a maximum of 42 months, with different monthly repayment installments 
schemes depending on the amount of the original deposit. Larger deposits were subject to longer schemes, 
with repayments beginning later as well. See Executive Decree 141/02 (full text available at 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-74999/71742/norma.htm; last visited 
02/21/2013) and Ministry of Economy Resolution 46/2002 (full text available at 




approval would have imposed, at most, temporary losses derived from deferment of 
maturities, in one form or another.1242 An even more inclusive rule, which required the 
validation of a neutral Supreme Court, allowed for the possibility of immediate release of 
funds, through injunctions, for truly needy depositors in dire personal circumstances,1243 
and preserved the savers‘ capital while allowing them to recover a substantial portion of 
their assets in relatively short terms.1244 While the Court adopted the stringent legality 
review variant, and explicitly invited Congress to address the issues raised in the case 
through general legislation that respected the boundaries set forth by the ruling,1245 
Congress did not pick up the gauntlet and let the Executive keep on maneuvering. 
                                                 
1242 Recall that Article 6 of the Law 25,561 only provided for restructing the depositors‘ credits against the 
banks, preserving their capital. Article 2 of the Law 25,820 insisted on the protection of the savers‘ capital 
through dollar-denominated state bonds. The initial restructuring scheme, done by the Executive pursuant 
to the delegation contained in Article 2 of the Law 25,561, extended restitution of bank deposits in dollars 
up to a maximum of 35 months (depending on the deposit‘s size), with 24 monthly repayment installments 
beginning in December 2003 for the least-favored deposits (those of over 30,000 dollars). Smaller deposits 
received a more favorable treatment, with deposits of up to 5,000 dollars (which, remember, made up 48% 
of all deposits subject to ―pesification‖) being subject to a repayment scheme of 12 months, beginning in 
January 2003. See Delegated Decree 71/2002 (full text available at 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-74999/71543/norma.htm; last visited 
02/21/2013) and Ministry of Economy Resolution 23/2002 (full text at 
http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-74999/71820/norma.htm; last visited 
02/21/2013). 
 
1243 See, e.g., U., P.M., 325 Fallos 8 (2002) (where the Court rejected a per saltum appeal filed by a bank 
against an injunction that ordered to give back the funds deposited by a couple of retirees where the wife 
suffered Alzheimer, had no medical coverage, and the husband had attempted suicide in the face of the 
emergency measures); Amezaga, 325 Fallos 46 (2002) (similar decision); Montalto, 325 Fallos 376 (2002) 
(same decision, in a case where the depositor suffered from a ―serious hereditary disease‖ and would need 
―lung transplant‖); González de Giadone, 325 Fallos 370 (2002) (rejecting a per saltum against an injunction that 
had ordered the release of the dollarized deposit of an 88-year old woman); Zanini de Landi, 2002-C La Ley 
363 (same, with an 89-years-old woman); S.M., M.I., 2002-C La Ley 366 (2002) (rejecting a per saltum appeal 
by the Central Bank against an injunction that had ordered the release of the dollar deposits of a woman 
whose son suffered from a serious cancer condition and needed expensive medical treatment); Alonso, 325 
Fallos 822 (2002) (same in a case involving a depositor suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis). 
 
1244 As noted above, Executive Decree 739/03, issued shortly after the San Luis decision gave depositors 
the option of receiving short-term deposits (the longest term was 120 days from the date of option) in pesos 
for approximately 67% of the free market value of the dollars originally deposited and the rest in dollarized 
State bonds with a ten year maturity term. This option implied the almost immediate availability of two-
thirds of the funds as well as the full recovery of the remaining third, plus interests, in the long-term. 
 




As seen here, less inclusive rules as the ones embodied in many Supreme Court 
landmarks rulings of the most recent crises often involve substantial costs in terms of 
rights‘ curtailments. Additionally, such rules are prone to bring about regressive 
redistributions, as the heaviest burdens (at least those directly associated with concrete 
emergency measures) are largely put upon the shoulders of relatively poor (or otherwise 
needy) individuals.  
The jurisprudential stance in question also has negative effects upon the 
democratic and republican value of transparency. By abdicating its role as custodian of 
the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers, the Supreme Court allows for the 
politics of obscurity, where public officers who are supossed to make the emergency 
decisions cannot realistically be held accountable, hence discouraging the ethics of 
responsibility.  
Let us recapitulate a bit the situation during the 2001-2002 crisis. The electorate 
had not voted for the ―pesification‖ of deposits; rather, it had opposed it.1246 The 
president, though he had promised voters that he would create a framework of 
―negotiation‖ for the return of deposits,1247 covertly pressed the Court to obtain its 
support for ―pesification‖ and sent to Congress omnibus bills including the ratification 
of emergency decree 214/02. Congress had promised, not once but three times, that 
deposits would not be ―pesified‖,1248 and refused to ratify the decree,1249 while winking to 
                                                 
1246 See above n. 846 and accompanying text. 
 
1247 See above n. 850 and accompanying text. 
 
1248 See Law 25,466 (―Intangibility of Deposits Act‖); Law 25,561 (Article 6); Law 25,820 (Article 2). 
 
1249 See above n. 875 and accompanying text. 
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the Court and the Executive (Law 25,820),1250 all in a sort of game of "throwing the stone 
and then hiding the hand", subtracting the issue from public debate as much as possible 
and trying to avoid any political responsibility.  
When the Court accepts ―tacit‖ ratifications (through congressional silence, as in 
Peralta) or ―implicit‖ ratifications (through ratification of related, albeit different, 
measures, as in Bustos), it unconstitutionally releases Congress from its duties of 
deliberating and deciding, before the eyes of the public, what is to be done. 
Representatives are left off the hook just too easily. It is virtually impossible to know 
whom to hold responsible, except perhaps for the President. When ratification comes in 
the form of an omnibus bill —usually, a budget bill—, there is no substantial deliberation 
on the provisions that ratify the Executive measures. Media coverage focuses on the 
main provisions of the bill, like the budget. Legislative records scarcely show any 
discussions of the ratified decrees. Finding out who voted for what, and for what 
reasons, becomes a Herculean task. But even if a stubborn voter attempts to get himself 
out of his rational ignorance and, after investing time and money in his investigative 
efforts, succeeds in finding some information on the ratification issue, it will be the odd 
case, unlikely to bring any kind of political retribution. The regular person will not even 
know if Congress did anything on the substantive issue and, if it did, what it did. Much 
less will she be able to find out why Congress did what it did. 
Just to exemplify, when the emergency decree 214/02 —the one that completely 
―pesified‖ the economy— was ratified by Congress three years later, through Law 25,967 
(the 2005 Budget Act), only three deputies (out of 257) and four senators (out of 72) 
                                                 
1250 The ―wink‖ consisting in amending Article 6 of the Law 25,561 (by Article 2 of the Law 25,820) in the 
sense of interpreting that the mandate to preserve the depositors‘ capital could be complied with through 
the offer of state bonds. Thus, Congress may be interpreted as suggesting the Court, which had just ruled 
straight ―pesification‖ unconstitutional, a solution not unlike the one validated in Peralta. 
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talked and made any references whatsoever to the ratification issue.1251 Interestingly 
enough, all references were negative.1252 Deputies Zamora and Rodríguez Saá denounced 
Congress for embracing a politics of obscurity. Zamora said: 
―[t]he Chamber of Deputies should have announced in the frontpage of the 
newspapers that it will ratify the decree, [it should have] told the people that it 
will validate an immoral, unconstitutional, illegal and unfair action, [it shoud have 
taken] responsibility with courage and bravery if it really believes that [the 
ratification] is positive‖.1253 
 
Rodríguez Saá, in a similar vein, argued that he  
―[...] would like to see if Congress dares to discuss [the ratification of pesification] 
before the eyes of the savers, of the middle class that lost years of hard work so 
that a foreign or national bank gets to keep [the middle class‘] money‖1254 
 
                                                 
1251 See Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, November 3, 2004 (taquigraphic 
version available at http://www.diputados.gov.ar/secparl/dtaqui/versiones/; last visited 02/20/2013 
(containing mentions to the ―pesification‖ issue by Deputies Zamora, Rodríguez Saa, and L‘Huillier) and 
Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, November, 24, 2004 (taquigraphic version 
available at 
http://www.senado.gov.ar/web/taqui/cuerpo1.php?anio=2004&pal1=&pal2=&operador=and, last 
visited 03/16/2013) (containg mentions to the ―pesification‖ issue by Senators Salvatori, Gómez Diez, 
López Arias, and Ibarra).  
 
1252 See Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, November 3, 2004 (taquigraphic 
version available at http://www.diputados.gov.ar/secparl/dtaqui/versiones/; last visited 02/20/2013 
(Deputy L‘Huillier held that ―`[the bill] intends to legalize pesification in violation of the National 
Constitution‖; Deputy Rodríguez Saá opposed the bill and argued that it intended to ―validate the 
pesification‖ and accused the State of being an ―accomplice‖ of the banks; Deputy Zamora opposed the 
bill arguing that the decree was ―ignominious‖,  that he had filed criminal charges against former President 
Duhalde for issuing it, and that the ratification was a fraud against the savers and in violation of the 
Emergency Law 25,561 that guaranteed the respect of the saver‘s capital); Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara 
de Senadores de la Nación, November, 24, 2004 (taquigraphic version available at 
http://www.senado.gov.ar/web/taqui/cuerpo1.php?anio=2004&pal1=&pal2=&operador=and, last 
visited 03/16/2013) (Senator Salvatori argued that Congress should not enact laws ―of dubious 
constitutionality‖ and, thus, it should not ratify decree 214/02; Senator López Arias argued that emergency 
decree 214/02 was a serious mistake that exceeded Congress‘ delegation and that he had systematically 
opposed its ratification, although he now voted for ratifying it in the face of the possibility of aggravating 
the crisis and ―assuming the ethics of responsibility‖; Senator Gómez Diez argued that the budget bill was 
not the proper occasion to debate the ratification of ―pesification‖; Senator Ibarra argued that she had 
proposed a bill to abrogate emergency decree 214/02 and that the budget bill was not the proper means to 







Presidents, in turn, have fair chances of eluding political responsibility. If they are 
in their second term, the constitutional prohibition of a further immediate re-election 
makes them relatively immune to electoral responsibility.1255 Also, if the measures are 
taken early enough in the first term, time helps the president. As time passes, public 
attention moves to other things, and the emergency issue losses its centrality. If other 
politically-sensitive issues go well, flagrant violations of rights go unpunished.  
But even if, as it seems likely, political retribution comes mainly from bad policy 
choices, not illegal/unconstitutional ones,1256 the lack of a clear-cut test of legality (in 
terms of separation of powers) in the Court‘s caselaw impedes citizens to determine with 
precision whom, among their elected representatives, should be blamed for bad 
emergency decisions, should the citizens so regard the measures in question. It also 
deprives citizens from the opportunity to reward those who opposed bad policy choices. 
The Court creates, thus, a spurious veil of ignorance behind which citizens must 
make their political decisions. Instead of fostering transparency and deliberation, the 
justices encourage the politics of obscurity.  
Last, but not least, this insufficient attention to separation of powers issues in 
economic emergency cases contributes to the sociological devaluation of the legitimacy 
of both courts and legal norms. As recent studies in legitimacy have shown, perceptions 
                                                 
1255 Article 90, Argentine Constitution, provides that ―[t]he President and Vice-President shall hold their 
offices for the term of four years; and they may be re-elected or may succeed each other for only one 
consecutive term. If they have been re-elected or they have succeeded each other, they cannot be elected 
for either of these two positions but with the interval of one term‖. 
 
1256 See Frederick Schauer, above n. 117, at 93 (arguing that ―[w]hen illegal policies are successful on policy 




of procedural fairness play a central role in the creation of legitimacy.1257 The economic 
arena, the evidence suggests, is no exception to this trend.1258 
 At the same time, it seems that a majority of the people in Argentina sees 
concentration of power in the Executive as an undesirable phenomenon. As noticed 
above, they disagree with frequent delegations of legislative powers and disapprove of 
the Executive practice of issuing emergency decrees instead of sending bills to 
Congress.1259 In a context where there is a strong longing for constitutional compliance, 
as well as a perception of fairly generalized non-compliance,1260 the disapproval may well 
come from the fact that the practice regarding both legislative delegation and emergency 
decrees has clearly overstepped their constitutional limits. They are both forbidden in 
principle and accepted only under exceptional circumstances. Both instruments have 
been abused in a departure from constitutional text. They are not the procedure the 
Constitution prescribes for steering collective life. Therefore, unconstrained 
decisionmaking by the Executive is likely to be perceived as unfair. Regardless of what 
the people think about any given emergency measure, the fact that it appears as the 
unilateral imposition of the president cannot contribute to the sociological legitimacy of 
the emergency norms. But if the norms themselves are, possibly, perceived as 
procedurally ilegitimate, then judicial decisions upholding them are bound to be regarded 
                                                 
1257 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, above n. 108, at 382 (arguing that the ―procedural justice effect on legitimacy is 
found to be widespread and robust‖). 
 
1258 See, e.g., James R. Kluegel & David S. Mason, above n. 979, at 817 (―We propose that, independently 
of their evaluation of distributive justice, people find inequality of [economic] outcomes more fair if they 
believe that the rules governing its production are consistently observed‖). 
 
1259 Some 57% of the people ―disagree‖ or ―disagree very much‖ with frequent delegations of legislative 
authority to the Executive and about 53% of the people disapprove of the Executive practice of issuing 
emergency decrees instead of sending bills to Congress. See Antonio M. Hernández, Daniel Zovatto & 
Manuel Mora y Araujo, above n. 941, at 148-149 (tables 135 and 136). 
 
1260 See above n. 948 and accompanying text. 
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as illegitimate as well. Hardly what the Argentine Supreme Court needs at this point in its 
history. 
 
b. Against Deferential Judicial Stances. 
b.1. Putting Up a Defense: The Technocratic Objection Revisited. 
In Part One of this dissertation I attempted to deflect the paradigmatic objection to 
judicial review: its alleged ―countermajoritarian‖ character. I left for a better time another 
central criticism of the practice, namely, the argument that courts are ill-equipped to deal 
with a good number of the questions that constitutional review puts upon their 
shoulders. I called this argument the technocratic objection. It is time to take up the challenge 
and put up a good defense against it. 
The basic idea is that comparative institutional analysis gives the Legislature a 
clear edge over courts when it comes to dealing with certain topics, economic liberties 
prominently among them. The Legislature, so the argument goes, is just better at it. The 
structure of the adjudicative process would make it particularly unsuitable for deciding 
the complex policy issues often involved in the regulation of economic rights. Some 
conflicts are polycentric, meaning that there are mutiple ―centers‖ to the conflict, which 
are interrelated in a systemic way, and that any decision regarding one of this ―centers‖ 
has implications for the proper decision concerning one or more of the remaining 
―centers‖. Lon Fuller, who introduced the term in the legal scholarship, illustrates the 
concept in the following way: 
 ―[w]e may visualize this kind of situation by thinking of a spider web. A pull on one 
strand will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern throughout the web as a 
whole. Doubling the original pull will, in all likelihood, not simply double each of 
the resulting tensions but will rather create a different complicated pattern of 
tensions. This would certainly occur, for example, if the doubled pull caused one or 
more of the weaker strands to snap. This is a ‗polycentric‘ situation because it is 




Although legal cases are often imbued with polycentric elements,1262 strongly 
polycentric conflicts are beyond the proper limits of adjudication, and more suitable for 
other methods of solution more typical of a legislature.1263 Economic regulations are 
generally strongly polycentric,1264 and even more so when they involve an emergency 
situation.1265 
Furthermore, courts allegedly lack the information and expertise needed to decide 
upon such topics. The adversarial structure of the litigation process prevents them from 
getting all the pertinent information and giving due consideration to the multiple policy 
factors that are at play in conflicts of this sort. The views and interests from individuals 
not parties to the lawsuit, but with stakes in the decision, may well be ignored, or not be 
given a fair presentation. Einer Elhague‘s position illustrates the point: 
 ―[f]irst, courts generally only hear (or pay attention to) the arguments of the 
actual litigants. Other persons interested in the precedential implications of the 
case, but not in the judgment itself, generally lack standing and receive inadequate 
consideration. Nor, assuming there are more possible policy positions or legal 
rules than there are litigants, will the courts necessarily be presented with the full 
array of policy arguments and regulatory options. Each party may argue only for 
the policy or rule that is best for it; none may argue for the policy or rule that is 
                                                 
1261 Lon L. Fuller, ―The Forms and Limits of Adjudication‖, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 395 (1978-1979). 
 
1262 Id., at 397 (―[...] it is equally important to realize that the distinction involved is often a matter of 
degree. There are polycentric elements in almost all problems submitted to adjudication‖). 
 
1263 Id., at 398 (arguing that polycentric problems are suitable to be resolved by managerial direction or 
contract). 
 
1264 Id., at 400 (―Generally speaking, it may be said that problems in the allocation of economic resources 
present too strong a polycentric aspect to be suitable for adjudication‖). 
 
1265 A cursory review of the 2001-2002 crisis in Argentina provides a clear example of a strongly polycentric 
situation. Any decision taken in regard to how bank deposits were going to be repaid (―pesified‖, and if so, 
at what rate, or in the original currency) had an impact on the issue of how bank debtors would repay their 
debts, and viceversa. Moreover, any such decision would also impact the chain of payments in the 
economy. Many more implications could be drawn, but these suffice as examples. 
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best for society [...] courts tend to underweigh, or be underinformed about, the 
systemic and prospective consequences of their decisions because they focus on 
the particular parties and adjudicated historical facts before them. A trial record 
usually reveals less about the social and economic consequences of the court's 
possible decision than does the information presented to legislatures or 
administrative agencies‖1266 
 
Constitutional rights protect individual interests that are deemed too important to 
be generally overriden by collective goals,1267 but the mere fact that something very 
important is at stake should not be a sufficient condition for treating it as a right (or, at 
least, as a judicially enforceable right —or, better, as a right protected by anything more 
intrusive than minimal rationality review—). This is Neil Komesar‘s position:  
―[…] the importance of a goal does not tell us whether the achievement of that 
goal should fall to the political process or the courts [...] A goal must be 
important and better handled by the (always imperfect) adjudicative process than 
by the political process before we have a good case for translating that goal into a 
right‖1268 
 
But, for reasons as those stated above, judges wouldn‘t be in a good position to 
handle review of economic regulations. Even Justice Scalia —someone who could hardly 
be said to object to economic liberties on ideological grounds— fears the courts would 
not do a good job if they were to afford significant constitutional protection to economic 
                                                 
1266 Einer Elhague, above n. 1202, at 77-78. 
 
1267 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, above n. 302, at 92 (―It follows from the definition of a right that it cannot 
be outweighed by all social goals‖); Ronald Dworkin, above n. 68, at 223 (―Most working political theories 
also recognize […] distinct individual rights as trumps over […] decisions of policy‖); George L. Priest, 
―Economic Rights…‖, above n. 26, at 3 (defining rights as ―largely immutable areas of citizen activity 
which the majority is prohibited from affecting in any way‖). 
 
1268 Neil Komesar, ―Constitutionalism and the Reality of Rights‖, Wisconsin Law School Legal Studies Research 




liberties.1269 I will quote Neil Komesar at some length, for his stance summarizes quite a 
few crucial points of the technocratic objection: 
―[...] if the conventional wisdom is correct and this sort of legislation is correctly 
presumed constitutionally valid, it is not because of an absence of serious 
systemic political malfunction or an absence of reason to believe that this 
political malfunction has serious impacts on vulnerable parts of the population. 
The problem lies not in the absence of serious malfunctions in the political 
process but in the presence of serious malfunctions in the adjudicative process. In other 
words, the problem lies on the supply side of rights. Judicial review of ‘economic classifications’ 
in the US is extraordinarily limited not because the possibility of harm to traditionally 
disfavored groups is limited and unimportant, but because, if anything, the evil is so pervasive.  
There is simply too much to review and that amount will likely only grow in the 
future.  More importantly, it is increasingly difficult to separate out the valid from the 
invalid use of these economic classifications.  As I have shown elsewhere, the presence of 
serious political malfunction does not mean that all the resulting legislation is 
bad. It only means that there is a tendency or bias in a given direction. Some of the 
legislation passed by a biased political process would have been passed by an unbiased process. 
The presence of the good among the bad makes the task of the reviewer both difficult and 
sensitive. Even courts thoroughly distrustful of the economic classifications 
employed by a political process subject to minoritarian bias would and should 
fear throwing out babies with the bath water, especially given the decreasing 
ability to discern babies from bath water.  The issue is not the absence of serious 
and systemic political malfunction. The issue is the inability of the adjudicative 
process to do better‖1270 
 
While there is some undeniable merit to all of the abovementioned criticisms, 
perhaps the objections go too fast. Perhaps courts can do an acceptable job in reviewing 
economic emergency legislation. Perhaps they can improve upon the political process in 
context such as the ones I have described in this work.  
I want to suggest that the comparative institutional analysis that underlies the 
technocratic objection has missed an important point. The key question needs to be further 
defined. It is not enough to say that legislatures —or the executive— are better than 
courts. We need to give precision to the question and state it clearly: better at what?  
                                                 
1269 See Antonin Scalia, above n. 1110, at 35 (grounding his skepticism in ―the absence of any reason to 
believe that the courts would limit their constitutionalizing of economic rights to those rights that are 
sensible‖).  
 
1270 Id., at 12-13. Emphasis added. 
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Our first reply should encompass the determination of what the Constitution 
requires or tolerates on the issue at stake. Are the elected branches better than courts at 
applying the Constitution? If the Constitution clearly forbids any given economic 
emergency measure, many of the points the critics wield against judicial review lose much 
of their force. If the Constitution rules out the possibility of adopting policy measure 
―x‖, it doesn‘t really matter if courts are not good at, say, weighing alternative policies. 
Or at listening to interested non-parties. Or at predicting the consequences of their 
rulings beyond the parties to the lawsuit. The measures will be unconstitutional, simpliciter, 
and courts should rule so.1271 But, of course, constitutional texts are seldom so explicit 
and determinate regarding policy measures. Some of them are clearly off-bounds, such as 
the prohibition to establish the death penalty in Argentina,1272 but many will be in the 
―argument zone‖. And the constitutional mandate that ―property is inviolable‖ (article 
17) doesn‘t help much. For the question will be, in any given case, whether a contested 
measure actually violates property or not. So we should reformulate the question and ask 
ourselves whether courts or legislatures (or the executive) are better at ascertaining the 
correct meaning of the Constitution and applying it to cases. For reasons I explained 
above, I think the correct meaning of the constitution is the current, public, textual, non-
esoteric meaning, that which a lay person would adscribe to the constitutional text in 
question today. As regards the property clause, I have called it the popular conception of 
constitutional property. While, generally speaking, it is debatable what branch handles the 
task better, the evidence I have provided here shows a clear superiority of the courts 
when it comes to reflecting —doctrinally, if not always practically— popular conceptions 
                                                 
1271 It is a different question altogether whether public authorities are morally obliged to take the allegedly 
unconstitutional measures to avert disaster. ―Extra-legal Measures‖ theorists of various kinds would reply 
yes, but that spawns a whole lot of special problems. See, e.g., Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ní Aolaín, above 
n. 31. 
 
1272 Article 4 of the San Jose de Costa Rica Pact (Inter-American Human Rights Convention), which enjoys 
constitutional standing in Argentina (Article 75.22, Argentine Constitution) terminantly forbids the 
reestablishment of the death penalty in states parties to the treaty that had previously abolished it. 
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of constitutional property. Congress has largely retreated from making substantial 
emergency decisions, and the Executive branch has gone for ever-deeper encroachments 
on property, understood in popular terms. So if ―better‖ means better at applying the 
Constitution as per its popular understandings, courts in Argentina are arguably better 
than the elected branches.  
Moreover, it is far from clear that elected representatives actually engage in good-
faith constitutional interpretation or that they even want to. In the U.S., for instance, 
some studies suggest that some 62% of representatives think that Congress should form 
its own independent constitutional judgement on issues before it, but at the same time 
the evidence signals that high levels of constitutional deliberation in Congress are rare.1273 
Let us put aside, for a moment, the possibility that the courts are better at 
ascertaining popular conceptions of constitutional property. Let us assume that it does 
not matter at all. Suppose that a different constitutional theory —one that, for instance, 
accepts interpretations that frontally contradict popular understandings of the text, or 
one that commends underenforcement of economic constitutional rights— is more 
convincing. In such a context, a possible answer to the ―better at what‖ question is a 
general assertion that elected branches are better at dealing with economic rights issues. 
But there are many dimensions that may enter an analysis of which institution does a 
better job in that regard. Moreover, the objection overlooks the possibility that courts 
and legislatures (or presidents) can work together, complementing —rather than 
completely displacing— each other. I want to explore briefly these two potential lines of 
defense against the objection. 
                                                 
1273 See Brett Max Kaufman, ―Weak Courts On Steroids: Improving Weak-Form Judicial Review‖, 87 Tex. 





An analysis of whether courts, legislatures, or presidents perform better in the 
realm of economic rights should not overlook that the very definition of better, as 
applied to the case, must include at least three interrelated dimensions: responsiveness to 
popular will, probability of ―getting it right‖, and public regardingness. When these 
factors are taken into account, it is far from clear that courts are at a disadvantage vis-a-
vis the elected branches, at least in the Argentine contexts I am dealing with. 
While the ―countermajoritarian difficulty‖ and the ―technocratic objection‖ are, 
of course, conceptually distinct, it is not clear that they should be totally divorced when it 
comes to arguing for or against judicial review of emergency measures. Even if, say, a 
team of bureacrats in the Executive branch ―knows better‖ how to overcome any given 
economic crisis, we do not want to give them carte blanche. It is not just accountability that 
we want, for it always comes late, if it comes at all, and it is often a very imperfect redress 
for the harms inflicted. We also want responsiveness. They may know better how to get 
over the emergency, but what price we are willing to pay for a solution is a different 
thing. 
Doctors know better than patients what treatments are available, but we still want 
patients to make the decisions. We request their informed consent. We do not trick them 
into treatments just because there is always liability if the doctors do wrong. Specially, we 
do not force them to undergo treatments they refuse. Certainly, the analogy I am making 
has its limits, for its not possible to completely equate decisions over one‘s own health 
and life, whose reach do not transcend from oneself, with collective decisions which, bar 
the case of unanimous consent, always affect someone who opposes them. Still, I think it 
is useful to emphasize the value of responsiveness to the judgements, and even 
preferences, of those who will bear the consequences of a decision. Bear in mind that 
once we realize the failure of the model of general legislation as protection from 
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legislative harm,1274 legislators are like doctors who act upon the patient‘s body but do 
not suffer themselves the consequences of bad policy decisions. Legislators are largely 
beyond the reach of their own normative products or they are sufficiently compensated 
by other means if they in fact suffer the consequences of the legislation they enact. They 
have privileged information and frequently belong to the classes that, I have shown, are 
rarely adversely affected by emergency regimes. Add to the equation that accountability is 
feeble at best, and then it is easy to see why responsivess is an important factor. 
As I have shown throughout the first part of this dissertation, in emergency 
contexts at least, electoral branches have often contradicted not only the popular 
conception of constitutional property, but also the majority‘s concrete will on the topic, 
as expressed through various means. Courts have vindicated popular sentiments only 
rarely. But they have tried to embrace conceptions of property more amenable to the 
people‘s will. On occasion, they have even defended the popular conception of 
constitutional property against violations from the political branches. They have shown, 
at least at the argumentative level and arguably also in the actual world, better fidelity to 
the Constitution, as understood by the people, and more responsiveness to their 
judgements and preferences.1275 There is a trade-off to be made between the probability 
of reaching the best possible solution and the responsiveness to the people‘s will. It isn‘t 
                                                 
1274 See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, above n. 1146, at 277 (explaining that ―If all 
collective action should be of such a nature that the benefits and costs could be spread equally over the 
whole population of the community, no problem of interest group, and indeed few of the problems of 
government, would arise. If each individual, in his capacity as choice-maker for the whole group could, in 
his calculus, balance off a pro-rata share of the total benefits against a pro-rata share of the total costs, we 
could expect almost any collective decision-making rule to produce reasonably acceptable results. Under 
these relatively ‗ideal‘ circumstances, individuals and groups would have relatively little incentive (because 
there would not exist much genuine possibility) to utilize the political process to secure advantage over 
their fellows‖). 
 
1275 Fidelity to the popular conception of constitutional property and responsiveness to the concrete wishes 
of a majority of the people need not lead to identical outcomes, of course. An undisputed interpretation of 
a constitutional clause, as per popular understandings, may be deemed as undesirable by a majority of the 
people in any number of circumstances. Still, in many instances in the narrative I have presented, historical-
sociological evidence hints that both have tended to coincide.  
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enough, then, to assert that legislatures (or presidents) are better than courts at dealing 
with economic rights to close down the discussion on judicial review.  
Regarding the probability of making sounder decisions, there is, indeed, an 
extensive literature exploring the possibilities of dialogic engagements between courts 
and elected branches in constitutional interpretation.1276 I am not going to enter such 
debate here. Still, I want to point out that the occasional instances in which Argentine 
courts adopted a moderately non-deferential stance, they prodded the elected branches to 
come up with solutions that were much more acceptable from the social standpoint and, 
arguably, more respectful of the rights at stake than those originally challenged.1277 Social 
acceptability is surely an important part of emergency decision-making, as economic 
emergencies often put strain on the administration‘s ability to retain control of the 
circumstances.1278 Respecting individual constitutional rights is a constitutional mandate, 
so it should also be a component of sound decision-making. Importantly, these judicial 
                                                 
1276 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, ―Dialogic Judicial Review‖, 61 Ark. L. Rev. 205, 209 (2009) (―The basic idea of 
dialogic judicial review is to encourage interactions —dialogues— among the branches about which of the 
competing reasonableinterpretations of constitutional provisions is correct‖) ; Id., at 212-213 (arguing that 
the evidence of dialogic judicial review is discouraging from a democratic perspective); Barry Friedman, 
above n. 118, at 653 (2009) (―I call the process of judicial review that actually occurs in the workaday world 
dialogue. The term emphasizes that judicial review is significantly more interdependent and interactive than 
generally described. The Constitution is not interpreted by aloof judges imposing their will on the people. 
Rather, constitutional interpretation is an elaborate discussion between judges and the body politic‖); 
Christine Bateup, ―The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential of Theories of Constitutional 
Dialogue‖, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 1109, 1180 (2006) (assessing different theories of dialogue and claiming that 
dialogue should incorporate both society-wide and institutional aspects). 
  
1277 See Barry Friedman, above n. 118, at 670 (mentioning ―prodding‖ other branches as part of the role of 
courts in the dialogic model). 
 
1278 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, above n. 108, at 377 (arguing that legitimacy is particularly important in times 
of crisis because ―disruptions in the control of resources brought on by periods of scarcity or conflict 
quickly lead to the collapse of effective social order. When the public views government as legitimate, it has 
an alternative basis for support during difficult times. Further, when government can call upon the values 
of the population to encourage desired behavior, society has more flexibility about how it deploys its 
resources. In particular, the government is better able to use collective resources to benefit the long-term 
interests of the group because the resources are not required for the immediate need to ensure public 
order‖). Id., at 381 (―Such a reservoir is of particular value during times of crisis or decline, when it is 
difficult to influence people by appealing to their immediate self-interest, and when there are risks 




decisions did not impede or frustrate the solution to the crisis. Once again, it seems that 
judicial intervention in the regulation of the emergency brought about a solution that 
reflected a superior trade-off of values than a wholly hands-off approach would have 
caused. Let us examine the evidence, once more, very briefly. 
When the Supreme Court struck down, in an admittedly hurried fashion, the first 
wave of emergency norms during the 2001-2002 crisis, in the Smith decision, lower courts 
followed the ruling and began granting (frequently partial) injunctive relief to the enraged 
savers. While both Congress and the Executive seemed to disagree with judicial 
mandamuses based upon Smith, and issued norms forbidding the granting of injunctions 
ordering the return of dollars to depositors, save cases where special circumstances were 
present,1279 the truth of the matter remains that courts played a central role in keeping 
social peace and channeling the savers‘ rage through institutional means. They helped 
defuse an explosive situation,1280 in a way that neither Congress nor the Executive was 
able to do. Sound(er) decisionmaking came from the interplay of elected and non-elected 
branches. 
The next following decision in the ―pesification‖ saga, San Luis further reinforces 
the point. Right after the Court declared ―pesification‖ of bank deposits unconstitutional, 
                                                 
1279 See Articles 1 and 4, Law 25,587 (available at 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/70000-74999/73816/norma.htm; last visited 
03/20/2013), and Articles 1, 2 and 3, Emergency Decree 1316/02 (available at 
http://infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/75000-79999/76187/norma.htm; last visited 03/20/2013). 
 
1280 See above n. 75. See also Agustín Gordillo, ―"Corralito", Justicia Federal de Primera Instancia y 
contención social en estado de emergencia‖, 2002-C La Ley 1217 (explaining the chaotic situation in the 
federal courts during the first few weeks after the entry into force of the ―corralito‖ and describing the 
judiciary‘s actions as ―heroic‖, channeling through pacific means the popular outrage unleashed by the 
―evolutive irrationality of the corralito‖); Dafne Soledad Ahe, ―El desamparo del amparo‖, 2002-C La Ley 
1227 (describing the dramatic situation of thousands of plaintiffs who showed up in the court‘s buildings 
in absolute despair, exhibiting prothesis, the last few doses of their own cancer medications, and other 
similarly eloquent signs of their own individual emergency, aggravated by the impossibility of using their 




President Duhalde issued Emergency Decree 739/03, which —as explained above— 
presented the depositors with an option to recover their funds that, arguably, respected 
their core constitutional property rights. It set up a scheme whereby smaller depositors 
(deposits of up to 30,000 dollars) could withdraw the full amount of their ―pesified‖ 
deposits right away, which amounted to two-thirds of the value of the original dollar 
deposit at the free market exchange rate of the time, and receive a 10-year maturity 
dollarized bond for the remaining third. Larger amounts were subject to a mandatory 
waiting period of 90 and 120 days before ―pesified‖ funds could be freely disposed. 
During such period, the funds would be put in a term deposit. All depositors would get 
the bond to cover the difference to the free market value of the original dollar deposits. 
The decree also authorized banks to offer depositors better restitution conditions and 
seven banks did so. Four banks allowed their depositors to withdraw ―pesified‖ deposits 
right away, regardless of their amount. Three other banks improved upon the conditions 
of the administration‘s scheme, offering immediate release for all deposits up to 100,000 
pesos (some 70,000 dollars, ―pesified‖ at the official conversion rate of 1.40 pesos per 
dollar).1281 
Those who opted for accepting the scheme tended to leave their money in the 
banks, in new, freely usable term deposits. About 60% of the money that depositors 
could have withdrawn under Emergency Decree 739/03 seems to have remained in the 
banks‘ vaults.1282 While many factors may have influenced depositors to forego actual 
withdrawal of the funds —i.e. high interest rates, insecurity, etc.—, one cannot discount 
                                                 
1281 See, e.g., ―Abren hoy el corralón a más de 145.000 ahorristas‖, Clarín, April, 8, 2003 (available at 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2003/04/08/e-02401.htm; last visited 03/15/2013). 
 
1282 See, e.g., ―Los ahorristas no sacaron sus depósitos del corralón‖, Clarín, April, 18, 2003 (available at 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2003/04/18/e-01215.htm; last visited 03/15/2013). At the time of the 
information, depositors still had three more days to opt for the conversion scheme. 
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that the Court‘s vindication of property rights in Smith and, especially, San Luis also 
played a role.  
We don‘t know for sure if the Court‘s ruling in San Luis prompted the Executive 
to issue the decree or if President Duhalde was going to take a similar measure anyway. 
But it is hard to imagine a president taking pains to guarantee full restitution in a scenario 
where the Court validated ―pesification‖ with a ―haircut‖ and two very big players, the 
banks and the so-called ―Grupo Productivo‖, were very much interested in full 
―pesification‖ of deposits. History supports the hypothesis that the Court did influence 
the Executive. Before the justices invalidated ―pesification‖, no offer likely to produce 
full restitution for everyone had been put forward; after the Bustos plurality upheld 
―pesification‖ no more exchange offers were made. It was only during the time when San 
Luis was good law that more reasonable alternatives were advanced.  
Before San Luis, all attempts offering depositors a voluntary conversion of their 
frozen and ―pesified‖ deposits into long-term State bonds were very limited and did not 
provide at for immediate availability of any portion of the funds, beyond the possibility 
of selling the bonds in the secondary market at a heavy discount.1283 The initial scheme 
contained in Emergency Decree 214/02 only provided for the optional conversion of 
deposits of up to 30,000 dollars into long-term dollarized bonds issued by the State. 
Later, Emergency Decrees 905/02 and 1836/02 extended the option to all depositors, 
regardless of their amounts.1284 Every alternative offered to the depositors prior to the 
San Luis ruling was modeled after Peralta. Thus, as I have already explained, they were 
likely to have significantly regressive effects, given the profile of the median saver and the 
                                                 
1283 Remember that Argentina had just defaulted on its sovereign debt. 
 
1284 Notice that all conversion schemes are posterior to the ruling of the Court in the Smith case. Even if 
Smith did not deal with ―pesification‖ (which had not been enacted yet), it did hint at the Court‘s later 
rejection of it. Therefore, options of dollarized bonds are likely to have been included with an eye on the 
Court‘s case law. 
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ensuing likelihood that many depositors could not help selling their bonds early and well 
below par. Heavy losses on depositors were to be expected. It was only after the Court 
struck down ―pesification‖ as an unwarranted intrusion of property rights that the 
Executive made an offer that was substantially less likely to deprive depositors of their 
property. The immediate availability of a significant portion of the funds made it more 
likely that depositors could actually wait to recover the remaining portion. But even if 
some depositors had to sell their bonds, any losses derived from early sales would only 
affect one third of their deposits. A depositor who could not afford to wait and had to 
sell her bonds right away would have received a total amount of almost 86% of her 
original dollar deposit, 1285 as opposed to the roughly 50% she was to receive under the 
―pesification‖ regime.1286 By way of comparison, remember that a similarly situated 
depositor in times of the Bonex Plan, forced to sell early, would have received about 
30% of the original value of her deposit.1287  
Notice that the Court‘s ruling did not bring about the failure of any banks, much 
less of the whole financial system, nor did it compromise the latter‘s viability. To the 
contrary, the interplay with the Executive seems to have instilled a much-needed sense of 
legal certainty into the financial system, prompting depositors to leave their money in the 
banks and fueling the system‘s recovery. Moreover, the Court‘s stance, insofar as it 
actually motivated the issuance of Emergency Decree 739/03, effectively protected 
                                                 
1285 See, e.g., ―Abren hoy el corralón a más de 145.000 ahorristas‖, Clarín, April, 8, 2003 (available at 
http://www.clarin.com/diario/2003/04/08/e-02401.htm; last visited 03/15/2013) (explaining that the 
bonds were selling for about 52% of their face value at the time of the Emergency Decree 739/02, that a 
depositor who accepted the administration‘s plan would receive enough pesos to purchase dollars 
amounting to near 70% of the original total deposit in dollars and that the remaining 30% —bonds— 
could be sold for about half of its value, thereby immediately recovering approximately 86% of the total 
original amount). 
 
1286 See above n. 995 and accompanying text. 
 
1287 See above n. 727 and accompanying text. 
 
 396 
property rights and prevented further regressive redistributions. All in all, a case can be 
made that the intervention of the Judiciary induced more reasonable, sounder, emergency 
decisionmaking than what the lone action of the elective branches had done. 
Last, but not least, courts may actually have an edge over legislatures (and 
executives) when it comes to assessing the public-regardingness of the decisionmaking 
process. Neil Komesar has made the point that a skewed decisionmaking process does 
not automatically mean unsound decisions. It only means there is a bias. But some 
decisions made through a biased process would also have been made by an unbiased 
one.1288 True enough. Some decisions would have been equally endorsed by a public-
regarding process. But citizens have a constitutional right to demand that public law be 
public-regarding.1289 If courts can improve upon the elected branches in the public-
regardingness department, then the technocractic objection is further undermined. 
Some commentators are very skeptical of the claim that courts can manage to 
weed out special interest legislation. Komesar emphasizes that it is increasingly difficult 
to separate out the valid from the invalid use of economic classifications and that courts 
would run the risk of making serious mistakes if they attempted to police legislation for 
rent-seeking efforts.1290 Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey make a related point: courts 
trying to stamp out rent-seeking would be forced to review virtually all governmental 
                                                 
1288
 See above n. 1123 and accompanying text. 
 
1289 See Jerry L. Mashaw, above n. 79, at 80 (―The Constitution presumes that private activity will be 
constrained only to promote public purposes [...] Citizens have a constitutional right to demand that public 
law be public-regarding. Otherwise, their private harms are constitutionally inexplicable‖). See also 
Jonathan R. Macey, ―Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An 
Interest Group Model‖, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 225, fn 14 (1986) (arguing that for a judicial interpretation to 
be consistent with the U.S. constitutional scheme it must, inter alia, ―result in making legislation more 
public-regarding by serving as a check on legislative excess‖ and that such requisite is an ―implied 
condition inherent in the structure of the Constitution‖). 
 
1290 Neil Komesar, above n. 1268, at 13. 
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activity, with costs to exceed any purported benefits.1291 In short, the task would be both 
very difficult and very vast, perhaps to the point of being unmanageable. 
I think both objections can be answered. Patrick Luff has forcefully argued that 
―[…] in contrast to the elected branches, structural, as well as attitudinal factors, 
suggest that courts are comparatively less likely to be captured by private 
interests, and therefore more likely to act in the public interest‖1292 
 
 In his view, there are two dimensions to the differences between courts and 
elected branches, when it comes to private interest influence: informational infuence and 
purchase influence.1293 A number of statutory and professional prohibitions limit the 
types of extraneous information to which judges are exposed and the way they process it,  
1294 enhancing their relative ability to detach themselves from the influence of actors 
pursuing special class legislation.1295 Also, relatively independent courts are better 
positioned than elected branches when it comes to purchase influence. Be it that judges 
have a ―legalist‖ inclination —that is, they decide cases based on rules, which constrain 
and channel their decisions, and regardless of their own policy preferences— or be it that 
they embrace ―non-legal‖ role orientations —that is, they decide based on what they 
                                                 
1291 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, above n. 1108, at 68-71 (arguing that public choice does not 
provide an adequate basis for a broadscale judicial attack on special interest legislation and analyzing what 
they perceive as the flaws of such an approach). 
 
1292 Patrick Luff, above n. 116, at 14-15. 
 
1293 Id., at 11. 
 
1294 Id., at 19 (mentioning as relevant factors that judges are prohibited from discussing pending lawsuits 
with those not party to the suit, and prohibited from engaging in ex parte contacts with those party to the 
suit, as well as the duty to recuse themselves that bears upon judges with personal interest in any given 
lawsuit). 
 
1295 Id., at 10 (―Elected-branch officials are busy, and the more information they get from a particular 
organized interest, the more likely they are to enact policies in favor of that interest, purely because of the 
disparity between the amount of information that a small, organized interest group is able to convey to 
policymakers, compared to large, unorganized groups‖). 
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think best for the public— ,1296 there is little room for private-interest influence.1297 
Legalist judges make their decisions divorced from their policy implications; thus, they 
cannot have private-interest motivations. As the judicial process lacks the ―purchase‖ 
influences prevalent in the elected branches,1298 judges with non-legal role orientations 
are unlikely to exercise their independence to favor private interests, unless it is an 
inevitable consequence of pursuing some wider policy goal.1299 
 If Luff is right, and both structural and attitudinal factors make courts less likely 
to be captured by private interests, then there is no need for courts to do any special 
search for invalid uses of economic classifications: the mere fact of their intervention 
ensures a better prospect of public-regardingness in official actions. Komesar‘s fears may 
be unwarranted. Granted, we still face the question of what courts should do, if they are 
not to conduct specific searches for special interest legislation. Mashaw proposes a cost-
benefit test as a manageable proxy for public-regardingness.1300 Macey proposes that 
judges should take a consistently neutral approach to all sort of statutes and apply 
traditional interpretive techniques, such as using legislative history, traditional canons of 
interpretation such as the ―plain meaning rule‖, all of which is likely to result in raising 
the costs of enacting ―hidden-implicit‖ legislation.1301 I will also follow the indirect 
                                                 
1296 Id., at 26. 
 
1297 Id., at 28. 
 
1298 Id., at 10 (―In exchange for favorable policies […] politicians receive campaign contributions and other 
organizational benefits, the promise of future jobs and, occasionally, outright bribes. The ability to provide 




1300 See Jerry L. Mashaw, above n. 79, at 66-68, 79-80. 
 
1301 See Jonathan R. Macey, above n. 1289, at 261-266. 
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strategy. I will provide a brief sketch on the test later. Suffice it to say that any test which 
does not embrace an ultra deferential stance will play a role in improving public-
regardingness. 
 Farber and Frickey‘s critique can also be dodged by my argument, as it is focused 
on certain particular circumstances, namely, economic emergency, which amplify 
opportunities for rent-seeking behavior while providing rhetorical cover up. These two 
features of economic emergency justify restricting my proposal of stronger judicial 
strutiny to this particular area, regardless of any arguments that might be put forward in 
support of a broader judicial supervision. I need not endorse such a strong position to 
defend my argument here. 
It is generally admitted that emergency circumstances justify stronger restrictions 
on individual rights, restrictions that under normalcy conditions would be deemed 
beyond constitutional limits.1302 Thus, Chief Justice Hughes held in Blaisdell that 
―[i]t cannot be maintained that the constitutional prohibition [of impairing the 
obligations of contracts] should be so construed as to prevent limited and 
temporary interpositions with respect to the enforcement of contracts if made 
necessary by a great public calamity such as fire, flood, or earthquake [...] The 
reservation of state power appropriate to such extraordinary conditions may be 
deemed to be as much a part of all contracts as is the reservation of state power 
to protect the public interest in the other situations to which we have referred. 
And if state power exists to give temporary relief from the enforcement of 
contracts in the presence of disasters due to physical causes such as fire, flood or 
earthquake, that power cannot be said to be nonexistent when the urgent public need 
demanding such relief is produced by other and economic causes‖1303 
 
In a similar —albeit more explicit— way, the Argentine Supreme Court has held 
that 
                                                 
1302 Only ―business as usual‖ models of emergency powers deny that emergencies justify exceptional 
measures. Such models are admittedly rare, though. See Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ní Aolaín, above n. 31. 
 
1303 290 U.S. 398, 440 (1934). Emphasis added.  
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―[e]mergency legislation can be valid even though it effects restrictions on 
individual rights which, under normal circumstances, would not have been valid 
under the Constitution‖1304 
 
This increased leeway means that the redistribution possibilities are also larger. 
Hence, the stakes for the players are substantially higher in a context of economic 
emergency. Such increase in the potential gains enlarges the amount of resources that 
small, organized groups devote to rent-seeking activities,1305 thereby increasing their 
―purchase influence‖. At the same time, the rhetoric of emergency, accurate or not, 
lowers the political costs of curtailing individual rights, for the people may tolerate 
particularly intense restrictions if they believe them to be inevitable. Thus, Higgs and 
Twight seem to be right when they assert that governments face a favorable cost-benefit 
calculus when assessing whether, and to what extent, to restrict individual rights for 
emergency reasons.1306 In economic emergency contexts, then, we can expect both 
increasing encroachments on individual rights and related larger private gains. This 
phenomenon justifies the need for more searching judicial scrutiny in this particular area 
of governmental activity, effectively defusing Farber and Frickey‘s argument that public 
choice necessarily leads to placing most, if not all, regulation under close judicial 
supervision. 
 Finally, Luff has also argued that the alleged informational problems that would 
hinder the Judiciary‘s ability to deal with complex policy issues might well be overstated. 
He argues that when the policy issue is framed narrowly and in such a way that it 
presents a binary choice, the binary adversarial system provides an ideal forum in which 
                                                 
1304 243 Fallos 449 (1959). 
 
1305 See above n. 1188 and accompanying text. 
 
1306 See Robert Higgs & Charlotte Twight, above n. 1174, at 771. 
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to assess the policy.1307 Amicus curiae can be filed, and courts can always require 
information from state agencies, if relevant to the decision. He further contends that the 
seriatim nature of legal decisions create a system likely to be more deliberative than 
legislative policymaking1308 and, one supposes, there is scarcely any need to argue that 
such a system is more deliberative than pure executive policymaking. If the argument 
holds true,1309 then the technocratic objection loses much of its power.1310 
 
b.2. Counterattacking: the Selective Risk, Equal Sharing of Public Burdens, and 
Right-to-a-Hearing Arguments. 
It is time to suggest some additional reasons why judicial review of economic emergency 
measures, beyond mere rationality review, may actually be a good idea. I will be brief, for 
the bulk of the arguments I will present here have already been hinted at throughout the 
dissertation. The evidence I will use has also, for the most part, been already presented 
and discussed in different sections and chapters.  
 The first argument relies on the idea of equality and impartiality in the 
distribution of risks created by economic emergency regulation, as well as on the 
                                                 
1307 See Patrick Luff, above n. 116, at 33. 
 
1308 Id., at 33. 
 
1309 While proving the accuracy of Luff‘s arguments is way beyond the scope of this dissertation, the 
evidence gathered here suggests that they might hold true, despite what is said in the following footnote. 
The Supreme Court struggled with the issue of ―pesification‖ of bank deposits during a period of about 5 
years, during which it interacted with lower courts, as well as with the elected branches, reacting to their 
respective decisions on the topic. As circumstances evolved, decisions were adjusted and modified, 
generally improving upon the sole work of the elected branches, as it has been argued throughout this 
second part of this text.  
 
1310 While Argentina‘s Judiciary does not seem to be quite up to the standards that Luff‘s arguments 
presupposes, in terms of independence and immunity to purchase and informational influences, the truth 
of the matter remains that the elected branches are comparatively worse. Moreover, if his argument is 
correct, then it makes sense to work towards improving the Judiciary, rather than to deprive it of revision 
powers.   
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constitutional mandate to respect equality in the sharing of public burdens. If no 
individual can be singled out to carry the burden of overcoming crises, then it would 
seem that over time, people might be compensated implicitly or in kind for the burdens 
imposed on them by any given emergency regulation. They might actually turn out to be, 
as Michelman suggests, ―net gainers‖. Such an argument faces significant obstacles from 
the perspective of those subject to the regulations. Economic emergencies, no matter 
how repetitive or pervasive, are not everyday events that readily lend themselves to the 
kind of trade offs and compensations that the argument presupposes. It is one thing to 
understand and accept that the limitation imposed on my property rights by a regulation 
that forbids building beyond, say, twenty meters of height, in order to prevent buildings 
from blocking light to other buildings is compensated in kind by the like limitation that 
my neighbor suffers. It is a completely different thing to accept that the limitation 
imposed today on my property rights over my savings (say, a 50% ―haircut‖) is 
compensated by the hope that in a future emergency someone else (other sector of the 
population) will bear the burden of controlling the eventual crisis. Arguably, the 
argument is almost naïve when transplanted from the takings context in which 
Michelman originally advanced it, to the emergency regulatory takings in question. As 
complex facts underlie economic emergencies, it may well be that solutions to the crises 
are frequently confined to regulating more or less the same sectors, in particularly 
intrusive (although significantly varying) ways, with the consequence that, potentially, the 
same classes of people (and even the same individuals) are brought to bear the costs of 
overcoming the emergency. There are ―net gainers‖ and ―net losers‖, indeed. But the 
chance of being on one or the other side is far from being equal. Public-burdens sharing 
is not equal, as the Constitution mandates. Not even over time.  
 403 
Analyzing the U.S. Supreme Court Kelo decision,1311 and in an admittedly 
somewhat different context, Laura Underkuffler has argued that a very potent issue is 
whether the risk of destruction of property, with the ensuing undermining of the 
individuals‘ political, social, and economic lives, is a risk extended equally to all, or is, a 
structural matter, extended only to a particular class of persons.1312 She says that 
―Whatever the theoretically equal risk that all community member face from 
economic revitalization projects, the ‗goals‘ that these projects seek —and the 
politics of wealth— mean the certain privileging of some over others‖1313 
 
Notice how well a paraphrase would work here: ―whatever the theoretically equal 
risk that all community members face from economic emergency regulations, the ‗goals‘ 
that these regulations seek —and the politics of wealth— mean the certain privileging of 
some over others‖.  
The truth of the matter is that risks created by economic emergency regulations 
fall selectively on the same class of persons, for both kind of reasons identified by 
Underkuffler. Lobby power, the evidence shows, has played a central role in determining 
outcomes in the last two economic crises in Argentina. Wealth, for a variety of reasons 
—which include but also go beyond— political influence, is directly correlated with 
avoidance of harms and reaping of gains in emergency contexts. But the ―goals‖ of the 
regulations also often create a bias towards favoring the rich, regardless of their political 
influence. If the regulations aim at, e.g., promoting the general welfare or the recovery of 
                                                 
1311 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 





the economy, then the aggregative calculus implicit in determining the content of such 
goals is likely to favor protection of the assets of the wealthy.1314  
Notice, however, that my argument is broader in scope than an argument based 
solely on the idea of special interests influencing decisively the political process (which 
affects the impartiality of the decisions and the equal distribution of risks) or on the bias 
that utilitarian approaches to the management of the crisis might create (which affects 
equality of burden-sharing). The argument I offer here encompasses both impartiality 
and equality concerns, procedure and substance.  
Deferential judicial review, to the point of abdication, has the effect of validating 
such morally unwarranted political outcomes. A Judiciary whose review powers have 
some bite may ameliorate these defective qualities of economic emergency 
decisionmaking. 
Additionally, judicial review grants the individual a chance of actual, and not 
merely theoretical, participation in the rule-making process that affects her rights. Judicial 
review increases, rather than undermines, participation. In doing so, it bolsters political 
legitimacy, insofar as legitimacy is based upon participation of the governed in the 
lawmaking process. 
Alon Harel, in a series of co-authored papers, has forcefully argued that any 
rights-respecting society owes its citizens a right to judicial review.1315 Such right derives 
from a basic right to a hearing that is due to any right-bearer whenever her rights are at 
stake:1316  
                                                 
1314 See above n. 1132-1141 and accompanying text. 
 
1315 See, e.g., Alon Harel & Tsvi Kahana, ―The Easy Core Case for Judicial Review‖, 2 J. Legal Analysis 227 
(2010); Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, ―The Right to Judicial Review‖, 92 Va. L. Rev. 991 (2006); Alon Harel 
& Adam Shinar, ―Between Judicial and Legislative Supremacy: A Cautious Defense of Constrained Judicial 
Review‖, 10 Int’l J. Con. L. 950 (2012). 
 
1316 See Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, above n. 1315, at at 1017 (―[...] individuals have a right to JR [judicial 
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―[t]he right to a hearing is grounded in the fact that people occupy a special 
position with respect to their rights. Rights demarcate a boundary that has to be 
respected, a region in which the rightholder is a master. One‘s special relation to 
the right, i.e., one‘s dominion, does not vanish even when the right is justifi ably 
overridden. When the infringement of the right is at stake, the question of 
whether it might be justifiable to infringe that right is not tantamount to the 
question of whether one should have dominion over the matter. A determination 
that the right has been justifiably infringed does not nullify the privileged position 
of the rightholder. Instead, his privileged position is made concrete by granting 
the rightholder a right to a hearing. Thus, infringing the right unilaterally is wrong 
even when the infringement itself is justified because the rightholder is not 
treated as someone who has a say in the matter‖1317 
 
The right to a hearing is comprised of three parts.1318 First, right-holders have a 
right to voice their (actual or imaginary) grievances. Second, individual justification must 
be given to them when their interests may be adversely affected by collective decisions. 
Finally, a true, open-minded, reconsideration of the decision affecting the individual 
rights must be granted. Courts are especially suited for satisfying this very basic right to a 
hearing,1319 are arguably superior to legislatures and other non-adjudicative bodies in that 
                                                                                                                                            
review]—a right which is derivative of the right to a hearing‖); Alon Harel & Tsvi Kahana, above n. 1315, 
at 238 (―[...] judicial review is designed to facilitate the voicing of grievances by protecting the right to a 
hearing‖); Alon Harel & Adam Shinar, above n. 1315, at 965 (―[...] judicial review is designed to protect the 
right to a hearing (or the right to raise a grievance)‖). 
 
1317 Alon Harel & Tsvi Kahana, above n. 1315, at 241. See also Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, above n. 1315, 
at 1002 (―The right to a hearing recognizes and accommodates a person‘s dominion over her rights even 
when infringement of those rights is justified. The failure to recognize this right to a hearing represents a 
failure to respect persons as right-holders. Since respecting rights requires recognition of this demarcated 
realm as such, respecting rights must also require recognizing the significance of the position right-bearers 
hold with respect to their rights. In particular, individuals should be able to claim their rights and be heard 
before those who have the capacity to infringe‖). 
 
1318 Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, above n. 1315, at 1002-1006. 
 
1319 Alon Harel & Tsvi Kahana, above n. 1315 at 249 (―It seems uncontroversial (to the extent that 
anything can be uncontroversial) that courts are designed to investigate individual grievances [...] The 
judicial way of assessing individual grievances comprises three components. First, the judicial process 
provides an opportunity for an individual to form a grievance and challenge a decision. Second, it imposes 
a duty on the part of the state (or other entities) to provide a reasoned justification for the decision giving 
rise to the challenge. Last, the judicial process involves, ideally at least, a genuine reconsideration of the 
decision giving rise to a challenge, which may ultimately lead to an overriding of the initial decision giving 
rise to the grievance. If the judicial review of legislation can be shown to be normatively grounded in these 
procedural features, it follows that courts are particularly appropriate in performing such a review. To 
establish this claim, consider the nature of a failure on the part of courts to protect the right to a hearing. 
Such a failure is different from a failure on the part of the court to render a right or a just decision. The 
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regard, and to the extent that such bodies may satisfy the right to a hearing, they perform 
typical adjudicative functions.1320 
 Ultra-deferential judicial review, as epitomized by Ferguson v. Skrupa and other like 
decisions,1321 has very little to offer to the citizen in this regard, for it fails at least the 
third condition of the right to a hearing. All it can say to the aggrieved citizen is 
―whenever your property rights are at stake, you have the right to vote for a 
representative who will represent you freely and who, without being obliged to consider 
—nor able to actually know— your true opinions, preferences, and circumstances, will 
vote on a final decision over your rights‖. It seems just too feeble a right to ground 
political legitimacy when important matters are in question. 
 If political representation is nothing but a necessary evil of modern political 
conditions,1322 and not the realization of the democratic ideal —which would require, 
among other things, the direct participation of each citizen in the lawmaking process—
                                                                                                                                            
latter failure indicates that courts are fallible, but it does not challenge their status as courts. In contrast, the 
former failure, namely a failure to protect the right to hearing, is a failure on the part of courts to do what 
courts are specially designed to do; it is a failure to act judicially; in short it is a failure to function like a 
court. It seems evident therefore that courts are specially suited to protect the right to a hearing‖). 
 
1320 Id., at 250 (―[...] whatever institution performs this task, such an institution would inevitably use 
processes that are indistinguishable from those used by courts [...] The more effective institutions are in 
facilitating a hearing, the more these institutions resemble courts‖). 
 
1321 See, e.g., 431 U.S. 1, 46 (1977) (Brennan, White, Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (―The central principle 
developed by these decisions, beginning at least a century ago, has been that Contract Clause challenges [...] 
are to be resolved by according unusual deference to the lawmaking authority of state and local governments‖; 
emphasis added). The case involved a Contract Clause challenge against a legislative retroactive repeal of a 
previous legislative decision of a contractual character. 
 
1322 In a more extreme form, the argument could affirm the impossibility of actual democracy. Rousseau 
famously argued in The Social Contract that ―[i]f we take the term in the strict sense, there never has been a 
real democracy, and there never will be. It is against the natural order for the many to govern and the few 
to be governed. It is unimaginable that the people should remain continually assembled to devote their 
time to public affairs, and it is clear that they cannot set up commissions for that purpose without the form 
of administration being changed [...] Were there a people of gods, their government would be democratic. 
So perfect a government is not for men‖. See Jean Jacques Rousseau, POLITICAL WRITINGS 71-73 
(Madison-Wisconsin, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1986). 
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,1323 then ultradeferential judicial review loses most of its purportedly democratic 
justification.  
 By bringing judicial review to bear on the issue of economic emergency 
regulation, my argument improves legitimacy through actual participation. The 
democratic legitimacy based upon procedural grounds extends from the rule-creation 
process to that of its application, and the deliberation through representatives in the 
creation stage finds its counterpoint in the effective possibility of contradiction during 
the application phase, the phase where —ultimately— the rights of an individual are 
given concrete and determinate content.  
Moreover, participation is broadened not only through the direct intervention of 
the (potential) right-bearer on the decisionmaking process, but also by means of the 
significant expansion of the universe of claimants who can take an active part in the 
process.1324 Access to justice is significantly easier in the judicial process than in the 
legislative process. 
There are several dimensions along which judicial review presents meaningful 
advantages over legislative processes when it comes to citizens‘ access. First, judicial 
review has a lower threshold of detection for claims to be recognized and processed. Its 
radar, so to speak, is more sensitive than the Legislature‘s, and thus even relatively 
invisible, socially-insignificant claims can receive a fair treatment. Second, and relatedly, it 
                                                 
1323 Id., at 103-104 (―Sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it inalienable, cannot be represented; it lies 
essentially in the general will, and will does not admit of representation: it is either the same, or other; there 
is no intermediate possibility. The deputies of the people, therefore, are not and cannot be its 
representatives: they are merely its stewards, and can carry through no definitive acts. Every law the people 
has not ratified in person is null and void —is, in fact, not a law. The people of England regards itself as 
free; but it is grossly mistaken; it is free only during the election of members of parliament. As soon as they 
are elected, slavery overtakes it, and it is nothing [...] Law being purely the declaration of the general will, it 
is clear that, in the exercise of the legislative power, the people cannot be represented‖). 
 
1324 Thomas W. Merrill, ―Does Public Choice Justify Judicial Activism After All?‖, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol'y 219, 225-226 (1997) (―Judicial activism dramatically expands the universe of groups that can make an 




is cheaper to use. A credible judicial challenge on allegedly unconstitutional legislation 
costs less than a lobbying campaign to block the enactment of such norms or bring 
about their repeal. Third, the ceiling beyond which having more money and resources 
available stops increasing the likelihood of success is significantly lower in the judicial 
arena than in the legislative process. In other words, the marginal utility of money 
decreases more rapidly in the courts than in legislatures. Notice that these last two 
features of the judicial process exhibit an inherent potential for equalizing political 
influence. And then there is, of course, the fact that noncitizens can be affected in their 
interests by collective decisionmaking and they are not generally represented in the 
process, so unless there is judicial review they have no voice whatsoever in creating the 
laws that affect them. Judicially-enforceable rights appear as a unique channel to protect 
noncitizens.1325 
Regarding the first threshold, which we could call the ―visibility threshold‖, it is 
easy to notice that courts and legislatures differ significantly when it comes to the entity 
of the claims that are actually heard in each forum. Rights claims that are not socially 
salient certainly have a hard time getting into the legislative agenda.1326 Representatives 
are not obliged to receive petitions from individuals, much less to include them in their 
                                                 
1325 See Daryl J. Levinson, above n. 1192, at 1338-1339 (―In theory, a strong case might be made for 
enfranchising everyone whose interests might be affected by a democratic decisionmaking process […] In 
practice, however, virtually no one thinks it would be a good idea to open the U.S. political process to 
everyone in the world. Extending rights protections to nonresident aliens whose fundamental interests are 
significantly threatened by U.S. policies may be thus the only practical alternative to leaving these people 
unprotected‖). 
 
1326 See Thomas W. Merrill, above n. 1324, at 223-224 (―Every once in a blue moon someone writes an 
editorial advocating a new law, key members of the legislature read the letter and are persuaded by it, and a 
statute more or less spontaneously results. But 99.9 percent of the time it does not happen this way. If a 
group wants to have a law change seriously considered by the legislature, it will have to mount a sustained 
and well-conceived campaign in pursuit of this end. The group will have to motivate key legislators to 
embrace its proposal, perhaps by showing them that the group has the ability to influence how a significant 
number of votes will be cast in the next election, or that the group can direct a large amount of campaign 
contributions to the legislators, or that the group has significant influence over the attitude that the media 
will adopt toward the legislators in the near future. In other words, in order to be taken seriously by 
legislators, the group has to command significant resources or organizational backing, and has to make a 
credible threat to deploy those assets in support of its request‖). 
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own agenda. Incentives point in the opposite direction: low visibility claims, no matter 
how important or well-founded as a matter of justice, are not likely to receive serious 
consideration by legislators. Courts, on the other hand, are usually obliged to give fair 
consideration to any sort of minimally founded claims that are brought before them. 
Judges do not face the same sort of incentives legislators do. They do not usually stand 
for re-election and, therefore, are not pressed to devote their valuable time and scarce 
resources to issues the public care about. Often, all that is needed to get a claim heard in 
court is to secure a lawyer, which in many cases can even be gotten for free, as is the case 
with Public Defense Offices in Argentina,1327 or on the basis of a contingency fee. All in 
all, it seems fair to conclude that in order to get the judicial system to detect and process 
an instance of rights violation significantly fewer resources are needed than to obtain a 
similar effect in the legislative forum.1328 As Thomas Merrill points out, the ―threshold 
costs‖ of engaging the Judiciary to seriously consider a claim are lower than those of 
pursuing a cause in the Legislature.1329 This means that more individuals and groups will 
have a chance to be heard in courts than in the political process. It also means that their 
profile will be different from the profile of the regular legislative players,1330 at least for 
low visibility right claims. 
                                                 
1327 Public Defense Offices in Argentina deal with all sorts of cases, not only criminal law cases. 
 
1328 For a similar argument, see Alec Walen, ―Judicial Review in Review: A Four-Part Defense of Legal 
Constitutionalism. A Review Essay on Political Constitutionalism‖, 7 Int’l J. Con. L. 329, 341-342 (2009). 
 
1329 Thomas W. Merrill, above n. 1324, at 224 (―[...] my guess would be that, on average, the magnitude of 
the minimum bid, at least in the U.S. Congress, is much higher than in court [...] The concept of threshold 
costs, together with the reasonable hypothesis that threshold costs are higher for legislative action than for 
judicial action, has important implications for determining the supply of law changes from legislatures and 
courts‖). 
 
1330 Id., at 226 (―Eliminating judicial activism would skew the market for legal change in favor of well-
endowed and well-organized groups. If, as seems plausible to assume, the well-endowed and well-
organized groups are more likely to be economic groups (for instance, labor unions, producer groups, and 
professional groups), then eliminating judicial activism might tilt social policy away from ideological causes 
in favor of purely bread-and-butter issues‖). 
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Finally, the influence of wealth in outcomes is also likely to be lower in courts 
than in legislatures (or in the Executive, for that matter). Again, Merrill‘s suggestions 
about what he calls the ―maximum bid limitation‖, the ceiling for the effectiveness of 
money as a factor in reaching a desired outcome, points in the direction of a Judiciary 
less likely to be influenced by the wealth of the parties. Allow me to quote him at some 
length: 
―What is the shape of the judicial supply curve as groups seeking law change 
make higher and higher expenditures? There is no doubt that, at least initially, the 
supply curve slopes upward to the right: the higher the expenditures, the greater 
is the supply of law change [...] With even greater levels of expenditure, the group 
can fund multiple test cases, hire a top-flight private law firm, procure the filing 
of amicus briefs by other supporting groups, and so forth. It is reasonable to 
assume that as the level of investment in litigation effort rises, the supply elicited 
from the courts, in terms of the probability of securing favorable rulings, rises 
too. After the litigation bills have piled up for a while, though, the law of 
diminishing returns starts to set in. Once one has hired Cravath, Swaine & Moore 
to file multiple lawsuits, and several boutique Washington firms to file amicus 
briefs, what else remains to be done? Hiring more and more lawyers will quickly 
generate coordination problems and may interfere with the work product. In 
effect, there is a ceiling on how much one can spend effectively in seeking legal 
change through litigation [...] after a point, the supply curve for courts is perfectly 
inelastic -no further increase in the level of expenditure by groups will yield a 
higher expected payout. Exactly where the supply curve becomes inelastic will 
depend on the nature of the issue [...] In the legislative arena, it is much less clear 
that the supply curve becomes inelastic, at least in the range of expenditures that 
we are talking about. If the sugar farmers want to secure legislation tightening 
quotas- or want to block efforts to liberalize quotas- then the more they spend, 
the greater the expected value of the legislative output. The more PAC 
contributions, the more television ads about the need to protect the family farm, 
and so on, the greater the likelihood of favorable legislation. At some point, it is 
reasonable to assume that limits will be reached, given restrictions on campaign 
contributions, public revulsion against bribery, and the danger of advertising 
overkill. But this will probably occur at a far higher level of expenditure than will 
be the case with respect to a campaign for judicial activism‖1331 
 
 Are all these conjectures plausible? The evidence gathered here, and elsewhere,1332 
suggests they are, indeed. As reflected in the 2001-2002 economic crises, the bulk of the 
                                                 
1331 Id., at 226-228. 
 
1332 See, e.g., Reginald Sheehan, William Mishler & Donald R. Songer, ―Ideology, Status, and the 
Differential Success of Direct Parties Before the Supreme Court‖, 86 Am. J. Polit. Sci. 464, 470 (1992) 
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people who litigated against the measures seem to have been comprised of relatively 
poor (or otherwise needy) individuals.1333 They had much better access to courts than to 
the political branches, as explained above. Even if the issue regarding the intrusion on 
property rights was perhaps the most salient topic of the times, Congress was incapable 
of actively protecting this relatively vulnerable group as well as courts did. Rights claims 
fared much better in the Supreme Court than they did in the Executive branch and in 
Congress, even if there were important differences between the elected branches, with 
Congress lending better protection to the rights of savers than the President. Especially, 
neither Congress nor the Executive channeled the voice of the millions1334 of outraged 
small savers who saw their savings destroyed by the distributively-regressive emergency 
scheme resulting from the pressures of the ―Grupo Productivo‖ and other large and 
influential debtors. 
 Although there was much political action in the part of savers, it is still true that 
many of them were able to recover their money and cover expenses directly related to 
serious health problems or other dire circumstances thanks to the actions of the courts. 
While the political branches did enact legislation that provided for the (limited) 
immediate availability of funds to those depositors who needed them desperately, they 
                                                                                                                                            
(―Theory suggests —and our data support–— the argument that litigant success before the Supreme 
Court depends substantially on the ideological composition of the Court but little, if at all, on the resources 
and prior judicial experience of the litigants‖).  
 
1333 See above n. 902, 1113-1115 and accompanying text. 
 
1334 In December, 2001, when the freeze on bank deposits was imposed, there were 1,586,198 time-
deposits holders and 8,691,935 savings accounts holders. Roughly 6 million holders of money in savings 
accounts had less than 300 pesos (or dollars —at the time one peso was equivalent to one dollar—) and some 
2.3 million account holders had between 300 and 10,000 pesos (or dollars). Regarding time-deposits, some 
1,223,331 individuals had deposits of less than 25,000 pesos (or dollars). See ―Información sobre tramos de 
depósitos‖, Estadísticas e Indicadores Monetarios y Financieros, Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, 
information as of December, 1, 2001 (available at: http://www.bcra.gov.ar/estadis/es020200.asp; selecting 




imposed the substantial ―haircut‖ of ―pesification‖ on such savers.1335 Administrative 
procedures, established by the emergency legislation, provided for immediate release of 
―pesified‖ funds, hence depriving small and needy savers from almost 50% of the 
purchasing power of their savings. Courts, instead, ruled ―pesification‖ unconstitutional 
and granted injunctions that allowed prompt disposal of all (or part) of the savers‘ 
dollarized savings. Regardless of whether any particular needy saver actually required the 
immediate availability of the full amount of their original deposit in dollars in order to 
avoid irreparable harms, or whether any lesser amount would have fulfilled the same 
function adequately, the truth of the matter is that the political branches‘ approach 
imposed on them not only a diminished economic capacity but also the undeniable stress 
of losing what the people deemed as their legitimate property.  
 Notice that the majoritarianly small savers who litigated against the measures 
faced the determinate opposition of both the Federal Government and the banks in the 
lawsuits, two very powerful and resourceful opposing parties who could hire thousands 
of lawyers, even the most prestigious law firms in Argentina, and had direct access to the 
courts.1336 Still, the savers —usually assisted by solo practitioners or public defense 
attorneys— managed to get an outcome in courts that, while less than ideal, was 
acceptable for most of them. Their fate was certainly different in the political process. 
                                                 
1335 See, e.g., Central Bank Communication A3467 (points 1.2.5, 1.2.6, 1.2.7, 1.2.8) (allowing cash 
withdrawals from accounts held by individuals older than 75 years, or accounts where severage payments 
or other kind of redresses had been deposited, or when the account holder or a close relative needed the 
funds to pay for medical expenses; in all cases, money could be withdrawn in pesos at the official conversion 
rate, thereby depriving the depositors of a substantial part of their property) (available at 
http://www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/comytexord/A3467.pdf; last visited 11/20/2013). 
 
1336 See, e.g., 326 Fallos 417 (2003) (§7) (the Supreme Court invited the Asociación Argentina de Bancos —
Argentine Banks Associacion— and the Asociación de Bancos Públicos y Privados de la República Argentina —
Association of Public and Private Banks of the Argentine Republic— to express their views on the issue of 
bank deposits before deciding the case); ―Los bancos acuden a la Corte‖, Clarín, March, 13, 2002 (available 
at http://www.clarin.com/diario/2002/03/13/p-358015.htm; last visited 04/02/2013) (both bank 
associations filed a brief requesting the Supreme Court to intervene via per saltum —a figure not unlike the 
certiotrari before judgement in the U.S.— to stop the injunctions against ―pesification‖ that were being granted 
by lower courts). 
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Powerful lobbies got the Executive branch to liquefy their debt through ―pesification‖ at 
the expense of ―haircuts‖ and deferments of maturities imposed, largely, upon millions 
of small (or otherwise needy) savers. Congress couldn‘t muster enough strength to 
oppose the President. The political process produced a very biased outcome that, 
arguably, was not inevitably required nor justified by reference to the public good.1337 
 Courts provided, instead, a forum where individuals could be heard and their 
claims treated on a more equal footing with the claims of such powerful players as the 
State, the banks and, indirectly, those interested in currency devaluation and debt 
liquefication. If anything, their intervention bolstered political legitimacy at a time when 













                                                 
1337 See above n. 911-933 and accompanying text. 
 
1338
 Remember that during 2001-2002 crowds were protesting regularly and claiming that the entire 
political class should be kicked off. 
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D. Epilogue: the Post-New Deal U.S. Supreme Court Caselaw as a “Negative 
Model” 
 
Courts in the U.S. have, for a long time now, largely abandoned the business of policing 
the political process when it regulates property rights. Judges seem to be fearful of the 
potential for social and political conflict that a more intrusive judicial role allegedly 
carries,1339 distrustful of their own abilities to deal with complex economic issues1340 or of 
the effects of their review on the development of governmental tasks,1341 and/or 
confident that the political process, for whatever reasons, does not usually obliterate the 
property owners‘ rights,1342 as Madison feared. Whatever the reasons for this now 
consolidated position, and despite continuing debate over it,1343 property rights have 
                                                 
1339 See, e.g., 431 U.S. 1, 62 (1977) (Brennan, J, dissenting, joined by White and Marshall, JJ.) (―[…] this 
Court should have learned long ago that the Constitution —be it through the Contract or Due Process 
Clause— can actively intrude into such economic and policy matters only if my Brethren are prepared to 
bear enormous institutional and social costs. Because I consider the potential dangers of such judicial 
interference to be intolerable, I dissent‖). 
 
1340 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, above n. 1110, at 32-35. See also Richard Posner, above n. 1147, at 24 
(arguing that ―A final objection to libertarian proposals for reinterpreting the Constitution to make it a 
charter of laissez-faire is the cost of judicial decisionmaking. Courts have limited competence to make 
economic (as other) decisions; and once it is recognized that constitutional doctrines are not self-defining 
or self-enforcing, the risk of heavy error costs and heavy litigation costs in any ambitious expansion of 
constitutional regulation becomes apparent‖). 
 
1341 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488 (2005) (―The disadvantages of a heightened form 
of review are especially pronounced in this type of case. Orderly implementation of a comprehensive 
redevelopment plan obviously requires that the legal rights of all interested parties be established before 
new construction can be commenced. A constitutional rule that required postponement of the judicial 
approval of every condemnation until the likelihood of success of the plan had been assured would 
unquestionably impose a significant impediment to the successful consummation of many such plans‖).  
 
1342 See, e.g., 431 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1977) (Brennan, J, dissenting, joined by White and Marshall, JJ.) (―I would 
not want to be read as suggesting that the States should blithely proceed down the path of repudiating their 
obligations, financial or otherwise. Their credibility in the credit market obviously is highly dependent on 
exercising their vast lawmaking powers with self-restraint and discipline, and I, for one, have little doubt 
that few, if any, jurisdictions would choose to use their authority ‗so foolish[ly] as to kill a goose that lays 
golden eggs for them‘ […] But in the final analysis, there is no reason to doubt that appellant's financial 
welfare is being adequately policed by the political processes and the bond marketplace itself‖). 
 
1343 See, e.g., Richard Funston, ―The Double Standard of Constitutional Protection in the Era of the 
Welfare State‖, 90 Polit. Sci. Quart. 261, 284 (1975) (asserting that ―[t]he Court‘s broad and indiscriminate 
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taken a comfortable second seat in the array of constitutional rights. Deference to 
political branches is the dominant theme in the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
 Argentina‘s Supreme Court has always had an eye on the caselaw of its U.S. 
counterpart. Early cases treated the U.S. constitutional practice as a source of 
authority,1344 and justices often felt obliged to show that the U.S. Supreme Court caselaw 
supported their position in any given decision or that the constitutional texts in question 
were different. The examples are numerous, but just to mention a couple of cases already 
discussed in this dissertation, let us recall Caffarena and Elortondo. In Caffarena, a decision 
that upheld retroactive alteration of contractual terms, the Court felt the need to 
distinguish our Constitution from the U.S. constitutional text.1345 In Elortondo, striking 
down an expropriation as running afoul of the ―public utility‖ clause of the Constitution, 
the Court cited Story and Cooley, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court.1346 
 Although reliance on U.S. Supreme Court decisions gradually declined after 
1930,1347 economic emergency is a topic where the Argentine Court never quite shook off 
                                                                                                                                            
rejection of any constitutional duty to protect property-related interests rests upon the failure to perceive 
that ‗the primary evil of the discredited doctrine was the dogmatic judicial intervention regarding ends, not 
means‖ and arguing for a ―strict‖ rationality test for property interests); Leonard W. Levy, ―Property as a 
Human Right‖, 5 Const. Comment. 169, 183 (1988) (arguing that ―the Court made a mistake fifty years ago: it 
should not have employed the rational basis test in cases of economic regulation involving property as a 
human right. The Court should learn to distinguish the rights of people from the rights of business 
enterprises. Strict judicial scrutiny is called for when personal rights of property are at issue‖); Walter 
Dellinger, ―The Indivisibility of Economic Rights and Personal Liberty‖, 2003-2004 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 9, 16 
(―The New Deal Court‘s elimination of any effective protection of economic rights seriously weakened the 
bases for protecting personal liberty as well‖). 
 
1344 See Jonathan M. Miller, ―The Authority of a Foreign Talisman: A Study of U.S. Constitutional Practice 
as Authority in Nineteenth Century Argentina and the Argentine Elite's Leap Of Faith‖, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 
1483, 1546 (1997) (―The most powerful examples of U.S. influence appear in decisions of the Argentine 
Supreme Court, however, because in the case of the Supreme Court's decisions one can demonstrate not 
only that U.S. practice was an important source of authority, but that it was binding‖). 
 
1345 See above n. 189 and accompanying text. 
 
1346 33 Fallos 162 (1888) (§20, 21, 25). 
 
1347 See Jonathan M. Miller, above n. 1344, at 1561-1568. 
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the U.S. influence. Citations to Blaisdell are still common,1348 and discussion of the Gold 
Clause Cases took place in the cases dealing with ―pesification‖ of bank deposits.1349 One 
could legitimately wonder, as the Argentine Founding Fathers did, if following the 
example of one of the most (if not the most) successful capitalist economies in the world 
would not be a good idea. The idea of imitating successful models is, after all, a very 
reasonable one, despite any problems one may find in the process. As Horacio Spector 
has argued 
 ―[p]ersuasion might proceed along these lines: If the U.S. Supreme Court accepts 
compulsory modification of contracts when the country is under macroeconomic 
distress, why could the Argentine Supreme Court not accept expropriation of 
financial assets under similar conditions? Or, if the U.S. (an advanced capitalist 
country) accepts limitations on these institutions, why should Argentina not do the 
same? By applying U.S. precedents to vindicate expropriations, the Court seems to 
say: ‗We cannot be more Catholic than the Pope‘‖1350 
 
Curiously, the Argentine Court never went beyond the 1930s U.S. cases, nor took 
the path followed by the U.S. Supreme Court, extending extremely deferential review to 
legislation not dealing with emergencies and eschewing the distinction between 
temporary and permanent restrictions.1351 Should it have done so?1352  
                                                 
1348 See, e.g., 313 Fallos 1513 (1990) (majority opinion, §40-41); 326 Fallos 417 (2003) (Fayt, J., concurring, 
§29); 329 Fallos 5913 (2006) (Argibay, J., concurring in the judgment, §5), 330 Fallos 5341 (2007) (Argibay, 
J., dissenting, §9) (criticizing the loose use of Blaisdell by the Argentine Court and analizing other U.S. 
Contract Clause cases such as Worthen v. Thomas, City of El Paso v. Simmons, and Allied Structural Co. v. 
Spannaus to support the interpretation that a clear line dividing permissible and impermissible alterations of 
contracts can be drawn). 
 
1349 326 Fallos 417 (2003) (Moliné O‘Connor, López, JJ., concurring, §36) (discussing and distinguing Perry 
v. United States) (Vázquez, J., concurring, §17) (distinguishing the ―pesification‖ of banks deposits from the 
situation dealt with in Perry v. United States and Norman v. Baltimore); 327 Fallos 4495 (2004) (Belluscio, 
Maqueda, JJ., plurality opinion, §10) (citing Perry in support of ―pesification‖) (Highton de Nolasco, J., 
concurring, §28) (citing U.S. Bankers Trust in support of ―pesification‖); 329 Fallos 5913 (2006) (Argibay, J., 
concurring in the judgment, §9) (criticizing the use of Perry and US Bankers Trust by the Bustos plurality and 
arguing that they did not support ―pesification‖). 
 
1350 Horacio Spector, ―Constitutional Transplants and the Mutation Effect‖, 83 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 129, 144 
(2008). 
 
1351 See, e.g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Ass’n of Newark, 310 U.S. 32 (1940) (―While the act [...] 
under review was not emergency legislation, the dangers of unrestricted withdrawals then became apparent 
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Deference is about enlarging the portion of reality that is subject to regulation by 
political majorities. Deference is, in a nutshell, about deepening democratic 
decisionmaking. In the particular case of economic emergency jurisprudence, deference 
is about enlarging democratic decisions at the expense of, arguably, debilitating the rule 
of law and the enforcement of property rights. If economic growth is a desirable goal for 
a political community, then an ultradeferential judicial stance might not be such a good 
idea after all. Some evidence suggests that protection of property rights is a determinant 
factor of economic growth, while democratic decisionmaking is not necessarily so.  
―[D]emocracy is neither necessary nor sufficient on its own to ensure economic 
performance [...] Indeed, [the more nuanced view] sees that any growth-
enhancing effects of democracy are conditional on a policy that includes a 
combination of market-orientated growth strategies —perhaps embodied in pro-
growth institutions— and trade openness [...] as far as enhancing economic 
performance is concerned, developing countries may be far better served by 
concentrating on improving the quality of political-economic institutions that 
exert a more direct, first-order influence on the functioning of market processes 
—such as the rule of law and the enforcement of property rights— rather than 
expanding their energies on building participatory political institutions‖1353 
 
 Moreover, it may well be the case that the reasons why the model has proved 
largely successful are not to be found in the U.S. Supreme Court‘s deferential stance in 
constitutional property matters. George Priest has argued that  
                                                                                                                                            
[...] The cases cited [...] make repeated reference to the emergency existing at the time of the enactment of 
the questioned statutes. Many of the enactments were temporary in character. We are here considering a 
piece of permanent legislation. So far as the Contract Clause is concerned, is this significant? We think 
not.‖). 
 
1352 Although some instances of very deferential review in non-emergency cases can certainly be found, 
they are not definitive of the physiognomy of the Court‘s stance. For a case involving an obligation to 
enter a contract, with some similarities to the recent debate of the so-called ―individual mandate‖ provision 
in the Affordable Care Act in the U.S, see CSJN, Cine Callao, 247 Fallos 121 (1960) (upholding a legal 
provision that forced cinema theater owners to hire variety artists and offer a live spectacle between 
movies‘ exhibitions). 
 
1353 See Jessica Henson Decker & Jamus Jerome Lim, ―What Fundamentally Drives Growth? Revisiting the 
Institutions and Economic Performance Debate‖, 20 J. Int. Dev. 698, 721-722 (2008). 
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―[...] the relative success of the United States, at least with respect to economic 
affairs, cannot be attributed in any important way to the provisions or the 
structure of the U.S. Constitution. The failure of countries to emulate the 
economic experience of the U.S. though they have adopted the U.S. Constitution 
may derive from the fact that these countries failed to adopt 200 years of English 
common law and the societal instincts that the common law had inculcated […] 
The basic rights created by the common law —the right to private property, to 
contract, to compensation for accidental harm— do not generate external harms; 
quite the opposite, they enhance societal value to the benefit of all the citizenry. 
As described above, even in the U.S., the legislative majority is not constrained 
from altering them in marked ways; they are not yet rights. If they were 
established as rights against the majority, the economic welfare of the society 
would be enhanced.‖1354 
 
 Other scholars have made similar points.1355 Regardless of any debate about the 
merits of such claims, democratic participation is an extremely worthy political value in 
itself, and should be extended regardless of the potential costs in terms of economic 
growth. It is, undoubtedly, a central basis of modern political legitimacy. But, as I have 
shown throughout this work, the Argentine Supreme Court‘s economic emergency 
caselaw falters, too, when it comes to fostering democratic participation. Its flaws are 
two-fold: it allows for almost unrestrained, unilateral Executive decisionmaking not 
unlike a dictator‘s, and it validates, by and large, decisions that are profoundly 
undemocratic, at least if democracy is understood as requiring a correlation between the 
people‘s views and their representatives‘ actions. Arguably, the elected branches have 
                                                 
1354 See George L. Priest, ―Economic rights…‖, above n. 26, at 11, 19. 
 
1355 See, e.g., Richard Posner, above n. 1147, at 28-30 (arguing that ―[i]t is highly plausible […] that 
economic growth will be helped if the government protects property and contract rights through a system 
of impartial courts enforcing property, contract, tort, and basic criminal law against not only private but 
also public misconduct (e.g., expropriation). Such protections for economic freedom would seem to 
encourage hard work and investment for the future […] a government strong enough to maintain law and 
order, but too weak to launch and implement ambitious schemes of economic regulation or to engage in 
extensive redistribution, is probably the optimal government for economic growth. The Constitution as 
originally drafted would have kept the United States Government on approximately this even keel, but 
judicial interpretations have, by authorizing a "Fourth Branch" of administrative agencies, by expansively 
construing congressional power over interstate and foreign commerce and congressional power to enact 
statutes that purportedly promote the general welfare, greatly strengthened the power of the federal 
government to regulate markets‖, with uncertain results from the economic standpoint). Id., at 24 (―Courts 
seem to do well in developing common law principles that allocate resources efficiently‖). 
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often gone beyond the popular understanding of constitutional property and beyond the 
public‘s preferences —which have tended to, but need not, coincide— in the concrete 
situations analyzed in this work. The ―true countermajoritarian difficulty‖ lurks in the 
shadows of judicial rubber-stamping of formally majoritarian collective decisions. 
 Furthermore, the evidence I have supplied shows that economic emergencies 
quite frequently create the opportunities for very effective rent-seeking behavior in the 
part of the most powerful political and economic actors. Thus, emergencies of this sort 
have often instantiated regressive redistributions, under the rhetorical cloak of the 
common good. Hardly a desirable feature of any political system, such transferences 
from relatively poor, politically weak or unconnected sectors of the population to the 
largest, most powerful and richest players pose a formidable normative difficulty for the 
traditional deferential approach. The Court should take notice of the most likely effects 
of its current stance and adopt heightened scrutiny when economic emergency 
regulations are at stake, for they are likely to consummate distributive injustices that are 
not sanctioned, in any meaningful way, by democratic procedures, regardless of what one 
thinks about the propriety of leaving property interests to be completely re-arranged by 
democratic decisionmaking.  
The deleterious effects of the ―true countermajoritarian difficulty‖ and the 
―regressive redistribution difficulty‖ have reached the Judiciary itself, undermining its 
quest to rebuild its sociological legitimacy. The people perceive that constitutional rights 
are not meaningful constraints on what the politically powerful can do (or cannot omit to 
do), and judges are seen as frequent violators of the Constitution.1356 Self-deprived of a 
textual source of legitimacy —pointing towards the constitutional text as the basis for its 
decisions— and lacking a sound moral basis for the redistributions they have validated, 
                                                 
1356 See above n. 940 and accompanying text. 
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courts have failed to achieve a political status that guarantees their independent role in 
the political process. While further empirical work is needed to isolate completely 
economic emergency decisions from other likely contributing factors and, most certainly, 
the Supreme Court‘s caselaw on the topic cannot be blamed as a unique causal 
determinant of the Judiciary‘s image in the eyes of the public, the evidence I have 
presented in this work hints that it has, indeed, played a significant role in bringing about 
such states of affairs. 
In this context, the U.S. post-New Deal caselaw should be rejected as a model to 
follow. It should be used as a ―negative model‖, instead, signaling what not to do as a 
general matter. It may well be the case that U.S. judges, as well as legal scholars and 
philosophers working in the American political-economic environment, ―can excoriate 
the concept of property because we believe, with great certainty, that the property we 
wish to shelter is safe‖.1357 Political processes, however imperfectly, may have been 
effective in providing acceptable levels of protection for individual property, thus 
avoiding the need for more zealous judicial oversight.1358 However low the levels of 
protection formally afforded to individual property by courts, the cultural and political 
background have restrained majorities from frequent large-scale expropriations. It may 
well be the case that  
―[…] in countries with long established formal and informal institutions of 
property rights protection […] the social costs entailed by the process of 
constitutional judicial review may not be worth the social benefits. In those cases, 
                                                 
1357 Laura S. Underkuffler, ―The Perfidy of Property‖, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 293, 316 (1991). While some 
evidence has somewhat undermined Underkuffler‘s claim, as she admits in regard to the Kelo decision (aee 
Laura S. Underkuffler, above n. 1312), it is still true that, by and large, property receives a much stronger 
protection in the U.S. than in Argentina.  
 
1358 See Daniel H. Cole, ―Political Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private Property: A Comparative 
Institutional Analysis‖, 15 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 141 (2007) (analyzing evidence from the U.K. and the U.S. 




the least inefficient solution could be to limit or even abandon the use of 
constitutional judicial review‖1359 
 
 Argentina‘s background is very dissimilar, at least when economic emergency 
strikes (and it does so quite frequently).1360 So judicial abdication is not prima facie justified 
from an efficiency perspective, nor is it justified on the grounds that the political process 
works well enough to provide acceptable protection. To the contrary, it is one of those 
cases where  
 ―[…] it seems plausible that constitutional judicial review would be the most 
efficient or (what amounts to the same thing) the least inefficient solution to the 
problem of protecting private property rights‖1361 
 
 But, am I not faced with somewhat of a paradox here? As Grossman and Cole 
argue 
 ―[j]udicial review should have its greatest net benefit where there is a potentially 
predatory government and ill-defined property rights, but this predatory 
government has to be one that does not interfere either with an independent 
judiciary or the enforcement arms of the law. It would work best, therefore, in an 
environment where predators are restrained to a considerable degree whether 
there is constitutional judicial review or not‖1362 
 
 In sum, judicial review is most desirable where it has fewer chances of being 
effective, and it has more chances of being effective where it is less necessary (and, at 
least from the social welfare perspective, less desirable as well). What is missing from 
Grossman and Cole‘s perspective is that an important part of what allows a Judiciary to 
                                                 
1359 Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole, ―Protecting Private Property with Constitutional Judicial 
Review: A Social Welfare Approach‖, 5 Rev. L. & Econ. 233, 234 (2009). 
 
1360 See Horacio Spector, above n. 1350, at 145 (questioning the wisdom of citing U.S. precedents in the 
Argentine context because ―there is a striking difference between applying a rule of expropriation once 
every hundred years and once every ten years‖). 
 
1361 Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole, above n. 1359, at 234. 
 
1362 Id., at 240. 
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be independent is its political capital, which in turn may depend on whether it is 
perceived by the public at large as warding off encroachments of constitutional rights by 
the political branches. In Argentina, as the evidence I have presented above suggests, it is 
very likely that to break out of the circle identified by Grossman and Cole, courts need to 
dare and seriously scrutinize at least the most severe and blatant violations of 
constitutional property. Admittedly, it is a tricky business, for if courts cannot command 
compliance with their rulings, which is always a concrete possibility in grave emergency 
contexts,1363 the task of positioning themselves as independent players in constitutional 
matters will be impaired.  
 What should Argentine courts do, were they to take up a more active role in 
protecting property rights in economic emergency contexts? I cannot do more that 
scratch the surface of the issue here, and suggest a mere sketch of how a new 
jurisprudential stance might look like. For starters, emergency executive decrees should 
be subject to careful examination, as they compromise the separation of powers in ways 
that encourage rent-seeking activities and are likely to jeopardize property interests of 
relatively vulnerable groups. Lobbying powers seem to be particularly effective in the 
Executive Branch,1364 even if this is a disputable empirical claim. Thus, I propose that 
courts only admit emergency decrees to the extent necessary to guarantee that 
                                                 
1363 See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, ―The Gold Clause Cases and Constitutional Necessity‖, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 
1243, 1277 (2012) (transcribing Roosevelt‘s Gold Clause Speech, which he intended to read to the U.S. 
public if the Supreme Court decided the Gold Clause Cases against the Government‘s interest, and where he 
was prepared to defy the Court‘s adverse decisions: ―It is the duty of the Congress and the President to 
protect the people of the United States to the best of their ability. It is necessary to protect them from the 
unintended construction of voluntary acts, as well as from intolerable burdens involuntarily imposed. To 
stand idly by and to permit the decision of the Supreme Court to be carried through to its logical, 
inescapable conclusion would so imperil the economic and political security of this nation that the 
legislative and executive officers of the Government must look beyond the narrow letter of contractual 
obligations, so that they may sustain the substance of the promise originally made in accord with the actual 
intention of the parties […] In order to attain this reasonable end, I shall immediately take such steps as 
may be necessary, by proclamation and by message to the Congress of the United States‖). 
 
1364 See above n. 1226 and accompanying text. 
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deliberation in Congress will not defeat the basic purpose of the proposed measure. 
Emergency decrees might be accepted insofar as they work as the functional equivalent 
of a judicial injunction decreed to preserve the possibility that a decision on the merits is 
effective. They should be temporary and provisional. For instance, if the Executive 
thinks that bank deposits need to be re-structured, it may not decide it by itself. As a bill 
proposing such a measure would be bound to start (or accelerate) a bank run, the 
Executive may impose a temporary, limited freeze, until Congress has had a reasonable 
time to decide on the substantive policy. Depositors won‘t be able to defeat the purpose 
of the emergency scheme, should it be enacted by Congress, but they will get their shot 
in the legislative arena.1365 
What about emergency legislation enacted by Congress? If, as I have argued 
above, the mere fact of emergency creates opportunities for special class legislation, as 
well as incentives for the Government to regulate individual property in particularly 
intrusive ways, surely decrees and laws should be treated on par. Not quite so. Legislation 
should be entitled to greater deference than decrees, but by no means to the ―unusual 
deference‖ suggested by the U.S. Supreme Court caselaw. On the one hand, Congress is, 
all other things being equal, more likely to provide superior protection to individuals‘ 
property than the Executive, and it enjoys greater democratic credentials. On the other 
hand, it is still the case that legislators are susceptible to private interest influence to a not 
inconsiderable extent and that governing parties often control the political levers that 
                                                 
1365 Admittedly, even temporary and provisional measures can alter the political scenario and constrain the 
options actually available to Congress. Legislators may prefer not to impose, say, a bank freeze of any sort, 
but once such a proposal has made its way into Congress and the Executive has issued a temporary 
restriction on the withdrawal of funds, Congress might not be able to avoid imposing some sort of 
restructuring. That is because even the temporary and provisional emergency decree that my framework 
allows alters the status quo and, hence, conditions the range of feasible options available to the branch that 
is charged with making a final decision on what to do about any given problem. In the example, once a 
temporary restriction is imposed, it is very likely that a sudden removal ignites a bank run. In such 
circumstances, Congress may need to provide for an orderly lifting of restrictions that might involve short-
term restructuring.  
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open or close careers for legislators. Agent-principal problems are very much present in 
the relation between Congress and the people.  
Moreover, the political support that property enjoys is linked to the possibility 
that owners mount a credible threat to exit from the jurisdiction.1366 Quite frequently, the 
universe of property owners affected by the emergency measures is largely comprised of 
individuals who cannot ―exit the jurisdiction‖ and, hence, are more likely to be exposed 
to substantial encroachments of their rights. Take for instance the case of ―pesification‖ 
in 2002. As I have shown above, a large percentage of bank deposits caught by the 
emergency scheme were very small. Larger depositors had taken their money out of the 
financial system long before the legislation was enacted. It is a structural situation: small 
and medium savers do not have access to foreign financial markets, because the amounts 
they own do not justify the costs of engaging in the process and, quite often, because 
offshore banking is open only to people operating with amounts above a certain 
minimum. They also suffer informational disadvantages vis-à-vis larger savers. Small 
savers cannot stay completely away from the financial system under any realistic 
assumptions, as the risks of having money at home are considerable. The same general 
picture was true, to a large extent, of creditors in lending contracts unrelated to the 
financial system. They cannot afford to take their assets out of the jurisdiction. These are 
the kind of owners who received the heaviest blow from the emergency regime.  
It is hard to delineate the basic contour of a test for emergency laws, as opposed 
to decrees. The test cannot be such that merely labeling a law as an ―emergency‖ measure 
triggers heightened scrutiny, for it would have counterintuitive effects and would be, 
after a short time, ineffectual. It would be counterintuitive, as Congress would enjoy less 
maneuvering margin in circumstances when it is often the case that more discretion is 
                                                 
1366 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, above n. 1129, at 230. 
 
 425 
needed. And it would become ineffectual, eventually, as Congress would try to shelter its 
emergency laws from more searching judicial scrutiny simply by not calling them so. 
How can we tackle the task, then? 
A declaration of emergency, in principle, opens the legal space for more energetic 
regulation of individual rights. Contracts can be altered in significant ways, and this, in 
itself, is a major departure from normal times. But it cannot be the case that Congress 
enjoys unlimited power over property rights. The traditional distinction between 
―haircuts‖ and ―deferment of maturities‖, suitably adapted, may be of help here. 
Congress is entitled to certain deference when its measures do not impose a definitive 
reduction of the creditor‘s (or property holder‘s) capital nor do they force upon the right-
holders deferments that are excessively long, enough as to stop working as deferments 
and become effective ―haircuts‖. More generally, temporary, as opposed to definitive, 
alterations in the rights‘ regime are entitled to certain deference. When the measures 
cannot be easily squared with a deferment, or they are likely to work as a ―haircut‖ in the 
plantiff‘s circumstances, then heightened scrutiny should be applied. While even short 
deferments can, undoubtedly, be the product of rent-seeking on the part of sectors who 
stand to benefit from them, it is also true that they are more likely to be justifiable on 
non-biased grounds. Moreover, the longer the deferment, the more likely it works a 
definitive (and potentially significant) transfer of wealth from one sector to another, 
which —if nothing else— provides a motive for any suspected rent-seeking behind the 
enactment. The more significant the potential transfer, the higher the stakes and, thus, 
the more reasons for powerful players to devote substantial resources to lobbying. 
Express compensation, if provided for in the scheme, should be taken into account when 
assessing the impact of the measures on the individual‘s property rights.  
Another good candidate for triggering careful and searching judicial scrutiny of 
emergency laws are previous public assertions by the relevant high-level public officials 
 426 
have guaranteed the people that the measure in question will not be taken. The reasons 
for heightened judicially scrutiny are present regardless of whether such public 
reassurances have taken the form of valid laws, but they are more pressing —and less 
troublesome from the standpoint of judicial manageability— when we face formal legal 
enactments. Such public promises are more likely to instill trust in less educated, less 
sophisticated groups of people. Such groups are more likely to rely on them when 
making decisions about what to do (or not do) with their property.1367 When the 
promises are not kept, they work as a ―bait and switch‖ strategy that leaves these groups 
exposed to be the main targets of the emergency regulation. At the same time, they allow 
groups with better information to prepare for impending State interventions on contracts 
and take both preventive measures —i.e., abandoning their positions on the sectors 
potentially exposed to emergency regulation— and measures aiming at profiting from 
likely emergency schemes —i.e., move towards positions likely to receive significant 
advantages in the foreseeable regulatory alternatives—. 
How should the more intense test work? While I cannot flesh out a proposal in 
any significant degree of detail here, one possibility would be to apply traditional means-
ends analysis, in strict scrutiny form. The concrete ends pursued by the State need to be 
very pressing and compelling, the means must be narrowly tailored to such ends, be the 
least restrictive alternative available and not be disproportionate to the importance of the 
ends and to the extent that the measures further such ends.1368 Justice Argibay has 
suggested a similar path by arguing that when the emergency measure imposes a 
definitive loss on the creditor and, hence, alters the ―substance‖ of a contractual right, it 
                                                 
1367 See above n. 906-910 and accompanying text. 
 
1368 For a detailed analysis of the strict scrutiny test in the U.S. context, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., ―Strict 
Judicial Scrutiny‖, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1267 (2007). 
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loses its presumption of constitutional adequacy.1369 In such cases, ―[…] courts must 
demand a full, convincing demonstration that the measure is both just and indispensable 
to meet a necessity whose satisfaction cannot be postponed‖.1370 While Justice Argibay‘s 
proposal is troubled by the relative indeterminacy of justice as a measure of 
constitutional validity,1371 hers seems to be a step in the right direction. 
A final caveat is in order. My criticism of an ultradeferential judicial stance, and 
my alternative proposal of more active judicial revision of emergency legislation, 
presupposes that the judiciary is impartial, well educated, and committed to the public 
interest.  This, of course, may not always be the case. Indeed, Argentina‘s history shows 
that independent, impartial, knowledgeable, and public-regarding courts have been 
largely lacking during the best part of the last century. Therefore, my proposal is strongly 
dependent on a substantial improvement of the current situation, and both selection and 
removal procedures for the federal bench deserve close attention if the Judiciary is to 
have any beneficial role in the Argentine political system.  
An analysis of the current procedures and of the possibilities for improvement far 
exceeds the scope of this work, but a rough sketch of the arrangements suffices to show 
some of the complexities involved in any such analysis. All federal judges are appointed 
by the President with approval of the Senate. Lower court judges are chosen from a 
short-list of three candidates elaborated by the Judicial Council, while Supreme Court 
justices are nominated by the President freely. The latter require the votes of two-thirds 
of all present senators. Senate sessions for appointment of judges are public, and in the 
                                                 
1369 329 Fallos 5913 (2006) (Argibay, J., concurring in the judgement, §5). 
 
1370 Id., §7.a. 
 
1371 Still, one could defend her proposal by stating that while what constitutes a ―just‖ solution to the 
discrete part of the crisis that any given regulation aims at solving may be indeed quite debatable, it is 
significantly easier to arrive at a relative consensus regarding what it is not just. See above n. 85. 
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case of Supreme Court justices, a special session must be held. While Supreme Court 
justices are subject to removal by impeachment procedures similar to those of the U.S. 
Constitution, lower court judges are subject to disciplinary procedures held by the 
Judicial Council. It is clear that both the composition of Congress and of the Judicial 
Council, as well as the power dynamics within them and in relation to the Executive are 
crucial to the possibility of building up a serious Judiciary. An in-depth understanding of 
their current functioning would necessarily imply digging into the national electoral 
systems. In any case, the latest political events in this regard are hardly encouraging.  
In early 2013, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner sent to Congress a pack 
of bills pompously called ―Democratization of the Judiciary Laws‖, which were quickly 
enacted by the officialist majority. One of the laws regulates injunctions against the State, 
limiting them severely.1372 Another law created a series of intermediate courts, courts of 
cassation, between the appellate courts and the Supreme Court, in the hope of staffing 
them with judges that could be trusted to have a friendly outlook in cases of interest to 
the administration and, at the same time, of hindering the arrival of cases to the Supreme 
Court, given that the justices had given a few signals of independence.1373 The third law 
modified the structure of the Judicial Council, giving decisive weight in the appointment, 
suspension, and removal procedures of lower court judges to members of the council 
representing the Executive and Congress, and diluting the influence of the lawyers‘ and 
judges‘ representatives, by making them eligible directly by the general electorate —as 
opposed to being eligible solely by lawyers and judges as article 114 of the Constitution 
                                                 
1372 Law 26,854 (available at http://www.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=212680; last 
visited 01/06/2014). It remains to be seen whether courts will uphold, generally, such a curtailment of 
their jurisdictional power. 
 
1373 Law 26,853 (available at http://www.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/210000-
214999/214383/norma.htm; last visited 01/06/2014). This reform is not, per se, unconstitutional, 
although it might generate State liability under the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights for 
violations of the right to a reasonable duration of the judicial procedures. 
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seems to mandate— and tieing their participation in the elections to a political party.1374 
This reform was quickly struck down by the Supreme Court —via a per saltum appeal— 
in the Rizzo case, preventing any future political majority from basically controlling the 
federal lower courts at will.1375 The Court was generally praised1376 for taking such a stand 
in the face of immense pressure from the Executive and its supporters.1377 
                                                 
1374 Law 26,855 (available at http://www.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/215000-
219999/215215/norma.htm; last visited 01/06/2014).  
 
1375 CSJN, 06/18/2013, Rizzo, Jorge G. v. Poder Ejecutivo Nacional. This decision is not paginated in the Fallos 
collection yet. 
 
1376 La Nación, for instance, praised the ruling in the following terms: ―In declaring unconstitutional the law 
that reformed the [Judicial] Council, the Court gave a lesson in the defense of republicanism. There are 
[some] steps that are so large, that initially it is hard to get a thorough understanding of their magnitude. 
That‘s the case of the admirable decision through which yesterday the Supreme Court not only aborted the 
rampant attempt of the Government to subordinate the Judiciary in the most complete way, but it also 
gave a brave lesson of constitutionality, public-spiritedness, and republicanism [...] The Court has thus set a 
timely limit to the totalitarian advance that, under the guise of a supposed ‗democratization‘ of the 
Judiciary, has only tried to subject it to the absolute discretion of the Executive branch, to turn the Judicial 
Council into an appendix of the ruling party. The ruling prevented that the body responsible for selecting 
and removing judges depended entirely on the political will of the person holding the Presidency of the 
Nation. The health of a democratic and republican regime is evidenced when the head of the Judiciary, is 
able to rule as it did yesterday, despite the open attacks of the Executive branch‖. See ―Límite al 
totalitarismo‖, La Nación, 06/19/2013, available at http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1593362-limite-al-
totalitarismo (last visited 01/08/2014). Clarín, in turn, assessed the decision in the following terms: ―Not 
because it was expected, the decision of the Supreme Court is less transcedent. By a six-to-one vote, the 
Court sanctioned two crucial things for this historic moment. It ratified that the members of the Judicial 
Council must be elected in accordance to the Constitution and not by the popular vote as provided by the 
reform approved by the Government. And, thus, it foreclosed the possibility of removing or disciplining 
judges that may annoy the Kirchners. The ruling sets a limit to the Government‘s attempt to dominate the 
Judiciary and run over the separation of powers. Hence, it transcends itself to become a message to the 
society: the Government cannot do everything it wants, even if it has gotten 54% of the votes‖. See 
Ricardo Roa, ―Un fallo que se trasciende a sí mismo‖, Clarín, 06/19/2013, available at 
http://www.clarin.com/opinion/fallo-trasciende-mismo_0_940705926.html (last visited 01/08/2013). 
Roa was one of Clarín‘s editors, and the section where he published his note is called ―from the editor to 
the public‖. See also ―Consejo de la Magistratura: siguen las repercusiones por el fallo‖, Todo Noticias, 
06/19/2013, available at http://tn.com.ar/politica/siguen-las-repercusiones-por-el-fallo-de-la-
corte_395995 (last visited 01/08/2014) (reporting the favorable opinions of a number of constitutional 
lawyers). The day of the ruling, but before it became known, Jorge Enríquez called the citizenship to 
support an eventual ruling declaring the unconstitutionality of the reform, praising the lower court that had 
ruled the reform unconstitutional, and declaring that the Court was ―at the gates of history‖. See Jorge 
Enríquez, ―La Corte, a las puertas de la historia‖, Economía para Todos, 06/18/2013, available at 
http://economiaparatodos.net/la-corte-a-las-puertas-de-la-historia/ (last visited 01/08/2014). 
 
1377 The day before the ruling Justice Maqueda had received threats from members of La Cámpora, a 
juvenile branch of the Peronist Party founded to support the Kirchners‘ political project. See, e.g., ―Piden 
que se investiguen las amenazas de La Cámpora a Maqueda‖, Diario Perfil, 06/18/2013, available at 
http://www.perfil.com/politica/Piden-que-se-investiguen-las-amenazas-de-La-Campora-a-Maqueda-
20130618-0033.html (last visited 01/08/2014). Right after the ruling, the Federal Administration of Public 
Revenues (AFIP, in the Spanish acronym) began a tax investigation on the President of the Court, Justice 
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This recent incident may prove that path dependence is likely to make any 
attempt at reform of the institutional practices regarding the Supreme Court very 
difficult. Dominant leaders have an almost constant tendency to the politization of 
courts. Diana Kapiszewski has forcefully argued that 
―[...] at a critical point in the past, leaders in Argentina [...] adopted a particular 
politics of Court crafting that eventually became locked in as expectations formed 
about high court appointment practices and as leaders needed —or desired— to 
recreate their Courts. In other words, it became increasingly difficult (or 
decreasingly desirable) for leaders to deviate from established Court-crafting 
practices‖1378 
 
Two factors that may cast things in a more optimistic light must be born in mind, 
however. The first is that the current Supreme Court has given some signals of 
independence and, while still undoubtedly struggling, it seems to be on its way to 
building some level of respect among the citizenship. Sociological legitimacy might be on 
the rise. It is this Court that might change the direction of things, provided it can become 
a respected, independent actor. Striking down the reform of the Judicial Council was a 
move in the right direction. The second is that even if entrenched political practices push 
in the direction of politicizing the Court —and the Judiciary more generally—, and this 
detracts from the institutional conditions that need to obtain for my proposal to be 
feasible, it is still the case that interpreting the property clause of the Constitution in 
accordance to popular understandings of its text is very likely to boost the Court‘s 
legitimacy, thus increasing the possibilities of breaking out of the dynamics identified by 
Kapiszewski. A more legitimate Court has more chances of being independent, because 
of its political capital. Public-regardingness, as well as legal skills, is likely to be an 
                                                                                                                                            
Lorenzetti. Such move was widely perceived as a political retaliation for the ruling. See, e.g., ―Alerta en la 
Corte Suprema: la AFIP investiga a Lorenzetti y sus tres hijos‖, Diario Perfil, 06/25/2013, available at 
http://www.perfil.com/politica/Alerta-en-la-Corte-Suprema--AFIP-investiga-a-Lorenzetti-y-sus-tres-hijos-
20130625-0034.html (last visited 01/08/2014).  
 
1378 Diana Kapiszewski, above n. 579, at 200. 
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important component of its legitimacy. Nonparadoxically, thus, adopting a less 
deferential judicial stance in economic emergency matters, such as the one I have 
defended here, might well be a first step in the direction of creating the institutional 
conditions in which such a stance may thrive with useful societal effects. Taking the 
property clause seriously may boost an incipiently independent Court. 
Adrian Vermeule and Cass Sunstein have argued that disputes over how to 
interpret legal texts are of little value if they are not especially attentive to institutional 
considerations: 
―[…] first-best theories are incomplete without an acknowledgement of the 
importance of [institutional questions] […] it is not possible to deduce, from 
large claims about legitimacy or authority, an answer to the reasonably disputed 
questions of interpretive choice‖1379 
 
In Part One of this work, I have offered an approach to the interpretation of a 
constitutional text, Argentina‘s Constitution Property Clause. In Part Two, I have 
explained and defended some of the distinguishing features of the Argentine Supreme 
Court‘s interpretation of the property clause.  The interaction between Part One and Part 
Two is meant to defend, albeit in a qualified fashion, a more robust judicial review of 
economic emergency measures. But in arguing for a particular interpretive stance, one 
that reduces judicial deference to the elected branches, I have offered a series of 
arguments that embrace institutional considerations. I have, for instance, advanced a 
comparative argument as to what institution —the courts or the elected branches— are 
better at interpreting the Constitution in accordance with popular conceptions and I have 
explained why it is important to pay attention to such conceptions. I have offered a 
comparison of the likely distributive effects of measures taken by Executive alone, of 
measures taken by Congress, and of measures taken by both political branches and 
                                                 




subject to non-cursory judicial review. This text has also explored the possibility that 
courts have an advantage vis-à-vis Congress and the Executive when it comes to 
producing public-regarding decisions and has provided some evidence that they also 
provide individuals with better access to the political decisionmaking process that affects 
their rights. In sum, I have developed the central features of an interpretive proposal that 
does not neglect important institutional effects of various sorts. Much work remains to 
be done in order to flesh out the details of this proposal, but the basics I offer here are, I 
believe, a significant contribution to current debates over constitutional property, in 
Argentina and elsewhere.  
Whatever the proper path for Argentina (and other similarly situated countries) 
might be, it seems clear that the economic emergency doctrine, as developed by the 
Argentine Supreme Court, is fraught with significant dangers (hindering economic 
growth, deepening distributive inequalities, undermining the legitimacy of both the 
Constitution and the Judiciary, among others). Enlarging judicial deference to elected 
branches, by adopting a U.S.-style bi-furcated review that further relegates property 
rights would be a large step in the wrong direction. Keeping the current situation is also 
unacceptable, as the rhetoric of democratic decisionmaking and the furtherance of the 
―common good‖ provides an excellent cover up for morally unwarranted redistributions 
that have both short and long-term pernicious effects. Conventional wisdom had led us 
to believe that ―unusual judicial deference‖ enhances the people‘s control over their 
collective destiny, improves the prospects of the relatively poor and vulnerable, and 
better achieves the ―common good‖.1380 It is high time we revise these misconceptions.   
                                                 
1380 See, e.g., Steven Semeraro, ―Sweet Land of Property? The History, Symbols, Rhetoric, and Theory 
Behind the Order of the Rights to Liberty and Property in the Constitutional Lexicon‖, 60 S.C. L. Rev. 1, 
61 (2008-2009) (arguing that ―[a] regime of strict judicial scrutiny of property regulation has never been 
part of American society‘s understanding of property [...] Those who seek to unify property and liberty 
must demonstrate empirically why we would be better off in a world where governmental actors were 
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